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OF THE
UNITED STATES

1981–1988
VOLUME IV

SOVIET UNION,
JANUARY
1983–MARCH 1985



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Volume IV

Soviet Union, January 1983-1985

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**Office of the Historian
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
February 2021**

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or

deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Department of State in Washington and the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by

the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981-1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes in this subseries is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified

records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* volumes have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of

abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015

and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 13 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985.

Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. General Editor **Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.** The Historian
Foreign Service Institute
February 2021

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume documents U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. Due to the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan administration, the Reagan subseries includes an extensive examination of U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in four volumes: [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983*](#)[☞]; [*Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985*](#); [*Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986*](#)[☞]; and [*Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989*](#)[☞]. In conjunction with these volumes, several other volumes in the subseries will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how U.S.-Soviet relations impacted the global character of the Cold War and U.S. strategy during the Reagan era. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, see [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XI, START I*](#)[☞], and [*Volume XII, INF, 1984-1988*](#)[☞]. [*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977-1983*](#)[☞], documents the NATO dual-track decision and TNF/INF negotiations through 1983. Documentation dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, and space arms control, including anti-satellite systems, will be published in [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XI, Global Issues I*](#)[☞]. The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM-related issues and other strategic considerations are addressed in [*Foreign Relations, 1981-*](#)

[1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984](#), and [Volume XLIV, Parts 1](#) and [2, National Security Policy, 1985-1988](#). For selected documentation on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II](#).

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV

This volume documents the development of the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. With Reagan's signature of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75 on January 17, 1983, the administration's approaches and policies toward the Soviet Union were codified in a specific four-part agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral relations. This volume examines the efforts of administration officials, namely Secretary of State George Shultz, President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and later Robert McFarlane, and NSC Staff member Jack Matlock, to implement the four-part agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union. The documentation demonstrates how administration officials developed policies related to the four-part agenda, mainly in the National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State, and then promoted these various tracks during meetings between Shultz, and on occasion Reagan, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in various fora. Although no high-level meeting took place between Reagan and either Soviet General Secretaries Yuri Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko during their short tenures, the documents provide a window into how the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet leadership and formulated policies to deal with whomever was in charge.

The volume also documents the bureaucratic struggle Shultz faced against the NSC in implementing the four-part agenda laid out by NSDD 75 and in gaining access to President Reagan. After some wrangling, by June 1983 an understanding emerged between Shultz and Clark, which allowed Shultz regular weekly meetings with Reagan. When Jack Matlock joined the NSC Staff as primary adviser on the Soviet Union, Shultz gained a like-minded ally in approaches to dealing with the USSR. While some administration officials, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, consistently argued that negotiating with the Soviet Union seemed futile, Shultz, Matlock, and others pushed President Reagan to see the value in keeping lines of communication open with the Soviets. Even during tragic events, such as the Soviet downing of the KAL 007 airliner in September 1983, Shultz kept his meeting with Gromyko a few days later in Madrid and used this as an opportunity to admonish the Foreign Minister for this inexplicable act and the inability of the Soviet Union to admit fault on the international stage.

The volume documents several Cold War flashpoints during the contentious months of 1983. The announcement in March 1983 of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) caused concern for the Soviet Union because it shifted the strategic balance from the theory of mutually assured destruction toward a defensive nuclear posture. Aside from the downing of the KAL airliner, the Euromissiles crisis came to a head with U.S. deployments of INF missiles to several NATO allies in late November 1983. While the bulk of the documentation dealing with these negotiations is covered in two other volumes, the scheduled deployments permeated all other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. The volume also presents selective documentation related to the 1983 Soviet "War Scare" and the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see [Appendix A](#)).

The volume attempts to demonstrate that even with these challenges, Shultz and others pressed to keep moving ahead with the four-part agenda and promote greater dialogue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

After the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in Geneva in late 1983, the administration focused throughout 1984 on developing a framework to restart arms control negotiations; the documents in this volume demonstrate the difficulties involved in opening new talks with the Soviet Union. Reagan's SDI program continued to cause problems. The Soviets believed SDI would "militarize space," and therefore the debates over how SDI would be dealt with during negotiations were a major point of contention during this period. When Shultz and Gromyko met in January 1985, they finally reached an agreement on a new round of umbrella negotiations. The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), scheduled to begin in Geneva in March 1985, would have three tracks, START, INF, and Defense and Space. The documents in the volume trace how various positions from the Department of State, NSC, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency impacted the decision to move forward with the three arms control tracks. While the other parts of the four-part agenda remained in play during this period and were discussed in bilateral meetings, restarting arms control talks seemed to trump the other areas of concern. Little did the U.S. or Soviet negotiators know that on the eve of these new NST negotiations, Chernenko would die, and a younger, more ambitious Soviet leader would emerge and dramatically change the course of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, especially Lisa Jones and Cate Sewell. A special thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency staff for providing access and assistance with Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project, and to the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence for arranging full access to CIA records. The editor wishes to acknowledge the staff at Information Programs and Services at the Department of State for facilitating access to Department of State records and coordinating the review of this volume within the Department. Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor extends thanks to the family and executor of the Estate of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of Secretary Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Elizabeth C. Charles collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by David Geyer and then Historian Stephen Randolph. Kerry Hite and Chris Tudde coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Kerry Hite also performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. Historian

Sources

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV,
Soviet Union January 1983-March 1985*

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library provide a key source of documentation on high-level decision-making toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. The Executive Secretariat files, a subset of this collection, include the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting Files; National Security Decision Directives (NSDD); the Head of State File; and the USSR Country File. Other relevant Staff and Office File collections include the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate; USSR Files; Director of Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock Files; and files of President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and Robert "Bud" McFarlane. Key collections of other members of the NSC Staff are the files of John Lenczowski, Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer, which focus on various aspects of policy development, arms control, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. In some instances, NSC records related to NSDDs and NSC and NSPG meetings have remained in the institutional files of the NSC in Washington. The text of the declassified NSDDs are available on the Reagan Presidential Library website.

The Department of State records most vital for this volume are in the following Executive Secretariat S/S Lot Files: Lot 91D257: Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum; Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989; Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989; Lot 93D188:

Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990; Lot 94D92: NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985; and Lot 96D262: Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983. The files of Lawrence Eagleburger in Lot 84D204 and Kenneth Dam in Lot 85D308, as well as the Policy Planning Staff Memoranda in Lot 89D149 and files of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, in Lot 91D231 provide an excellent insight into high-level decision-making in the Department. The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department includes cable traffic between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington, as well as other related cables.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

Lot 03D256: EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas J. Simons, Jr.

Lot 03D314: EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files

Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967–1984

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files

Lot 89D149: S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Lot 89D250: A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of
Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill
Lot 90D137: Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989
Lot 91D231: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Office of Soviet Affairs, 1978-1989
Lot 91D257: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top
Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum
Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive
Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents,
1984-1989
Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive
Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989
Lot 93D188: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records,
Memorandum of Conversations, 1981-1990
Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, NODIS
and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985
Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special
Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983

**Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley,
California**

Intelligence Directorate
NSC Records

White House Staff and Office Files

Frank Carlucci Files

William Clark Files

Kenneth deGraffenreid Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security
Council

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: Europe and Soviet Union

Head of State File

Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

System Files, System II Intelligence File
System Files, System IV Intelligence File
Subject File
Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate,
National Security Council
Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National
Security Council
Files of the Situation Room, White House
Donald Fortier Files
Fred Ikle Files
Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989
Sven Kraemer Files
Robert Lehman Files
John Lenczowski Files
Robert Lilac Files
Robert Linhard Files
Jack Matlock Files
Robert McFarlane Files
Edwin Meese Files
John Poindexter Files
Roger Robinson Files
Papers of Charles Hill
Papers of George Shultz
President's Daily Diary

Central Intelligence Agency

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Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986)
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National Security Council

Carter Intelligence Files

Institutional Files

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Maryland**

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FRC 330-85-0023: 1983 Official Files of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of
Defense

FRC 330-86-0048: 1984 Official Files (Top Secret) of
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Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-87-0023: 1984 Official Files (Secret and
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Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASAT, anti-satellite
ASBM, air-to-surface ballistic missile
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AWAC, Airborne Warning and Control
BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense
BW, biological weapon
C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CA, covert action
CAB, Civil Aviation Board
CBI, Caribbean Basin Initiative
CBM, Confidence-Building Measures
CC, Central Committee
CD, Conference on Disarmament
CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CI, Counterintelligence
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM, cruise missile
CODEL, Congressional Delegation
COM, Chief of Mission
CP, Communist Party
CPPG, Crisis Pre-Planning Group
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, chemical weapon
D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; Democrat
DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DATT, Defense Attaché
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA, Director of the National Security Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DST, Defense and Space Talks
EC, European Community
EconOff, Economics Officer
EE, Eastern Europe
EEC, European Economic Community
EmbOff, Embassy Officer
EOB, Executive Office Building (houses the Vice President's Office)
ERW, enhanced radiation weapon
EST, Eastern Standard Time
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; after September 15, 1983, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, Exclusive Distribution
FAA, Federal Aviation Administration
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBS, forward-based systems
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
FM, Foreign Minister

ForMin, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
G-7, Group of 7, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile
GOJ, Government of Japan
GPS, George P. Shultz
GRU, Soviet military intelligence agency
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
Department of State
HPSCI, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
HUMINT, human intelligence
I&W, Indications and Warning
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IG, Interagency Group
IMEMO, Institute of World Economy and International
Relations
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INF, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
IOC, International Olympic Committee
JCC, Joint Commercial Commission
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMC, Joint Military Commission
KAL, Korean Airlines
KGB, Committee for State Security in the Soviet Union
L, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State
LANDSAT, Land-Use Satellite
Limdis, Limited Distribution
LRINF, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
LTA, Long-Term Agreement on grain

MAD, mutual assured destruction
MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, most favored nation
MIRV, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MOU, Memorandum of Understanding
MX or M-X, missile experimental (intercontinental ballistic missile)
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Niact, Night Action
NID, National Intelligence Daily
Nocontract, Not Releasable to Contractors
Nodis, No Distribution
Noform, No Foreign Dissemination
NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSPG, National Security Planning Group
NSC, National Security Council
NSDD, National Security Decision Directive
NSSD, National Security Study Directive
NST, Nuclear and Space Talks
NTM, National Technical Means
NUF, non-use of force
OAS, Organization of American States
OBE, overtaken by events
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Orcon, Originator Controlled
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OVP, Office of the Vice President

P, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
P-II, Pershing II missile
PDB, President's Daily Brief
PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PNE or PNET, Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
POLAD, Political Adviser
PolCouns, Political Counselor
Poloff, Political Officer
PRC, Policy Review Committee
PROFs notes, internal White House and NSC electronic messages
R, Republican
R&D, research and development
reftel, Reference Telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RL, Radio Liberty
RR, Ronald Reagan
RW, radiological weapons
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S&T, Science and Technology
SACG, Senior Arms Control Group
SACPG, Senior Arms Control Policy Group
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC, Special Coordinating Committee; Standing Consultative Commission
SCG, Special Consultative Group (NATO)
SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative

Secto, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State while away from Washington
septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
SIG, Senior Interagency Group
SIG/I, Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence
SIG-IEP, Senior Interagency Group-International Economic Policy
SLCM, surface-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; sea-launched cruise missile
SNDV, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
Specat, Special Category
SRINF, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
START, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TASS, official Soviet news agency
TNF, Theater Nuclear Forces
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
US, United States
USA, United States of America; United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USAFSB, United States Army Field Station Berlin
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, European Command
USDel, United States Delegation
USDOC, Department of Commerce
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USN, United States Navy

USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military
Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,
Europe

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USTR, United States Trade Representative

VOA, Voice of America

VP, Vice President

WH, White House

WHSR, White House Situation Room

WP, Warsaw Pact

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

Abrahamson, James A., Lieutenant General, USAF;

Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

Abramowitz, Morton I. (Mort), U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations from March 1983; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985

Abrams, Elliott, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until July 1985

Adelman, Kenneth L. (Ken), Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from April 1983

Akhromeyev, Sergei F., Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from September 1984

Allen, Richard V., President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until January 1982

Andreas, Dwayne, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy; U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)

Andropov, Yuri, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982, until February 9, 1984

Arbatov, Georgii, Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Armacost, Michael, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1984

Azrael, Jeremy, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985

Babrak Karmal, President of Afghanistan from December 1979

Bailey, Norman, Director, Planning and Evaluation, National Security Council, from April 1981 until 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,

International Economic Affairs Directorate, from June 1983 until October 1983; thereafter, consultant to the National Security Council Staff

Baker, James A., III (Jim), White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury

Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr., (Mac), Secretary of Commerce

Baraz, Robert, Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Barker, Robert, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1983 until 1986; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings

Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A., Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, to March 1983; thereafter Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs from March 1983

Bishop, Maurice, Prime Minister of Grenada until October 19, 1983

Block, John R. (Jack), Secretary of Agriculture

Bosworth, Stephen W., Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from January 3, 1983, until April 7, 1984

Bova, Michele, Director, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from 1984

Boverie, Richard, Major General, USAF; National Security Council Staff

Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry), Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until March 27, 1983

Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death on November 10, 1982

Brock, William E., III, U.S. Trade Representative from 1981 to 1985

Burt, Richard (Rick), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (European and Canadian Affairs from September 15, 1983), from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985

Bush, George H.W., Vice President of the United States

Byrd, Robert, W., Senator, (D-West Virginia), Senate Minority Leader

Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981

Casey, William J. (Bill), Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981

Chain, John T., Jr., General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985

Chernenko, Konstantin, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985

Clark, William P. (Judge), President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from February 1982 until November 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 1983 until February 1985

Cobb, Tyrus (Ty), Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Cooper, Henry F. (Hank), Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Courtney, William H., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State

Craxi, Bettino, Prime Minister of Italy from August 1983

Crocker, Chester, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Dam, Kenneth W. (Ken), Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985

Deaver, Michael K., Deputy White House Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until 1985

deGraffenreid, Kenneth E., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Dobriansky, Paula J., Deputy Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; thereafter Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate

Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dolan, Anthony R. (Tony), Speechwriter, White House Office of Speechwriting until 1985

Dunkerley, Craig, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Eagleburger, Lawrence (Larry), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1982 until May 1984; Career Ambassador from April 1984

Ermarth, Fritz W., National Intelligence Officer for USSR, Central Intelligence Agency, and member, National Intelligence Council Staff, from 1984

Foley, Thomas, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington); House Democratic Whip

Fortier, Donald R. (Don), Director, Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council Staff, from September 1982 until June 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Political-Military Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Policy Development from December 1983

Gandhi, Rajiv, Indian Prime Minister

Garthoff, Douglas F., Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Department of Defense

Gates, Robert (Bob), Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; also, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, from September 1983

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

George, Clair E., Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, from July 1983 until July 1984; Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1984

George, Douglas (Doug), Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from June 1982

Glitman, Maynard W. (Mike), Negotiator for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Goodby, James E., Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from 1983 until 1985

Gorbachev, Mikhail S., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985

Gordievskiy, Oleg, Colonel, Committee on State Security (KGB), USSR; secret agent for British Security Service from 1974 until his defection to the United Kingdom in 1985

Grechko, Andrey A., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense from 1967 until 1976

Gregg, Donald P., Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Grinevsky, Oleg A., Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from 1983 until 1986

Grobel, Olaf, Director, Office of Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hartman, Arthur A., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Hill, M. Charles, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Secretary

Horowitz, Larry, Executive Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Howe, Sir Geoffrey, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1983

Howe, Jonathan T., Rear Admiral, USN; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1984

Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Isakov, Viktor, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy in Washington

Kamman, Curtis, W., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until August 1985

Kampelman, Max, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1983; head of U.S. human rights mission to Europe in 1984; head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Keel, Alton B. (Al), Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget

Kelly, John H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Kennedy, Richard T., Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs from 1983

Keyes, Alan, staff member, National Security Council in 1983

Keyworth, George A., II, Science Advisor to the President; Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President

Kimmitt, Robert M., Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J., U.S. Representative to the United Nations until April 1985

Kohl, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Korniyenko, Georgii, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Kraemer, Sven, Director, Arms Control, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A., Head of the Soviet delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations in Geneva until December 1983; Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva from March 1985

Lehman, Ronald F., II (Ron), Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until January 1986; Deputy Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Lenczowski, John, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Levine, Richard, Deputy Director, Defense Programs, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council

Staff

Lilac, Robert, Director, Political-Military Affairs
Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983
until 1984

Linhard, Robert E. (Bob), Colonel, USAF; Director,
Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate,
National Security Council Staff

Marshall, Andrew, Director, Office of Net Assessment,
Department of Defense

Matlock, Jack F., Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Directorate, National Security Council Staff

McFarlane, Robert C. (Bud), Colonel, USMC (Ret.);
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs from 1982 until October 1983; Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs from October
1983 until December 1985

McKinley, Brunson, Deputy Executive Secretary of the
Department of State until 1985

McMahon, John N., Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence from 1982

Meese, Edwin, III (Ed), Counselor to the President until
February 1985; U.S. Attorney General from February
1985

Mitterrand, Francois, President of France

Montgomery, Hugh, Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Moreau, Arthur S., Admiral, USN; Assistant to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1983 until
1985

Mulroney, Martin Brian, Prime Minister of Canada
from September 17, 1984

Murphy, Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs

Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister of Japan from
November 27, 1982

Nitze, Paul, Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985

Ogarkov, Nikolai V., Marshal, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, until September 1984

O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr. (Tip), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts); Speaker of the House

Palme, Olof, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 1982

Palmer, Robie M.H. (Mark), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Parris, Mark R., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pascoe, Boris L. (Lynn), Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982

Perle, Richard, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

Pipes, Richard, Senior Director, East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1982

Platt, Nicholas, Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 7, 1985

Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until October 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985

Powell, Colin L., Major General, USA; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Raymond, Walter, Jr., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983; Senior Director, International Communications and Information Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Reagan, Ronald, President of the United States

Regan, Donald T. (Don), Secretary of the Treasury until February 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 1985

Robinson, Roger, Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; Senior Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984 until 1985

Robison, Olin C., President of Middlebury College

Rodman, Peter, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State until 1984; Chairman, Policy Planning Council, from April 9, 1984

Rostow, Eugene V. (Gene), Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until January 1983

Rowny, Edward L., General, USA; Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985

Sagdeyev, Roald Z., Director, USSR Institute of Space Research

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident

Scowcroft, Brent, Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; member of the Dartmouth Group

Seitz, Raymond G.H., Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until July 1984

Sestanovich, Stephen, Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984

Sharansky, Natan (also Shcharansky, Anatoly),
Soviet dissident and refusenik

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State from July 1982

Shultz, Helena (Obie), wife of George Shultz

Simons, Thomas W., Jr., Director, Office of Soviet Union
Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,
Department of State, from 1982 until 1985

Sofaer, Abraham, Legal Adviser, Department of State

Sokolov, Oleg, Minister-Counselor at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington

Sokolov, Sergei F., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense,
from December 1984

Sommer, Peter R., member, European and Soviet Affairs
Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Speakes, Larry M., Assistant to the President and
Principal Deputy Press Secretary from June 17, 1981

Spiers, Ronald I., Under Secretary of State for
Management from November 23, 1983

Stearman, William L., member, National Security
Council Staff

Taft, William H., IV., Deputy Secretary of Defense from
February 1984

Thatcher, Margaret H., Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom

Thayer, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense until January
1984

Timbie, James P., Advisor for Strategic Policy to the
Deputy Secretary of State

Tower, John G., Senator (R-Texas) until January 3, 1985;
Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in
Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space
Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from
March 1985

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Minister of Defense until
December 1984

Velikhov, Yevgeny P., Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences

Vershow, Alexander, Multilateral Relations Officer, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Vessey, John W., Jr., General, USA; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1982

Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Weinberger, Caspar W. (Cap), Secretary of Defense

Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency

Wolfowitz, Paul, D., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Zagladin, Vadim, Deputy Chief, International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union

Zimmerman, Warren, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until July 1984

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council (NSC) to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively executive branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice, but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and

Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the

Department of State and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the Departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of NSC directives, the responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the CIA's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve

covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November,

he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counterinsurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging this responsibility.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its

predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation that had not been reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and politically sensitive covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal

meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d' etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a finding and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order (EO) 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group (OAG), composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action. President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the OAG with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.¹⁷ Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers).

The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's

EO 11905 on United States Foreign Intelligence activities.¹⁸ In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC-Intelligence (SCC-I) to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in EO 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced EO 11905 and its amendments. EO 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.¹⁹

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document—known as “Perspectives”—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential findings or Memorandum of Notification (MON). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while the Department of State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

The Carter administration initially used MONs to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically specific operations under a previously approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the Committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence Committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the Committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence Committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and

minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence Committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.²⁰

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257*](#).

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [*Document 292*](#).

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [*Document 298*](#).

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 90*](#).

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see [*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171*](#).

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see [*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212*](#) and [*250*](#).

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See [*Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962, Documents 270*](#) and [*278*](#).

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see [*Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68*](#).

NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56*](#).

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see [*Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 204*](#).

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56-57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see [*Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Document 203*](#).

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ P.L. 93-559.

¹⁶ EO 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

¹⁷ The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the SCC. The SCCs jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, non-intelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System", January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

¹⁸ EO 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

¹⁹ EO 12036, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194-214. Since EO 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the EO to the "SCC" were effectively references to what was known in practice as SCC-I.

²⁰ P.L. 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions," Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA'S Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280-281.

134. Article in the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, November 10, 1983

USSR-EAST GERMANY: Air Units Alerted *The Soviets have increased the alert level of their air units—including their strike forces in East Germany—in response to “Able Archer-83,” a NATO command post exercise.*² [portion marking not declassified]

[less than 1 line not declassified] the alert began on 2 November and is to continue through tomorrow, when the NATO exercise enters its concluding phase. Unit commanders were told that all measures were to be taken quietly under the guise of routine training. In line with this, command personnel have attended scheduled meetings and took part in the Bolshevik Revolution anniversary celebrations. [portion marking not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

Comment: Soviet fighter units in East Germany have gone on increased alert in the past, both in response to NATO exercises and during Soviet holidays. This alert, however, is unusual in breadth and in involvement of strike units. The alert apparently has been confined primarily to Soviet air units, suggesting that the Soviets are using the NATO exercise to train these forces in achieving increased readiness and not because of an anticipated military move by the West [portion marking not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [*codeword not declassified*].

² See [Document 135](#).

135. Editorial Note

In early November 1983, NATO forces in Europe conducted an annual, planned command and control exercise, codenamed Able Archer 83. During that fall, tensions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship had mounted, in particular after the downing of the KAL 007 airliner by the Soviet Union on August 31 and the NATO INF deployments to Western Europe loomed for the end of November. The Kremlin continued to protest the planned INF deployments by waging a propaganda war both in Western Europe and within the Soviet Union, as they covertly promoted the peace movement in Western Europe. This Soviet propaganda fostered a "war scare" mentality by claiming that a conflict might erupt if the missiles were installed in NATO countries. The bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and the U.S. invasion of Grenada further heightened international tensions in late October.

Amidst the tense situation, the NATO Able Archer exercise began as planned on November 2. In a March 1984 report, the British Head Office summarized the exercise as follows: "Able Archer 83 which took place from 2-11 November was an annual command post exercise designed to practice NATO nuclear release procedures. It differed from previous exercises in the series in a number of ways which made it of considerable interest to the Soviet authorities. In 1983, the detailed NATO procedures and message formats used for the transition from conventional to nuclear war were substantially changed. The 1983 exercise featured increased emphasis on headquarters-to-subordinate-echelon messages. Unlike previous Able Archer scenarios, in which NATO forces remained at General Alert from the beginning of exercise play throughout the exercise, in 1983 there were pre-exercise communications which notionally

moved forces from normal readiness through various alert phases to General Alert. [*1 line not declassified*] The exercise also took place at a time when there was actually considerable political strain between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, shortly before the start of INF deployment in Western Europe. Able Archer 83 nevertheless remained entirely a Command Post Exercise, as in previous years.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Intelligence Reports [pre-1980, May 85-Jan 86])

While Soviet reactions to Able Archer later caused great debate, at the time of the exercise in early November, the Intelligence Community (IC) in the United States did not have a complete picture of the Soviet responses. After some reporting on Soviet anxieties began to emerge, which were more specifically related to the war scare and INF deployments, intelligence analysts and policymakers began contemplating how Soviet leadership perceived and reacted to Able Archer. As a result, in February 1990, during the George H.W. Bush administration, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) completed a study on “The Soviet ‘War Scare.’” (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files; Reports to the President—War Scare Report 1990 [OA/ID CF01830-020]) The PFIAB reviewed intelligence, analysis, and information related to Able Archer and the Soviet war scare, examining what was known at the time and after the fact, and then wrote the following summary of Soviet responses to Able Archer in November 1983:

“Able Archer 83

“From 7–11 November, NATO conducted its annual command post exercise [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. This is a recurring event that includes NATO forces from

Turkey to England, and is routinely monitored by Soviet intelligence. Typical Soviet responses in the past have included increased intelligence collection and increased readiness levels at select military garrisons.

“The 1983 version of Able Archer, however, had some special wrinkles, which we believe probably fueled Soviet anxieties. NATO tested new procedures [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that emphasized command communications from headquarters to subordinate units. In addition, unlike previous scenarios wherein NATO forces remained at General Alert throughout, the 1983 plan featured pre-exercise communications that notionally moved forces from normal readiness, through various alert phases, to a General Alert.

“Soviet intelligence clearly had tip-offs to the exercise, and HUMINT elements underwent a major mobilization to collect against it. On 8 or 9 November, Moscow sent a circular telegram to KGB Residencies in Western Europe ordering them to report on the increased alert status of US military bases in Europe. Residencies were also instructed to check for indications [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; the London KGB Residency interpreted this as a sign of Moscow’s VRYAN concern. Similar messages to search for US military activity were received by GRU Residencies. [*footnote text not declassified*]

“Other Warsaw Pact intelligences services reacted strongly as well. [*1 ½ lines not declassified*] during the Able Archer time frame he had been, ‘particularly occupied trying to obtain information on a major NATO exercise . . .’ [*less than 1 line not declassified*] efforts were in response to a year-old, high-priority requirement from Moscow ‘to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a

preemptive nuclear strike against the countries of the Warsaw Pact.'

"The Pact also launched an unprecedented technical collection foray against Able Archer 83. Beginning on November 1, Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish [*less than 1 line not declassified*] units were tasked to concentrate on the exercise. [*1½ lines not declassified*] The Soviets also conducted over 36 intelligence flights, significantly more than in previous Able Archers. These included Soviet strategic and naval aviation missions over the Norwegian, North, Baltic, and Barents Sea—probably to determine whether US naval forces were deploying forward in support of Able Archer.

"Warsaw Pact military reactions to this particular exercise were also unparalleled in scale. This fact, together with the timing of their response, strongly suggests to us that Soviet military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the US would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real attack.

"The Soviets evidently believed the exercise would take place sometime between 3 and 11 November, but they initiated significant military preparations well in advance. [*7 lines not declassified*] Several days before the exercise actually began, the Soviets placed elements of at least two forward-based air armies on alert: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

"These alerts were highly unusual. Most notably, they probably involved [*less than 1 line not declassified*]—activity seen only during crisis periods in the past. Moreover, [*3½ lines not declassified*]

- Transporting nuclear weapons from storage sites to delivery units by helicopter.
- A 'standdown,' or suspension of all flight operations, from 4 to 10 November—with the exception of intelligence collection flights—probably to have available as many aircraft as possible for combat.
- Invoking a 30-minute, around-the-clock readiness time and assigning priority targets [*3½ lines not declassified*]
- [*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]
- [*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

"Similar measures were taken by about a third of the Soviet Air Force units [*3½ lines not declassified*].

- [*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]

[*4 paragraphs (17 lines) not declassified*]

"There were a number of other unusual Soviet military moves that, taken in the aggregate, also strongly suggest heightened concern:

[*7 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified*]

"By November 11, the Soviet alert evidently was withdrawn. Flight training by Soviet Air Force units in East Germany returned to normal on the 11th [*1½ lines not declassified*].

"On the same day that Soviet forces returned to normal status, Marshal Ustinov delivered a speech in Moscow to a

group of high-ranking military officers that, in our view, offers a plausible explanation for the unusual Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. Calling the US 'reckless' and 'adventurist,' and charging it was pushing the world toward 'nuclear catastrophe,' Ustinov implied that the Kremlin saw US military actions as sufficiently real to order an increase in Soviet combat readiness. Finally, possibly referring to the use of an exercise to launch a surprise attack, he warned that 'no enemy intrigues will catch us unawares.'

"Ustinov also voiced his apparent conviction that the threat of war loomed heavy. Exhorting his forces, he declared that the international situation—"the increased danger of an outbreak of a new world war"—called for extraordinary measures:

We must actively and persistently foster high vigilance and mobilize all servicemen both to increase combat readiness . . . and to strengthen military discipline.

"There is little doubt in our minds that the Soviets were originally worried by Able Archer; however, the depth of that concern is difficult to gauge. On one hand, it appears that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to preempt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under cover of Able Archer. Such apprehensions stemmed, in our view, from several factors:

- US-Soviet relations at the time were probably at their lowest ebb in 20 years. Indeed, the threat of war with the US was an ever-present media theme throughout the USSR, especially the armed forces.
- Yuriy Andropov, probably the only man in the Soviet Union who could authorize the use of nuclear

weapons at a moment's notice, was seriously ill and, in fact, may have been incapacitated.

- [*1½ lines not declassified*] Pact exercises to counter a NATO surprise attack always portrayed NATO 'jumping off' from a large training maneuver before reaching full combat readiness. Soviet doctrine and war plans have long posited such a scenario for a Warsaw Pact preemptive attack on NATO.

"On the other hand, the US intelligence community detected no evidence of large-scale Warsaw Pact preparations. Conventional thinking assumes that the Soviets would probably undertake such a mobilization and force buildup prior to a massive attack on NATO. The Board questions, however, whether we would indeed detect as many 'indicators' as we might expect, given, for example, Soviet improvements in communications security and procedures for secret mobilization.

"The 'mixed' Soviet reaction may, in fact, directly reflect the degree of uncertainty within the Soviet military and the Kremlin over US intentions. Although the Soviets usually have been able to make correct evaluations of US alerts, their increased number of intelligence reconnaissance flights and special telegrams to intelligence Residencies regarding possible US force mobilization, for example, suggests to us serious doubts about the true intent of Able Archer. To us, Soviet actions preceding and during the exercise appear to have been the logical steps to be taken in a period when suspicions were running high. Moreover, many of these steps were ordered to be made secretly to avoid detection by US intelligence. This suggests that Soviet forces were either preparing to launch a surprise preemptive attack (which never occurred) or making preparations that would allow them a minimum capability

to retaliate, but at the same time not provoke the attack they apparently feared. This situation could have been extremely dangerous if during the exercise—perhaps through a series of ill-timed coincidences or because of faulty intelligence—the Soviets had misperceived US actions as preparations for a real attack.” (PFIAB, pages 69–76)

Unlike the drafters of the 1990 PFIAB report, in November 1983 the IC did not have the benefit of hindsight, let alone the full range of evidence eventually collected through various sources and methods. While intelligence on the Soviet air alerts existed concurrent to and shortly after Able Archer 83 (see [Document 134](#)), it remains unclear who received this information and when. In reviewing the intelligence collected and reported during the exercise, the PFIAB paper stated: “This abnormal Soviet behavior to the annual, announced Able Archer 83 exercise sounded no alarm bells in the US Indications and Warning system. United States commanders on the scene were not aware of any pronounced superpower tension, and the Soviet activities were not seen in their totality until long after the exercise was over. For example, while the US detected a ‘heightened readiness’ among some Soviet air force divisions, the extent of the alert [*less than 1 line not declassified*] was not known until two weeks had passed after the completion of the exercise. The Soviet air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a week before [*less than 1 line not declassified*] aircraft were noted on air defense alert in East Germany.”

The PFIAB report continued: “There were plenty of reasons why the Soviet military response to Able Archer was missed; there was no context by which to judge behavior. First, Moscow’s ‘war scare’ activity was not yet the focus of intelligence or policy attention. Additionally, Soviet

intelligence requirements against the exercise, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] learned until long after the fact. Moreover, the air standdown was not at first perceived abnormally because it occurred during the Soviet Revolution holiday; about midway through the exercise, [*2½ lines not declassified*]. Despite late-developing information, the intelligence community evaluated the Soviet response as unusual but not militarily significant. Analysts reasoned that more indicators should have been detected if the Soviets were seriously concerned about a NATO attack.” (PFIAB, pages 8–9) Aside from the November 10 National Intelligence Daily, no documentation was found in the President’s Daily Briefs or other sources relaying to Reagan or other high-level policymakers information about this heightened Soviet alert status or possible Soviet anxieties over a first strike nuclear attack.

Reagan’s November 18 diary entry demonstrates some awareness of Soviet apprehensions, perhaps coincidentally or perhaps as the result of some verbal reporting or documentation that was not found. He met with George Shultz on both November 16 and November 18 to discuss “establishing a pipe line outside the bureaucracy for direct contact with Soviets.” On November 18, he wrote: “I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 290)

What prompted Reagan to make these comments remains unclear.

For further discussion of Able Archer and the PFIAB report, see [Appendix A](#).

**136. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, November 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Discussion of Channels to the Soviets

Secretary Shultz has advised me that he intends to discuss alternative approaches for dealing with the Soviets during his meeting with you today at 1:30.²

This is an extremely complex, important and timely issue. Numerous analysts and observers returning from the Soviet Union in recent weeks have reported uniformly a high level of anxiety among Soviet leaders, and apparently sincere interest in communication, but a frustration at not knowing how to make it happen.³

You have persistently tried to arrange such an authoritative discreet channel. For various reasons the Soviets have not responded. Having observed successful⁴ efforts by three Administrations, I believe I may have something useful to offer both on the substance and mechanics of doing business with the Russians. Subject to your approval I would like to attend your session today with George.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) November 1983; NLR-362-6-10-5-7. Secret.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan held a private afternoon meeting with Shultz on November 16

before an NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: "Met with Geo. S. about establishing a pipe line outside the bureaucracy for direct contact with Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) ³ See [Document 132](#).

⁴ McFarlane inserted "and unsuccessful" in the margin.

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1983, 3-4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR Ambassador Dobrynin

Mr. Isakov, Minister-Counselor, USSR Embassy

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger

The Secretary began by indicating he wished to discuss several items of substance—items which would illustrate a problem which the Ambassador and the Secretary had talked about earlier, i.e. how we talk to each other.² *First* was the question of START. All arms control efforts are important, but START remains the centerpiece. For the United States, the underlying message in our build-down proposal is that we see, as do the Soviets, that if our negotiations are to go anywhere, we will have to come to grips with the fact that our systems are not identical; they are, in fact, of very unlike characteristics. If we are to get anywhere in our START negotiations it will be on the basis of a mutual recognition that a negotiated settlement will require agreement on appropriate tradeoffs between systems.

A START agreement, said the Secretary, must be comprehensive; if both sides are striving for equality, as we are, then we must arrive at a formula which will set forth “what equals what.” If the Soviets wish to discuss this issue with us in a conceptual framework, then the U.S. is prepared to enter into direct and private discussions free of the glare of publicity.

The *second* area the Secretary wished to discuss was the Middle East. This topic had been the subject of earlier

talks, including with Foreign Secretary Gromyko.

The Secretary said that as we survey the world situation, the most dangerous “flash point” is the Middle East. In particular, we must focus on Lebanon, plus the potential “offshoots” of the Iran-Iraq war.

With regard to Lebanon, the issues are extremely complex. The United States wishes to see Lebanon at peace internally, with all foreign forces out. Syrian interests in Lebanon are obvious; one only has to look at the map and be aware of history. The United States does not dispute that fact. If Lebanon is to be stable, it will have to find a political balance among warring groups. It is interesting to note that the recent reconciliation meeting which took place in Geneva is the first time that the various Lebanese groups have met together in many years; in fact, either the representatives who met in Geneva or their fathers (with the exception of Barri) are the people who put Lebanon together in the first place.

Continuing, the Secretary said that the warring parties must, as he had indicated, find a new balance of forces; through that balance Syrian influence will find its place. The U.S. objective is to see an independent Lebanon; we have no desire for a permanent U.S. presence in that country. At the same time, we do not believe Lebanon should be a base for attack on Israel; we do believe that Israeli interests in Lebanon will also have to be recognized. With that said, however, we believe strongly that Israel cannot, amongst outside powers, exercise exclusive influence on the Government of Lebanon.

With regard to the PLO, the Secretary frankly admitted that we do not at this point know precisely what is going on, but the situation is certainly a tense and dangerous one. King

Hussein has been very outspoken in his comments about the difficulty—of the PLO founders—of deciding who represents the interests of the Palestinian people. Many of our European friends are greatly concerned that Arafat will be “eliminated,” since he alone can speak for the Palestinian people.

Syria has developed substantial power, in great part thanks to the Soviets. This fact is now bringing about an Israeli counter reaction which can be dangerous. The Secretary said that he had absolutely no doubt that Israel is prepared to withdraw from Lebanon, and will do so under previously agreed conditions. But it is to be noted that there remain large numbers of Syrians and Palestinians in Lebanon, and the Israeli pendulum is now swinging back toward a more active role in the area. “Israeli passivity,” said the Secretary, “is ending.” It is important for both the Soviet Union and the United States to recognize that an aggressive Syria and an increasingly less passive Israel can create real dangers in the Middle East, an area where both the U.S. and the USSR have interests. This situation is, therefore, doubly dangerous.

The Secretary indicated that in these circumstances it is important that the reconciliation talks be encouraged, that all foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon as soon as possible, that Lebanon be rapidly removed as a potential source of conflict between East and West, and that the Soviets do what they can to influence the Syrians in the direction of caution. (The Secretary added that perhaps this was an effort the Soviets already had underway).

Item *three* on the Secretary’s agenda was to follow-up on the KAL 007 tragedy. We and the Soviets, said the Secretary, had a great deal to disagree about with regard to this issue. But the Secretary wished to highlight the fact

that there are steps available which would make it possible to avoid a repetition of this terrible event. Most important, would be if the Soviets were prepared to engage in an information exchange covering the area that Pacific flights now have to traverse between Alaska and Japan without those facilities so common on most other international routes. Technical solutions to this problem are available, solutions which would ensure greater safety of flight for international aircraft. The Secretary said he wished to call these facts to Ambassador Dobrynin's attention in the hope that perhaps the Soviet Union would be prepared to propose constructive solutions.

The Secretary then turned to the *fourth* item on his agenda, i.e., dialogue between the U.S. and the USSR. We have encountered problems in discussing a number of issues with the Soviet Union; gross misunderstandings on several questions have been extremely bothersome. The conversations in Madrid between Ambassador Kampelman and Mr. Kondrashov are an example. We thought an understanding had been reached between those two gentlemen on how to deal with a number of Soviet dissidents. Certainly it had been our opinion that we were in consultations with an authorized contact when we dealt with Mr. Kondrashov. Ambassador Dobrynin interrupted to say that the Soviets were not at fault, since Kampelman had been talking with the wrong man. The Secretary responded that, nevertheless, the Kampelman-Kondrashov conversations were representative of a problem which concerned us greatly.

The Secretary went on to say that we are now faced with a similar problem regarding INF. Ambassador Kvitzinski had told Ambassador Nitze some days ago that if the U.S. were to make a proposal calling for the reduction of 572 Soviet missiles, to be matched by a decision on the part of the U.S.

not to deploy its INF missiles, it would be accepted by the Soviet Union. We have now learned that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn has described this proposal to officials in the Bonn Government as a proposal emanating from Ambassador Nitze. We have been forced to comment publicly on this claim, emphasizing that Ambassador Nitze has made no such proposal. (At this point the Secretary gave Ambassador Dobrynin several documents, including a document handed over to the FRG by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn).

In our view, said the Secretary, what the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had done is a gross misuse of the so-called private channel. "How is it possible," the Secretary asked, "for us to conduct a dialogue with the Soviet Union if it acts in this manner?"

There are many other subjects we might discuss, the Secretary said, but he emphasized that he wished to stay with this narrow agenda because the issues are critical. The Secretary concluded by saying that he wished Ambassador Dobrynin to know that, on the basis of a Presidential decision, the USG was prepared to undertake with the Soviet Union a "no holds barred" discussion. The United States wishes the Soviets to understand that we are willing to talk together both through Ambassador Dobrynin here in Washington and through a dialogue with appropriate officials in Moscow. We want to talk to Foreign Secretary Gromyko, but there are also others in Moscow that we will want to talk with as well. Our access to appropriate people in Moscow must be assured. Ambassador Hartman must, of course, be fully involved. We will await suggestions from the Soviet side as to how these private discussions might be arranged and carried forward.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether there are any specific ideas that we believed should be discussed with the Soviets. This, said the Ambassador, will be important in deciding who should be involved in the discussions, since on specific issues it is often necessary to engage particular experts with knowledge of the subject.

The Secretary said that at the moment what we are interested in is the establishment of a process for dialogue which would make it possible for both sides to try to move our relationship forward. The Secretary indicated that for our part we would have a small group of people here in Washington prepared to work on the form and content of our private dialogue with the Soviets.

Dobrynin noted the Secretary's earlier comments on the Middle East and said "You are focusing on Lebanon, but why limit our talks exclusively to Lebanon?" Dobrynin indicated that the focus of such talks should be broadened to include the Middle East as a whole, a point to which the Secretary did not respond.

Dobrynin said that the Soviet position on the Middle East was well known, while that of the U.S. was less clear. Therefore, it would be wise to talk about the over-all Middle East picture. The Secretary indicated general agreement with this point, and then said that another issue worthy of discussion would be the Iran-Iraq war. Our views, he said, are not necessarily widely different from those of the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin agreed that Iran-Iraq was a possible subject for discussion and then said that the Soviet Union was, indeed, concerned about greater U.S. military involvement in Lebanon. "We appeal to you to use judgment and constraint on this question," said Dobrynin.

Turning to other subjects earlier discussed by the Secretary, Dobrynin said that with regard to remarks on the KAL issue, he would pass those comments to Moscow. At this point, he said, he had no knowledge of what the reaction there would be.

With regard to the Kampelman-Kondrashov conversations, as Dobrynin had earlier indicated, he was surprised when he heard some months ago what we believed had come from those talks. He sent a cable to Moscow, returned to Moscow himself shortly thereafter, and met with Kondrashov personally. Kondrashov gave a different story from that claimed by the Americans.

The Secretary said that after his earlier conversation with Dobrynin, when the Ambassador had indicated doubt about what had come from the Kampelman-Kondrashov talks,³ he had talked personally with Ambassador Kampelman. Kampelman then returned to Madrid and met with Kondrashov, who reaffirmed to him that he (Kondrashov) was speaking on "instructions from the highest authority."

Dobrynin said that Kondrashov told a different story in Moscow. According to Kondrashov, Kampelman came to him and indicated that Shcharanskiy, under Soviet law, would soon have the right to a pardon. Under these circumstances, Kampelman asked, would it be possible to expect a release of Shcharanskiy soon? According to Dobrynin, Kondrashov then checked with Moscow and told Kampelman that indeed it was correct that Shcharanskiy would soon be eligible for pardon. But, said Dobrynin, Kondrashov made no promise to Kampelman that Shcharanskiy would, in fact, be released. Dobrynin added that we must understand that someone of Kondrashov's rank in the Madrid Delegation would not be authorized to deal on issues of this sort without the involvement of the

head of the Delegation. We should have kept the Delegation chief informed of our conversations with Kondrashov.

Turning to the Nitze-Kvitzinski conversations, Dobrynin said that on November 3 Ambassador Nitze had approached Kvitzinski with a "Nitze idea."⁴ Conversations had then taken place over a number of days between the two Ambassadors, with Nitze asking a number of questions of Kvitzinski. The Soviet Ambassador finally said to Nitze that were Nitze to put his proposal forward, with the authorization of the USG, the Soviet Union would be prepared in principle to accept it.

In fairness, Dobrynin said, Nitze had indicated when he initiated these conversations that he was not certain that the U.S. Government would accept his ideas. Nevertheless, the conversations continued over a number of days and Nitze asked a number of questions which led the Soviets to believe that he was acting under instructions from the U.S. Government. Dobrynin emphasized that he agreed that Nitze had never claimed that the U.S. Government endorsed his ideas, but nevertheless the Soviet Delegation believed that the U.S. Government must know what Nitze was doing because of the various questions he asked over a period of time. Each time, said Dobrynin, Nitze told Kvitzinski that he was reporting his conversations to Washington. Because of this, "over time we came to the impression that the exploration was going on on an official, instructed basis." The Secretary again reminded Ambassador Dobrynin that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had handed over a document which represented the ideas put forward by Kvitzinski as proposals of the U.S. Government. The Secretary said you should be clear that this is *not* the position of the United States Government.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that might be true, but that he understood how Soviet authorities could come to the conclusion that this was a U.S. Government proposal. Nitze had told Kvitzinski on several occasions that he had no answers from Washington, but he did say "I have received questions I would like you to answer." After a period of time Kvitzinski had finally said to Nitze, "Look, I have answered your questions; it is now time for you to put the proposal forward as an official U.S. position. Under those circumstances I can tell you it will be acceptable to us."

The Secretary replied that Dobrynin's statement made it clear that the Soviet Government did not believe the proposal was an official U.S. position since Kvitzinski had said that it was now time for Nitze to put it on the table as a U.S. proposal. "Our concern," said the Secretary, "is that your Ambassador has claimed this is an official U.S. Government proposal. It is not our proposal; we do not believe it is a good proposal."

The Secretary went on to say that his underlying message was that the United States is ready to have a dialogue with the Soviets on anything it might wish to discuss, so long as the U.S. is free to introduce anything into these discussions that it might wish. We should think about how to manage such a dialogue so that further misunderstandings do not take place.

Dobrynin asked whether Ambassador Nitze had reported to the Secretary that he was asking questions of the Soviets on the new proposal. The Secretary replied that Ambassador Nitze had reported that a new Soviet offer was emerging and finally reported that the Soviets had described their proposal and said that if it was put forward by the United States the Soviet Union would accept it. The Secretary added that it was not relevant at this point to

argue about who had introduced what; rather we were not happy about the claims the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had made about U.S. responsibility for the proposal.

Dobrynin asked whether Nitze would receive instructions soon on how to reply to Kvitzinski. The Secretary replied that he would be receiving such instructions, but that the comments made today should give the Soviets a good idea of what our response will be.

Dobrynin then said that with regard to INF the U.S. had clearly made its choice; the Soviet Union now will have to make its decision in light of what the U.S. has decided to do.

The Secretary closed by saying that he would like to hear from Ambassador Dobrynin after his return from Moscow on whether the Soviet Union wishes to establish a channel for dialogue. We are prepared to proceed and await word from the Soviet Union. Dobrynin said he would put the proposal to his authorities in Moscow, but emphasized again that from the Soviet point of view INF was the most critical issue between our two countries.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eagleburger; approved by Shultz on December 6. Shultz's approval is noted on another copy. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union Nov) A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The surnames for Kondrashev and Kvitsinskiy are misspelled throughout the document. On the cover note from Eagleburger, Shultz wrote: "LSE, excellent summary."

² In his personal note for November 18, Dam wrote: "I also had a meeting with the Secretary in preparation for his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin. The Soviets are going around town and in fact around the world saying that we don't want to talk to them, but we are having difficulty getting them to talk in any serious way with us. They prefer to blame us for the lack of progress in the INF talks and pretend that this is some kind of a Reagan plot to refuse to talk to them. But the fact of the matter is that they continue to adhere to the proposition that they should have SS-20s in Europe and Asia, whereas there should be no NATO deployments whatever of medium-range weapons." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

³ See [Documents 130](#) and [131](#).

⁴ The only record found of a conversation between Nitze and Kvitsinskiy on November 3 was at a Soviet reception for the INF delegations in Geneva. Nitze recounted the discussion: "Was the emphasis in Kvitsinskiy's proposal merely on the proposition that the reductions be equal or on a specific reduction on the U.S. side by 572 to zero, balanced by a reduction of 572 on the Soviet side? To give an example, supposing hypothetically that the U.S. was prepared to reduce by 472, would the Soviet side be prepared to reduce by 472? Kvitsinskiy thought about it for a minute and then said, 'I don't think so.' Nitze responded that he did not mean to give Kvitsinskiy any false hopes. He did not think it would be satisfactory in Washington, either." (Telegram 10230 from the Mission in Geneva, November 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830647-0676)

138. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, November 19, 1983, 7:30 a.m.

SMALL GROUP

Meeting of November 19, 1983

Present: The Vice President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Meese, Mr. McFarlane, and the following representatives of agencies: NSC: Matlock, Fortier; State: Dam, Eagleburger, Burt, Azrael; DOD: Thayer; CIA: Gates. (Gen. Scowcroft and Amb. Hartman were not in Washington.)

Two preliminary papers, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twelve Months," and "Suggested Policy Framework" were distributed before and during breakfast.²

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by going over the following topics:

Ground Rules: During a meeting with Shultz and McFarlane November 16, the President had directed that a small group be formed to work in complete confidentiality to review the state of our relations with the Soviet Union and to consider appropriate policy.³ Members had been chosen either because of their overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy, or their expertise and positions enabling them to request studies and information from their organizational units in the normal course of their duties. The group should not be mentioned to persons not members, although discussion among members is encouraged. Matlock would serve as executive secretary and would keep the sole copy of any papers developed by the group.

Related Study: Secretary Shultz had earlier requested Eagleburger and Bosworth to do a special study relevant to the group's interests. It seemed in pretty good shape and would be distributed to members soon for their consideration.⁴

Pattern of Relations with Soviets: In the spring we initiated a pattern of meetings: Shultz with Dobrynin and Hartman with Gromyko, and the President had met with Dobrynin once for two hours.⁵ He stressed his interest in the Pentecostals at that time, and their subsequent release was probably a result, although we are careful not to claim credit publicly. We went on to negotiate a grain agreement (which the Soviets are unlikely to give us credit for since they understand the domestic pressures here) and to start negotiations on bilateral matters such as consulates and an exchanges agreement. We had intended that the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid would be the first in a series, with Gromyko coming here for meetings in New York and perhaps with the President in Washington, followed perhaps by a Shultz visit to Moscow. KAL had derailed these plans, and furthermore the Soviets seemed to have welched on a deal we thought we had for Shcharanskiy's release.

Recent meetings with Dobrynin: Shultz resumed meeting Dobrynin a couple of weeks ago,⁶ but the latter seemed uninstructed on any subject except INF. Two recent meetings by Hartman and Gromyko also seemed unproductive.⁷ At the meeting with Dobrynin yesterday (Nov. 18), attended by Eagleburger, Dobrynin seemed totally uninstructed.⁸

At that meeting, Shultz had told Dobrynin that we were willing to have a totally private dialogue. He mentioned our dismay in our experience with the Shcharanskiy deal and

also with the Soviet misrepresentation of our INF position to our allies. He asked if the Soviets were interested in discussing START conceptually, and stressed the explosiveness of the situation in the Middle East and the dangers of their involvement with the Syrians. Overall, his presentation was an attempt to stick to our agenda, by making it clear that arms control cannot be dealt with in isolation.

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that we can proceed on the foundation of three years of work by the Administration, during which we have been able to mend the disrepair in our defenses, get our economy moving again, and shore up the Alliance. Now we are in a position of strength in dealing with the Soviets.

Regarding the items on the agenda for the meeting, *Matlock* observed (1) that we probably cannot expect major adjustments in Soviet policy over the next 12 months because of the leadership situation in the Soviet Union and other factors such as INF deployments and the U.S. Presidential election; (2) that it is nevertheless important to convey, both publicly and privately, a clear message to the Soviets, since this could be a factor in the leadership struggle and could prepare for significant changes in 1985; and (3) that we must have a credible and consistent negotiating stance to ensure the sustainability of our policies with our public and with our allies. He noted the paper headed "Suggested Policy Framework" as an initial attempt to articulate our policy.

The Vice President observed that there is a public perception that we are not communicating with the Soviets, and this makes the public uneasy. There is a need to convince the public that we are in fact in communication.

Eagleburger observed that our dialogue is like ships passing in the night. We must get into more discussion of fundamental questions. We should structure the discussions so that we are conveying to them clearly our views on various important issues such as the Middle East and Cuba in some detail. He recalled that studies had been done sometime back of the view from Moscow and the view from Washington, in order to get a feel for the difference in perspectives, and wondered whether it might not be useful to commission updated studies on these topics at this time.

Secretary Shultz agreed on the need for discussing regional issues with the Soviets and noted that this does not mean formal negotiations or formal consultation.

McFarlane observed that the Soviets are facing an abrupt change in their expectations. Their expectation of a decline in the West has been dashed. They have not decided how to react to this and are uncertain regarding our global intentions.

Burt noted that the past year has been a difficult one for the Soviets. The INF deployments will put great strain on the relationship, but further out there may be opportunities. The Soviets have painted themselves in a corner to a degree that it may be impossible for them to do business for a while.

Secretary Shultz observed that we should turn around the Soviet charge that they cannot do business with the Reagan Administration, by pointing out that in fact we cannot do business with them.

Burt suggested that we (a) state a willingness to engage in a dialogue on the issues; (b) point out to them that START has the greatest potential if the Soviets are willing to bite;

(c) consider discussions of regional issues as a form of pre-crisis management; and (d) examine the possibilities of trade-offs, since the Soviets have more interest in some issues and we in others.

Dam agreed that we should look for tradeoffs in the bilateral area.

Matlock pointed out that we need to make a basic decision whether to continue the suspension of negotiations on bilateral issues because of KAL or whether to proceed at some point, and under what conditions.

Secretary Shultz noted that he had suggested to Dobrynin yesterday that, even if the Soviets were unwilling to pay compensation, they could easily cooperate in providing navigation assistance to planes flying the route in order to avert tragedies in the future.

Gates observed that the prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet relations are dismal over the next 12 months. The Soviets must turn inward and look at their succession problem. It will be hard for them to react to new initiatives. Furthermore, any initiatives from us will be seen in the context of election-year politics. The question is really how to use the next year to put down building blocks for the second term. Indeed, the election of the President to a second term will convey an important message, that the U.S. has recovered from the vacillations of the recent past and is on a steady course. Thus, we need to convey our views for the role they can plan in the Soviet succession and in order to establish a basis for 1985.

Meese pointed out some of the political factors involved: many are criticizing the President for excessive rhetoric and for not being serious about negotiation, while the right

feels he has not taken enough punitive action, and indeed would like a policy based on the “missing elements” in the paper suggesting a policy framework. We thus need to articulate our policy more clearly and develop a unique Reagan Administration view.

Azrael observed (1) that there were some areas where we might desire to “push” the Soviets, and that this could cause complications in relations, and (2) that at some point we must come to grips with the fact that some proposals are non-negotiable from the Soviet point of view.

Burt predicted that the Soviets would not come back to the INF talks as such. A continuation will have to take another form. We must consider what sort of forum we should seek.

Secretary Shultz noted that we need an authoritative statement, and that work had been done on a speech. It could be by the President, or he could make it. But we need a clear public statement of our policy to build on.

Eagleburger pointed out that the Soviets could be dangerous when they are in trouble and there is uncertainty in their leadership. We must keep that in mind and take steps to reduce the potential for miscalculation.

The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, [Saturday Group Notes] (November–December 1983). No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Dining Room at the Department of State. In his book, Matlock explained the origin of the small group meetings: “Despite his impatience to get relations with Moscow on a constructive track, Reagan did not seem to be

focusing on the substantive issues. Decisions were stalled by squabbles among the various agencies. Shultz noticed this, of course, and tried to break the logjam within the administration by starting a series of Saturday breakfasts for senior officials. Shultz and McFarlane asked me to organize the meetings and act as executive secretary. They wanted to make sure that all the participants could be seated around a single table in a dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department. They also insisted that the fact of the meetings, as well as the content of the discussions, be kept confidential." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 75)

² Attached but not printed.

³ See [Document 136](#). Reagan also met with Shultz on November 18 before that morning's NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry, Reagan wrote: "George Shultz & I had a talk mainly about setting up a little in house group of experts on the Soviet U. to help us in setting up some channels. I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 290)

⁴ See [Document 139](#). It is unclear when it was distributed to the group members.

⁵ See [Documents 10](#) and [11](#).

⁶ See [Documents 129](#), [130](#), and [131](#).

⁷ See [Document 127](#).

⁸ See [Document 137](#).

139. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Client Relationships

It has become very clear that Soviet ties with some key Third World clients are creating potential US policy opportunities. The dissatisfaction that frequently marks both sides of such relationships is the result not only of Soviet resource constraints, but of increased respect for our military strength, political resolve, and readiness to compete. Grenada reinforced this trend,² but it has been evident as well in the Soviet approach to a series of other involvements—toward Syria and the PLO, toward Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran rebels.

This combination of Soviet hesitation and US activism could set the stage for real breakthroughs, indeed for some of the most important diplomatic accomplishments of this Administration. Because clients play such a crucial role in Moscow's global policy, loosening their connections with the Soviet bloc would help us to deal with specific regional crises. More importantly, progress in even one or two cases could reinforce the perceptions of a marked shift in what the Soviets call the global "correlation of forces." The snowball effect on both allies and our adversaries, in many regions, could be highly beneficial to our interests.

Given these stakes, US policy should give high priority to weakening Soviet client relationships in the Third World, particularly to those supported by a Cuban military

presence. Not all such ties are in equal jeopardy, and no all-out US offensive would be likely to succeed. But we believe almost all such relationships deserve close monitoring and some deserve a significantly greater effort than we have made to date. With your approval, an *ad hoc* interagency task force will begin immediately to explore possible next steps.

I. *Overview*

Our informal review of this problem suggests a series of general conclusions, followed by analyses of specific openings:

1. While Soviet clients should be a collective focus of US strategy, we clearly need individual approaches tailored to each client. Our prospects for success will be best where we have carefully prepared the ground beforehand.
2. Our near-term opportunities are likely to call for a mix of political and economic rather than military measures. The states on which we focus should understand both the potential benefits of cooperation, as well as the likely costs of continuing to challenge us.
3. Our policy should aim to exacerbate disagreements and suspicions among the Soviets, Cubans, and other clients. Communication with all three should be managed with an eye to setting them against each other where possible, thereby increasing our own leverage. Because we now lack a channel to (not to speak of full diplomatic relations with) some of these actors, we may be able to find—or create—openings merely by resuming communication.
4. Progress in relations should usually depend on tangible movement away from Moscow or Havana, with particular

emphasis on reductions in the Cuban presence. If “improved” US relations with Soviet clients don’t bring changes in their behavior, then our policies may only alarm friendly neighboring states, drain our resources and leave us vulnerable to the charge that our approach is purely atmospheric. With many *real* friends in trouble, we can’t afford such “successes.”

5. We and our allies will often disagree on how to exploit openings with Soviet clients. Our allies tend to see “improved relations” with these states as intrinsically good and this can help Soviet clients to avoid the stricter criteria we would apply. An allied presence in a country with which we have poor relations can sometimes help to keep a Western option alive. But in general we should try to hold our allies to a standard of concrete “results”, to keep them from playing all our trump cards (such as aid and trade concessions) too soon.

6. The harm done by unsuccessful initiatives toward Soviet clients could be just as great as the gains. An effort that misfires, for example, could squander the new momentum of our policy. If a US effort merely alerts the Soviets or Cubans to a challenge without limiting their options, we are likely to fail. An approach that targets Soviet clients also risks stimulating retaliation against our own allies. Finally, if we alarm a Soviet client state without showing it an alternative, it may simply move closer to Moscow.

II. *Cases*

What follows is not an action plan but a general policy approach toward specific Soviet clients where we see accelerating movement and some rethinking about the value of Soviet bloc connections:

—Mozambique and Ethiopia appear to present the most serious opportunities for progress; of the two, Mozambique seems ready to move, while Ethiopia is the bigger strategic prize.

—Angola and Nicaragua, each embroiled in a major regional crisis, are harder nuts to crack; yet both show concern over US intentions, which we may be able to exploit.

—Initiatives in some lesser cases are considered for the extra weight they could lend to a US offensive.

—Hard-core cases like Afghanistan and Vietnam are also reviewed; here, increased leverage may be called for. (We do not examine Syria, while recognizing that it may present the most dangerous dilemmas—for both superpowers—of any Soviet client.)

—Finally, the paper discusses how to incorporate US policy toward Soviet clients into our dialogue with Moscow.

1. Southern Africa

We should consider an intensified US policy effort in Mozambique and Angola. New progress with Mozambique at this time could eventually help us gain a breakthrough on Angola and Namibia. Even without a Namibia settlement, we may be able to draw Mozambique out of the Soviet orbit at low cost.

Mozambique

In a very successful meeting this month with US officials, Machel³ indicated 1) interest in a mutual stand-down with

South Africa, 2) readiness to push Angola to address our concerns in the Namibia process, and 3) a need for both economic and—notably—security assistance. He has also sought aid in travels to Western Europe, but so far only a little British and Portuguese help seems likely. Machel's hopes for broader Western economic help include bids for IMF and IBRD membership.

Given this background, we would like to move relations forward, but the legal and congressional obstacles are great. Mozambique is ineligible for aid under the 1980 Foreign Assistance Act and probably can't pay for weapons. We will offer some food aid, but legal restrictions bar the use of ESF already budgeted for the southern African region.

Only a reduced Cuban connection would enable us to surmount these obstacles for long and we should begin addressing this more explicitly with Machel. (The feasibility of non-interference understandings with the SAG could depend on such progress in any event.) If he acts on Cuba, we can also press for significantly increased Allied involvement. The main point, even if resources are available, is that continuing US support depends on concrete steps by Maputo; reversals, particularly after we have made the effort to get aid, would undercut our broader effort. (The Portuguese attitude is promising here: Soares⁴ has told Machel that Portuguese advisers cannot train his army in Mozambique alongside Soviet bloc personnel.)

Angola

Our communication with Angola has been interrupted of late, and the Namibia effort is stalled. The civil war has

also entered a new, more active phase: Savimbi⁵ remains unable to take Luanda, but there have been steady UNITA successes, an MPLA counteroffensive, and now a new UNITA front in response. Soviet military aid is increasing, and some Cuban troops may be moving from Ethiopia to Angola. Despite acute Angolan needs, Soviet economic aid has *not* increased.

As the situation on the ground worsens, Angolan dependence on the Cubans (and on Moscow) increases. Yet Soviet bloc help has not solved the MPLA's problems and it probably now fears that a breakdown in the Namibia process would significantly widen the civil war with UNITA and increase SAG involvement. For the MPLA, the prospect of a second Reagan term only makes this picture more ominous. This may then be the moment to increase our pressure—indicating, if we are prepared to follow through, that our patience is thin. For maximum effect, we would want all our inducements on the table too. Recognition, as we have always understood, is one card that could move the process forward; until we see whether movement is possible, however, it should be held in reserve. (Section VI below discusses the Soviet side of this problem.)

In sum, toward both Mozambique and Angola we are working with largely the same tools as in the past, although they are made more weighty by each state's growing security and economic problems. It may be that our instruments can now best be brought together at a higher level than we have been using (i.e., perhaps an under secretary level mission). The extensive preparation that has gone into both these efforts has produced real results, but more difficult decisions lie ahead on all sides and higher-level involvement may be needed.

2. *Central America*

No state feels more directly jeopardized after Grenada than Nicaragua, which has itself been explicitly menaced this year by the presence of nearby US forces. To be sure, Sandinista anxiety could lead to increased dependence on the Soviet bloc and even to retaliation against neighbors friendly to us. But for now the evidence suggests that the Grenada effect has made Nicaragua more, not less cautious and perhaps also more receptive to an understanding with the US. Both recent intelligence and Castro's own statements further indicate the limits of Cuban willingness to assist them; this should deepen internal divisions within the leadership, a trend that is the most plausible route to the internal changes we desire.

To this end, we could augment our current strategy of support for the *contras* and regional negotiations by creating the appearance of a separate channel with Cuba. This would arouse fears in Managua of an accommodation at its expense: we want the Nicaraguans to think that if the Cubans are going to leave, they—not Castro—should gain the key concessions from us. (This channel would be largely cosmetic; we would avoid publicity, but ensure that the Sandinistas find out. It would be most effective if Castro initiated the talks but this is not essential: Grenada allows us to talk to him at little risk to our credibility with our friends in the region. And, as noted later, it can be used against Castro himself by opening discussions at the next level up, with Moscow.)

Even if Grenada strengthens our hand, this will be a tortuous process. Nicaragua will certainly increase its own efforts to deflate pressures on them before committing themselves to any of our conditions, such as withdrawal of a Cuban presence. One Cuban and Nicaraguan gambit

(which may already be in use) to get us to ease up will be to disseminate claims that their activities in Central America are being phased out. To the extent this is just a tactic, our own rhetorical emphasis may have to shift, from the (hard to verify) aid flow to other insurgencies, to internal repression and the continuing Cuban presence in Nicaragua. In particular, the issue of repression should be more prominent on the regional negotiating agenda; this issue has cost the Sandinistas some European support and may do the same in Mexico.

As for carrots, the Kissinger Commission will soon make public a set of ideas for economic assistance to the region after a settlement.⁶ The Commission's report should create a real prospect that the Sandinistas, by meeting our concerns, can tap a large pool of Western resources.

To increase the credibility of this aid, we want to show that changes of course are rewarded. Given Suriname's new (if tentative) direction, a small effort—probably in the economic area—is advisable. If Bouterse⁷ holds to his course, we should expect to follow up next year with a comparable step. Coordination with the Dutch and Brazilians is essential here.

3. The Horn and South Arabia

Ethiopia's strategic significance—based on location, cooperation with South Yemen and Libya, the Cuban troop presence—makes it an extremely large prize. Yet we have given Ethiopia and South Yemen much less priority than other states with a Cuban presence. There is now plainly some flux in each one's relations with both Cuba and the Soviet Union, reflecting internal strains and leadership divisions; we want to exploit these if possible. Progress

with either Ethiopia or PDRY can help with the other and with weakening Libya's capacity for mischief.

Ethiopia

In the past year Mengistu⁸ has followed a confusing course. First, apparent probes toward the West were suddenly aborted in favor of renewed Soviet ties. Then his cancelled trip to Moscow preceded the most interesting development of all: the recent departure of Cuban troops, reportedly at Ethiopian initiative.

Exploiting this opportunity involves major uncertainties. We are not sure how strong the ideological orientation of Mengistu and the top leaders is, and whether US efforts to improve relations have a chance while they are in place. Nor do we know how influential a residual Cuban presence would be, even if the bulk of the force departs for Angola or home.

Nevertheless the potential opening here is too large to ignore. We need to examine steps that can build on evident Ethiopian interest in reviving economic, cultural, and other contacts, while opening a channel in which to push for complete Cuban withdrawal. We would hardly come to such a dialogue without cards. Our ties with Somalia will, for example, be of extreme interest in Addis now, as Cuban forces begin to withdraw. And, although there are powerful reasons not to use it, we have potential leverage in the possibility of assistance to the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies (and perhaps more importantly, in our influence with their regional patrons, like the Sudan).

Outside the UNGA, we have had only middle-level contact with Ethiopia. At the right moment, a mission, even at

Assistant Secretary level would have more than the usual impact. It would also provide us with a sense of the real possibilities that we can get in no other way.

South Yemen

Despite his treaty ties with Ethiopia and Libya, and despite a Soviet base and Cuban troops, PDRY's President has been pursuing a Western opening for over a year. He is improving relations with pro-Western neighbors (e.g., ending PDRY's support of insurgents in Oman, reducing it in North Yemen). Yet his position remains vulnerable, since his predecessor now lives in waiting in Moscow. As a result, he would have to weigh carefully any Western initiative for its effect on his personal safety. The Saudis have the principal immediate stake here; and, coordinating closely with them, we might explore what could be achieved by resuming diplomatic relations and offering some (small) amount of aid. Given the importance to the Soviets of the Aden naval base, they are likely to make a major effort to preserve their access. Our best hope, therefore, may be in starting smaller, with the withdrawal of Cuban technical and military support as our first target. The Saudis in particular should have great interest in removing this presence as tensions around the Gulf keep rising.

4. The Hard Core

Despite its softness at the edges, we cannot forget that the Soviet empire has a hard core of states with whom we will not be able to do business. The reasons may vary from unbreakable Soviet control to irreconcilable hostility toward us, but we should be very clear to ourselves, our friends, and our public that an intense focus on Soviet clients does not mean that we expect to improve relations

with all of them. On the contrary, our policy toward the hard cases will continue to be built primarily around “sticks” and other pressures. This is what we mean, in another context, by differentiation. Globally, just as in Eastern Europe, our policy will gain clarity—and support—on the basis of whom it *excludes*, as well as for whom it includes.

Insisting on differentiation will be particularly important in two respects to the broad policy we are outlining here.

—First, those clients over whom the Soviets have most control (or whose conflicts with us are greatest) will be the ones from whom we are most likely to see efforts at retaliation, to knock us off our stride. Libya in Chad is one such possibility; and Cuba in Central America and the Caribbean is another. (East Germany and Czechoslovakia, in a very different sense, will have such a role in INF.)

—Second, working with allies is difficult enough without seeming to revise our policy toward Soviet clients across the board. Pakistan and ASEAN, for example, should have no doubt of our support for them on Afghanistan and Kampuchea. In general, as we focus on drawing Soviet clients toward us, we should also take a reading of our pressures on the hard core.

With these cautions in mind, we may find that some extremely limited steps with the hard cases can serve our interests. Upgraded diplomatic contacts, for example, can be considered in two cases where little immediate payoff is foreseeable. Apart from symbolically broadening the scope of a US offensive, they are of interest for their place on the Sino-Soviet agenda:

—*Mongolia*. Diplomatic recognition of Mongolia was last discussed with Ulan Bator in the Carter years; though it might well be vetoed again by the Soviet Union, a renewed effort has some advantages. Even if unsuccessful, it would demonstrate (once leaked) Soviet rigidity and defensiveness. If successful, we would gain a valuable observation post in the Soviet Far East, important given Mongolia's place in Sino-Soviet security talks.

—*Laos*. Here, despite Vietnamese dominion, we already have a diplomatic mission in place. If the Lao are ready to cooperate with us on issues like locating MIA remains, etc., we could install a resident Ambassador—like Mongolia, a valuable observation post in a key area where our information is scanty now.

III. *Communicating with Our Adversaries*

The strategy described in this paper deals *indirectly* with problems created by the expanded Soviet and Cuban global presence of the past decade. We believe a channel to both Moscow and Havana could strengthen the approach.

The Soviet Union

Unlike the Middle East, a US offensive that focuses above all on getting new movement in southern Africa, or even in Central America, poses little danger of US-Soviet military confrontation. Communication with the Soviets—if only to clarify each side's "red lines"—is not therefore critical to such an effort. It can even have certain drawbacks, for our diplomatic opportunities often stem from the desires of states in a region precisely to *distance* themselves from the Soviets and Cubans.

Nevertheless, structuring a dialogue with the Soviets around geopolitical themes would have these advantages:

—Although early progress on other issues, especially arms control, is unlikely, we could hope to remove some important obstacles that might bar broader progress later, when opportunities reappear. We want the Soviets, in particular, to understand the large long-term problem that Soviet-Cuban activities represent.

—Several key clients will worry that a Soviet-American dialogue is likely to be at their expense; this worry could advance our own efforts.

—Finally, the Soviet ability to undercut US efforts has to be respected, and a dialogue may have use in limiting Soviet efforts to thwart us—by creating the illusion of participation, and preventing worst-case Soviet assessments of our goals. Our southern African strategy has, for example, assumed from the start that we had to manage the Soviet angle; we have, therefore, envisioned *some* participation by Moscow, hopefully too late to do much damage. Actively exploiting Soviet difficulties with clients will not undo this requirement.

Cuba

A channel to Cuba would have less long-term utility than discussions with the Soviets. Given Cuban anxieties at this time, however, and the obvious Nicaraguan fear of abandonment by all patrons, a limited dialogue with Castro might pay real tactical benefits.

If you agree with this general approach, I believe the next step would be to assemble a small *ad hoc* task force under Larry's direction, to elaborate whether and how to proceed

on specific countries. With your approval, the group would be led by S/P and modeled after the interagency group of officials that worked on the “global instability” paper. The task force would be supported, as appropriate, by expertise from State regional bureaus.

Recommendation

That you authorize S/P to assemble a small *ad hoc* interagency task force under Larry’s supervision to follow up on this paper with specific recommendations for initiatives toward the countries discussed above.⁹

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Kaplan. Forwarded through Eagleburger, who wrote in the margin: “G.S.: This is very much worth reading. LSE.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on November 28.

² See [Document 128](#).

³ Samora Machel, President of Mozambique.

⁴ Mario Soares, Prime Minister of Portugal.

⁵ Jonas Savimbi, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

⁶ The Kissinger Commission, formally the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, was a 12-member group established by President Reagan in 1983 to

review the administration's approach to Central America.
See [footnote 15, Document 159](#).

⁷ Dési Bouterse, leader of the Revolutionary Front and de facto military dictator in Suriname.

⁸ Mengistu Haile Mariam, Ethiopian Head of State.

⁹ Shultz initialed his approval of the recommendation for this task force and wrote: "but I'd like to discuss with you and Larry at outset. G."

**140. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, November 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Leadership Uncertainties and U.S. Soviet Policy

Whether or not Andropov reappears in the next few weeks, the leadership context in Moscow will be different from what it was before the Revolution Day festivities he missed.² At a minimum, he is politically weakened. At a maximum, a new leadership could be announced at an early Central Committee special plenum—conceivably the reason for Dobrynin's trip to Moscow. This paper looks at the various leadership configurations which could emerge. And, in the knowledge that we cannot completely understand political developments within the Kremlin, we recommend a policy approach designed to get our message across to whomever is in power there.

The Political Cost of Physical Weakness

Andropov may return soon to public view, as *Izvestiya* editor Tolkunov and others have predicted. The snap Central Committee meeting Dobrynin and other CC members posted as ambassador abroad evidently have been called back for could provide the stage for his reemergence. Or it could register the emergence of a new leadership.

If Andropov is physically able, he has the political capacity to recoup some of the cost he has paid by visibly taking charge and imparting new vigor to the conduct of affairs. But by showing unmistakably that he is gravely ill, he has made it impossible to recoup the whole cost. Given the enormous inertia of the Soviet system, it takes a powerful and feared political leader to generate change among the thousands within the Soviet elite. Those thousands will now be hanging back, watching for the next leadership phase, before taking any risks.

Speeding Up the Succession Timetable

Renewed maneuvering for the succession is practically certain, if it has not already begun. Up to now, we have been projecting something like a two-stage succession. In the first stage, oldsters of the Brezhnev generation gathered around Andropov would be in charge for 3-5 years, and would gradually bring men in their 60's and 50's into the leadership. In the second stage, the younger people would take over. We need to revise that projection. Oldsters and "youngsters" are mixed together in leadership positions, as individuals with their own clienteles, right now. It is no longer clear that the younger generation will have to wait 3-5 years to take over completely.

The Players

When Brezhnev died a year ago, there were enough members of the Brezhnev generation available in the leadership for us to predict very substantial policy continuity. This is no longer so true. While Defense Minister Ustinov (75) and ex-Brezhnev protégé Chernenko (72) are still around, potentially strong candidates for the top spot now also include such "younger" figures as Romanov (60)

and Gorbachev (52). As dark horses, in addition to Moscow party boss Grishin (69), we now have First Deputy Premier Aliyev (60). And, as a “possible” somewhere between generations, there is Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy, at 65.

In terms of the system’s traditions, the inside tracks must go to the only three men beside Andropov who are party secretaries as well as full (voting) Politburo members: Chernenko, Gorbachev and Romanov. Each has a chance, but each also has liabilities as a contender for the top spot.

—*Gorbachev* has been clearly favored by Andropov and has been steadily accumulating new portfolios. The fact that he has twenty political years ahead of him could be a positive asset after recent experience with a slowly declining Brezhnev and a sick Andropov. But the prospect of two whole decades of Gorbachev could also make his colleagues wary. He is junior in both age and experience, and his strong suit has been in agriculture rather than the key military-industrial management sector.

—*Romanov* earned a good reputation in that sector in Leningrad, but has not been in Moscow long, and he brought with him a harmful reputation for roughness, naked ambition and shifting cadres around.

—*Chernenko*, finally, could be a relatively nonthreatening, temporary candidate, but he is ill, and has not succeeded in building a political base of his own, especially in the military-industrial apparat, from his starting point as Brezhnev’s bag-man and paper-pusher.

The dark horses also have liabilities as well as strengths. Given his base in the military and his competence, *Ustinov* is an attractive caretaker candidate. But although he is no

more a career military man than Andropov was a career KGB man, picking Ustinov as head of the party could create the unwelcome appearance of another Jaruzelski-type military takeover of the party, this time in the “first country of socialism.” Furthermore, Ustinov’s health is not good. Neither is *Grishin*’s, and despite his strong Moscow base, Grishin is apparently not part of the “Andropov coalition.” *Shcherbitskiy* has not been strong enough to parlay his late support for Andropov in 1982 into the move from Kiev to Moscow which he has long sought; he remains a provincial. *Aliyev* has moved to Moscow, but his comparable switches over the years may have encouraged positive mistrust which counterbalances his recognized managerial abilities. In any case, his non-Slavic origin and reputation for ruthlessness are disabilities from the outset.

Thus, the data we have do not allow us to identify a frontrunner. Similarly, positive intelligence has not been—and will not be—much help in predicting personnel and policy outcomes in specific terms. Yet we must still try to shape a policy that fits whatever the Soviets serve up. We must therefore engage in some informed speculation, using the best data we have, on what is old and what is new on the Soviet leadership scene, and where we should be.

Two Possible Patterns

In general terms there are two different leadership patterns which could emerge.

1. *An Amalgam of Old and New.* We already are facing a composite leadership, with both the Brezhnev generation and the “younger” men influential, and a gradual transition taking place. This could continue for some years with or without Andropov. Ustinov and Gromyko provide ample

experience and continuity in the national security/foreign affairs area even if Andropov leaves the scene.

2. A Clean Generational Break. It is also possible that the leadership will decide that it was a mistake to have chosen such an old and weak-from-the-start Andropov, especially after years of a declining Brezhnev. They may conclude that the Soviet Union has been seriously handicapped by a leader unable to play a vigorous role domestically or to travel and act strongly on the international scene. This could lead to selection of a younger General Secretary of the Party like Gorbachev or Romanov, perhaps constraining him initially by withholding the other two key titles—President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Defense Council. It is striking that none of the leading contenders in this next generation has any direct experience in the foreign and security affairs field. On the other hand they will inherit staffs in the Central Committee, General Staff, KGB and Foreign Ministry which are increasingly sophisticated and skilled in this area.

Under either of these scenarios, there is likely to be substantial continuity in Soviet policy over the next 6-12 months. With Andropov weakened or gone, there will be increased preoccupation with the internal struggle for power. Even if a “younger” leadership should emerge, their inexperience in foreign and national security affairs is likely to make them less confident and more cautious at least initially. They also may decide to wait until the U.S. elections before taking new initiatives or engaging in new adventures.

While we believe it is less likely, we cannot rule out a more activist approach. Andropov focussed heavily on the domestic scene because that was where his power base needed building and because the problems were greatest

there. But the industrial and agricultural upturn in 1983 eases the internal situation somewhat. The external setbacks the Soviets have suffered recently, particularly INF deployments, could argue for greater leadership focus on national security and foreign affairs.

Moreover, the newer, younger contenders for the top slot will be tempted to put their own stamp on policy, to use their (relative) vigor to prove their prowess; and they may be less willing to let the USSR roll with punches at home and abroad. After all, they are less able politically to bear the discredit of fresh “defeat” on their watch than the better established oldsters they are competing with. In addition, there is evidence the voice and role of the Soviet military may be increasing.

Hence, we cannot say how the Soviets will act on given issues; what we can say is they will be more unpredictable than before.

The Role of U.S.-Soviet Relations

That is about the best we can do for now: it would probably be a mistake to carry informed speculation much farther. If the second pattern—the clean generational break—emerges, we will need to think our current policy approach through carefully, to see if there are significant new things we need to be doing. Even in that case, however, the tripartite policy of realism, strength and negotiation, which has been designed as a policy for all seasons, should equip us to deal effectively with the Soviets under any leadership that can now be realistically envisaged.

Provided we remember one thing: that U.S.-Soviet relations will be an issue in the internal struggle for succession within the Kremlin. It will cut in a variety of directions

which we can neither discern nor predict when it comes to individuals. But it is certain that relations with us will be a critical foreign policy variable for everyone. Contenders will be tempted to take stands on the question of whether or not it is possible to do productive business with the United States. We cannot tell who the winners will be, but we can say that it is not in our interest that those who emerge victorious from the struggle do so on the basis of anti-American postures. Hence, although we cannot determine the outcome, we have the capacity to influence the struggle by adopting a posture that makes it harder to claim that the USSR cannot do business with us.

Getting our Message Across: Three Levels

To use that capacity, we need to act over the next 6-12 months on three levels:

—*Overall*, with power more diffuse in Moscow and a proliferation of leadership candidates underway, we need to make our policy approach absolutely clear and consistent to the Soviet leadership. We will be even less certain than we were about whom we are dealing with, but whoever they are they must understand that we will sustain our strength and that we are prepared to negotiate with the USSR in earnest.

At this level, the best device for registering U.S. policy consistency with absolute clarity as the Soviets enter a more uncertain time would be a speech by the President devoted exclusively to U.S.-Soviet relations. The opening of the INF deployment winter, when Western publics will be susceptible to Soviet scare propaganda, is in any case an opportune moment for a forward-looking explanation of our own negotiating agenda. But until now, the idea of a

Presidential speech has lacked a persuasive rationale within U.S.-Soviet relations (as distinguished from U.S. and Alliance politics). Andropov's absence November 5 and 7 has filled that gap. We are working on a draft for your consideration.³

—*Diplomatically*, we need to take steps to keep established channels of communication in good working order. To demonstrate that they are in fact in good order, there must be substance passing through them. We have already done a great deal to provide such substance in the arms control field. However, the Soviets themselves may well clog this channel for some time after initial INF deployments. In our own interest, we should be working to unclog it. But we will also need to explore ways to put more content into discussions of our other agenda areas: regional issues, human rights, bilateral topics.

Here I think you will have to take the lead. Increasing the pace and thickening the substance of your talks with Dobrynin is an obvious place to start. We should be giving Art Hartman as much to do as we can, but Dobrynin remains an indispensable vehicle, just as Gromyko remains an indispensable interlocutor at the Moscow end.

In fact, Andropov's ailments make Gromyko and Ustinov more indispensable than ever, as long as they are there. They are fellow-members of the Brezhnev generation cohort, they are Andropov's strongest supporters, and they constitute the rest of the national security "troika" whose clienteles have provided the basis for Andropov's power. For that reason, it would also be helpful in this context for you to meet with Gromyko at Stockholm in January.

We should also be thinking about a visit by you to Moscow, either following on a Stockholm meeting or without it. For

other men are now coming into the leadership picture too. More indispensable than ever for now, Gromyko is also one of those who will be leaving the scene in fairly short order. And for years many have seen Gromyko as more of a hindrance than a help to creative diplomacy. If you decide to go to Moscow to meet him, it will be important to make clear that you would also like to meet not only with Andropov but with others of his colleagues in the leadership. We need to get our message to a broader spectrum of people, even if we cannot predict who we will be dealing with in five years' time.

—*In terms of contacts*, we need to get our message across to more people in the Soviet elite outside the narrow group of top leaders and potential candidates. The Soviet political constituency is smaller than ours by far, but it still numbers in the thousands, and provides the clientele that top leaders must have to gain and maintain power. As it rejuvenates, it will also become even more insular and more provincial than it is now. As a long-term project, we will need to think and act creatively about how to reach it with the American message. Improving and strengthening access through the radios is one obvious means that we are already working on. But expanding exchanges between the two countries—official and unofficial, professional and cultural—is another. Finally, the growing power of such regional bosses and ex-bosses as Leningrad's Romanov, Kiev's Shcherbitskiy and Baku's Aliyev points to the importance of strengthening and expanding our presence outside Moscow.

Conclusion

This is not a prescription for public diplomacy. Public diplomacy will play a key role in our overall diplomacy vis-

a-vis the Soviets in the upcoming period. But if we are to make our policy work with the vigor and effect required by increasing uncertainty in Moscow, we must go beyond public diplomacy, and put content into our approaches. As you have agreed, enriching our dialogue with the Soviets should be an important priority for us. And in his discussion with Larry and me last Monday, Dobrynin had it right as far as he went: dialogue yes, but not dialogue for dialogue; dialogue for understanding.⁴ But I would go further and say dialogue for results.

START is the obvious place to begin. Exploring tradeoffs and a mutually acceptable framework should be the centerpiece of your discussions with Dobrynin. But we should also be looking for ways to engage the Soviets on regional issues. That includes potential flashpoints where neither side wants confrontation but where confrontation is nevertheless a risk, and where we need to understand each other's intentions better.

We do not need a new strategy for dealing with Moscow; we need to be more creative and active with the one we have.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer on November 16. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22.

² The Embassy in Moscow reported: "Yuriy Andropov failed to take his place at the October Revolution Anniversary Assembly in the Kremlin on the evening on November 5. Beyond any shadow of a doubt an appearance at this most

important of Soviet holidays is obligatory for a CPSU General Secretary—none has missed the event in at least the last two decades—and Andropov's absence is unequivocal evidence that he is very seriously ill." (Telegram 14010 from Moscow, November 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830650-0287) Another telegram reporting on the November 7 parade and events also noted his absence. (Telegram 14072 from Moscow, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0646) A November 5 INR report also noted that Andropov had not appeared in public since his August 18 meeting with Senator Pell. (Telegram 318844 to USNATO, November 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830653-0631)

³ After several weeks of effort and coordination with the NSC Staff, this culminated as Reagan's January 16, 1984, speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. See [Document 158](#). The address is also in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 182](#).

⁴ There is no record of Eagleburger and Burt meeting with Dobrynin on Monday, November 7. However, Eagleburger did meet with Dobrynin on November 9 and prepared for Shultz, who was in Tokyo, a brief report found in a draft telegram that Eagleburger drafted on November 9. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, November, 1984)

141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Revised Presidential Letter to Andropov

Issue for Decision

Whether to forward the attached draft letter to Andropov under cover of a memorandum to the President.

Background

As you will recall, we owe a response to Andropov's August 27 letter to the President on INF.² You decided to defer a reply until after the trip to Japan and Korea.³ We have now prepared a revised version, updated to cover more recent developments, in particular the Soviet suspension of the talks (Tab 2).⁴

Given the current strains and uncertainties surrounding our relationship with Moscow, we believe that a Presidential letter to Andropov at this time could be quite useful. The Soviet interruption of the INF talks in Geneva—coming at a time of sharpened Soviet polemics, political uncertainties within the Kremlin itself, and increased popular concern within the West over U.S.-Soviet tensions—makes it important that the President directly reaffirm his interest in developing a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship. The timing is particularly important with the

Soviet leadership faced with reacting to a major foreign policy defeat and, perhaps, caught up in a difficult political transition. These considerations, in my view, also argue for a Presidential speech on U.S.-Soviet relations (which is the subject of a separate memo.)⁵

The draft message to Andropov, and through him to the rest of the senior leadership, reiterates our basic stance, yet makes it clear that we are not seeking to exacerbate existing differences with the Soviet Union. Consistent with our earlier public and private statements, it stresses our readiness to pursue a pragmatic, problem-solving approach to questions now before the two nations, and cites particular areas where progress might be possible. Without minimizing such current problems as the INF impasse, it notes that while we will continue to resist unacceptable Soviet actions, we are nonetheless willing to explore mutually-acceptable solutions to specific issues on a case-by-case basis. To that end, the letter expresses a readiness to pursue a "problem-solving" dialogue through private and candid exchanges with the Soviet leadership.

We have prepared the letter for transmission to the White House on the assumption that Andropov's health and political situation will be clarified before too long.⁶ Should events in Moscow warrant otherwise, we can revise the address on the letter as appropriate.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President (Tab 1)⁷ transmitting the draft letter to Andropov (Tab 2).⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Two handwritten notes in the upper right-hand corner read: “Given direct to McFarlane by GPS 12/3” and “done & given to Bud.” McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and Hill’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on December 3.

² See [Document 81](#).

³ The President went on State visits to Japan from November 9 to 12 and to South Korea from November 12 to 14.

⁴ The draft is attached but not printed. The Soviet delegation walked out of the INF negotiations in Geneva on November 23 after the West German Bundestag voted to approve INF deployment. For Reagan’s statement on the suspension of the talks, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1624–1625. For Nitze’s statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 1000–1001. Andropov issued a statement on November 24 explaining the Soviet decision and cancelling the Soviet moratorium on deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union; see *ibid.*, pp. 1005–1009.

⁵ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 140](#) and [Document 158](#).

⁶ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 140](#).

⁷ The memorandum is attached but not printed.

⁸ Shultz wrote in the margin: “do *not* send. Put in as item for the Sat. meeting of the Soviet group.” A note written by an unknown hand in the margin reads: “S/S—Secretary passed original signed Sec/Pres to McFarlane on 12/3 AM.”

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 7, 1983, 1607Z

15284. For the Secretary, Eagleburger and Burt. Dept. Pass Urgently to Secretary and Burt. Subject: Soviet Posture Towards US Likely To Harden.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. The Soviets have announced their military countermeasures to the INF decision and have walked out of the talks.² The attitude they will assume towards other arms control negotiations and, more specifically, towards the U.S., is just beginning to develop. Our guess is that the Soviet tactics, which Dobrynin, Bessmertnykh and colleagues from the Central Committee have probably been busy devising, will be aimed at denying the U.S. either the actuality or even the appearance of being able to conduct a fruitful relationship with Moscow. Their hope is to improve their bargaining position by stepping up European pressures on us, reinforced by American public pressures as the 1984 election campaign gets into full swing.

3. A Soviet move to enforce a pause in the START and perhaps even the MBFR talks would be part of this tactical effort.³ We have already been informed of the Soviet unwillingness to hold a bilateral round of discussions in Washington on non-proliferation, and the response has been temporizing on scheduling the next round of talks on upgrading crisis communication facilities. Attendance at our official functions in Moscow is dwindling and we are being turned down for appointments with many of the

foreign policy specialists we can usually see (an exception is the MFA, which still receives us).

4. We had all anticipated that this would be the winter of Soviet discontent, and that we'd have to get through some turbulence before drawing on the new assets in our military and political situation in Europe to achieve a better balance in US-Soviet relations. One way to exacerbate the difficult period we face is to rub the Soviets' face in their defeat; another is to stress that they have no choice but to swallow it and come back to the table. That will just stiffen their determination to show us and the Europeans that real business is indeed impossible with the Reagan administration and that they must be taken seriously. Moreover, if we attempt to predict Soviet behavior in our public statements, we increase the incentive for them to undermine our credibility by ensuring that the predictions don't come to pass.

5. Our general approach to the Soviets at this juncture should be focused on our own responsible and sober assessment of the issues, coupled with a willingness to engage in a dialogue with Moscow on these issues. The tone set by the President in reacting to the end of the INF talks is the one we want to maintain, even if the Soviets freeze several other areas of relations. To keep the initiative there are several things we might consider:

A. The Secretary's attendance at Stockholm is valuable for us tactically, since Gromyko will either have to pass up attending the opening or will be at a loss to explain things if the Soviets turn down the U.S. offer of a bilateral meeting. The fact of a meeting, if it takes place, will speak loudly—and we need not claim more for it than can be sustained by subsequent events. We can take quiet

satisfaction in holding the meeting without forcing the Soviets to rebut premature optimism about its outcome.

B. The uncertainties about resumption of various arms control negotiations should not deter us from developing new approaches and letting it be known that we have serious contributions to make whenever the Soviets are willing to sit down again in a genuine effort to reach agreement.

C. The Soviets may be proceeding from the assumption that they have nothing to lose by turning their backs on us for a while. Small gestures are unlikely to tempt them, but they might find it hard to resist an approach on the Middle East. Our reading of their current position is that they are worried about where their Syrian client might lead them, that they have no coherent strategy, and that they would dearly like to restore the appearance of being taken seriously somewhere in the world, and not least the Middle East. At relatively low cost, we could consult with them formally and visibly, seeking common denominators but yielding none of our vital interests. The offer of a Shultz-Gromyko meeting on the Middle East in a third country setting (e.g., Geneva) could serve these purposes.

D. The China card can help whet Moscow's interest in reviving a balanced U.S.-Soviet relationship, but only if it is played subtly, avoiding public challenges to which Soviet leaders will have to reply out of pride or anger. We would think Beijing shares this concept of how to handle its relations with the U.S.

6. Most of all, we have to combine patience with willingness to talk. The Soviets have fundamental interests that can best be advanced at the negotiating table with us. Our task in the next few months is not to let them place us

in the position of coaxing them back, thereby weakening our position at the table; not to bypass possible opportunities to talk, thereby [garble—heightening] the nervousness of our allies; and not to gloat at their discomfort, thereby allowing them to make us, not them, the issue.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

² See [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

³ When the current session of START talks ended on December 8, the Soviets refused to set a date to reconvene the talks. In his diary entry for December 8, Reagan wrote: "The Soviets have walked out of the START talks but not so definitely as in the I.N.F. talks. This is regular time for holiday break and they didn't say they wouldn't be back. They just said they were unable at this time to set a date for their return." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 296)

143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 12, 1983, 1531Z

15443. Subject: Soviet Decision To Shut Down US-Soviet Dialogue? Ref: A. Ottawa 08998, B. Moscow 015409.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: There is mounting evidence that the Soviets have recently undertaken a major review of their approach to US-Soviet relations between now and the US Presidential elections. One outcome of that review appears to have been a decision to do everything possible to create the impression that the US-Soviet dialogue has broken down and the relationship is worsening. In pursuit of that end, the Soviets appear willing to shut down or deemphasize channels of communication through use of which the US has in the past been able to demonstrate a continuing dialogue. This implies Gromyko may either refuse to meet with the Secretary in Stockholm, or use the meeting for a sharp attack on the administration. We should be prepared for either contingency. End summary.

3. Ref A's report of Arbatov's suggestion that a major Soviet review of East-West policy was underway at the time of the Pearson visit fits with a number of hints here that such a reassessment has recently been completed.²

—The first was Dobrynin's return to Moscow on November 20, well in advance, it is now clear, of this year's second Party Plenum, and in contrast to his usual practice of returning to the USSR closer to the year's end holiday. We

understand that Sokolov, one of the two Minister-Counselors in the Soviet Embassy, was also in Moscow during this period.

—A second was the disappearance shortly after Dobrynin's return of USA Department Chief Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, ostensibly "on leave." Bessmertnykh returned to work December 5, according to USA Department staffers.

—A third was USA Institute Director Georgiy Arbatov's absence from Moscow during the same general period. Embassy officers working on arrangements for the recent Dartmouth Group visit to Moscow were told November 21 by the Institute's Deputy Director that Arbatov was "out of town" and "unreachable." We know Arbatov was in Tokyo as of November 16 and resurfaced in Moscow December 2.

4. It seems unlikely to us that so many of the Soviets' top USA experts should be away from their posts by coincidence at so critical a moment in US-Soviet relations. We think it virtually certain that some kind of review has, in fact, taken place since the Bundestag vote and the introduction of the first components for US LRINF in Europe.³ Such high level examinations have occurred in the past at important junctures in East-West relations; we recall that Dobrynin was in Moscow for a similar session in December 1979—before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is possible that the results of such a session could be released at the forthcoming CPSU Plenum.

5. Our guess is that the most recent review has been devoted to plotting Soviet strategy toward the US between now and the Presidential elections. As we reported Ref B, a US academic with excellent access has gained the strong impression during a recent visit that the outcome of the US elections had become the primary determinant of Soviet

policy.⁴ While we have no way of knowing what decisions may have been taken during the review, we suspect we are already seeing its first results. These point to a decision to create the impression of a complete break-down in the US-Soviet dialogue.

—The first evidence of such an approach was Moscow's breaking off of the INF talks, although that decision appears to have been made before any formal review.

—A second sign, which may well have been approved during the reassessment, was the Soviets' terminating of the current START round without setting a resumption date.

—Moscow's reluctance to schedule NPT talks for December seems of a piece with the START decision, and Soviet ambiguity about continuing the MBFR talks suggests a similar scenario may be contemplated in Vienna.

—Soviet authorities have meanwhile told a visiting US academic here that recent exchanges between the Secretary and Dobrynin in Washington seem designed simply to sustain the appearance of an on-going dialogue, while Washington stands pat on matters of substance.

—The Turkish Embassy here has informed us that during farewell calls last week by former Ambassador Halefoglu, Korniyenko made the same complaints about recent exchanges with Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.

6. These actions suggest a Soviet perception that the Reagan administration may be vulnerable in Europe and the US on the issue of its handling of the USSR, and a determination to do everything possible to fuel fears that the relationship is dangerously out of control. The Soviets

presumably calculate that such tactics will reinvigorate peace movements on both sides of the Atlantic, lead to greater pressure on NATO governments to accept a pause in INF deployments, widen differences within NATO, and ultimately redound to the President's disadvantage next November.

7. Such an approach, as we noted at the time, was foreshadowed in Andropov's September 28 remarks on the US.⁵ Nor is there anything new in the tactic of charging the US with breaking off the bilateral dialogue; it was used after both Afghanistan and Poland. What is new is an apparent Soviet determination this time around to put on ice or degrade those channels through the use of which we have in the past been able to deny claims that we were not talking. In so doing, of course, the Soviets are running a risk that they themselves will be blamed for obstructing a dialogue. (Our own efforts will presumably be directed toward precisely this end.) They will also be constrained by a desire to avoid unduly alarming their own populace. Moscow appears to have concluded, however, that these risks are outweighed by the need to deny the administration any hope of pointing to on-going discussions as a means of calming domestic and European concerns over East-West tensions.

8. An early test of this hypothesis will, of course, come at the forthcoming Stockholm meeting. If the Soviets have in fact made a decision to portray the US-Soviet relationship as having broken down, Gromyko may well refuse to meet with Secretary Shultz. Even if he is prepared to meet, there will be a strong probability that his purpose will be to expose strains in the relationship. While Moscow may simply choose not to send Gromyko to Stockholm, our guess is that the event provides too effective a propaganda platform for him to pass up. Whichever scenario he follows,

we should anticipate an effort to deny us any benefit from our willingness to meet.⁶

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731-0263. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ottawa, and Rome.

² In telegram 8998 from Ottawa, December 8, the Embassy reported: "the Soviets said they were undertaking a basic policy review on East-West relations over next two to three weeks; blamed the U.S. for the breakdown of INF; were pessimistic that any constructive dialogue was possible with the present administration; and even hinted they might not return to START." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830724-0759)

³ The Bundestag vote was on November 22.

⁴ In telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10, the Embassy reported that an unnamed American academic said that "a significant shift has taken place in Soviet thinking and attitudes, especially towards the U.S., over the past six months. Where earlier Soviet decision-making was founded almost exclusively on pragmatism and reasoned calculation of Soviet interests, emotionalism and even irrationality are now entering into play. The academic perceives a growing paranoia among Soviet officials, and sees them literally obsessed by fear of war. He believes that the U.S. Presidential elections have become the central determining factor in Soviet foreign policy." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830728-0711) See also Matlock's analysis in [Document 144](#).

⁵ See [Document 120](#).

⁶ Shultz and Gromyko met on January 18, 1984, in Stockholm. See [Document 159](#).

**144. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, December 13, 1983

SUBJECT

American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I.² It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

—Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

—A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

—The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

—There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/13/83); NLR-748-24-43-1-3. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the page by McFarlane reads: "This just doesn't seem plausible to me (i.e. severe anxiety & fear of war). M."

² Attached but not printed is telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10. See [footnote 4, Document 143](#).

145. Memorandum From the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) and the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Combining INF and START

With the Soviets having “discontinued” INF negotiations, the question of combining INF/START into a single negotiating forum may assume greater currency. Over the past months a number of allied figures have, on a variety of occasions, argued in favor of combining START and INF. It is also possible that the Soviets will propose to combine INF and START issues in some fashion. This memo examines this question in some detail, and also discusses possible Soviet approaches to the issue. On balance, we do not believe that combining START and INF would be in the U.S. interest. However, we need to study how we would respond to Soviet proposals for some type of merger.

It is an historical accident that INF and START are two separate negotiations. Had SALT II been ratified, it is possible that INF systems would have been negotiated directly in SALT III. The 1979 dual track decision states that INF would be addressed “within the SALT framework.” However, even in the Carter Administration there was considerable nervousness about the impact of strategic-theater negotiating linkages. Specific commitments to such linkage were avoided in the SALT II Joint Statement of Principles.²

Over the past months arguments have surfaced that it would make sense to combine the START and INF negotiations. Statements in favor of such a merger have, for example, been adopted by the Danish and Dutch Parliaments. We see the genesis of such sentiment as a way of avoiding U.S. deployments. Now that deployments have begun and the Soviets have "discontinued" the INF negotiations we can expect further pressure for a merger from those sensitive to public pressure against deployments.

There are a number of arguments against a merger. From our point of view the most compelling argument is that, in a combined INF and START negotiation, the Soviets can be expected to exploit the blurred distinctions between INF and strategic systems. The Soviets would, for example, seek to include U.S. "FBS" and third country medium-range systems in the merged forum because these systems can strike the USSR and hence meet the Soviet definition of "strategic."³ At the same time, the Soviets would seek to exclude their "medium-range" systems on grounds that they cannot strike the U.S.

Combining INF and START would considerably complicate both sets of negotiations and could risk the loss of what progress we have made in separate INF and START talks during the last two years. While the U.S. and the Soviets remain far apart on central issues in both negotiations, there has been some narrowing of differences on some issues, for example, treatment of aircraft and geographic scope in INF. Such gains could be lost if the two talks were merged. A combined forum, from the U.S. perspective, would have to cover a range of Soviet missile systems from the SS-18 down to the SS-23. Two separate fora are simpler to manage and permit each negotiation to progress at its own pace.

Next, merging INF and START would also increase the potential for intra-Alliance problems. Separate INF and START fora allow separate Alliance consultative mechanisms. In INF the Allies play an active role while in START the United States, for the most part, informs its Allies of unilateral U.S. policy decisions. This separation is very much in the U.S. interest. NATO consultations on INF have proved effective, and have allowed Allies to play an active role in the formulation of U.S. INF policy. The Allies have become accustomed to such a role, and it would be unrealistic not to expect them to want to continue it in combined INF/START negotiations. The more that INF issues lost their separate character in such a negotiation, the harder it would be to keep our commitment to consultations focused only on such issues. We do not believe it would be in the U.S. interest to involve Allies directly in the decision-making process on U.S. strategic arms control policy. To do so would greatly complicate that process and would lead to the Allies wanting to have a say with regard to purely strategic issues, such as modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Combining INF and START would also cause difficulties in reconciling different U.S. approaches to the two sets of talks, particularly with respect to units of account. For example, the U.S. has made a concerted effort in START to reduce Soviet throw-weight. There is no parallel concern in INF, and therefore we have made no corresponding effort to address the throw-weight of Soviet INF missiles. The Soviets could be expected to exploit a merged negotiation by arguing for adoption of INF's "simpler" unit of account—warheads only. Their objective would be to move us away from the emphasis on reducing the destructive capability of ballistic missiles that we have expressed in START. Application of "build-down" to INF would also raise

problems because the U.S. would have to begin such a build-down from a base of fewer LRINF missiles.

If INF and START were to be combined, we would also face potential Allied concerns that the U.S. was more interested in limiting strategic systems that threaten the U.S. directly than in limiting INF systems which threaten Western Europe. The active consultative process on INF has to date allayed such Allied fears. It is not clear we could reassure the Allies in a like manner if INF and START were merged. Certainly any efforts at INF/START trade-offs—a major interest of many merger proponents—would be carefully and critically scrutinized by our Allies.

Moreover, we have argued in INF that a Soviet effort to seek compensation for U.K. and French forces is not based on a substantive concern but is merely a pretext to rationalize unequal limits on U.S. and Soviet INF systems. This argument has proven effective in rebutting Soviet claims for compensation. We could lose the argument if INF and START were combined. On the other hand, some would argue that combining the two talks might actually make it easier to deal with the compensation issue, since the inability of even modernized British and French forces to present any credible offensive threat to the USSR would become even more self-evident when measured against the entire panoply of Soviet strategic and INF forces. Such an argument could, however, be undermined should a combined negotiation lead to substantial reductions in Soviet strategic forces while the U.K. and French proceed with plans to increase substantially the number of their own warheads.

In sum, we do not believe there is a compelling rationale for combining INF and START and that doing so could pose dangerous pitfalls for the U.S.

Nevertheless, we will need a strategy for rebutting public arguments for combining INF and START. In doing so we believe the U.S. could best draw upon the following themes, at least until final decisions are made about how to proceed on the INF/START relationship:

—Responsibility for the interruption of INF lies with the Soviets alone and we must not appear to let them off the hook by offering an alternative negotiating forum.

—Separate fora have already been established for negotiating limits on INF and on START systems. Although it is less than we would have hoped, definite progress has been made in both these negotiations. A merger could undermine this progress.

—Problems in both negotiations cannot be solved merely by transferring them from one to another forum.

—A combined INF/START negotiation would be extremely complex.

—Separate fora have allowed each negotiation to progress at its own rate. If the talks were combined, differences over issues in either the INF or the strategic context could bring the entire dialogue to a stalemate.

—The Soviets would attempt to exploit a merged negotiation to U.S./NATO disadvantage. For example, they would try to focus it on those systems they call strategic, including so-called U.S. “forward-based systems,” by excluding their own medium-range systems, such as SS-20s.

Regardless of the U.S. position on merger, the Soviets may seek to accomplish their ends without proposing a merger. They could simply move U.S./INF systems into START.

The Soviets have already laid the necessary groundwork for including P-II and GLCM in START. The Soviets might also seek to include all U.S. "FBS" in combined START and INF talks. They may well seek compensation for British and French forces as well. Under such an approach the Soviets would, however, face some difficult decisions on what to do with their own medium-range systems. The Soviets might attempt to exclude their own medium-range systems from combined talks on grounds that their systems cannot strike the U.S. and hence are not comparable to U.S. "FBS." But such a position would appear extremely one-sided and hence could undermine Soviet efforts to portray themselves to European audiences as sincerely interested in arms control.

Another possible Soviet approach might be to propose formal combination of the talks, but seek to maintain more or less separate strategic and medium-range negotiating positions which would, however, be linked at the top in some general fashion. For example, a combined negotiating team could be established, or an agreement in one forum could be explicitly tied to an agreement in the other. This approach would allow the Soviets the option of negotiating their own "counter-deployments" against U.S. P-II and GLCM deployments, with the least disruption to negotiating positions previously established in both START and INF.

Accordingly we recommend that the work currently underway on how to respond to the various possible Soviet actions re resumption of START, including the possibility that the Soviets may propose including certain INF systems in the resumed START talks, be focused on developing a fully analyzed and coordinated position prior to your possible meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret.

Forwarded through Adelman. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² For the text of the SALT II Joint Statement of Principles, signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, pp. 1078-1079.

³ During the INF negotiations, the Soviet delegates argued that British and French systems should factor into reduction totals. U.S. forward-based systems (FBS), which could strike the Soviet Union, were also a contentious issue.

146. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)¹

Washington, December 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Moscow Tea Leaves—The Role of the Military in Soviet Policy toward the U.S.

With their moves to create uncertainty over the future of East-West dialogue in not only INF but now START, MBFR and possibly CDE as well, the Soviets have chosen a tough approach as a way of stepping up European and American public anxieties and, ultimately, pressures for a weakening of particular U.S. policies. While this tactic tracks with the general line set down in Andropov's September 28 statement,² we also have indications that they have been conducting a general policy review on East-West relations over the past month.³

The problems inherent in speculation about Kremlin leadership dynamics behind such a decision are well-known; reliable information is simply too sketchy to allow for overly ambitious interpretation. Nonetheless—while reaffirming the familiar caveats that senior Soviet civil and military leaders share much the same experience and world-view and that their interaction takes place within a strong tradition of party control over the military—we would call your attention to several recent items which cumulatively suggest the possibility of an increasing (and perhaps parochially hawkish) voice for the senior Soviet

military precisely at this time when major decisions vis-a-vis relations with the U.S. are being made.

—The spate of background-noise rumors that our Embassies in Moscow and Eastern Europe are picking up on the theme that, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding Andropov's physical and political health,⁴ "the Soviet military now enjoys a degree of autonomy in the military sphere unprecedented in the post-war Soviet Union," and that "its power is growing." Yugoslavs and Romanians could be expected to highlight this danger, but we are now getting it from other East Europeans and Soviets as well. (On the other hand, we note that Bulgaria's Zhivkov is taking pains to deny to recent U.S. visitors "that the military could have a decisive influence in any communist country".)⁵ Such speculation about the military might well be considered as par for the course under the circumstances, but that does not mean there may not be some substance to it.

—The curious intimations in the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy contretemps which suggested not just Soviet clumsiness in attempting to embarrass us (or Nitze) with the Allies, but also some sort of disconnect or disagreement within Moscow.⁶ Nitze has suggested it was a failed bureaucratic end-run by part of the MFA around elements of the military establishment over the substance of the "Equal Reductions" ploy, though others seriously question this interpretation given the composition of those on the Soviet Delegation who reportedly were in the know on this.

—An intriguing article by Fëdor Burlatskiy in the November 23 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* which, in the ostensible guise of recreating JFK's Oval Office deliberations with the NSC during the Cuban Missile Crisis, takes great pains to make the point that "the most terrible thing there can be is to

allow the military to take part in political decisions.” Burlatskiy, drawing an implicit parallel to the current INF situation, describes the problems of political leaders in curbing “military hawks” who were pressing for rash responses to the emplacement of threatening missiles in nearby Cuba. (Burlatskiy has had special ties with Andropov in the past, and in 1982 wrote a somewhat similar piece analyzing the political stagnation of Maoist China that was widely seen as an indictment of the Brezhnev system within the Soviet Union;⁷ he himself made sure that Westerners realized it was a parable about the USSR.)

There is, of course, a temptation to read too much into all of this. We do not intend to suggest any sudden shift in power nor dramatic divergence of policy view within Moscow. Whatever hints of sharp internal differences someone like Burlatskiy might coyly drop, we do not doubt that there continues to be a basic consensus within the Soviet leadership élite on the fundamentals of Soviet foreign and defense policy. Similarly, it is not that surprising that, after a decade during which the institutional influence of military professionals has been on the rise, the senior military should now be playing a central role when such national security matters as arms control are high on the agenda. Particular tales for foreign audiences of beleaguered “liberals” within the leadership, moreover, can have obvious and self-serving purposes.

Nonetheless, the evidence—tenuous but accumulating—is worthy of our note. That the Soviet military is a critical actor today in Soviet succession questions and decision-making is perhaps a truism; what the military’s precise effect on specific Soviet policy choices might be, however, remains quite unclear. Our very uncertainty in this regard, however, only underscores the special need for consistency

and coherence in our own policies and statements during this difficult period.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley on December 9; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Haass in substance, Kelly, and Baraz for information. An unknown hand initialed for Dunkerley. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 16. A stamped notation indicates Eagleburger saw the memorandum on December 19. He wrote in the margin: "Very good piece! LSE."

² See [Document 120](#).

³ See [Document 143](#).

⁴ Andropov's public appearances were greatly limited, which led to much speculation about his health. See [footnote 2, Document 140](#). In telegram 14870 from Moscow, November 29, the Embassy relayed an unconfirmed report from a Soviet physician that Andropov was in "'grave' condition" and "cannot be expected to return to a full schedule or to remain in office for much more than a year." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830701-0028) For a subsequent report on Andropov's condition, see [Document 151](#).

⁵ From December 10 to 12, a delegation led by Congressman Sam Gibbons (D-Florida) visited Bulgaria and met with various members of the leadership, including President Zhivkov. The main purpose of this visit was to explore possible openings in trade relations with Bulgaria. During the meeting, the following exchange occurred: "Congressman Conable said there was much uncertainty in the U.S. about who was in charge in Moscow. In view of

Andropov's evidently serious illness, many thought the Soviet military were in the saddle. Zhivkov denied that the military could have decisive policy influence in any Communist country." They "had their tasks to fulfill, but they were under the control of the Communist Party." (Telegram 4650 from Sofia, December 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830734-0166)

⁶ Shultz and Dobrynin discussed this on November 18. See [Document 137](#). Documents on this are also scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security 1977-1983](#).⁶

⁷ Burlatsky's *Novy Mir* article on China's economic reforms as a possible example for the Soviet Union was discussed in telegram 5861 from Moscow, May 13, 1982. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820251-0640)

**147. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, December 19, 1983

SUBJECT

Letter to Andropov

Attached at Tab I is a clean draft of the letter to Andropov.² It is essentially the revised draft submitted earlier,³ except that it takes account of the fact that the President will not be making the speech until January. I think it best not to refer to the speech specifically this far in advance, but have included a sentence at the end of the first paragraph to foreshadow it.

The language in brackets on page three should be used only if Hartman is able to deliver it to one of Andropov's aides (or, of course to Andropov himself—but this is most unlikely). That point could be covered in the instructions to Hartman, and the actual letter could be signed after we learn how delivery was made.

You will want to examine with particular care the language on the Middle East and Lebanon at the bottom of page three. Secretary Shultz may feel that this opens us up to inviting the Soviets into the ME peace process. I do not believe it does, in fact. The reason I suggest it is that I believe the Soviets have a strong desire to discuss the Middle East with us, and I believe it can be done without opening the door to their greater involvement in the area. At some point, we may wish to discuss such matters as

expanding the UNIFIL mandate, and this can be done more effectively if we have some general discussions behind us. (Hartman's recent discussion with Gromyko was, I believe, useful.)⁴

In any event, the letter needs some "bait" if we are to expect the Soviets to bite. We must recognize that they look at consultations in general as furthering *our* political purposes and will be reluctant to grant them unless they are convinced that something may come out of them and that the agenda will include, at least in part, matters of interest to them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you coordinate the attached text with Secretary Shultz.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner, likely by McFarlane, reads: "Return by courier."

² The draft letter is not attached to this copy of the memorandum, but a copy is attached to a December 18 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983) See [Documents 149](#) and [150](#) regarding the final letter.

³ See [Document 141](#). In his December 18 covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As I mentioned to you yesterday, Jack Matlock and I have taken another look at the draft Presidential letter to Andropov,

which we think should be sent immediately before a Presidential speech on US-Soviet relations. We have agreed on a revised text of the letter, which is attached. It mainly reflects new developments since the original draft was sent over to the White House. If you have any comments or suggestions, I am standing by." Shultz wrote in the margin: "RB Good ltr. No comments. G." (Ibid.)

⁴ Hartman and Gromyko met on December 10 in Moscow to discuss the Middle East. (Telegram 350505 from Moscow, December 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830012-0432)

⁵ McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, it is clear that the letter was coordinated with Shultz. In a December 19 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: Attached is an updated version of the draft Presidential letter to Andropov, reworked by Jack Matlock and me. The only changes from the draft you saw earlier today [see [footnote 3, above](#)] are contained in the first paragraph omitting reference to the Presidential speech on US-Soviet relations." McKinley wrote in the margin: "The Secretary approves." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983)

148. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 19, 1983

TALKING POINTS ON SPY WAR

—There is a continuing espionage war. The Soviets are taking quite a beating over the last year or so.

—[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (6½ lines) not declassified]

—At that time the Tokyo press was publishing the names and pictures of over 25 Japanese who had been disclosed in the *Reader's Digest* by the KGB Levchenko to have worked for the Soviets in previous years. This was probably the Soviet response to these disclosures in Japan which the KGB attributed to the CIA because we were sending the KGB defector Levchenko around the world briefing [less than 1 line not declassified] friendly countries on how the Soviets operate in active measures and espionage.

—The more recent approach probably comes from the punishment the Soviets have been taking in the espionage game around the world over the past year [3½ lines not declassified].

—During the last year, close to 150 Soviets have been expelled mostly in Europe and Asia. This is more than triple the yearly average for 1975-1980. This action has been taken by virtually every Western power, every one of our close allies, neutral countries [less than 1 line not declassified] and Third World countries, [less than 1 line

not declassified]. Since Soviet retaliation has thus far been weak, other states are encouraged to take similar action [*1 line not declassified*].

—In addition to expulsions, Soviets have sustained major defections. [*7 lines not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]

—An increasing number of countries, now including the ASEAN states, deny visas to Soviets expelled from other nations, thus compounding the negative impact.

—Allegations of Soviet/Bulgarian involvement in the shooting of the Pope have damaged the Soviets, and their efforts to counter them have been ineffectual.

—[*1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified*]

—Soviet intelligence, with the traditional paranoia of a police state society, undoubtedly overestimates both their vulnerability and our intentions. It's unlikely that any discussion of rules for the spy war will go anywhere. It may be that they merely want to see how we react, whether they can learn anything about us and, perhaps more important, about some defectors whose whereabouts must mystify them. We would hope to get further insights into their purposes, their state of mind and the state of the KGB.

—There is a more serious side to this. Operational guidance to overseas agents from both the KGB and the military intelligence, GRU, seem to show a high state of

nervousness about and some aggressive reactions to what they see as a new western aggressiveness.

—[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

—Obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union will not be surprised by an actual threat of war or preparations for a nuclear attack; determine the enemy's intentions and actions, primarily in the field of strategic armaments, and acquire information concerning production and deployment programs for the MX, Trident, and Pershing II missiles, cruise missiles, western space weapons, and other fundamentally new methods of warfare; collect technical information, materials, and samples of benefit to the Soviet domestic economy, and to the implementation of the food program; acquire current information on basic research and discoveries in the most important areas of western science and technology; recruit new and valuable sources who can be used to collect intelligence or as channels for active measures, and improve work with agents of influence who can be used to influence the adversary to our benefit, particularly those agents through whom hostile intelligence services can be discredited.

—[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

—A final message was brought from a November 27–December 3 conference in Moscow by Bob Neuman (former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) and Hal Saunders (former Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East). A Deputy Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party gave them each a

message, delivered seriously and, they believe, under instruction. The message was:

At the same time, there are signs that the Soviets have developed a new respect and accorded new credibility to US policy. A Soviet officer returning to Moscow reported that among officers at significant Soviet headquarters with whom his duties brought him in contact had formed the opinion that "President Reagan surrounded himself with a good, capable team of advisors and organized his Administration professionally. This done, he tackled the economy, a subject that was foremost on the minds of Americans, and he straightened out the economic situation of the country by taking a strong and clear-cut position."

"Having gained the confidence of the American people by dealing effectively with economic matters, President Reagan's hands are not tied with respect to foreign policy and, specifically, with respect to his attitude toward the Soviet Union. GRU officials believe that Mr. Reagan's tough stance toward the Soviet Union is highly beneficial to the military-industrial complex."

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 14, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '83). Secret. The talking points were likely drafted by Gates for Casey's discussion with Reagan on the "Spy War" and the general reporting on the increased Soviet intelligence activities related to the "war scare." (See [Document 135](#).) In his memoir, Gates recalled: "Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union

would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine 'the enemy's' intentions and actions. Finally, the GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information 'seems to reflect a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations.'" (Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 271-272) No record of a meeting with Casey on December 22 appears in the President's schedule. However, a telephone call from Reagan to Casey at 5:15 p.m. was noted. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

On December 23, Casey sent the President a memorandum dated December 22 on "the Spy War and Doomsday Talk," which directly correlates to these talking points; however, the memorandum was a short summary and did not include as much detail on Soviet collection activities. In the covering memorandum to Reagan, Casey wrote: "In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west: First, is a memo reporting on the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and grudging respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 1, Folder: Meeting w/the President (Backup) (10 Jan '84))

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 23, 1983, 2239Z

Tosec 160014/363464. Special Encryption—Nodis/Alpha. Amb. Hartman only. Subject: Letter to Andropov.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. You should arrange to deliver the following letter from the President to Andropov. Note that the bracketed paragraph (“If you would find it helpful . . . and unofficial basis”) is to be included in the text of the letter handed over only rpt only if you are able to give the letter directly to Andropov or to one of his immediate aides, such as Alexandrov. If you are compelled to deliver the letter via the Foreign Ministry, the bracketed language should not rpt not be included in the text. Please let us know immediately (by Nodis Alpha cable) to whom the letter was given and whether the bracketed language was included.²

3. Begin text: Dear Mr. Chairman:

On his recent return to Moscow, Ambassador Hartman conveyed to Foreign Minister Gromyko some of my thoughts on the current direction of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I continue to believe that despite the profound differences between our two nations, there are opportunities—indeed a necessity—for us to work together to prevent conflicts, to expand our dialogue, and to place our relationship on a more stable and constructive footing. Though we will be vigorous in protecting our interests and those of our friends and allies

we do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people. We are ready to deal seriously and positively with you and your government in an effort to reach mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions to the problems in our relationship. I will be stressing these themes in my public statements over the coming weeks, and hope that my desire to build a more stable relationship will be reciprocated on your part.

In considering the issues now confronting our nations. I especially regret the decision of the Soviet Union not to continue negotiations for the reduction and elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Since your August 27 letter to me,³ both our governments made new proposals. For our part, we have sought to address particular Soviet concerns, but have not yet seen a comparable readiness on the Soviet side. The negotiations have reached a stage which suggests the potential for forward movement in some areas; clearly, however, much more needs to be done. Thus, I see no justification for an interruption of these talks, particularly since for two years we were willing to negotiate while you deployed new missiles.

As I have pledged, both publicly and privately, the United States seeks and will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at equal, but much lower levels than now exist. I still feel that zero on both sides is the best solution. We are, of course, prepared to continue the search for an agreement. It is only through serious negotiations that the reduction and eventual elimination of the weapons over which the Soviet Union has voiced such public concern can be achieved.

This also is true as regards reductions in our respective strategic nuclear arsenals. As you are aware, over recent months we have made significant modifications to our

position in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. We will continue to insist that any START agreement be meaningful—that it lead to real reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems, as measured by their warheads, and in the overall destructive power of our two strategic forces. In seeking a lower and more stable strategic balance, however, we do not insist on identical force structures.

Any successful negotiation must eventually embody a balance between the interests and advantages of both sides. If the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to meaningful reductions in ballistic missile warheads and destructive power, where it holds the advantage, the United States is prepared to accept more stringent limits on heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, where it possesses certain advantages. If we could achieve a balance of capabilities in this manner, we would be able to develop a common framework for carrying out strategic arms reductions. Thus far, however, our efforts to explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into balance have been rebuffed. I urge you to reconsider carefully our latest proposals, for I believe they offer an approach which could be fruitful. I would welcome your own thoughts in this regard. We are prepared for a serious and confidential dialogue on this issue.

(If you would find it helpful, I am prepared to send to Moscow a personal emissary who is thoroughly familiar with my thinking on this issue to deal with you or your designee directly. He could explore the possibilities of this approach—or others you might wish to suggest—with you and your advisers in private, on a totally confidential and unofficial basis.)⁴

Efforts to achieve bilateral arms control, however, constitute only one part of our relationship, and their benefits can be undercut by actions and events in other areas. I must particularly note the dangers posed by an escalation of tensions in any of the world's troubled regions. The Middle East is one of these, and I am sure you appreciate the dangers inherent in the turmoil in Lebanon. Though we may not be able to agree on the causes of this tragic situation, or on the steps necessary to restore peace to the region, I believe it is incumbent on both our governments to use our influence to urge restraint on all the parties and to curb the resort to violence. This, also, is one of the topics which might benefit from a more detailed private discussion.

These are only a few of the issues that divide us, but all of them underscore the need for a meaningful dialogue between us. Events seem to have forced us both to communicate largely through the public media, which obviously undermines our ability to reach practical solutions. While I am under no illusions as to the difficulty of the problems we now face, I nonetheless believe that serious and forthright exchanges could open up avenues to mutually beneficial arrangements. In this connection, I hope that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be able to meet with Secretary Shultz in Stockholm in January, and that we can establish a pattern of regular high-level consultations, along with confidential exchanges of views at other levels.

You have pledged to me your commitment to peace and I have made a similar and heartfelt pledge to you. In your letter of August 27, you wrote of "the need for a broad, considered approach and for taking bold political decisions looking to the future." If you are indeed prepared to take such an approach and to make far-reaching decisions and, by doing so, to address in a tangible way some of the basic

causes for divisions between our two nations, then you will not find the United States lacking for a positive response comparable in scope.

I await your thoughts on these matters, and on any others which you feel we should address in a joint search for ways to move relations between our countries in a more positive direction.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

End text.

Dam

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hill; cleared in S/S-O and by McFarlane; approved by Dam. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz. A handwritten note reads: "Letter delivered to Gromyko on 12/24—no cable (reported by phone)."

² In a note to Shultz on December 20, Poindexter wrote: "Mr. Secretary, The President has approved the attached draft. The bracketed language on page 3 should be included only if Amb. Hartman is permitted to deliver the letter directly to Andropov." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983) A handwritten note on the attached copy of the telegram reads: "Bracketed information was *not* included." See [footnote 4, below](#).

³ See [Document 81](#).

⁴ This paragraph, the bracketed text referenced in [footnote 2, above](#), was not included in the text given to Gromyko, See [Document 150](#).

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 26, 1983, 1448Z

15915. Subject: Letter to Andropov. Ref: State 363464.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Upon receipt reftel December 24, I immediately requested through MFA an appointment with Andropov or an assistant such as Aleksandrov. On December 26 I was given an appointment with Gromyko at 3:00 p.m. local, and delivered to him the version of the message without repeat without paragraph regarding special emissary. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Division Chief Bessmertnykh and an interpreter. I was alone.

3. Gromyko explained that Andropov was busy with the preparations for this week's activities (a Supreme Soviet session, presumably preceded by a Party Plenum), and Andropov had thus asked him to receive the message on his behalf. Gromyko opened the message and read through it.

4. Gromyko said he would not attempt to respond on the spot, but he did seek clarification whether the paragraph concerning ballistic missiles pertained to START. I indicated that it did.

5. He said he could react to the paragraph concerning a meeting with the Secretary in Stockholm. It had been decided that he would attend the opening of CDE, and he would be prepared to meet with the Secretary.

6. As for the remainder of the message, he thought we would receive a Soviet response soon. It was not clear whether he meant at Stockholm or before.

7. Gromyko said Andropov and he had received New Year's greeting cards from the President and asked me to convey their thanks. The President would be receiving New Year's greetings from the Soviet leaders in the near future.

8. I told Gromyko I planned to say nothing public about this meeting. Gromyko interjected that it was always Washington that had something to say about such meetings. I reiterated that I did not plan to comment on it, nor on the information Gromyko had provided about his intentions for Stockholm. Obviously, the two sides would have to have some further contact on the timing of a Stockholm meeting.

9. Comment: All my previous meetings with Gromyko have been announced by TASS. I do not know how they will treat this one, but if announced I do not plan to offer any comment on the purpose of the meeting.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-6-5. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Reagan initialed this copy of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

² See [Document 149](#).

151. Report Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 28, 1983

SPOT COMMENTARY: Andropov's Status

UPI reports this morning that a member of the party Central Committee said that Andropov had been hospitalized and would not attend the Supreme Soviet session today.² This source said that Andropov had planned to attend but was told by his doctors to remain in bed. The Central Committee member said that Andropov's specific medical problem was a state secret, but said the problem was not related to his kidneys, and would not normally be a problem for a younger man. He said that Andropov was alert and following the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet closely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Comment: Although Andropov has been out of public view since August, we do not believe he has been ill the whole time. It is likely that since about mid-October he has had more than one setback to his health, and a partial recovery that allowed him to conduct some official activities behind the scenes. [*2 lines not declassified*] The above report is the first authoritative flat denial that his current absence is related to his kidneys, but this does not mean that he has no kidney problems at all. In fact, the Kohl delegation was told last July that he had missed an appointment due to the pain of passing a kidney stone.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet secrecy may have added to Andropov's political problem, making it seem that his long absence might be

due to a single prolonged medical crisis. [*1 line not declassified*].

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-8-3. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by [*3 names not declassified*]. Reagan initialed this copy of the report, indicating that he saw it.

² The Supreme Soviet met in Moscow on December 28.

³ See [footnote 4, Document 60](#).

152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 4, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 3, 1984

Dobrynin came in to see me on my first day in the office following his return from Moscow December 23. He had instructions responding to questions I had asked him before he left for Moscow,² and he appeared to be in a businesslike mood.

My questions essentially asked whether the Soviets are ready for serious private dialogue with us. Dobrynin said he had been instructed by his government to say that they are ready for such a dialogue. He was authorized to conduct personally whatever such discussion we desire. However, he added, they also consider that Art Hartman in Moscow is an appropriate channel for this private dialogue.

Recognizing that Gromyko and I are to meet for some three hours later in the month,³ Dobrynin stressed that the Soviets are not interested in dialogue for the sake of dialogue; dialogue must have content. He asked me what I thought should be discussed in Stockholm.

I agreed that content would be the key to any constructive dialogue, and made the point that each side should be free to bring any issue to the table. On the Stockholm meeting, I said I thought we should review our relationship and how it should be conducted, including mechanisms. On substance, I thought we should discuss arms control (principally START, INF and compliance, but also CDE, MBFR and

confidence-building measures) and regional issues (principally the Middle East, but southern Africa and Afghanistan as well). I told Dobrynin I would also want to discuss human rights. Characteristically he asked why; I replied because of the importance of human rights issues to you and to Americans generally. I said I saw no big bilateral problems on which Gromyko and I needed to spend much time in Stockholm, but added that there might be bilateral issues for others to discuss.

I told Dobrynin that if the Soviets want further discussion of the Stockholm agenda I am ready for it, but it could also be conducted by Rick Burt and his deputy Sokolov.

Dobrynin then referred to your letter to Andropov delivered December 24,⁴ and asked specifically what the language on START meant when it spoke of a common framework embodying a balance between the interests and advantages of both sides. I replied that we are prepared to look for a common framework that accommodates the different force structures of the two sides.

Dobrynin also asked about the language concerning "confidential exchanges of views at other levels" besides me and Gromyko. On this, I said that there might be certain issues on which we could designate others if this seemed appropriate.

In general, we agreed that the next step should be for both sides to begin setting out content for productive dialogue. At the same time, we also agreed that as that process moves along, it would be worthwhile to step back from time to time and have a more philosophical exchange on how different systems can relate to one another. I recalled talks I had had with then-Premier Kosygin about how free-market and centrally-planned economies can deal with

each other.⁵ Dobrynin's examples, such as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings on Cuba, had less to do with differences between systems than with the advantages of private channels like this one for handling sensitive issues between the two countries.

Dobrynin then asked how I saw U.S.-Soviet relations shaping up in 1984. I replied that I saw a question mark here: we want dialogue, but also recognize that things can get out of hand, particularly over differences concerning regional issues like the Middle East. I said I expected the world economy to improve this year, and also noted it would be an election year for us. In this respect, however, I said that although political pundits disagree on how this would affect U.S.-Soviet relations, I expect you will play it straight and determine your policy on the basis of what is good for the country, without reference to partisan politics.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets would respond to anything constructive from Washington even though it is an election year. I could not tell whether he was expressing an official view or only speaking for himself, but this could mean that the Soviets will not intervene in U.S. domestic politics during the coming months.

Mention of our election gave me the opening to ask Dobrynin about what is going on in Moscow. I said we had some sense of a transitional atmosphere there and invited him to comment.

Dobrynin replied that while in Moscow he had visited Andropov at home, and Andropov had asked him questions about what is going on here. Andropov seems to be conducting business at home, and Politburo members see him regularly there. Dobrynin said he had tried to get Armand Hammer⁶ in to see Andropov at home, but the

basic decision had been taken not to receive visitors other than insiders. When I asked about Andropov's illness, Dobrynin replied that he did not know, and had not asked, noting that such matters are more sensitive in the Soviet Union than here. But he did say that during his own visit with Andropov, he (Dobrynin) reached for something Andropov wanted, implying that Andropov has some incapacity in arm movements at least. Politically, however, the agenda for the Politburo's regular Thursday sessions was set by Andropov, and his decisions on issues are final. I am passing these observations to Bill Casey.

Overall, Dobrynin's comments left the impression that Andropov is operating the government from his residence, but is acting as a decisive leader at that distance. For my part I commented that as far as we are concerned there is a functioning Soviet government and we are prepared to deal with it.

In conclusion, Dobrynin said he had to raise one "unpleasant matter" and handed me the text of an "oral statement" protesting our declaration of areas of the Mediterranean as a "zone of dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy."² I said we would study the démarche and respond appropriately. The text of the démarche is being transmitted to the NSC staff by a Hill-McFarlane memorandum.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/03/84-01/04/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on January 3. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note on a Department of State copy of this memorandum reads: "Original Sec/Pres hand carried by GPS to WH." A telegram was drafted for Hartman in

Moscow on January 4 reporting on this meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984—Soviet Union—January)

² The last meeting between Shultz and Dobrynin before the holiday break was on November 18. See [Document 137](#).

³ Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Stockholm on January 18. See [Document 159](#).

⁴ See [Document 149](#).

⁵ During Shultz's tenure as Secretary of the Treasury, he met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in October 1973. See [Document 191, footnote 2 in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXI, *Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976*](#).

⁶ Armand Hammer, President of Occidental Petroleum

⁷ The translated text of the Soviet oral statement reads: "The United States of America, in violation of generally recognized standards of international law and the principles of freedom of seafaring, has declared a vast area of the Mediterranean adjacent to the coast of Lebanon 'a zone of dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy' and established in that zone a special regime for international navigation.

"Introducing these arbitrary restrictions, the American side, in fact, lays claim to having a part of the high seas under its sovereignty, which is in flagrant conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1958 to which the U.S. is a party, too.

"The Soviet side declares a resolute protest in connection with this arbitrary and unlawful act of the U.S., does not recognize the restrictions introduced by the United States, and warns that the entire responsibility for the consequences of that act will be borne by the American side.

“At the same time, we call the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that its actions near the coast of Lebanon cannot fail to aggravate even further the already extremely tense situation in the entire region. The American side should realize what such a dangerous policy can lead to in terms of developments in the Middle East and even beyond that region.” (Telegram 998 to Moscow, January 4; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840030-0732)

**153. Information Memorandum From the
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
(Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, January 5, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Gameplan—The Near Term

Looking back on 1983, we can point to some signal successes in the superpower competition. INF deployment is merely the most notable in a list of achievements that also includes the continued implementation of other major defense programs, the liberation of Grenada, a stronger position in Central America, and improved relations with the PRC. Looking ahead to 1984, we foresee significant opportunities for further progress, including some that could crystallize a shift in what the Soviets call the global correlation of forces. If we can capitalize on these opportunities (which were discussed in our previous memorandum on Soviet client relationships),² the Soviets may become substantially more responsive to our counsels of self-restraint and our proposals for constructive dialogue.

In the near term, however, we will have to contend with a strong Soviet impulse to challenge and defy us. Although the Soviets doubtless recognize that their scare tactics might backfire, they seem to have concluded that a freeze in US-Soviet relations offers the best hope for undermining domestic and allied support for the Administration's policies. This is clearly their direction at present, and they will be extremely reluctant to change course before the US elections. Although there are undoubtedly hypothetical

offers that they could not refuse, we have no intention of making unilateral concessions that would vindicate Soviet tactics and jeopardize our basic strategy. At the same time, Moscow is not at all likely to evince much interest in "small steps" like those that figured so prominently in our earlier gameplan (e.g., cultural exchanges, consular agreements, or merely cosmetic changes in arms control positions). Efforts to stimulate a dialogue in this way will almost certainly fail.

In this situation, our only responsible choice may be to keep our powder dry and wait the Soviets out. In the interim we can count on adroit public diplomacy to ensure that Moscow bears full responsibility for our deadlocked relations. And we can rely on our continued efforts to strengthen ourselves and our allies to deter Soviet attempts to "retaliate" for our recent successes and inflict a humiliating defeat. Since the present Soviet leadership is not particularly dexterous in public diplomacy, nor prone to reckless adventurism, such a steady-as-you-go strategy has much to recommend it.

This prescription, however, does not address, much less resolve a number of dangerous problems around which Soviet-American confrontation could grow. It may also foster an impression of an inactive, even failed foreign policy, and may not dispel the public anxieties that a freeze aims to arouse. Before settling on it, therefore, we should canvass prudent but substantive overtures that might revive high-level dialogue, and interest the Soviets enough to moderate their course.

No initiative would have greater weight, both with Western publics and with a skeptical Soviet leadership, than a reshaped, and much less ambitious, START package. It would ease our alliance management tasks and might

encourage a Soviet policy review as well. At the same time, no other step would look as much like weakness under pressure. Whether to move on this front is the key issue facing the President in the short term.

A second arms control initiative that could be a useful signal to the Soviets is a revised MBFR proposal. Yet despite the responsiveness of such a step both to European concerns and to Soviet claims that we “owe” them a new offer, it would be unlikely to affect Moscow’s overall assessment and might not even bring them back to the table in Vienna.

We have also identified three other candidate initiatives that may deserve consideration, especially in the absence of movement on START. These include opening a more operational discussion of Lebanon and Nicaragua, and an exchange on fundamental issues of European security. Early results are unlikely, but merely launching such initiatives may help to reduce misunderstandings that could lead to crisis. None of these steps is completely risk-free, but we believe the risks can be made manageable and must in any event be weighed against the risks of a deepening US-Soviet freeze.

1. *A Lebanon initiative:* As you know, the Soviets have shown some interest recently in discussing the situation in Lebanon—the only case where US and Soviet forces could be directly embroiled. Picking up on their all-but-official hints, we might indicate our willingness to discuss US policy and presence in Lebanon in conjunction with Soviet policy and presence in Syria. Plainly we have to avoid making our Mideast policy as a whole hostage to Moscow, or granting the Soviets an institutionalized role in the security management of the region. There may, however, be a workable match between our interest in a Lebanese

reconciliation and an orderly withdrawal of US troops, on the one hand, and Soviet interest in avoiding a superpower confrontation through Syrian actions, on the other.

In such exchanges, we could explore what might be necessary to gain Soviet pressure on Syria and her Lebanese allies, support for the process of Lebanese reconciliation, and agreement to a broader role for UNIFIL. Although growing domestic pressure to withdraw our MNF contingent will weaken our bargaining position, the Soviets probably tend to overestimate our staying power and may be ready to pay at least a small price to reduce their own exposure and gain some credibility as a regional problem-solver. The limits on Moscow's leverage with Syria may be a further obstacle, but from the Soviet point of view they are also a reason to seek an accommodation with us.

2. *A Nicaragua initiative:* Central America is the other region in which Moscow may perceive the prospect of a significant near-term reverse, involving not only the loss of another client regime (through overthrow or apostasy under pressure) but possible collateral US action against Cuba as well. In this situation, the Soviets may be more willing than in the past to distance themselves from their regional clients, both militarily (by curtailing weapons supplies) and politically (by pressuring Nicaragua to cut off the Salvadoran insurgents and ending their own, Soviet, support for the FMLN). Without launching a real negotiation with Moscow, we would for our part need to demonstrate that in promoting a process of internal reconciliation in Nicaragua we are not determined to bring down the regime in Managua. Admittedly, we might thereby help the Soviets to claim that they had gained US respect for Nicaraguan and Cuban security and legitimacy. This would be only a claim, however: we would do and say nothing even remotely implying a guarantee of the

Sandinistas' survival, much less sanctioning a Soviet role in perpetuating the regime.

3. *European security initiative*: Although the Soviets may continue to boycott all other East-West arms talks, they will participate actively in CDE and seek to broaden its agenda. While we must insist on a narrower agenda in this forum, Moscow's interest in an across-the-board discussion of European security could offer an opportunity for constructive conversations outside the CDE framework. You may want to raise with Gromyko the idea of bilateral discussions to explore each side's views on the military threat in Europe.

In addressing this issue, we would focus on the military problem that underlies NATO's sense of insecurity but that we have almost never raised directly with the Soviets—i.e., the massive Soviet offensive threat on the central front. At the same time, we would want the Soviets to see how their interest would be served as well as ours. Agreements that addressed the basic military sources of insecurity in Europe in a meaningful way would also make many other East-West issues look quite different. Many of our arms control positions, for example, would be subject to re-examination. With enough Soviet interest in meeting our concerns, we would have more flexibility in meeting theirs. Although these discussions will not lead to a real meeting of minds, they could help to clarify some of our policies and purposes for a highly insular Soviet leadership.

Channels

If convincingly briefed to the Soviets before Stockholm, these initiatives might go some distance to producing a less sterile and confrontational meeting there with Gromyko.

These preliminary talks, which might be fuller than the usual pre-ministerial exchanges, are probably best conducted in existing ambassadorial channels. Except for a new START proposal they are unsuitable for inclusion in a Presidential speech, but could and should be part of a letter to Andropov following the speech.

If your meeting with Gromyko suggests any Soviet interest in initiatives apart from START, we will have to consider what channels to propose by way of follow up. The possibilities include both old and new channels. For example, discussions of the Middle East and Central America (which might be less artificial if conducted separately) could be led either by ambassadors, Assistant Secretary-level contacts *a la* Crocker-Ilichev, or perhaps by special emissaries.

The more novel perspective on European security might fruitfully be put forward in informal consultations led by the Department of Defense, or at least with high-level DoD participation. Alternatively, the President might designate a distinguished outsider or two (Brent Scowcroft, for example) to conduct a round of talks. We have long advocated military-to-military contacts; informal discussions might be a good start.

Beyond these more focused exchanges, S/P, EUR and NSC staff have discussed the idea of "policy planning talks" as a flexible medium for exploring the long-term perspectives of each side. Such talks would seem to meet our current interest in broadening the bilateral discussion in a realistic way that takes up the most important questions. You might want to propose to Gromyko that he consider a trip to Moscow by some members of the Policy Planning Council, perhaps joined by a high-level NSC representative to add Presidential weight.

Conclusion

As argued earlier, US initiatives in START would do more than any other steps to revive a Soviet-American dialogue, and to create the impression that relations had turned a corner. For the other initiatives described above, including a new offer in MBFR, the forecast must be much more cautious. Even if the Soviets were intrigued by them, they would be unlikely to return to the INF bargaining table and might well continue to boycott other arms talks. Furthermore, because the channels we have in mind would be largely confidential, they would not do much in the short term to relieve public concern about a breakdown of East-West communication. We would in fact have to expect continuing Soviet exploitation of this concern even as we talked in private.

Nevertheless, on-going consultations and exchanges could make the Soviets more cautious about waging the sort of all-out competition that would exacerbate public anxieties about the risk of war. And over the longer term, if these exchanges began to make progress, they would have an increasingly open impact on the relationship and on concrete problems dividing us. This could further increase Soviet caution and ease public fears. And even if they do not make progress, we will be free to let the story out as we desire; a failed effort could still pay a political return, by strengthening our efforts to increase public understanding of why our relations are deadlocked and what conclusions should be drawn as a result.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 1/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Forwarded

through Eagleburger. Eagleburger's Executive Assistant, William Montgomery, initialed for Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on January 5. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Bosworth wrote: "The attached memorandum is an effort by Jeremy Azrael and Steve Sestanovich to identify some US initiatives that may deserve consideration as you prepare for your meeting with Gromyko. We are aware that each of these initiatives raises serious bureaucratic, political, and strategic problems. However, we are also conscious of the problems that could arise from a continued stalemate in US-Soviet relations and believe that this is the almost certain outcome of our standing pat on attempting to revive our former 'small step' gameplan." See [footnote 4](#), [Document 31](#).

² See [Document 139](#).

154. Memorandum From the Deputy White House Chief of Staff (Deaver) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 5, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian.² We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to *articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union*.

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate.

There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

- U.S. opinion makers;
- West European governments and publics;
- Soviet leaders; and
- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you

think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news—even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech—such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some

Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Additionally, a stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that he saw it.

² Reagan wrote in his diary on January 6: "Met with speechwriters re the Soviet speech. We want it to be a level headed approach to peace to reassure the eggheads & our European friends I dont plan to blow up the world." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 305) As Matlock later recalled the evolution of the speech: "I sent my preliminary draft to Mark Palmer in the State Department for amplification, correction, and general vetting, then obtained approval from both Shultz and McFarlane before it went to the president for his review. After reading it, he asked Michael Deaver, deputy chief of staff—and close personal friend of the Reagans—and Richard Darman, Chief of Staff James Baker's assistant, to meet with us to discuss it. Both were associated with the faction in the White House that encouraged the president to establish an active dialogue with the Soviet Union.

"Deaver began the meeting by commenting that the president thought the speech had too much material, covered no new ground, and was pedestrian. Darman asked who had drafted the text. With some trepidation, I admitted that I was the main culprit, though I had help from the State Department. Darman then relieved the tension by remarking, 'I wondered, because it is the most coherent and reasoned speech draft I have seen in this administration.' He went on to say that he could not understand the president's reaction, because if the president found nothing new in it, most people who heard him would, and he was sure it would be eminently newsworthy.

"Of course, I was disappointed that Reagan found my text pedestrian, since I had tried to make it as appealing as the subject would allow. But it was more important to me to hear that he found 'nothing new' in the text. This meant that I had correctly guessed what he wanted his policy to be. In Reagan's mind, the draft contained nothing more than what he had been saying all along. What he didn't understand was the degree to which his intentions had been misinterpreted and misunderstood by much of the public." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 80-81)

³ According to Matlock's subsequent account: "Reagan accepted the explanations in my memorandum and we proceeded to work on the text without adding anything of substance." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 82)

**155. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, January 7, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet Speech

In preparing for my trip to Turkey I have not had as much time as I would have liked to devote to the Soviet speech. I am concerned about the present draft, however, and wanted to pass on my basic thoughts to you.²

All of us agree that the time has come to demonstrate to a broader Western audience that we are not guided by a blind and uncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism. We have to send a message of reassurance, in part to resolidify support for the inevitable competition that we will continue to face and in part to rebut the Soviet argument that the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

The speech does convey a sense of reassurance, but it does so in a rather simple way. The speech will not impress either domestic or foreign audiences with its thoughtfulness, and it fails to send a very concrete message to the Soviets—a fact that will only help to contribute to the impression that we are aiming at an electoral audience rather than trying to achieve more durable substantive gains.

The emptiness of the message to the Soviets is particularly apparent, I think, in the presentation of “our goals” in the first half of the speech. Instead of anything concrete, these

include vague appeals to let the Third World focus on economic development, or to abolish nuclear weapons, or to stop stealing Western industrial secrets. I doubt these are appeals with much meaning for the Soviets, who speak a more sober language of power, security, and interest.

Just to take two obvious examples, the point about the Third World that Moscow would *best* understand (but which is not made in the current draft) is a statement that we are concerned about the risk of confrontations that are in neither side's interest. Similarly, the Soviets will not know what to make of the off-handed way compliance is treated in the section of the speech on establishing a better working relationship. They know this problem is coming and want to see how the President deals with it. In light of where we're likely to be by the time of the speech, we run a major risk of being misunderstood if we don't say more to indicate the gravity of our concern on this issue.

The speech, in my view, also needs to be more direct and candid about some of the difficulties that we face in trying to solve problems between us. If the President discusses these difficulties, his main message—the expression of a forthcoming desire to work on disagreements or conflicts—may in fact be taken even more seriously.

Having said this, I don't think that improving the speech requires starting over. One small change that might begin to move it in the right direction is to build on the important claim made at the beginning that we see some important potential "opportunities for peace" at this time. The President should then ask the question—what do we *and the Soviets* have to do to seize these opportunities?—and give concrete, thoughtful answers. In this way, the "goals" of the present draft would become "tasks," or "challenges," or problems to be solved.

By focusing on key immediate tasks rather than long-term goals the President would sound more programmatic and purposeful than he is likely to now. *He needs to sound as though his policy is designed to reach more than just distant and possibly unattainable goals.* (Each of these “tasks” or “challenges,” I might add, could usefully include some historical comparisons, indicating how the nature of the task is different or harder than in the past but also why the opportunity for progress now exists—after three years of trying to get our message across to Moscow.)

This change from “goals” to “tasks” would, with some significant re-drafting, send a different message in the entire first half of the speech. The talk about our desire to reduce the use of force would, for example, be made much less airy, focusing more on what each side has to do (and not do) to limit the risk of superpower conflict. This can sound tough but it has a constructive side. For example:

“We believe that the situation in the Middle East has been made more dangerous for all concerned by the introduction of thousands of additional Soviet military personnel into Syria in the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. This is just one of many situations around the world in which the Soviet Union could bring its influence to bear to reduce risks for both sides. The confidence created by such progress would be valuable in trying to deal with other aspects of our competition.”

Similarly, using the three tasks of U.S.-Soviet relations in the present draft, the President could say that the second task—reducing armaments—requires some serious thinking about how to increase strategic stability. Rather than simply try to top the Soviets in a vague commitment to a

non-nuclear world, we can challenge them with our commitment to specific negotiating measures. For example:

“Our thinking in the area of arms control has led us to embrace the build-down approach to reducing strategic weapons. [One sentence explaining build-down.] We wish the Soviet Union would do the same, and call on its leaders to do so. This is a time when we need more, not less discussion of this approach, for it is a formula that could make it possible for *both* sides to rethink many of their strategic programs.”

The Soviets would be greatly intrigued to hear a hint that we might not have to build everything we plan, and would begin to ask what systems this could mean. In short, we would have their interest.

As for the final task—developing a constructive working relationship—the President could again make hard points and soft—hard on issues like the need for compliance with past agreements, soft-sounding on the obvious fact that we are willing to work even for small improvements in the relationship.

I have gone over this first half of the speech at some length because once it is recast, the remainder can be devoted to elaborating our approach. I have fewer difficulties with the rest of the text as it now stands, but it too could be strengthened by more concreteness. (And by less rhetoric that could open us to ridicule. For example, the President can't say that “ignorance” is a common enemy of the U.S. and the USSR. The country with the world's largest censorship apparatus is *not* an enemy of ignorance!)

Finally, the concluding quote from JFK's American University speech is a useful reminder of how different our

job is from Kennedy's. He was lucky enough to be able to produce an agreement on a comparatively simple question—the test ban—in six weeks. Because we have much less chance of such breakthroughs, we have to give a more convincing proof that we are doing everything prudent to achieve them and that if we fail it will not be our fault. It just won't be enough to say "we all breathe the same air."³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Sestanovich wrote next to Fortier's name and initials: "(dictated and signed in his absence) S.S." Brackets are in the original.

² See [Document 154](#).

³ In a January 11 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock informed him: "I am working on some more fundamental revisions in accord with Don Fortier's suggestions and should have these ready late today. Meanwhile, I recommend that you convey these suggested changes to the speechwriters." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/05/84) (2))

**156. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of
the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, January 10, 1984

SUBJECT

The Situation in the Soviet Union and Recent Disinformation

You may have already seen the attached cable from Moscow citing the report of an "academic" who recently visited there (Tab I).² If you have not, I call it to your attention, because it is being widely circulated and may be influencing the thought of many of our analysts and, perhaps, policy makers. There is concern, however, that the report represents an attempt at disinformation by the Soviets and a possible agent of theirs.

Two factors contribute to this possibility. The first is the substance of the academic's report. It reflects one of the principal Soviet propaganda messages of recent months—namely that American "militarism" and "bellicosity" are fueling Soviet "paranoia." The second is the apparent source of the report—a certain East European emigre, who was once a member of the Communist Party in his native land. Everything, from the circumstances surrounding his immigration to this country, to his decade-long establishment of academic *bona fides* at a prominent university, to his subsequent policy recommendations and analytical pronouncements, to the very high-level entree he enjoys whenever he visits Moscow, contributes to the possibility that he may be a classic disinformation agent, perhaps one of the most effective of his kind in the U.S.A.

This report is only the latest bit of evidence pointing to this possibility.

Are the Soviets "Paranoid"?

The "academic" has reported that Soviet officials are growing increasingly "paranoid" and obsessed by fear of war—so much so that emotionalism and irrationality are now entering into play. As evidence for this, the source cites a "straight-faced claim" made to him by one official that the KAL flight was a deliberate provocation staged by the U.S.

Not only is this report of Soviet war "paranoia" preposterous, but, given the manner in which it and its supporting evidence are presented, it reflects either ignorance about the USSR or, more likely, deliberate disinformation. First of all, the Soviets are not, and in the post-war period never have been, "paranoid" about the United States. If paranoia signifies rational fear, the Soviets have had no cause to see any military or geopolitical threat from this country. They know very well that when we had nuclear monopoly and superiority, we refrained from using it to threaten the USSR. They know that when anticommunism was at its peak here in the 1950s, we did not even help the Hungarian resistance. The Soviets know that today there is even less of a political constituency for rendering such help. The idea that the Soviets could possibly have a rational fear of war instigated by the U.S. is simply implausible. The principal rational fear the Soviets have is of their own people and the possibility that foreign influences may spark a severe internal security problem. Given the degree to which they have sealed their society from most such influences and the means by which they are

conveyed, the Soviets have little cause to fear foreign instigation of this threat.

If paranoia signifies irrational fear—i.e., a form of insanity where actions taken are beyond the personal responsibility of the actors, this possibility is equally misleading. The only conditions under which this could be the case in the USSR would be if the leadership fell into the hands of an all-powerful dictator of the Stalin type whose personality and its aberrations would become de facto policy. This would require the end of collective leadership in the USSR—a condition that is nowhere in sight.

So long as collective, institutional leadership remains, Soviet policy will be formulated as it has been for years: decisions to advance or retreat (“two steps forward, one step back”) are made according to “scientific” assessments of the correlation of forces. Just because the U.S. is rebuilding its strength these days is no cause for Soviet strategists to entertain apocalyptic fears.³ It is a fundamental misinterpretation of the way the Soviets assess the correlation of forces to assert, as some are doing within the Administration, that we have handed the Soviet so many defeats recently that we have sent them reeling.

The Soviets see weaknesses in the West—from political polarization and “peace” movements to interests that compete with defense priorities for scarce resources—all of which mitigate any tendencies perceived to threaten their rule. Their failure to stop our deployments and split our alliance may give them cause for a little frustration—but only on account of their failure to move history forward as fast as they would like. To the contrary, in spite of their recent setbacks in Grenada and INF, the Soviets still are sanguine that the correlation of forces is in their favor. Their attempt last year to intervene so blatantly in the

German elections was indicative of an excessive optimism on their part—but was based nevertheless on a calculated risk that perhaps the correlation of forces was configured even more in their favor than they had been calculating. When it actually shifts to our favor is when we can expect them, as part of a strategic retreat, to abandon their intimidation strategy, renew their peace offensive and make those cosmetic concessions which kindle the hopes of many in the West that true accommodation with the USSR is possible.

Soviet "Paranoia" as a Disinformation Theme

The Soviets have used the paranoia idea as one of their key disinformation themes for decades. Notwithstanding accounts by Soviet military historians themselves that most military engagements conducted by Tsarist Russia were in fact aggressive Russian actions, the Soviet disinformation machine continues to repeat the myth about "traditional Russian insecurity"—as if the Russians had more cause to be insecure than anyone else.

As a disinformation theme, the Soviet paranoia and insecurity argument fulfills many useful purposes. Construed as a "self-defense plea" or an "insanity plea" it serves to legitimize aggressive Soviet acts—from the KAL shootdown to the invasion of Afghanistan. It also serves to obscure the nature of Soviet intentions—by attributing traditional great power security concerns to the Soviets while disguising their uniquely communist concerns and motivations. Finally, in the present context, it serves as part of the Soviets' overall strategy of intimidation and deception. *By convincing the West that they are paranoid and perhaps even irrational, the Soviets encourage us to be*

wary of them and to treat them with kid gloves lest they lash out with irrational behavior.

That the source of this report should cite as evidence of irrationality a “straight-faced claim” by a Soviet official that KAL was a U.S. provocation reflects either ignorance or disingenuousness. The Soviets have made lying with a straight face standard operating procedure. Because of the nature of Soviet indoctrination, and the normal prescribed behavior for spouting the Party line, Soviet officials are capable of lying with extraordinary expressions of emotion and sincerity. The psychology of this ability may incorporate both genuine belief in the lie or, more often, simple, advanced, Soviet-style cynicism. The source’s personal background in Soviet bloc Communist Party politics suggests that his failure to raise the likelihood that cynical mendacity may be involved here (as distinct from genuine irrationality) is a disingenuous attempt to disinform Americans less trained in Soviet affairs. It is also important to note that the academic’s contacts in Moscow, Ponomarev, Zagladin, Arbatov, et al., make up the “A” Team of the Soviet disinformation apparatus. So, even if the source is not a witting disinformation agent, he could be serving as an unwitting conduit.

The Soviets and Our Presidential Elections

One other significant point of dubious reliability in this cable is the source’s assertion that “in their efforts to prevent the President’s reelection, the Soviets are determined not to allow him to assume the mantle of peacemaker.” It is possible that this is indeed the Soviet position. But it is equally possible, and even quite probable, that this assertion represents more disinformation.

It is by no means clear that the Soviets are certain of the best means by which to harm the President's reelection chances. And even if they were to hire America's finest political consulting firm to advise them on this, it is unlikely that such a firm could give them any sure-fire advice. By playing their current intimidation game and denying the President a START or INF agreement, they do not necessarily deny him the mantle of peacemaker. Rather, they supply him with further evidence that the President's peace-through-strength policy is what ultimately keeps the peace whatever the vagaries of treaty negotiations. In short, it is not easy to deny the President that mantle of peacemaker when the truth is on the President's side.

The Soviets, however, do have a motive in equating treaties and summitry with peacemaking and impressing this equation on the Western public mind. They hope that the public will brand the absence of treaties and summits as an absence of peaceableness. Further, they hope U.S. policy makers will swallow the same equation or at least be influenced by the public's ingestion of it. This, the Soviets hope, will spur the President to make negotiating concessions and create treaty loopholes through hasty treaty-drafting in the interest of reaching election year agreements.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400010. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock, deGraffenreid, Lehman, and Raymond. McFarlane's stamp appears on the memorandum,

indicating he saw it. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "John —Don't you expect this was Seweryn Bialer? He has left a lot of people very nervous in Eur." Seweryn Bialer was a professor of Political Science at Columbia University who focused on Soviet and contemporary Russian studies.

² Reference is to telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10, not found attached. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 143](#) and [Document 144](#).

³ A checkmark was placed in the right margin next to this sentence, presumably by McFarlane.

⁴ McFarlane checked the Approve option.

**157. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, January 11, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Study on Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation
with the United States

I believe the attached study (Tab I) is right on target as regards all its major judgments.² Specifically:

—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;

—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power which would require them either to back down or accept the risk of confrontation. They genuinely fear our technological capacity and probably doubt that they could keep up if we went flat out. And just trying to keep up will put enormous pressures on their shaky system.

—Of all the regional disputes, they are probably most nervous about the Middle East, primarily because of the proximity of our forces there. In their eyes, they have acted prudently by not challenging directly our military actions in Lebanon. Israeli or (worse in their eyes) U.S. strikes on Syrian territory would be harder for them to tolerate—but they would probably do so. Still, they do not want to be faced with the choice.

One element which is not elaborated in the paper deserves attention. That is, the nature of Andropov's internal rule, as it is shaping up. I see increasing signs that it is in fact a sort of neo-Stalinism, with the emphasis on discipline and police controls, combined with pronounced Russian nationalism. These trends stem primarily from internal factors and Andropov's own personality, but have implications for foreign policy. In fact, we may have, in Andropov, a Soviet leader who has a policy stake in the appearance of tension, since it makes it easier to mobilize the population if the latter is convinced that there is an external threat. Therefore, while Andropov may be very careful not to provoke a real confrontation, he may see little merit in relaxed tensions for their own sake (as Brezhnev clearly did).

Tab I

**Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency³**

Washington, December 30, 1983

SOVIET THINKING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Summary

Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States. With the major exception of the Middle East, there appears to be no region in which the Soviets are now apprehensive that action in support of clients could lead to Soviet-American armed collision. By playing up the "war danger," Moscow hopes to encourage resistance to INF deployment in Western

Europe, deepen cleavages within the Atlantic alliance, and increase public pressure in the United States for a more conciliatory posture toward the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet policymakers, however, almost certainly are very concerned that trends they foresee in long-term US military programs could in time erode the USSR's military gains of the past fifteen years, heighten US political leverage, and perhaps increase the chances of confrontation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Moscow's sense of pressure and challenge from the United States is probably magnified by difficult near-term policy dilemmas which US actions pose. The Kremlin must consider painful any increases in the rate of military spending; it must provide or deny additional assistance to client regimes under serious insurgent attack; and it must react to a sharp ideological offensive against communist rule at a time of growing public demoralization arising from stagnation in living standards in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, Moscow is frustrated by and angry at the Reagan Administration. [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. Soviet rhetoric would suggest that Moscow believes the Reagan Administration has sharply increased the likelihood of armed confrontation between the United States and the USSR. Soviet spokesmen have accused the President and his advisers of "madness," "extremism" and "criminality" in the conduct of relations with the USSR. They have charged that the United States is pursuing a nuclear first strike capability and preparing to unleash nuclear war as a means of crushing communism. The Soviets maintain that the Reagan Administration is eager to apply military force in the Third World and has no intention of resolving its

differences with Moscow through negotiation. One Western visitor to Moscow was recently told that Andropov had sent a letter to all party organizations in October forcefully declaring that the fatherland was truly in danger. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. Conversations by Westerners with Soviet citizens indicate that the “war danger” propaganda line is probably widely believed by the public at large, and that various elements of this line are accepted within the foreign policy advisory community. [*2 lines not declassified*] there was an obsessive fear of war, an emotionalism, and a paranoia [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that had not been present earlier.⁴ [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The question of whether Soviet leaders actually believe that war could break out, and whether they are basing policy on such a judgment, is critical. If the answer to this question were positive, then Moscow would have a strong incentive to pre-empt the United States and might be so hypersensitive to US moves that the chances of accidental conflict would be greatly increased. In our view, however, Soviet leaders do not believe their own war danger propaganda and are not likely to base policy on it. Rather, they have a fundamental and transparent policy interest in making it appear to the world public that the USSR is dedicated to preserving the positive elements of the bilateral relationship, that the United States has been intransigent and irresponsible, and that the Soviet side is rightfully angry. Their purpose is to:

- Encourage continuing resistance to INF deployment by the “peace movement” in Western Europe.
- Create support for a restructuring of arms control talks on a basis more acceptable to Moscow.

- Foster a long-term shift in Western Europe toward neutralism.
- Deepen suspicions in West European governments of the motives and competence of the Reagan Administration.
- Increase public pressure in the United States for concessions to the USSR in future arms control negotiations.
- Undercut the President's reelection prospects.
[*portion marking not declassified*]

4. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

5. Apart from the basic Soviet interest in fostering the appearance that confrontation with the United States could erupt at any moment, there are other strong reasons for skepticism that Soviet policymakers either believe this proposition or base policy on it:

- Moscow's inflexibility in its INF tactics, its suspension of arms negotiations, and its reduction of contacts with the United States, are not moves the Kremlin would have taken if it genuinely feared confrontation. Rather, it would have tried to keep the dialogue open in order to keep closely in touch with US intentions and lessen the chances of miscalculation.
- Soviet policymakers almost certainly realize that the developments most disturbing to them—full US INF deployment, the broad US strategic buildup, and strengthening of US general purpose forces—could influence the military balance only gradually, would

not affect the near-term US calculus of risks, and are still subject to substantial political uncertainty.

- Historically, Soviet policy has generally been driven by prudent calculation of interests and dogged pursuit of long-term objectives, even in the face of great adversity rather than by sudden swells of fear or anger.

- However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be by the Reagan Administration, they also have a sense of the USSR's strengths and of potential domestic and international vulnerabilities of the United States. They typically take a longer view of Soviet prospects, and the perception from the Kremlin is by no means one of unrelieved gloom. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. These considerations imply that any anticipations of near-term confrontation that may exist in Moscow are likely to affect policy more at the margin than at the core. We believe this generalization is supported by how the Soviets probably assess the risk of conflict with the United States arising from two most likely quarters: nuclear-strategic rivalry, and competition in the Third World. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Nuclear-Strategic Rivalry

7. Despite their impassioned rhetoric about the "nuclear danger," we strongly believe that the Soviets are fundamentally concerned not about any hypothetical near-term US nuclear attack, but about possible five-to-ten year shifts in the strategic balance. In a TV interview on 5 December, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, pointed to the factors that would presumably now deter

even the most hostile US administration from a deliberate first strike attempt—the large Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons, diverse delivery systems, “repeatedly redundant systems of controlling them,” and the vulnerability of the United States to retaliation. And, in a speech on 18 December, Minister of Defense Ustinov stated there was no need to “dramatize” the current tense situation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. The Soviets probably do believe that US INF missiles, when fully deployed, would significantly affect their plans for conducting nuclear war. They think that the Pershing II is part of a broader US strategic plan to acquire forces to fight a limited nuclear war in the European theater, and that it would be able to strike critical strategic targets—particularly the Soviet command and control system—in the Western USSR, reducing Moscow’s confidence in its launch-on-tactical warning option. They probably believe their public assertion that the range of the Pershing II is 2,500 km rather than the 1,800 km claimed by NATO, which would—as they assert—substantially increase the vulnerability to a sudden disabling nuclear attack of the Soviet leadership and strategic command and control facilities located in the Moscow region. But they apparently were willing to run the risk of passing up a possible INF deal involving no Pershing II deployments, in order to pursue their maximum objective of no US INF deployment at all. They are aware that full INF deployment is not scheduled to be completed until 1988, that it will be attended by heavy political opposition in Western Europe, and that it could be aborted or limited. Their likely near-term countermeasures to INF deployment are not provocative, and do not appear to be emotionally inspired. In Europe, in fact, there has been no serious Soviet threatening, and efforts to woo the democratic Left and

maintain economic ties continue. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. As INF deployment is completed about the same time new US strategic systems are being fielded, the Soviets could see a greater possibility of confrontation with the United States. We do not believe the Soviets think that deployment will decisively alter the strategic balance, but they could think it would embolden the United States to take more risks and increase the chance of accidental war. With the sharp reduction in warning time accompanying deployment of the Pershing IIs, the Soviets could also well fear—as some spokesmen have obliquely implied—that they themselves might mistakenly trigger a nuclear exchange. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Competition in the Third World

10. Despite the truculent mood in Moscow, we see no signs of any emerging general pattern of Soviet behavior risking armed confrontation with the United States in the Third World. Nor, by the same token, do we detect much fear that US actions in most parts of the Third World might precipitate an armed clash with Soviet forces that Moscow could not avoid. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. The single case today in which Moscow clearly does foresee a heightened threat of armed confrontation with the United States is Syria-Lebanon. The Soviets almost certainly are apprehensive that the proximity of US and Soviet combat units could spark a direct conflict. They may also fear that the recent US-Israeli security agreement could increase the risk of a US-Soviet clash in the event of renewed major hostilities between Israel and Syria. The Soviets have given no sign of interest in attempting actively

to use their military resources in Syria and Lebanon to provoke Washington. And Moscow's public response to recent Syrian-US hostilities has been quite cautious. Yet, the Soviets have not been moved by fear of confrontation with the United States to qualify their support of Assad. Thus, in attempting to protect their equities in relations with Syria, they have assumed a posture toward a possible clash with the US that remains basically reactive. [*8½ lines not declassified*]

12. In attempting to make good on their threats, the Soviets might face choices that could lead directly to confrontation with the United States. But Moscow's capability to act militarily in the Lebanese-Syrian theater itself in ways that threatened armed confrontation with the United States is limited physically by severe constraints on the Soviet ability to project force rapidly into the region during hostilities, and would be influenced psychologically by considerable uncertainty about reactions that might be anticipated from the White House. The Soviets might agree to expand the number of Soviet advisers in Lebanon if the Syrians demanded this, but would strive hard to limit their combat exposure. They would probably prefer to ignore US-caused casualties among their advisers in Lebanon. At higher escalation levels, they might choose to increase their naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean if they had not already done so, dispatch some fighter aircraft to Syria, and deploy small numbers of airborne or naval infantry troops to rear areas in Syria—with the intention of showing the flag more and raising the deterrent tripwire. They would continue to provide warning data from their ships offshore to air defense units in Syria, would allow Soviet advisers with Syrian air defense units in Syria to participate in combat operations, and probably would authorize Soviet pilots already in Syria to fly combat missions within Syrian air space. They would try to use the

SA-5s only in defense of Syrian territory, and even then might restrain themselves if US attacks on Syrian targets were not extensive. They would certainly attempt to defend SA-5 sites against US strikes. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet Concerns

13. Having asserted that the Soviets basically are not acting on the belief that war is likely to “break out” soon, we must add that in Moscow the Reagan Administration is nevertheless the least loved of any US administration since that of President Truman; that some Soviet officials may have talked themselves into believing their own war scare propaganda; and that the general level of frustration and anxiety surrounding relations with the United States is substantially higher than it was in the 1970s. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. Soviet officials have perceived a hardening of US policy beginning in the latter part of the Carter Administration. But US actions since President Reagan’s election have heightened Soviet anxieties. The major foreign policy defeat represented by the initiation of INF deployment, the perceived unyielding current US posture in the START talks, the US action in Grenada, the deployment of marines in Lebanon, US aid to insurgencies against Soviet client regimes, the Reagan Administration’s perceived political “exploitation” of the KAL shootdown, and in general the Administration’s perceived unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or to treat the Kremlin with the “superpower” deference it desires, appear to have combined to generate a sense of anger toward the United States among Soviet officials and a belligerent mood. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. Moscow, moreover, is probably genuinely concerned or uncertain about several developments that seem to have changed the terms of reference in bilateral relations and could potentially increase the likelihood of hostilities between the United States and the USSR or constrain opportunities for Soviet political gains abroad. These include:

—A possible adverse shift downstream in the overall military balance with the United States arising from the acceleration of US defense spending, support in America for a broad range of new strategic force programs, and increased momentum behind development of US general purpose forces.

—The perceived lower priority accorded by the Reagan Administration to arms control negotiations with Moscow, its unwillingness to accommodate Soviet interests in arms talks, and its apparent intention of developing weapons systems that Moscow may have thought were blocked simply by the fact that arms talks were ongoing.

—The end of the “Vietnam syndrome” and readiness of Washington to use force once again in the Third World, either by supporting insurgencies against Soviet client regimes—as in Nicaragua, or acting directly—as in Lebanon and Grenada. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. The immediate psychological and political impact of these developments—the enlivened sense of US pressure and “imperialist encirclement”—is probably greatly magnified by the difficult near-term policy dilemmas they pose for the Kremlin. In the defense area, US plans to deploy the Peacekeeper, R&D on the “Midgetman,”

development of the B1 and Stealth bomber, the beginning of deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, development of precision guided munitions to attack armored forces, and announcement of a program to develop space-based defense systems confront Soviet leaders with a painful and possibly contentious choice of accelerating the growth of defense spending in the 1986-90 five-year plan. Decisions on the plan must be made over the next 12-18 months, and even the costs at the margin of slighting either investment or some improvement of living standards are clearly viewed by the Soviet leadership as very high indeed. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Insurgencies against client regimes also create unpleasant near-term policy choices which probably reinforce a certain siege mentality on Moscow's part. Instead of being on the attack, the USSR has been placed on the defensive. It is constrained either to up the ante of military and economic aid, or pay the price of loss of political influence. Increases in Soviet assistance carry with it possible indirect costs in relations with third parties. Not least, the existence of insurgencies casts an unwanted propaganda spotlight on the repressiveness of allies of the USSR. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. While the Soviets have an obvious interest in portraying their own side as deeply offended by the militancy of the Reagan Administration's ideological offensive against communism, they probably do in fact find it quite unsettling. On a purely personal level, the top Soviet leadership undoubtedly does resent being challenged publicly by the President of the United States. More importantly, perhaps, Moscow is no longer inclined to treat the Administration's words as "rhetoric," but sees them as reflecting a serious policy aimed at actively exploiting political vulnerabilities across the board in the USSR and

the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are well aware of public malaise generated by stagnating consumption and corruption, and of repressed nationalism throughout their empire; and they do not discount the power of ideas to weaken compliance or—as in Poland—spark actual resistance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects

19. The Soviets have a number of options for dealing with the situation as they perceive it. They are probably still counting on the Reagan Administration overreaching itself and

- Revitalizing the “peace movement” in Western Europe.
- Fanning anti-Americanism in the Middle East, Central America and elsewhere in the Third World.
- Losing support among American voters.

Their response to INF deployment provides evidence that they have not abandoned hope of capitalizing upon such developments. [*portion marking not declassified*]

20. They could attempt to heighten the war of nerves by engaging in threatening military operations, conducting menacing military exercises or the like. Their approach here would have to be selective in order to avoid counteracting the attempt to depict the United States as the major threat to peace. So far they have not systematically engaged in such activities. To some extent their war scare propaganda has already backfired on them in Eastern Europe, where there has been considerable resistance to the emplacement of new Soviet missiles as a

“countermeasure” to NATO INF deployment. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. They could also attempt through proxies to step up the pace of ongoing leftist insurgencies (for example, in Central America) or to provoke new armed conflicts that would, by forcing either US engagement or abstention, damage American interests. Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, or Zaire, perhaps, might be candidates for such attention. However, there are important obstacles or disincentives in most instances to pressing destabilization too hard and too openly, and thus the attractiveness of currently available options along such lines is arguable. [*portion marking not declassified*]

22. If Soviet security concerns are basically long-term, as we believe, and are seriously felt, as is likely, we would expect that anxieties here would be expressed in an acceleration of the pace of military spending in the 1986–90 five-year plan. The current tense superpower environment will probably increase the pressures on the Politburo to accept “worst-case” threat assessments and stipulations of requirements from military planners—despite the further strain this would place on an already taut economy. The extent of such a response, however, might not be visible to us for several years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System II Intelligence Files—INT #2, Folder #2, 8490035–8890278. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. He also wrote in the margin: “Jack—I have sent this to Shultz & Casey asking their views on” and drew an arrow to the final paragraph of the memorandum.

² In a covering memorandum forwarding Matlock's memorandum and the CIA intelligence report to Shultz and Casey on January 21, McFarlane commented: "I have read Bill Casey's analysis (Tab B) of Soviet thinking about the prospect of conflict with the U.S. and believe it reflects an accurate portrayal of the strategic realities which are tending in a more stable direction. Jack Matlock has done a one-page commentary which I also concur in (Tab A). I was especially drawn to Jack's last paragraph in which he characterizes the regime's style and strategy. I would welcome any reactions you might have to Jack's characterization." Shultz replied on January 23: "Bud: Thanks for your note enclosing Jack Matlock's comment on the 'Soviet Thinking' memo. Jack's view is insightful. This interplay (Gates-Matlock) could be useful in our Saturday a.m. sessions." (Ibid.) Tab B is the December 30 Intelligence Memorandum printed below. Tab A is Matlock's January 11 memorandum printed here.


³ Secret; NoFORN; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Foreign Policy Issues Branch, Policy Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Jack Matlock, This is almost congruent to my analysis. What do you think? Bud 1-10-84."

⁴ The Embassy reported this in telegram 15409 from Moscow, December 10. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 143](#) and [Documents 144](#) and [156](#).

158. Editorial Note

On January 16, 1984, President Ronald Reagan delivered a televised address at 10 a.m. from the East Room of the White House, titled an "Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations." In the November 19 Small Group meeting, (see [Document 138](#)), the participants discussed the need for a speech to clarify U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union. Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs on the NSC Staff, started drafting the speech in November, anticipating it would be delivered some time in December. Matlock had a draft completed in mid-December but the speech was postponed until January. See [Documents 154](#) and [155](#).

Reagan began the address, which became known as the "Ivan and Anya" speech for its appeal to common Soviet citizens: "During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you and the people of the world my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace—relations between the United States and Soviet Union." He continued: "Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialog as serious and constructive as possible—a dialog that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship." After saying that the United States "must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence," Reagan stated: "Our policy toward the Soviet Union—a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation—will serve our

two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It's a challenge for Americans; it is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence. We seek genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication. And, as I've said, we'll stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations. Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best in the Soviet Union." Reagan concluded by stressing: "If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so that we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed, of people everywhere. Let us begin now." For the full text, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 182](#) .

Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "the day really began in the East room at 10:00 A.M. when I went live on T.V. worldwide with address on Soviet-U.S. relations. The press, especially T.V. is now trying to explain the speech as pol. etc. The speech was carefully crafted by all of us to counter Soviet propaganda that we are not sincere in wanting arms reductions or peace. It {therefore} was low key & held the door open to the Soviets if they mean what they say about loving peace to walk in." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 308; curly brackets are in the original)

According to Matlock's subsequent account, reactions to the speech were mixed. "It was generally welcomed in the United States even though some dismissed it as a political maneuver to gain reelection. Its impact in Europe, particularly on allied governments, was greater. German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher went out of his way to compliment it when he met with Shultz in Stockholm on January 18. His aides said that he actually danced for joy as he read the text. The view among U.S. allies in Europe was that, finally, Reagan had the right balance between firmness and negotiability. The impact on the Soviet government was, however, less than that intended. The White House had gone out of its way to call attention to the speech in advance, alerting Ambassador Dobrynin to it and supplying an advance text to the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow." Matlock continued: "Soviet media were directed to treat the speech as nothing new. In a brief statement the official new agency, TASS, labeled it nothing more than propaganda: 'Behind the loquacious rhetoric about adherence to limiting the arms race and love of peace, was, in effect, the known position of the U.S. administration . . . [T]here is no indication of any positive changes in the Reagan administration's approach.'" (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 86; brackets are in the original)

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Stockholm, January 18, 1984, 3-8:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador, Moscow
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Senior Advisor, NSC Staff
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
William Krimer, Interpreter (Notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
V.G. Makarov, Ambassador, Personal Aide to Gromyko, MFA
S.P. Tarasenko, Counselor, Deputy Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V. Sukhodrev, Counselor, 2nd European Department, MFA, Interpreter (Notetaker)

Foreign Minister Gromyko thought it would probably be advisable to agree at the outset of today's talk that the subject matter of discussions will cover two main areas: (1) the current international situation, i.e. questions of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the United States; and (2) the bilateral relations between the two countries. Of course, these two areas were extremely broad and included a variety of elements. If some element or other were considered by one of the sides to be unsuitable for discussion, it would of course be senseless to discuss it. Thus, the discussions should cover those questions where both sides agree there was room for discussions, taking into account past experience.

Secretary Shultz said that prior to leaving Washington he had discussed this and other matters with Ambassador Dobrynin.² They had touched on the question of the agenda for this meeting. The Secretary took it that Dobrynin had received some response from Gromyko with regard to the general outline of the agenda. Depending on how broadly the two items named by Gromyko were viewed, he would think that their views should be compatible. We had identified arms control as one item for discussion; regional issues, such as the Middle East, as a second item; and human rights as a third item. Then there were a variety of strictly bilateral issues, such as trade, as a fourth item. Of course in each of these items there were various categories and, while the words were perhaps different, generally he felt that both sides meant the same thing.

Gromyko said that he had not consented to all the specific issues mentioned by the Secretary, but, as he had said, the two broad areas for discussion would be the international situation and bilateral relations. He thought that, as he had told Dobrynin, this was the direction in which the discussions should go. He noted that the Secretary had named a number of other items, among them, for example, human rights. Since the Secretary had named this matter, he would tell him at the very outset of their discussion that he did not intend to discuss any such topic. Of course, the Secretary could talk about it if he insisted, but Gromyko would not enter into discussion of this item.

The Secretary said that of course it would be up to Gromyko whether he would wish to respond to something the Secretary would say. That was Gromyko's privilege. But the Secretary said that he must make some comments.

Gromyko repeated that he would tell the Secretary at the very outset that he would not enter into discussion of this

topic. The two of them already had some experience when one side does not wish to discuss some specific issue. He would only say again that he would not discuss this item because the Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs. To raise this issue would therefore be an evident waste of time. Surely it would be too much of a luxury for foreign ministers to lose time on that sort of item. As for himself he had no wish to lose time. As for the Secretary, he could of course do so, but without Gromyko's participation. He would suggest that the Secretary feel free to speak on the two items named, i.e. the international situation and bilateral issues. Or, if the Secretary preferred, Gromyko would lead off and talk on our bilateral relations. He thought that neither of them would feel constrained and they would have enough room to exchange views, particularly about the Stockholm Conference. At the Conference the Secretary had expressed the views of the U.S. Administration and today Gromyko had expressed the views of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership.³ He thought it would not be superfluous if he said something in addition to what he had stated publicly.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko and said he would proceed to some items. The first thing he would say was that he had come to listen to Gromyko's speech and had been disappointed. He entirely disagreed with some, in fact most, of Gromyko's statements, and found many of them unacceptable. However, he did not want to take the time to go through that speech now, but would instead address the nature of our relationship and its content.

As the Secretary had told Dobrynin upon the latter's departure from Moscow at the end of last November,⁴ the President wanted to see our relations in a more constructive state. Therefore he would speak not only in

the context of the various issues we had been discussing with Gromyko in one forum or another, but also address the mechanisms for achieving a more constructive relationship. He would note that contacts between himself and Gromyko had been greatest in well-publicized forums, generating a great deal of public attention. On the other hand, it seemed to President Reagan—and the Secretary had the impression that Dobrynin had agreed with this—that it would be useful to establish a private channel for discussions which would be out of the limelight and not open to public commentary. The President had said that he would like to see something like that take place.

For that to be effective he thought it would be necessary to manage things carefully so that it would be clear that an individual speaking in such private discussions was speaking for his country and that this would be known to each side. For the United States, the President had asked the Secretary to help him manage this process. We would expect the people on our side of this table to take part in such discussions as well as other designated people at times. He believed it would be appropriate for such discussions to be held between Ambassador Dobrynin and himself or whomever he would designate. Ambassador Hartman would be the appropriate interlocutor in Moscow, and the President would expect him to be used in this capacity. Whenever he and Gromyko met it was a public event, but beyond this sometimes experts on a specific subject would have to be designated and it should be clear to both sides that they spoke for their country.

The Secretary had one further point. When Dobrynin had returned from Moscow he had discussed this with the Secretary and told him that Gromyko had authorized this process. Both he and Dobrynin had emphasized to each other the importance of such discussions carrying real

content, so as to make progress, and not just be dialogue for the sake of dialogue. To sum up, beyond the publicly known meetings between officials of the two countries there was room for private discussions. Dobrynin had said that Gromyko had approved of this and, if that was indeed the case, one should reflect on how to proceed from here.

Gromyko said he first wanted to address the Secretary's comments about his speech at the Conference. In that speech he had outlined in some detail the Soviet attitude to some of the questions that were within the context of the task facing the Stockholm Conference. He had focused attention on some specific matters and saw no need to expand on this now. On the other hand, it was absolutely impossible to regard the issues before the Stockholm Conference in isolation from what happened beyond the Conference hall. From this standpoint, he naturally had to touch on U.S. foreign policy. In his speech in Washington President Reagan had talked about the international situation as a whole and commented on Soviet foreign policy. As is his custom, he had not minced words or spared words in choosing expressions to depict Soviet foreign policy from a very broad perspective. The Secretary had said that a number of statements in Gromyko's speech today—in fact almost all of them—were unacceptable to him. He had to tell the Secretary that he regarded this statement as praise for his speech. This was precisely the reaction he had expected. Indeed, he would have been put on his guard if the Secretary had said that the Soviets were quite right in saying what they had.

The Secretary interjected that he was glad to hear that Gromyko was not on his guard.

Gromyko continued by saying that he had pointed to U.S. policy as the principal cause of the increase in tensions in

the world today and of the dangerous situation currently existing. He also had to tell the Secretary that the speech he had delivered yesterday, as well as the President's speech, were unacceptable to the Soviet side in many respects, in fact with regard to most of their elements.

Of course, the Secretary's speech⁵ and the President's speech⁶ had contained some individual words or phrases which, taken separately, had not generated any Soviet doubts. But the entire structure of the two speeches was hostile to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet policy of peace; and that was the only assessment of the two speeches that he could arrive at. He would point out that what was important for the Soviet leadership were not individual phrases or words, not the music, so to speak, but the actual content of those statements.

He would ask the Secretary what sort of a thesis it was to speak of the "artificial division of Europe," Gromyko continued. What kind of a proposition was that? Obviously the Secretary and the President did not like the fact that there were some socialist states in Europe and, obviously, the Soviet side did not like the fact that there were some capitalist states on the other side. He would put it even more broadly. The U.S. did not like the fact that there were socialist states in the world and, of course, the Soviets did not like it that there were imperialist states in the world. But, he would ask, what were they then to do? If both sides stood on such a position, there would be a wall between them, a blank wall built of steel or concrete or whatever. In that case it would of course be impossible to find any points of contact in any of the discussions. He would recall that after arriving in Stockholm, just as previously in Madrid and in Belgrade and Helsinki before that, he had believed it important to find the points of contact between various positions. Such contacts were sought consistently by all the

35 participants in the Conference. If points of contact were found, this would indeed be tremendously important for the international situation as a whole.

Gromyko said this was his response to the Secretary's comments regarding the unacceptability of Gromyko's speech. He would point out that the essence of his speech today consisted of trying to seek and find common language between the socialist states and the capitalist states, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the NATO states. This was the main objective the Soviet delegation would strive for at the Stockholm Conference.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that before Gromyko proceeded further, he wanted to clarify something that was evidently based on a misunderstanding. Our position was that if any country wanted to have a socialist system, that would be up to the people of that country to decide; we believed it would be up to them. Based on his observation, socialist systems did not work very well, but that was a separate question. It was not the cause of the wall between us. The main problems were those of free movement across the wall, free interchange of people and ideas. Both the President and he had tried to say as clearly as possible that we recognized that our two systems were very different and that we did not care if any country chose either system of its own free will. If indeed a country chose socialism, so be it. However, we did not believe that the difference between our systems should preclude a constructive relationship between us. These were two different things.

Gromyko continued by noting that the Secretary had touched on a question of procedure. He thought we had agreement that certain specific matters could be discussed

in private discussions out of the limelight of the media and public. It was clearly agreed that on the U.S. side the Secretary would speak for the President, as would whomever he designated, for example Ambassador Hartman. But this was purely a matter of procedure, an organizational matter. It was high time for such private discussions to take place. Today it seemed useful to talk about international politics because the world situation was very acute, relations between our two countries were bad, and the general situation throughout the world was very tense. He had intended today to touch on some of these matters, but had not felt that the Secretary was prepared to discuss them. On the other hand, where else should these most acute and timely matters be discussed if not at meetings such as the present one?

Gromyko noted that in his interjection the Secretary had ended by stating the correct proposition that, if a country wanted to have a socialist system, it should be allowed to live; and if a country wanted its people to live under a capitalist system, it should equally be allowed to live. This was basically a correct conclusion. However, the trouble was that the actual policy of the United States was not in line with that conclusion. Why was it necessary to consider that the evil or the cause of the present tensions was the division of Europe into socialist and capitalist countries? This statement by the Secretary was in conflict with what he had said just now. Somehow he was not making ends meet.

Further, if the Secretary's last comment was correct, that meant people must have the right to live under whatever system they preferred, why then declare a crusade against socialism? This false—and he would even say illiterate—slogan concealed efforts to motivate people to fight against the socialist system even in the countries that had chosen

that route. The Soviet side categorically objected to anything of the sort. Furthermore, this was a clearly unscientific primitive concept, but it was precisely this that made it impossible to reach agreement on the questions facing the forum in Stockholm today.

The Secretary said that he would try once again to explain his views. Socialism as a system of organizing economic activity had been advocated by many people. In his opinion it did not work well for people, but, as he had said, if people wanted to organize their activities that way, that was their privilege. It was not this that he objected to in Gromyko's comments on what Gromyko had picked out of the Secretary's speech. It was not economic activity, but the lack of freedom of people that had led to the division as represented by the Berlin Wall, not socialism as such, but the restrictions on interaction between the people on both sides. Taking the Soviet Union and the United States as two countries existing in this world, we believed, and Gromyko had said that he believed, that it should be possible to find areas where we can reach mutually satisfactory conclusions. Indeed, we would not be engaged in discussions if this were not so. We were not trying to reform the socialist countries and did not think the Soviet side would attempt to reform capitalist countries, but these were different issues.

The Secretary certainly agreed with Gromyko that the present forum right here was the one in which the two sides should discuss the main questions troubling the world today and troubling our two countries. In his speech today and earlier, in Madrid, Gromyko had emphasized that one of these issues concerned arms, and particularly nuclear arms and our mutual desire to reduce their numbers. In this light the Secretary would comment on various areas of arms talks and would express our views.

First, the Secretary would comment on strategic arms reductions. We have held five rounds of talks in that area,⁷ and while it was fair to say that some progress had been achieved, we were still far from resolving the issues. Reflecting on that, it seemed to him that what we were seeing was that Soviet strategic forces and our strategic forces, both very impressive and large, were structured very differently from each other. The decisions of the two countries on which road to follow in the development of arms produced a great asymmetry between the forces of each side.

On the one hand, as we looked at the situation, we saw Soviet heavy MIRVed ICBMs with tremendous throw-weight and great destructive potential, which appear to us to be a destabilizing factor; we wanted to see them reduced. Reading their account of the negotiations, it seemed that the Soviets had expressed concern over U.S. heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. In the Soviet view these were considered a threat. Thus, in the negotiations we have talked of various forces and each side had offered proposals, but he and the President wondered whether we would not get further if we could find a common framework that would encompass these problems.

If we could agree on such a framework, then it would be possible to tell our negotiators to go back to the negotiating table and work out the details. In such a framework neither side would try drastically to restructure each other's forces, but would identify in the negotiations many different items and would establish a relationship between them. Therefore, we thought it would be worthwhile in private discussions to seek a framework that would include heavy ICBMs on the Soviet side and heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles on the U.S. side.

We thought that through such a framework it might be possible to make the negotiations fruitful.

Thus, on START it would be well to set a date for resumption of the talks, the Secretary said, but that was not his point. He simply wanted to raise with Gromyko the possibility of establishing a framework in private discussions that could lead to progress. If that was of interest to Gromyko we were prepared to explore this matter in greater detail.

With reference to so-called INF, the Secretary said he would not have much to say. As we reviewed the negotiations, we noted that there had been progress in some areas, such as aircraft, but on the main issues there had been no agreement. Now deployments were taking place, and the Soviet side had chosen to leave the negotiations.⁸ If Gromyko had any suggestions as to how to proceed in the discussion of this subject, the Secretary would be very pleased to hear them.

On the subject of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Secretary continued, we believed that the Soviet side should agree to a date for resumption and return to the talks, to which we give a high priority. We recognize that in the Eastern proposals of February and June, with some subsequent clarifications, the East had taken positive steps on the subject of verification and specification of reductions. We were studying ways to build on these positive steps. On the President's instructions, the Secretary had made the point to Dobrynin that progress on verification would lead to flexibility on our side on the so-called data issue. Thus, in MBFR, we believed it would be well to set a date and resume in Vienna. We were also prepared to move in the form of a private dialogue between

us and the Soviet Union; undoubtedly our Ambassador Abramowitz would be an important person in this regard.

On the subject of the CDE meetings here, the Secretary noted that of course discussions were just starting. As he had indicated in his speech, we would be tabling proposals soon. Here he would also make a procedural comment: our delegation chiefs had worked well together during the preparatory talks. We had also taken the point the Soviets had made in diplomatic channels that we should work together in a businesslike fashion for genuine progress, and he agreed. Ambassador Goodby, he thought, was well known to people in that field in the Soviet Union, so Gromyko would recognize that he was a capable and competent person.

On the subject of chemical weapons, which Gromyko had raised this morning and earlier, it was our view that since they were easily transportable, it would be more appropriate to find a global rather than a regional solution. For this reason our emphasis was on the proposal the U.S. had made in Geneva. As he had said earlier, here we will be able to table a draft treaty in Geneva, emphasizing verification in this connection. Verifiability was a difficult but very important matter.

These were some of the comments the Secretary wanted to make with reference to the various forums in which the topics Gromyko had properly identified as matters of concern in our country and in the world would be discussed.

Gromyko said that first of all, he wanted to reply to one of the questions the Secretary had touched on at the beginning of their talk today. The Secretary had raised the question of human rights, blowing it out of all proportion.

He would say that the Secretary was probably well aware of the Soviet appraisal of his entire position on this question. Gromyko was convinced that the U.S. position on this subject was entirely pervaded by falsehood, and that the U.S. was exploiting this matter for propaganda purposes. In essence, the Soviet position was more or less generally shared in the world, and it was that nowhere else were human rights violated so much as in some of the places in the Western hemisphere that were so dear to U.S. hearts, not to mention in the U.S. itself.

Gromyko said he would ask the Secretary not to ask him to be more precise; he could of course be more precise, but he did not believe he should waste time on this matter. If he were to talk on this subject he would only restate his assessment of the human rights situation as it existed in the United States. The Secretary had spoken of the importance of people moving across borders, the importance of reunifying families, etc., but he would simply point out that he did not know of a single instance where these matters had caused wars to break out. The Soviet Union was unshakeable in that position. He would not want to devote any time to the details of these matters.

The Secretary said he was surprised that it was Gromyko who had raised the subject of human rights. He was ready to discuss this topic and there were a few comments he wanted to make:

—First, the Secretary wanted to express his admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the Pentecostal families.⁹ The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it had been made. It showed that progress was possible.

—Second, he wanted to say that with reference to individual issues, President Reagan preferred a process of quiet diplomacy in this area.

—Third, he wanted to mention the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Begun, as people of great interest to the United States.

—Further, he would also mention a subject we had discussed with the Soviets many times: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its radical decline in recent years.

—He also wanted to note that Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, had made an arrangement to come to Moscow to discuss issues concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. The Secretary hoped that Gromyko would receive him and work with him.

—On a more traditional note, the Secretary recalled that at their earlier meeting in New York¹⁰ he, in the usual practice, had given the Soviet side a list of people who claimed U.S. citizenship under our laws, but had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. He would like Ambassador Hartman to provide Minister Korniyenko with an updated list of such cases, and also lists of persons seeking to join members of their families in the U.S. and of binational divided spouses. (Ambassador Hartman passed these lists to Korniyenko following the meeting.)

Gromyko then referred to another subject touched on earlier by the Secretary, negotiations on strategic arms. He had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet side was very disappointed by the state of affairs in connection with these negotiations. On the question of strategic arms no headway had been made at all. The proposals made by the U.S. side

clearly indicated that there was not the slightest desire on the U.S. side to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet side believed that this was the very reason the U.S. advanced such proposals, i.e. so that there should be no agreement. The reasons why the Soviet side had come to that conclusion had been explained to U.S. representatives, to the Secretary personally, and to his predecessor on numerous occasions.

Today, our respective representatives were not engaged in negotiations, Gromyko continued. He had understood the Secretary to say that he was very interested in progress and could say something additional on that subject. Well, that of course would be up to him; the Secretary could say anything he wished, Gromyko said. But he had to tell the Secretary now that once the U.S. had proceeded with deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the situation had changed radically. Following the beginning of that deployment it had become completely impossible to consider further discussions of strategic arms other than by linking them to the medium-range weapons.

Once they were deployed in Western Europe, all such weapons—and all those additional medium-range weapons that the U.S. was planning to deploy in Europe—were, from the Soviet standpoint, arms of strategic significance. After all, what was the difference from the Soviet standpoint between nuclear weapons that were deployed many thousands of kilometers away from Soviet territory and those that were deployed much closer: one thousand, fifteen hundred or perhaps only several hundred kilometers away? While these were medium-range weapons from the standpoint of their characteristics and parameters, from the standpoint of their capacity to reach Soviet territory they were strategic arms.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to consider the situation that would arise if the Soviets were to agree to continue talks on strategic arms under conditions when there can be no discussion of medium-range weapons. It would be completely unnatural and would deceive people about the true situation. This was one aspect of this issue. Thus, through deployment of medium-range weapons in Western Europe, the United States had obtained an additional strategic potential against the Soviet Union. Should this not be taken into account at the negotiations on strategic arms?

Quite apart from that, Gromyko said, during the negotiations on the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union had stated that it was absolutely necessary to discuss the question of nuclear weapons, taking account of U.S. forward-based systems. He would ask the Secretary to follow his step-by-step analysis, for otherwise there could be no meaningful discussion. At that time, during the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. side had said that it would very much complicate the problem of reaching an agreement on a SALT II treaty if FBS were linked to the SALT II negotiations. At that time a sort of compromise had been reached—as Gromyko had on a number of occasions been obliged to remind some U.S. officials who had not been engaged in those negotiations and perhaps were not aware of this matter. As for himself, he had had the pleasure to be engaged in negotiating these matters, and he recalled that by way of a compromise the two sides had achieved what was recorded in the SALT II Treaty, including agreement on the heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union. As a result the Soviet Union had agreed not to seek resolution of the question of FBS in the SALT II Treaty. But then, of course, the Soviet side had stated that in the follow-on negotiations in the future, after SALT II, this question—FBS—would have to be

resolved. Meanwhile, SALT II was to be "delinked" from U.S. FBS, as the Americans called it.

Now Gromyko asked, did not the question of U.S. FBS arise in connection with consideration of medium-range systems, and does it not have a direct bearing on all future negotiations on strategic arms? This followed clearly from the SALT II negotiations. Even if there had been no deployment of U.S. medium-range arms, this question would have arisen in any event.

These are the two main watertight arguments in favor of not ignoring the deployment of U.S. medium-range arms in Europe, Gromyko said. This might perhaps be entirely new for some people on the U.S. side, but he would think that even the new people on the U.S. side engaged in these matters must be informed of it. After all, the generation of people who have been actively engaged in those negotiations was still alive and well. Moreover, the records of those negotiations were also very much alive.

Taking into account all those circumstances, and also the fact that the policy of the United States with respect to arms, especially strategic arms, was clearly aimed at achieving a dominating position come what may, the Soviet side had to engage in thorough reconsideration of the new situation which had arisen after U.S. deployment of new weapons in Western Europe. The Soviet side would have to do a lot of thinking before reaching decisions on where to go from here.

If the Secretary were to assume that strategic arms negotiations could continue as if nothing had happened, while negotiations on medium-range nuclear arms were in abeyance, he would be very much mistaken. The Soviet side would have to reflect on all of these matters before

deciding on how to proceed. With respect to the Geneva negotiations on medium-range arms, the Soviet position was crystal clear. He was convinced that to continue those talks, given the present policy of the United States, would mean to participate in U.S. attempts to deceive people. He believed that Washington's present position was not intended to lead to agreement with the Soviet Union.

Thus, all the statements the Soviet side had made on this subject remained fully in force, Gromyko went on. His discussions of these matters with the Secretary in no way constituted continuation of the Geneva negotiations, and should in no way be seen as steps toward continuation of those negotiations or toward new negotiations. He repeated that it was not to be construed as continuing the old talks or starting new ones. In order for negotiations to resume, the U.S. would have to change its positions and, as he had already said, express willingness to return to the situation existing before deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe had begun. Under those conditions the talks could be resumed, but otherwise the Soviet side would simply be helping the U.S. to hold up a screen concealing the true state of affairs.

Gromyko said he knew that from time to time the U.S. had made statements to the effect that things in Geneva had been proceeding well. But in fact the U.S. side had been engaged in erecting an impenetrable wall in the path of any progress at the talks. If, upon returning to Washington, the Secretary were to report to the President and others that the Soviet position was such as Gromyko had just stated it and as it had been stated by Yuri Andropov and in other official statements of the Soviet side, he would be correct. However, should the Secretary report differently, Gromyko would have to correct any misstatement, and possibly in public.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would like to have all those problems resolved, but in that case the United States would have to abandon its present policy, which was aimed at securing a dominating position for itself, and be guided in its conduct of relations with the Soviet Union by the principles of equality and equal security. As for the Soviet side, it had no desire to achieve a dominating position, and this was clear from the entire policy conducted by the Soviet Union and from its moral stand. The Soviet Union wants to be on an equal footing with the United States. If this will be what the Secretary reports in Washington, he will be correct.

If such a policy were adopted, Gromyko said, it would not be difficult to find common language in Geneva, as well as outside Geneva, and at this meeting in Stockholm. He alleged that what the Soviet side had witnessed was an endless series of insulting statements about the Soviet Union, building an additional solid fence preventing good relations. However, if one were to reflect on matters objectively, he would say that he did not believe that the United States was desirous of having a collision with the Soviet Union. There were surely some rather primitive people in the U.S. who considered the possibility of such a collision, but those were people who could not see beyond the four walls of their rooms. He would note, however, that one met with such talk in the U.S. Sometimes there was talk of nuclear war, of a clash with the Soviet Union, as if this were some sort of picnic. This surely could not produce any positive results.

The Secretary interjected that his mother had told him when learning to drive to avoid collisions with Mack trucks. As far as he was concerned, in the field of international diplomacy, the Soviet Union was a Mack truck.

Gromyko said he now wanted to say a few words about chemical weapons. As he understood it, the Secretary was emphasizing the importance of that question and that was good. The Soviet side too believed this matter to be important. It was not a new issue: for a number of years it had been discussed in various forums, including such a broad forum as the United Nations. Negotiations had also been conducted between our two countries on chemical weapons. But neither the wider nor the narrower negotiation had led to any progress in resolving this matter.

Speaking frankly, Gromyko said, he would tell the Secretary how the Soviet side viewed the frequent attacks against the Soviet Union now current in the United States, as if the Soviet Union had been using chemical weapons somewhere in Asia or elsewhere. As he saw it, the U.S. was simply trying to divert public attention away from this entire issue and from the need to resolve it and achieve a ban on chemical weapons. He certainly did not believe that U.S. officials were so ignorant as not to know that the Soviet Union has not been doing anything of the kind. Thus, if the Secretary were interested in knowing the Soviet position, Gromyko could state to him officially that the Soviet Union wanted to see this problem resolved in an international accord on chemical weapons. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss such a ban in a broad forum or in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. Either way, the Soviet Union was prepared to go ahead, and it was his belief that agreement on this problem would generate a more favorable atmosphere for resolution of other matters as well.

He would suggest that they both see whether the U.N. Disarmament Committee in Geneva had broad enough shoulders to bear up under an attempt to resolve this matter. Personally, it was his hope that it will be able to bear up, and he would continue to issue appropriate

instructions to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva. The Soviet Union wanted to reach such an agreement and called upon the United States to join it in an effort to reach it. Such an agreement would really cast a ray of light in the present gloomy international atmosphere and would have beneficial effects in other areas, too. Furthermore, it would also be beneficial to our own bilateral relations.

Gromyko said that this was basically what he wanted to convey to the Secretary with reference to the Secretary's statements. He would conclude his remarks by expressing his wish that the Stockholm Conference contribute to an improvement of the international atmosphere. If so, it would also help with a number of problems, particularly the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union was prepared to act constructively, provided the United States was similarly disposed. The Soviet Union was not at all opposed to some measures, but it would favor adopting such measures as were fully justified by the facts. He would point out quite frankly that with reference to any issue requiring solution one could formulate proposals in such a way as to be clearly unacceptable. On the other hand, they could also be formulated in a way to be acceptable to all. He repeated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to confidence-building measures with reference to maneuvers and other matters at the Stockholm Conference. All this can come about if no one sets himself the goal of undercutting the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in order to secure for himself the commanding heights, so to speak. Should such a position be taken, there would be no positive outcome at the Stockholm Conference. There would not be the result he believed was desired by the majority of the countries here. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on that matter in terms of perhaps finding common language for our two sides.

Referring to the Vienna negotiation mentioned by the Secretary, Gromyko said that it should not be thought that the process of the Vienna negotiations had been interrupted. That forum was still in being. The two sides had declared a recess and had simply not yet agreed on a resumption date, but the process itself was still alive. He thought that if it were acceptable to the U.S. side, some date in mid-March could be agreed upon for resumption, perhaps the 16th of March or thereabouts. He would only want to express one reservation. If these negotiations were only used once again to throw dust into people's eyes, then the Soviet side might be forced to take steps somewhat similar to those it had been compelled to take with respect to the negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He would hope that the Vienna negotiations would not enter upon such a path. It was sad, very sad, that there was no progress at those negotiations, and he believed that perhaps the reductions discussed in Vienna also did not fit in with the plans of the Western participants. He said, "Well, we will see."

In addition, he wanted to tell the Secretary that should the Secretary present matters on MBFR or the other negotiations to public media in such a way as to imply that this, in fact, meant that the Soviet Union was abandoning the position it had stated with respect to nuclear arms, that would distort the Soviet position, and in that case, he would be forced to state publicly that these kinds of generalizations were far from reality, and he would be forced to put things in their proper place. He therefore hoped that this would not be necessary.

The Secretary said he had a few comments on the points made by Gromyko. First of all, he noted Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Union sought equality with the United States and did not wish to have a collision with the

U.S. He could state that the avoidance of such a collision and equality with the Soviet Union were also our aims. Thus he could agree with both formulations.

Secondly, turning to the talks on nuclear missiles which have now stopped, the Secretary said he had understood Gromyko to say that deployment of our medium-range missiles in Europe was regarded by the Soviet side as a strategic matter even though these missiles were medium in range, and that therefore they had a bearing on the strategic arms talks. It was his impression that Gromyko thus appeared to be in the process of reflecting on how such talks could be structured if they began again. He would say that we would consider any suggestion Gromyko might make regarding these forums.

But the forums would not change the fact that there are problems involved, the Secretary said. He felt he had to make the point that we could not consider talks where U.S. medium-range missiles were involved, but Soviet medium-range missiles were not. This was because SS-20s were deployed and could strike our allies. If Soviet missiles should hit them they would be hitting us, because we were bound together with our allies. He was not asking Gromyko to agree to this formulation, but was only telling him how we saw things. Therefore, if Gromyko had a suggestion concerning renewed or new negotiations, we would listen with interest, but they would have to include negotiations on SS-20s if Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles were included.

Next, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had taken up the subject of chemical weapons and had expressed readiness to try to reach agreement. The Secretary welcomed that statement. For its part, the U.S. was ready to work hard on this subject.

He also noted Gromyko's comments regarding the old problem of compliance. In the past Gromyko had raised this matter as an important one. We believed it of crucial importance to arms control and other agreements. In this connection, some questions had arisen, and he informed Gromyko that the President, as directed by Congress, was in the process of submitting a report to Congress.¹¹ He was sure that Gromyko had been informed of the extensive briefing we had given the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the contents of that report, and he would therefore not repeat the details. But he could tell Gromyko that the President's report was classified. Compliance was an important matter, and questions needed to be resolved through careful exploration.

Returning to the question of chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed Gromyko's positive statement here. As he had said, we would be ready to table a draft treaty soon. This was an important issue; like the Soviet side, we wanted to see progress. He might add that in the minds of many people the matter of biological weapons should be resolved as well, but that was a separate subject.

Regarding Gromyko's statement about the CDE in Stockholm, he agreed that it was important to structure any idea in such a way that it would be useful to Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries. If we wanted to reach agreement it would be well for the heads of our respective delegations, who are both professionals in this field, to maintain liaison and avoid problems that might arise as a result of failure to exchange views. We were prepared to do that.

With reference to Gromyko's comments about MBFR, the Secretary welcomed his idea of reconvening the negotiations in March. The 16th seemed to be an

acceptable date for us, and he would suggest that this be put into diplomatic channels. The date appeared to be O.K. He believed that we could arrive at agreement in Vienna. The U.S. had no wish to put dust in anyone's eyes on this subject or any other.

In reply, Gromyko referred to the question of so-called violations of agreements and obligations. He noted that the Secretary had not been able to resist the temptation of bringing up something in that area. Gromyko said that he was not familiar with the details of the President's report to which the Secretary had referred, but when he learned the details he would respond in kind. The Soviet side can show how the U.S. treats its obligations, and point to some things about its conduct.

The Secretary said as a point of information that Mr. Burt had given a briefing to Mr. Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and had informed him of the details of the report in question.¹² Gromyko noted that this had been done in general terms and repeated that, taking into account all the circumstances, the Soviets would respond in kind.

Gromyko asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on our bilateral relations. He noted that they have been in a state of disarray for some time. These matters had been discussed on many occasions with representatives of the present U.S. Administration, with the Secretary personally as well as with his predecessor and other U.S. political leaders. As he had said in his speech today, the U.S. Administration had done a great deal with "an easy hand" to destroy what had been built up in the 1970s. In a word, it had proved the truth of the thesis that it is much easier to destroy than to build. The United States has been engaged in destroying, with a big stick as it were, what had

been built up by others. He did not know what the U.S. had in mind now, whether the Administration still adhered to the same views it had expressed immediately after coming into office. If the Secretary had something new he could tell Gromyko that might help to improve our relations, he would be interested to hear it.

The Secretary replied that he did not believe that what he had to say was new, but he would comment briefly on our bilateral relations. He knew that the Hotline talks had been going forward and promised to produce good results. On non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, he knew that another round of discussions is scheduled and this was an area where our interests were parallel, so that was worthwhile. On depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, we were glad to have received a positive response from the Soviet side. Further, we continue to believe that trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, conducted on commercially sound terms, and not militarily related. Agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade. The Secretary also wanted to make a comment about a vast stretch of the Pacific where the Korean airliner had been lost. He understood that various questions were under discussion within ICAO, such matters as fixed navigation aids, radio beacons, and communications links between responsible civil aviation officials. These can help avoid a situation where an airliner is unable to determine its position from outside sources. This could be worked out constructively, if the Soviet side agreed.

On opening consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural agreement, the Secretary said the agreement in principle made last summer to go forward still stands. However, the timing needed to be

right. It was difficult to move forward in the atmosphere of recent months.

The Secretary noted that there were many other issues of great importance. They were not necessarily bilateral issues, but they were nevertheless of interest to both of our countries. Gromyko had mentioned Lebanon in his speech. This was a matter of major interest to both of us, and it was of tremendous significance to other Middle East issues.¹³ The Secretary was interested in hearing Soviet views and would be glad to present ours. He would say that there were also some interesting developments in southern Africa. He had long thought this was an area where our two countries should both be interested in achieving constructive progress. We have people directly involved in these matters on our side, such as Assistant Secretary Crocker, who are available to engage in discussion on this subject.

There was a wide range of regional issues of very great importance. Expressing his personal opinion, the Secretary thought that if one talked about tensions in the world today, we should realize that the place generating the worst tensions was clearly the Middle East—not just Lebanon and the Palestinian issues, but also the war between Iran and Iraq, as well as developments inside Iran itself, which he found very disturbing. Although these are not bilateral issues, they were issues of mutual concern which might be discussed.

Gromyko said that to a certain extent the Secretary had helped him. He had intended to touch upon some purely bilateral issues and then go on to regional matters. Now he would change the order so as to discuss the regional matters first and then proceed to bilateral issues. After all, the two categories touched one another.

Gromyko said he could agree with the Secretary that the Middle East area was an area that almost daily generated very acute problems. He was convinced that these acute problems are generated as a result of the policy pursued by the U.S. and Israel which, of course, is constantly buttressed by the U.S. He was certain that if the U.S. wanted to act in a manner to prevent many of these problems from arising, with its influence upon Israel, it could prevail on Israel to change its aggressive policy. After all, Israel occupied Arab lands, the Golan Heights, and it retained them to this day as if it were master of these territories. In fact, what Israel did in wresting these territories from their rightful owners were aggressive and bandit-like acts. Since the U.S. invariably supported Israel, it had to share responsibility for this situation. Very often, particularly in Washington, it was frequently said, "What about Syria, Syria, Syria?" Earlier it was asked, "What about the Palestinians, Palestinians, Palestinians?" One or the other or both were blamed for the tensions in that area. In actual fact, Syria is a victim of aggression by Israel. Israel tore off a slice of Syrian territory and is now taking completely illegal steps to formalize this act of aggression. The Palestinians remain without a homeland of their own; that is, they had a homeland in the past, but not today. This is the main reason for the dangerous tensions in the Middle East. In the past the U.S. supported Israel politically for many years in discussions in the United Nations, in our bilateral discussions and in other forums. Now direct U.S. military support for Israel was growing.

Also, today the U.S. has intruded into the Middle East with its own military forces, setting up military bases wherever it considers this possible. U.S. troops are actually in Lebanon. The question arises: on what grounds? The Secretary might answer that Gemayel had requested U.S. military forces to come in, but surely it was a fact that

Gemayel had done so virtually with a gun pointed at his head. Can that agreement be taken seriously? Obviously not. U.S. forces are present in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon as occupation troops, as interventionists. The Soviet Union believes that U.S. troops should not be in the Middle East as a whole.

The U.S. would be acting rationally if it were to withdraw its troops from that area. It was a real shame that the U.S. was not sparing the blood of its soldiers, its young men there. They should be taken out of there, removing this additional cause of tensions in the Middle East—a step which would promote an easing of the situation. Of course, British, Italian and French forces must also leave. One hears, of course, such arguments as, “What will then happen to the inhabitants of Lebanon? After all, they will slaughter each other.”

In this connection, Gromyko said he wished to recall a bit of history, going back to the years 1917 and 1918 when the socialist revolution had taken place in Russia. A great many foreign people, including U.S. troops commanded by General Greyson, came to Russia. This is well described in a book entitled “American Adventure in Siberia” which, he thought, Ambassador Hartman might have read.¹⁴ At that time it was also said that, after all, the Russians were fighting each other there, and it was necessary to intervene and help one side to win. First, he would note that nothing came of this intervention in Russia. Secondly, he asked, what sort of reasoning is that? Is it reasonable to believe that foreigners must support one side against the other in a civil war? After all, you had your own Civil War too. (At this point the Secretary interjected that, on this point, at least, Gromyko was stating a fact.) You know, if such actions were to be legalized, one would have to find a large furnace and

immediately burn all the documents of international law, all treaties and agreements.

Thus, it is not what will happen in Lebanon when foreign forces are withdrawn that one should worry about. If you were to ask about Syria, it has repeatedly stated that if Israel and the other occupants withdraw, it will withdraw its forces as well. The Soviet Union has good relations with Syria, Gromyko said, and he was in a position to reaffirm once again that the Syrians will pull out their forces if other foreign forces are withdrawn.

Thus, retaining U.S. forces in Lebanon is not going to improve the reputation of the U.S., which has already been undermined. The Soviet Union's position with respect to Israel is crystal clear. The Soviet Union has never agreed with extremist demands from extremist groups to throw Israel into the sea. He would remind the Secretary that, jointly with the U.S., the Soviet Union had stood at the cradle of the state of Israel. At that time he was leading the Soviet delegation in the UN and had raised his hand in voting for the establishment of an independent state of Israel. At that time the decision had been taken to set up both a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine. The Soviet Union believed that Israel was entitled to independent existence, but this did not mean that it was entitled to commit aggression.

Thus, it was necessary for the U.S. to withdraw its troops from the Middle East in general, and from Lebanon in particular. It was necessary for Israel to withdraw as well. These troops were the main reason for tensions in the Middle East, along with other foreign troops. No matter what one might call them—an international or multinational or peacekeeping force—that did not change anything at all.

Gromyko recalled that in the past the U.S. had frequently asked the Soviet Union to bring its influence to bear upon Syria to act in a more restrained manner. He had to point out that the Soviet Union had done so on quite a few occasions, and that the Syrians had accepted such approaches with understanding. It was therefore not the Syrians who were now at fault in the situation in Lebanon, but the aggression that had been committed there. This was the Soviet assessment of the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

Of course, it is hardly possible to resolve all the troubles there in one fell swoop. But just the same, if the U.S. and other countries were to withdraw their troops, the situation would be defused, and once all factions felt that they did not enjoy foreign support, the Lebanese themselves would come together and agree. Ultimately this would mean less bloodshed and less terrorism. This was what the Soviet Union advocated.

Gromyko noted that for some reason in recent years there were no contacts with Washington concerning the Middle East. He would not want to appear as a supplicant with outstretched hand, but he was sure that without withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, one could not promote a general settlement in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in seeing a conflagration in that area, and he did not believe that the U.S. was interested in seeing such a conflagration either.

The Secretary thought Gromyko would not be surprised to learn that he could not agree with many aspects of his analysis. However, there were some things in Gromyko's statement with which he did agree. Perhaps that could lead to some constructive developments.

First, the Secretary noted, Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union did not wish to see an explosion in the Middle East. Neither do we. Second, he agreed that if all foreign forces were out of Lebanon there would be a better chance for the Lebanese to be able to construct their country. We agreed on this as an objective. He wanted to assure Gromyko that the U.S. had no wish to keep forces in that country. The question was how to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and that was a hard question. We knew that good first steps had almost been achieved in the so-called Security Plan. We believe it could bring a better reconciliation between the various forces there. But once again, something broke down between Jumblatt and Gemayel.

Nevertheless, if such steps were taken, they could be precursors of a further withdrawal of Israeli forces. If discussions emerged in which Syria made a statement about its intent to withdraw, we could see a whole process taking shape fairly promptly. We were working toward law and order there as foreign forces left the area. We would like to see programs of that kind succeed.

In thinking about this problem, it was also necessary to consider the existence of Palestinian camps in various parts of Lebanon. This is because many Lebanese do not like the Palestinians. We thought that U.N. forces could play a constructive role in providing security in those camps. Obviously this has to be a Lebanese effort as well, and it would be good if this kind of process could come about. But it too often breaks down. We do believe that a positive move from Syria could accomplish a great deal. We had many discussions with Israel; for example, they were successful in obtaining a relief of the siege of Deyr-al-Qamr. At any rate, we are working on this line of action, and it could be a way toward withdrawal of all foreign forces,

including our own in Lebanon and Soviet troops in Syria, if the Soviets supported it.

Gromyko said the Soviet side believed that if the U.S. and its pals in the area withdrew their forces from Lebanon, it would compel the Lebanese themselves to find solutions faster. He hoped the Secretary would agree that it now appeared as though the U.S. was simply acting out of fear of some negative consequences if it should withdraw its troops. He also hoped the Secretary would agree that this does not sound very convincing. He believed that the U.S. had very often provided all-out support to Israel, even in those cases where the U.S. could have avoided departing from a position of principle. And yet, each time that Israel merely expresses a desire for the U.S. to provide its shoulder for support, the U.S. does so. Whether or not the U.S. now has a treaty of strategic alliance with Israel, it is in fact constantly providing support. He doubted that people in the Middle East have such a weak memory as to forget these facts quickly. He had nothing further to add on this regional problem.

Gromyko said he wanted to comment briefly on regional problems in the Caribbean and Latin America. Of course, for a long time the Soviets had been observing what was happening in that Caribbean region. This was especially true for the last few months. The Secretary would understand why he spoke of the last few months, because it is precisely in that period that the situation became especially aggravated and tensions increased. He believed this was entirely the fault of U.S. policy. The U.S. did not like the internal systems of Cuba or Nicaragua. He would point out that he did not know very much about Nicaragua, except that it was a small nation and that it had not wished to live under the hated dictatorship of Somoza, which the people of Nicaragua had overthrown. They wanted to live

as they wished, and they were entitled to do so, as any other people. Washington claimed that their internal system was a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. How could that be possible?

To provide even a shadow of credibility to this Washington position, it was said that Nicaragua probably acted at the direction of the Soviet Union and with the help of the Soviet Union. He would only point out that the Soviets did not know these people. They saw them for the first time during an official visit to the Soviet Union. Gromyko had met their foreign minister twice when he had come to Moscow. He would note that he had met more often with the Secretary than with the Nicaraguans. The situation with respect to Cuba was somewhat similar, although the Cuban socialist state had been in existence much longer. But now the U.S. was ceaselessly arranging all sorts of attacks against both Nicaragua and Cuba. Gromyko emphasized Nicaragua because of allegations in Washington to the effect that the Nicaraguans posed a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. Surely, the Secretary realized full well that no one would believe this to be at all possible. The U.S. had even gone so far as to state officially in Washington that unless Nicaragua changed its internal system to please Washington, the U.S. might take some military action there. Naturally, this was something that had aroused indignation throughout the world.

Gromyko pointed out that he had not mentioned Grenada. The Secretary probably knew how this was perceived throughout the world and in the Soviet Union. This was simply something that had aroused amazement. Here was a good example of the "transparency" about which so much had been said here in Stockholm. Just 24 hours before the U.S. invasion, Washington had assured the world that it had no plans for an invasion of Grenada. "There's transparency

for you,” Gromyko exclaimed. The Secretary probably did not expect anything but condemnation from the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. acts in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This area was very remote from the Soviet Union. But he was mentioning it and talking about it because it concerned a matter of principle.

South Africa was also remote from the Soviet Union. Had the U.S. ever tried to do anything to put an end to South Africa’s aggression toward Angola? The answer was that it had done nothing at all. If for some reason the Soviet Union’s position was not well known to the Secretary, Gromyko was sure that it should be quite clear now. The Soviet Union believed that every nation, large and small, had the right to its own independent development. Washington sometimes pronounced the same principle—the right of any people to its own independent development. But all these pronouncements were forgotten as soon as they conflicted with U.S. actions.

Gromyko said that he had spoken at great length on some of these matters, and had done so to be sure that the Secretary was completely aware of Soviet policy in this regard. The Soviet Union was resolutely against any country dictating to any other country the internal order that should exist there. In response, the Secretary might say, “What about Soviet forces in Afghanistan?” It was true that Soviet forces were still there, but did the Secretary know that the previous leadership of Afghanistan as well as the present one had asked the Soviet Union eleven times for help in repelling the daily intervention against Afghanistan from Iran and from Pakistan? He might ask “Has the Nicaraguan government ever appealed to the U.S. for help?” The answer, of course, was—never. But the Afghan Government had appealed for help against the intervention, and the Soviet Union had provided it in

accordance with the U.N. charter. He would now state officially to the Secretary that the Soviet Union wanted to see Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state which would maintain good relations with the U.S., with the Soviet Union and all other countries of the world. And yet, at the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. was trying by hook or by crook to pass a resolution aimed at stepping on Soviet toes, so to speak. He would add that the U.S. keeps on feeding the intervention against Afghanistan from Pakistan and from that good friend of the U.S., Iran, and all this for the only reason that the internal regime in Afghanistan is not to the liking of the U.S. The U.S. is providing arms to the interventionists, and the Soviet Union knows this very well because of serial numbers and the like on arms that wind up in Soviet hands.

Further, just as in the case of the Caribbean region, the U.S. is in effect protecting the racist regime in South Africa, which has committed many aggressive acts against other African countries. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. were to act justly in that area, they would jointly put South Africa in its place. The Soviet Union wants nothing in Angola, but it is certainly opposed to South African aggression against Angola. South Africa has been throwing U.N. resolution after U.N. resolution into the wastebasket—resolutions for which both our countries have voted regarding independence for Namibia. He was certain that the U.S. too should be opposed to South African actions, as was the Soviet Union. He thought that not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. too would be interested in preventing a spread of the racist contagion beyond the borders of South Africa. By the way, the situation there too was such that some day the majority of the people of South Africa will have their say—their time will surely come.

Gromyko repeated again that he had spoken at great length, but noted that these were the kinds of questions that poisoned relations between our two countries. He had wanted to set them forth in detail. After all, he and the Secretary had sat down at this table in order to make clear to each other one another's policies with respect to each issue discussed. He felt he had done that, and had pointed out that the Soviet Union wanted nothing in Nicaragua, nothing in Angola, and nothing in Afghanistan except that the people of these countries themselves have the possibility to decide their own affairs. The Soviet Union wanted to see Namibia independent and Afghanistan independent and non-aligned. He believed that the U.S. too should be interested in these same objectives.

The Secretary said that he did not want to go through the details in each of these areas, but he did have a few comments.

First, on Central America, one of the key problems was interference by the Nicaraguans in the internal affairs of other countries by providing arms to insurgents; they often came through Cuba, often originating from the Soviet Union and sometimes from others. There were many other problems in that area. It was a poor area, and people there needed help. It was for this reason that President Reagan had persuaded Gromyko's friend, Henry Kissinger, to investigate the situation there. Kissinger had produced a good report, and the Secretary would be glad to give a copy to Gromyko.¹⁵ He would arrange to have a copy given to Gromyko, and it would be well worth reading.

A great deal had been written about Grenada, and a White Paper had been issued which was at variance with much of what Gromyko had to say. The Soviet Embassy had received

a copy and he would suggest that Gromyko's people look it over.¹⁶

On South Africa, the Secretary said, we hold no brief for the racist policies of South Africa, and we have criticized them. It was an area that suffers from conflict and tension. It was an area also a long way from our home, but we are trying to help. The Secretary also believed that this was an area where we could jointly do something useful. As he had already pointed out, there were some recent events in the area that were interesting, and he thought that consultations between us might have a direct positive influence there. As for Afghanistan, we too would welcome a free, independent and non-aligned country; we thus share this objective with the Soviet Union. The United Nations has initiated negotiations; we wish them well because it is clear that we cannot have a free, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan unless Soviet forces are withdrawn from the country.

Gromyko interjected that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces just as soon as intervention in Afghanistan ceases. The Secretary said that there was a hopeful process of negotiations underway.

Our combat forces had already been withdrawn from Grenada and he was sure we would withdraw our forces from Lebanon, the Secretary said, before the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In Grenada all that is left is a small support contingent. These three areas represent different cases, and they provide examples of situations where we could hope that if we had better relations with the Soviet Union, with more discussions between us, we could get beyond accusing each other and could carefully explore why things take place, perhaps achieving constructive results.

At this late hour, he wanted to say to Gromyko that more constructive relations were what we wanted. He believed that more frequent private discussions would help this process along. As he had said earlier, we would like to engage in such discussions. He felt that he had to look at Gromyko not only as the Foreign Minister of a great power but also as a human being. As Foreign Minister, Gromyko had without a doubt more diplomatic experience than any other person in the world.¹⁷ He had seen a great many and a great variety of achievements. He would now ask Gromyko to look at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to think about the possibility of establishing more constructive relations between us and to think that he and the Secretary (with guidance from the President), might see a better day. We are ready to work on that.

Gromyko said that if he understood the Secretary correctly, he had spoken in favor of more frequent exchanges of views between the two of them; he shared this wish. He noted that some U.S. officials (here he was not blaming the Secretary personally) believed it to be to their credit that they exchanged views with whomever one wished, but not with the Soviet Union. That was surely a primitive approach. Thus, this was a constructive wish, if indeed it reflected the Secretary's true intentions. He was in favor of such exchanges.

Gromyko also noted the Secretary's enumeration of several specific bilateral matters and took satisfaction in the fact that these were proceeding, albeit slowly. With respect to depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, the Soviet Union had advanced a specific proposal which, in fact, was an alloy of the proposals of each country. He would urge the Secretary to devote some attention to this matter.

With respect to certain aviation problems the Secretary had mentioned, he would note that both countries had representatives in ICAO, and he would suggest letting them work out some positions that might be acceptable to both our countries and to others. He believed this should be possible so long as no attempt is made to impose a solution on any of the sides.

As for the opening of consulates and cultural relations, he believed that some progress could be made and would like to know the Secretary's specific considerations. Whenever he felt it would be possible to set them out for the Soviet side, they could be examined carefully. As for opening consulates, he would ask how many years this matter had already dragged on? Here were two major powers that were unable to resolve such a pigmy question. Now that pigmy begins to look like a huge monster in the eyes of some people. As for cultural relations, it would be good to arrange them to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Gromyko then noted that some difficulties had arisen in connection with some other agreements between our two countries in terms of understanding what state they were in. Some of them were evidently in a state of hibernation. Some people evidently thought that these agreements should die; for his part, he believed that they should be brought back to life. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at them, and if something did not suit him, to let the Soviet side know.

Gromyko noted that they had discussed a number of issues today, and felt that such a discussion had indeed been necessary. It would be good if the Secretary were to take into account the observations he had expressed today. This could help to elicit points of contact between the sides.

As for the Stockholm Conference, Gromyko thought that he probably could not promise that some arguments would not arise at the Conference between our two countries; they would. But he would be very much in favor of maintaining consultations in order to have such arguments eventually result in joint positions. Soviet representatives at the Conference will be prepared to consult with U.S. representatives and not only regard each other with suspicion. If the Secretary would instruct his delegation to take a confrontational attitude only, obviously this would produce no results. Gromyko was in favor of searching for all possibilities of achieving results and his delegation would be instructed accordingly.

The Secretary said that those would be the instructions he gave to our delegation as well.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/84-01/25/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock noted: "Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat." Although several copies of this text were found, no final version with Shultz's clearance was located. McFarlane's stamp appears on the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 152](#).

³ For the text of Gromyko's January 18 speech to the CDE, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 24-32. In telegram Secto 1025, January 18, the Secretary's

delegation forwarded an English translation of Gromyko's statement in Stockholm to the CDE. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840080-0219) In a separate telegram, the delegation commented: "In the CDE plenary of January 18, Gromyko took twice his allotted time to deliver a hard-hitting attack on the administration, reiterating in detail the Soviet thesis that the U.S. has used arms control negotiations as a cover for an arms race designed to reestablish U.S. military superiority; that initial INF deployments had in fact undermined European security; that an aggressive U.S. foreign policy remained the 'main threat to peace' in not only Europe but the Mideast and Central America as well; and finally, that recent U.S. statements alleging an interest in dialogue were a tactical sham. As a contrast to this pattern of U.S. 'militarism,' Gromyko also reviewed a familiar litany of past Soviet arms control and confidence-building proposals, concentrating on those put forward in the 1983 Prague Declaration and at the 38th UNGA." (Telegram Secto 1023 from Secretary's Delegation in Stockholm, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840048-0543, D840036-0048)

⁴ See [Document 137](#).

⁵ Shultz gave a speech at the CDE on January 17, in which he stated: "an artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent—and, indeed, heartlessly divided one of its great nations.

"This barrier was not placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is not the West that prevents its citizens free movement or cuts them off from competing ideas.

“Let me be very clear: the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed division of Europe. This division is the essence of Europe’s security and human rights problem, and we all know it.

“Human rights remain central to any discussion of European security. As the Helsinki Final Act declares, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is ‘an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation.’ The attempt to impose division on Europe is inevitably a source of instability and tension.” (Telegram Secto 1019 from the Secretary’s delegation, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840034-0830) For the full-text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1984, pp. 34-36.

⁶ See [Document 158](#).

⁷ START negotiations began in Geneva on June 29, 1982. They were suspended without a set resumption date on December 8, 1983, a Soviet decision related to U.S. INF deployments to Europe. See [footnote 3](#), [Document 142](#).

⁸ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 141](#).

⁹ See [Document 74](#).

¹⁰ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 221](#).

¹¹ On January 23, the President sent a message to Congress on Soviet noncompliance, along with a fact sheet and a classified report. For the text of the message and the fact sheet, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 72-76. Reagan wrote in his diary on January 9: “An NSC meeting—this one on how to handle report to Congress on Soviet violations of weapons treaties—which are numerous. We’re going to low key it in the report but deal directly with the Soviets on what do they intend to do about them.”

(Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 306) On January 13, Reagan continued in his diary: “An N.S.C. meeting on our approach to the Soviets re arms negotiations. We’ve notified them of our report to Cong. on their violation of various treaties & agreements. They do just plain cheat.” (Ibid., p. 308)

¹² Burt and Sokolov met on January 13 to discuss the report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Instead of providing Sokolov with a written statement, Burt went through a series of points covered in the report. (Telegram 12804 to Moscow, January 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840001-0338)

¹³ Hartman and Gromyko had held a series of meeting related to Lebanon and the situation in the Middle East. The most recent had been in mid-December 1983. See [footnote 4, Document 147](#).

¹⁴ Gromyko seems to be referring to the book *America’s Siberian Adventure* by William S. Graves, published in 1931.

¹⁵ The Kissinger Commission Report was issued publicly on January 11. The full text is available in the journal, *Population and Development Review*, vol. 10, No. 2, June 1984, pp. 381–389. A summary and guidance on the report was transmitted in telegram 6714 to multiple American Republic diplomatic posts, January 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840016-0724)

¹⁶ Not found.

¹⁷ Gromyko had served as Soviet Foreign Minister since 1957.

160. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Stockholm, January 19, 1984, 0103Z

Secto 1032. White House Eyes Only for the President and McFarlane. SecState for S/S (Hill) (Only). Subject: Memorandum for the President: My Meeting With Gromyko in Stockholm, January 18, 1984.²

1. (S—Entire text)

2. As you know, Gromyko gave a very tough speech in Stockholm this morning,³ and as I expected I found him in a sour mood when our talks opened this afternoon. Nevertheless, the talks went two hours longer than anticipated, and during these five hours I inserted all the points I wanted to make into the record Gromyko will pass to the Soviet Politburo. For his part, Gromyko demonstrated that while there are basic differences between us, the Soviets see a need to be talking to us, and there may be some issues where they want to make progress. They are extremely sensitive about publicity, and if we publicize progress they will certainly retaliate by denying it and may well pull back on individual issues. But I am mildly encouraged by the meeting, assuming we can manage the follow-up wisely both within the government and publicly.

3. I began by restating your desire for a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, based on private discussions that will be kept out of the limelight. Gromyko responded by criticizing both your speech of Monday and my speech here yesterday.⁴ There may be "some words" in both speeches

that the Soviets can agree to, he said, but the basic problem is that we do not like socialist systems and want to change them. He said they feel the same way about capitalist systems, but if we base relations on these dislikes, we will be building a blank wall between us, and the Soviets prefer to look for points of contact. As concerns socialist systems, I replied, the problem of whether they are efficient—which I doubted—is different from the problem of whether peoples have the right to choose them, but I also reminded him that it is the differences in values and freedom that have created the tensions of postwar Europe. After all, they had built the only wall in Europe.

4. Gromyko then turned to specific issues, and made it very clear that if the Soviets are willing to talk, the conspicuous exception at this point is nuclear arms control, the Geneva negotiations. On arms control in general, he said the Soviets seek equality and want to avoid collision, and I told him we agree with both points. On INF and START in particular, however, he insisted that U.S. INF deployments have changed the situation, and that the Soviets are neither willing to return to the previous situation nor willing to engage in new talks on the subject matter right now. At the same time, the specific points he made concentrated on the history of U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) both in SALT II and subsequently, and his clear message was that if negotiations resume the Soviets will want to treat U.S. intermediate-range systems as FBS.

5. I responded that if ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's are to be treated in negotiations, we will also have to address Soviet SS-20's, because we and our allies are bound together, and if the Soviets hit them it is the same as hitting us. With regard to START, I conveyed your desire to move forward, and to explore the possibilities of trade-offs among systems where each side had advantages

given the asymmetries in force structures. But I did not enter into any details, given Gromyko's unwillingness to address the Geneva negotiations.

6. On other arms control topics, Gromyko took a more constructive tack:

—On MBFR, as Dobrynin had predicted he said the Soviets are willing to resume the Vienna negotiations on or about March 16, warning against exploitation of this proposal to prove that there is business-as-usual. I replied that although this sounded acceptable, we should work it out in diplomatic channels.

—On chemical weapons, Gromyko expressed what appeared to be genuine interest in moving forward, and especially in our plan to table a treaty draft in Geneva. He noted that the Soviets have made a regional proposal while we have a global approach, but said they are willing to discuss both, and focussed more on overcoming difficulties than on debating the merits of the two approaches.

—On the Stockholm Conference measures, he recognized the differences in approach but stressed several times that our negotiators should keep in touch and work together in businesslike fashion.

7. In our exchanges on arms control, I stressed the importance we attach to the compliance issue, its corrosive effect on the confidence needed to move forward in arms control and our desire to resolve compliance questions rather than use them as sticks to beat the Soviets. Although I expected an indignant rebuttal, Gromyko responded only that if we give heavy publicity to our charges the Soviets will retaliate with charges that the U.S. has violated arms control commitments.

8. Referring back to the emphasis I had put on human rights in my CDE speech yesterday, Gromyko then raised human rights as another alleged U.S. propaganda device, and this gave me the opening to make the points I had planned to make: your personal interest in these issues and commitment to quiet diplomacy as the best way to resolve individual cases; the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Iosif Begun; the drastic decline in Jewish emigration from the USSR; and the upcoming visit to Moscow of World Jewish Congress President Edgar Bronfman to discuss Jewish issues, which I supported. Finally, I notified him that Ambassador Art Hartman would give his deputy our traditional lists of cases of (1) long-standing applicants for emigration with a claim to U.S. citizenship under our law; (2) people seeking reunification with family members in the U.S.; and (3) Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens seeking to join them in the U.S. (Gromyko's deputy accepted the lists after the meeting.)

9. Gromyko then invited comments on bilateral issues with the familiar claim that our bilateral relations are in disarray because we have purposely torn down the structure of agreements built up in the 1970's. I responded by pointing out certain topics on which we were making or hoping for progress: Hotline upgrade and other communications measures; nuclear non-proliferation, where we have scheduled another bilateral session in Vienna next month; the Pacific maritime boundary, where the Soviets have agreed to negotiations in Washington at the end of this month; and trade, where agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial exchange without military spinoffs. I pointed out that they could take some very useful technical steps, navigation aids and the like, to avoid a recurrence of the KAL tragedy, and that we stand by last summer's agreement in principle to move forward on consulates in Kiev and New York and negotiation of a new cultural

agreement, but that the timing must be right in terms of the overall relationship.

10. Gromyko then moved into regional issues, and delivered himself of an extended tirade on the theme of U.S. militarism and interference in the internal affairs of others, which swung from the Middle East through Southern Africa to Central America/the Caribbean:

—On the Middle East, he stressed Israeli aggressiveness and our responsibility for it, given our “great influence” on Israel; and the familiar charge that we wish to emplace military forces in a region on the USSR’s southern borders;

—On Southern Africa, he stressed our support for “racist” South Africa, and our alleged withdrawal of support from UN Resolution 435 that we had both voted for;⁵

—On Central America/the Caribbean, he hammered on the familiar line that Nicaragua is no threat to us and that what we really object to is “socialism.”

11. Probably because he sensed just how weak his case was, he concluded with a discussion on Afghanistan in which he reiterated the well-worn claim that the Afghan Government had invited the Soviets in many times to defend its integrity before the Soviets agreed, and that we are egging on external interference from Pakistan and Iran, “your friends.”

12. On the specifics, I made a standard presentation on the theme that we should be talking more about issues whose destructive potential was very clear and present in our relationship, but could not resist saying that I expected we would have our forces out of Grenada and Lebanon before theirs were out of Afghanistan.

13. From that launch pad, I summed up by expressing the hope that we want a more constructive relationship and think it may be possible to fashion one if we can only get away from accusations and talk quietly about the issues. I then appealed directly to Gromyko, not only as the world's most experienced diplomat but also as a human being, to review the current situation in our relationship carefully and see whether he did not see some way of moving forward toward a better day.

14. Gromyko's response was somewhat disjointed, but also perhaps the most interesting part of the discussion:

—If I were suggesting the need for more frequent exchanges, he said, the Soviets support it, and are ready to talk on any issue except the Geneva negotiations;

—The Middle East is the regional issue we most need to talk about;

—Their proposal for Pacific maritime boundary talks is really an “alloy” (i.e. an amalgam) of the proposals of both sides.

—Proposals in the civil aviation field would be under discussion in ICAO; we should consider them, and our representatives should talk; and we should be able to make headway so long as U.S. representatives do not put forward “unacceptable” solutions (which I took to mean measures fingering the Soviets for KAL responsibility);

—The Soviets are awaiting concrete proposals on consulates and the cultural agreement;

—There are other bilateral topics which the U.S. has put into “hibernation,” and which should be looked at;

—This has been a “necessary” discussion, and it would be good if we took Soviet views into account in the future.

16. On balance, I think the meeting showed some modest forward progress on the course you have charted for U.S.-Soviet relations. It could scarcely have been worse than the Madrid session,⁶ and in fact it was better. At the same time, the prospect is very clouded. The Soviets clearly have not yet figured out how they wish to handle a resurgent U.S. For the time being, they wish to keep nuclear negotiations in a deep freeze. But they also seem prepared to embark on discussions concerning a whole range of other issues. However, even that inclination is very tentative. They have been impressed, as they should be, by our skill in conveying your tripartite approach of realism, strength and negotiations. By the same token, they are genuinely fearful that we will exploit any genuine dialogue to dismiss their concerns over rising tensions, and claim that life goes on as usual.

17. Much will therefore depend on how we manage the small openings toward dialogue Gromyko was holding it [out?] If we trumpet them as proof we have the Soviets where we want them, they will do what they have to do in order to prove we are wrong. That would be a pity, since progress on the substance of the issues will be the best gauge of whether our policy has been right all along. We should therefore be very close-mouthed about today's meeting, and above all avoid any predictions about future results. That is the approach we are taking here, and I hope it will be the approach taken in Washington too.

Shultz

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840037-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State.

² See [Document 159](#). In his memoir, Shultz wrote that this meeting with Gromyko “had provided a way to reengage the Soviets on what amounted to our four-part agenda and provide a quiet forward thrust to U.S.-Soviet relations.

“This had been my best meeting with Gromyko by miles. In spite of the posturing, we had some real exchanges. He could sense that too, I was sure. About halfway through the meeting, I felt that I was in charge: the talk was about our agenda and our initiatives. ‘The Soviets feel the heat,’ I told my team on the aircraft going home. ‘No one is in their corner. But it would be a mistake to push too hard right now. They’re too tentative.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 470-471)

³ See [footnote 3, Document 159](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#) and [footnote 5, Document 159](#).

⁵ See [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 96, footnote 4](#) ⁵.

⁶ See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

161. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, January 25, 1984

Gromyko's approach to START and INF in Stockholm—refusing to enter into substantive discussions but emphasizing that US “forward-based” systems would have to be addressed were START resumed²—suggests that the future of nuclear arms negotiations lies in some form of START-INF merger. In this regard, it is interesting that Gromyko did not dispute your rejoinder that we could not discuss our LRINF missiles without addressing the SS-20 as well. While silence does not connote acceptance, the Soviets surely understand that a “partial merger” on their terms, involving only US systems and excluding the SS-20, is not acceptable either to the US or the Allies.

Since a return to the *status quo ante deployment* is not acceptable, the policy question at present is what kind of merger would be most advantageous for us, in terms of our strategic interests, Alliance management and consultation, and negotiability with the Soviets, and what kind of approach could win approval in Washington—where other agencies and the NSC staff have been strongly opposed to any form of merger. There are essentially two alternatives:

—A full substantive merger of the START and INF agendas, in which SS-20s, Pershing IIs, and GLCMs are included within the appropriate overall START aggregates for missiles and warheads, with or

without sub-ceilings and constraints on freedom to mix;

—A compartmentalized merger, in which the present START and INF agendas maintain their separate identity, and are dealt with as distinct sections under one umbrella negotiation.

Pros and Cons of Full Merger:

The first approach has significant conceptual advantages. Putting US and Soviet strategic and INF systems in overall aggregates would underscore the strategic unity of the Alliance, counteracting to some degree the notion of a separate European balance which has arisen in some quarters in the context of a distinct INF negotiation. Such an approach would facilitate an effort to secure global limits on SS-20s. Were the Soviets to accept this concept—as opposed to their own narrower demand for the one-sided inclusion of US forward based systems—they would have implicitly agreed that the Soviet threat to US allies was a legitimate subject of US-Soviet negotiations on strategic forces. At the same time, this approach would not necessarily preclude our introducing regional elements, such as the offer not to deploy the entirety of our global entitlement of INF missiles in Europe which we considered last fall for the INF talks.

From the Soviet viewpoint, a fully merged negotiation would allow them to claim persuasively that they had not, after all, returned to the INF negotiations, unlike a compartmentalized approach—in which the INF portion would strongly resemble the INF talks in Geneva. The prospects for reaching an agreement with the Soviets on limitations covering INF could also be improved by the

expansion of the agenda beyond the intractable political issues confronted in INF. Full merger would create a wider range of potential tradeoffs between differing US and Soviet advantages and perspectives, and between strategic and INF systems. At a technical level, it also would have the advantage of rendering more tractable such questions as whether particular cruise missiles and Backfire bombers are strategic or theater systems, since a place could be found for all systems within the overall aggregates.

A full merger would, however, have certain disadvantages. Consultations with the Allies would become more complicated, since it would be difficult to establish any clear break between INF issues—on which they would continue to insist on a major say, and strategic forces issues—where we would want to continue our past practice of only keeping them generally informed. Tension could develop between the U.S. and the allies over the bounds of consultations, which is one of the arguments in Washington against merger. Substantively, the availability of trade-offs could prove a two-edged sword, raising the possibility of competing US and allied interests or perceptions, which might be exploited by the Soviets to drive wedges in the Alliance. On the one hand, the allies could fear that the US might be tempted to accept imbalances vis-a-vis Europe in return for Soviet agreement to US positions on intercontinental systems. Conversely, some in Washington are concerned that the allies could press us to sacrifice our interest in reducing and limiting Soviet strategic forces, for example heavy ICBMs, and to concentrate our bargaining efforts on INF issues. This concern has been another of the principal arguments against a merger in the Washington community. The obverse of this is that the Soviets would also face difficult choices on trade-offs, as for example between numbers of ICBMs and numbers of SS-20s under a common aggregate. The dilemma for the Soviets is in

some way crueler, for whereas US INF and intercontinental systems can both hit targets in the USSR, Soviet INF cannot reach US targets. Thus for the West INF and intercontinental systems are militarily, although not politically, largely interchangeable, whereas for the Soviets they are not.

A full merger would also make explicit the dependence of an agreement on strategic forces, which has heretofore been relatively unpoliticized, on the resolution of INF issues, which have become extremely political. A merger could thus be seen to delay prospects for a START agreement as long as the Soviets remain adamant in refusing any US INF deployments in Europe.

A chart setting forth an illustrative package of limitations under a full substantive merger of START and INF is attached at TAB 2.³

Pros and Cons of a Compartmentalized Merger

The principal advantage of a compartmentalized approach (a "negotiation within a negotiation") is that by dividing subject matter between INF and strategic forces, it would minimize opportunities for Soviet wedge-driving between the US and the allies, and would facilitate an orderly structure of alliance consultations. In effect, the allies would continue to be closely involved in work on the INF portion of the negotiation, while we would simply keep them briefed on the strategic forces issues. There would be no change in the procedures or the relative importance of the INF issues.

A compartmentalized approach would also be more attractive in Washington, since it would come closest to a

continuation of the negotiating pattern we have been accustomed to and would not require any reordering of substantive positions, as a full substantive merger would. For just these reasons, however, the Soviets might find it more difficult to return to a compartmentalized START/INF negotiation than to a fully merged one.

Substantively, a compartmentalized approach would lessen negotiating flexibility on both strategic and INF issues. The separate agendas and problems as they had developed through the negotiations to date would remain largely unmodified. There would be limited opportunity for trade-offs between strategic and INF systems, although a compartmentalized approach could evolve toward a full merger over time. Conceptually, the compartmentalized approach would entail a greater risk of returning to the concept of a distinct European nuclear balance, separate from the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, which would be potentially divisive of Alliance strategic unity.

The Soviet Attitude Toward Merger

If the Soviets eventually agree to a merger of START and INF, they will want to change the parameters of the negotiation to protect their position. Up to now, the START negotiations have been focused on global limitations on US and Soviet launchers and warheads—precisely the principles which the Soviets have rejected in INF. The existence of such potential inconsistencies may cause the Soviets to hesitate on the merger idea. At the same time, the Soviets may appreciate the greater negotiating flexibility and range of tradeoffs which a merger would offer, and could find in some form of merger a face-saving escape from the impasse they created by walking out of the START and INF talks.

At Tab 1 is a summary of the Soviet efforts to bring US forward based systems into the negotiations on SALT I and SALT II.⁴ This is a continuing issue, where the negotiating record is subject to sharply varying interpretations. In SALT I the Soviets claimed that the larger launcher aggregate which they were allowed represented compensation for US FBS—as well as for UK and French systems. We denied this, pointing out that the Soviet launcher numbers were offset by larger US warhead and bomber numbers. In SALT II, the Soviets argued that their right to a monopoly of 308 heavy missiles was compensation for UK and French systems. We have noted that this is not the case, and that the US in any event had no plan to build heavy missiles.

UK and French Forces

No form of merger will resolve the issue of UK and French forces. The Soviets will continue to advance the demands for compensation which they made in INF, and we will continue to insist that we cannot include third country forces in our aggregates. At the same time, it is possible that in the context of a broader merged agenda, there would be more possibility for the issue of UK and French forces to be resolved in the same manner that it was in SALT I and SALT II. That is, as noted above, the existence of asymmetries between US and Soviet forces under an agreement could be interpreted in different ways by the US and the Soviet Union.

Next Steps

If we and the Soviets reach agreement that START and INF should resume on a merged basis, the initial form of that

merger should most logically be a compartmentalized structure. This approach would most easily win approval in Washington and with the Allies, in that it is the closest to the pre-deployment negotiating pattern and presents the fewest new issues to be digested. It is also likely that the Soviets, with their cautious and conservative approach to arms control, will want to take an approach which, while enabling them to say that they are not returning to the INF talks, does not force them to make major decisions at the outset concerning the shape of a fully merged negotiation. This being the case, we do not need to make decisions now on the the desirability or structure of a fully merged negotiation ourselves, but it is clearly a subject that deserves careful thought.

Richard Burt⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to Seitz, Burt wrote: "Ray—I have done the attached memo in its present form because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, given that we are not yet even back into negotiations with the Soviets. However, given that the Secretary now is clearly interested in the topic, I think he will find this memo of interest. I hope he will find the time in the next few weeks to read it. Rick." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22, Arms Control (01/24/1984-03/25/1984)) In a covering memorandum to Shultz on January 25, Eagleburger wrote: "Rick has done an excellent analysis of two approaches to a merger of the INF and START negotiations and of the advantages and disadvantages of each."

“Rick suggests that we consider first the more modest alternative of a ‘compartmentalized merger.’ That approach will be easier to sell in Washington and may be more appealing to Moscow but is likely to result in little more than a return to stalemated nuclear arms control talks in a slightly different package. As Rick suggests, the ‘full merger’ approach promises more benefits but also poses greater risks. In the end, we may not want to make that leap, but I suggest you discuss the full merger idea with Ken, Rick and Jon before ruling it out.” A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on Eagleburger’s memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, January 16–31, 1984)

² See [Documents 159](#) and [160](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Burt signed “Rick” above his typed name.

**162. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹**

Washington, January 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Increased Danger of US-Soviet Conflict

Attached is a quick paper on the subject of the increased danger of US-Soviet conflict. If there is time, I would like to develop one additional point upon which I need to secure additional information. That has to do with Soviet efforts to improve flight control procedures in the Far East, in the aftermath of our rhetorical censure of their behavior.

Tab I

**Paper Prepared by Donald Fortier of the National Security Council
Staff²**

Washington, undated

INCREASED DANGER OF WAR FACT OR FICTION?

During the last few months, a feeling has emerged in both the United States and in West Europe that the danger of a war has increased. The shutdown of the Korean Air Lines passenger jet, the bombing attack on our peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, the terrorist bombing of the leaders of the Republic of Korea in Rangoon, and the suspension, which we hope is temporary, of the START and INF arms control discussions have all contributed to the feeling that

the world has become a more dangerous place, and that the superpowers may be edging toward a conflict.

These events, of course, have had some effect, a negative effect, on the state of US-Soviet relations. It is curious, however, that the government of the United States is being held responsible by some people for the present state of affairs. It was not the United States that was the perpetrator of these acts, but the Soviet Union, its allies and proteges who have attacked civilians and walked out of negotiations.

Did the United States, by its actions, create an environment in which clashes between the superpowers became more likely? What, in fact, has the United States done over the last three years? We have made substantial progress toward rebuilding our armed forces to repair the damage that they suffered during the 1970s as a result of reduced budgets. While there is some debate about exactly how large the increases in our defense budget should be, no one that we know of, aside from George McGovern, has denied the need for those increases. It is interesting to notice that the chief defense analyst of the Carter administration Defense Department, Russell Murray, has now publicly stated that his office completed a study back in 1980 that showed that US defense spending increases of the size we have recommended were in fact necessary to restore the forces needed for our security (*Washington Times*, 19 January 1984; *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1982, p. 57).

We have carried through on the policy chosen by NATO more than five years ago to deploy cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. We remain ready to return to a world in which no

such missiles are deployed, or limited, equal numbers are deployed.

We defended our citizens in Grenada and defeated a coup d'état led by pro-Soviet would-be dictators. And, unlike some other unfortunate recent episodes, we acted effectively and *in time*.

Part of what we are seeing, of course, is a self-conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Union to use rhetoric to fan the belief that the world is becoming more dangerous. They know that, to the extent they succeed in convincing world opinion this is so, the onus will increasingly be on us, rather than them, to make new concessions. Precedents for this kind of behavior can be found both in Khrushchev's effort in 1960 to abort the summit with President Eisenhower and also in subsequent Soviet provocations over Berlin, which were intended to try to prevent President Kennedy's defense buildup.

The real question, of course, is whether the chances of war have been increased by our programs to rebuild American military strength and support our commitments around the world. The Soviet Union, by means of its recent, angry statements, says that we have. History tells us something quite different.³ World War II became unavoidable when the democratic powers of West Europe surrendered first part, then all of Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler. This capitulation only reinforced Hitler's belief that it was safe to attack Poland, because the great democracies were too weak and timid to fight.⁴ It reinforced the feeling of other nations that France and Britain were not reliable allies. The North Korean attack on South Korea became more likely when the Truman administration in 1950 mistakenly and inadvertently backed away from its public commitment to defend South Korea.

The record is clear. War is not made more likely when the military power of democracies is restored. It becomes more likely when the strength or will of those nations comes into question. No one has accused our Administration of allowing that to happen. We intend to keep it that way, and by doing so, and by remaining willing to engage in productive negotiations with the Soviet Union, we will keep the world as safe a place as a strong, prudent, United States can make it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Confidential. Sent for information. In a handwritten note to McFarlane at the bottom of the page, Poindexter explained: "Bud, This is in response to Jim Baker's question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here. John."

² No classification marking.

³ From this sentence forward, the text was circled. It is unclear whether Poindexter or McFarlane made the markings.

⁴ "to fight" is struck through.

163. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 26, 1984

SUBJECT

Horowitz Conversations in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to Senator Edward
Kennedy
Admiral Poindexter
Jack Matlock

Horowitz said that he had come over to deliver a message from Zagladin, with whom he had a long conversation in Moscow on Thursday, January 19² —that is, after the President's speech on U.S.-Soviet relations³ and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm⁴ (although it was not certain that Zagladin had yet received a report of the meeting).

Horowitz said that his meeting with Zagladin began with Zagladin delivering a lengthy and vitriolic polemic against U.S. policy and the President personally. He even compared the present situation to the thirties and the President to Hitler, in the sense that he seemed to be preparing for war. He said the Soviets could not figure out what our aims were. He asked rhetorically if we were trying to frighten them, and observed that our policies had forced Soviet decisions on new weapons which had already been taken and the results of which would be apparent in two to three years. He observed that the Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary not to fall behind the U.S.

Zagladin then asked, again rhetorically, if the U.S. was trying to isolate them in the world, and answered that this

would not work either. Then he observed that great powers have to allow each other to save face in a difficult situation, and noted, for example, that if oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand if the U.S. considered it necessary to take action to restore the flow. But then he complained about what he called a U.S. “propaganda campaign” directed at the Soviet people. He claimed that the Soviet people fear war, but that “Our greatest fear is what if—God forbid—Reagan is reelected. Every door in every negotiation would be closed.”

At this point, according to Horowitz, there was a total change in Zagladin’s tone. He asked if it would be possible for Horowitz to deliver a message to the White House, and alluded to the fact that the request might appear strange, given the fact that Horowitz works for a Senator on the other side of the aisle. Horowitz assured him that, nevertheless, he was sure he could deliver a message if this was desired.

Zagladin then said that the situation between our two countries is serious, but that Soviet decision-makers have analyzed it and have found one area where progress might be possible. The only realistic first step seems to them to lie in the area of chemical weapons. If we could work jointly on a treaty in this area and bring it to a successful conclusion, then that would “start us on the right road.”

Once this “message” was delivered, the rest of the discussion went back and forth on a variety of subjects, during which Zagladin told Horowitz that Andropov was on the mend and, indeed, that he had seen Andropov that very morning.

Other Conversations: Horowitz is a physician and had some contact with Soviet doctors. One told him that Andropov is

suffering from instage [*end-stage*] renal disease, combined with hypertension. He had responded well to treatment, but had an unexpected downturn in December, from which he is recovering, is now working about three hours a day, and is likely to appear in public before the March 4 local elections. Horowitz was questioned at length, without direct reference to Andropov but clearly with the latter in mind, regarding how to deal with anesthesia during an operation on a patient who had recently undergone surgery. There was also discussion of possible new drugs which suppress the immune reaction, which suggested that consideration was being given to a kidney transplant.

During a conversation with Academician Velikhov, the latter expressed grave concern over U.S. BMD research. He said that the Soviets had researched the field and were convinced that BMD is in fact feasible, although enormously expensive, and commented that the Soviets considered it potentially supportive of first strike intentions. When questioned on the logic of this, Velikhov responded that no defensive system could be a hundred percent effective, but if a nation built one it could launch a first strike confident that the BMD would limit damage from a retaliatory strike to acceptable proportions.

Horowitz said that his principal contact in Moscow was Andrei Pavlov of the State Committee for Science and Technology, with whom he had worked during the 1978 visit of Senator Kennedy and that Pavlov's deputy, Valery Antonov, accompanied him at all times. (Pavlov had been instrumental in 1978 in arranging a meeting between Kennedy and Brezhnev after the meeting was initially refused.)⁵ He also noted that, before leaving, he received a call from a person named "Latva," who was identified as a personal assistant to Andropov, and who thanked him for

coming. He took this as a signal that Andropov was aware of his visit and wished that fact to be known.

At various times during the visit Pavlov, Velikhov and Antonov indicated they thought the President would be re-elected which would make arms control agreements nearly impossible to achieve in the second term.

Horowitz said that he had also discussed some "private matters" and expected to have further contacts if he could be of use to us. He said that Senator Kennedy considered the matter beyond politics and was ready to be of assistance if we desired, but would not be at all offended if we did not desire. He asked that his report not be disseminated widely and was assured that access to it would be confined to the West Wing.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Poindexter's office. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it.

² Telegram 12229 to Moscow, January 14, reported that the primary purpose of Horowitz's mission was to discuss the "Fallout from 'Consequences of Nuclear War' Forum: Mark Palmer has learned from his sources in Ted Kennedy's office that the Senator's AA, Larry Horowitz, will be in Moscow January 16-19 to meet with Velikhov of Academy of Sciences to discuss the possibility of setting up an event in the USSR similar to that held in the US in December on the consequences of nuclear war. No decision has been made yet on whether the US side would actually go ahead or whether the Senator would participate. Kennedy's office provides this strictly FYI. They do not repeat do not want

the Embassy to make any contact with the Soviets on this.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840027-0835) The December 1983 Forum on the “Consequences of Nuclear War,” which was called by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and held in the Senate Caucus Room, brought together Soviet and American scientists to discuss the effects of a nuclear war. (Philip Shabecoff, “US-Soviet Panel Sees No Hope in an Atomic War,” *New York Times*, December 9, 1983, p. A13; Tom Wicker, “A Grim Agreement,” *New York Times*, December 12, 1983, p. A27)

³ See [Document 158](#).

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ Senator Kennedy traveled to Moscow in September 1978 and met with Brezhnev on September 9. (Telegram 21718 from Moscow, September 11, 1978; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D780369-1165)

164. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, January 28, 1984

I have given a careful thought to your letter of December 23.² I am answering it with account taken of the subsequent development of the situation and the recent meeting between A.A. Gromyko and Secretary of State G. Shultz in Stockholm.³

I already expressed, also in my correspondence with you, our view as to what the Soviet-American relationship should be. I can reaffirm with all due emphasis our principled stand in this regard.

If one must state today that the affairs between our two countries are taking on, to put it frankly, an extremely unfavorable shape, then the reason for it is not our policy. We did not and do not want it to be so. On the contrary, we have been trying persistently not only to straighten up our relations but also to act in such a way that they develop constructively and in a stable manner. We suggested concrete paths which could be followed in order to achieve this objective.

The Soviet Union conducted serious and meaningful negotiations on the nuclear arms, doing the maximum to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Unfortunately our efforts continued to run against a stonewall. In no way were we able to feel a desire on the part of the U.S. side to reach agreements. I will even add that while assessing the

U.S. negotiating posture and practical actions, one cannot fail to draw a conclusion that the U.S. pursued a goal of a different nature—to challenge the security of our country and its allies. There has been nothing so far that convinces us otherwise.

On more than one occasion we have candidly told the United States that there is a limit in the relations between our countries which one cannot go beyond. It is determined by the genuine security interests.

We were prepared to accept very deep reductions both of the strategic and the European nuclear weapons. With regard to the latter—even to the point of ridding Europe entirely of medium range and tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union continues to be in favor of this. Having started the deployment of its new missiles which are strategic systems, as far as the USSR is concerned, the U.S. side destroyed the very basis on which it was possible to seek an agreement, we have only one view of this step—it is an attempt to upset both the regional and the global balance. So we are reacting accordingly. It appears that the U.S. side has underestimated our resolve to preserve the military and strategic equilibrium, nothing short of equilibrium.

Let us be frank, Mr. President, there is no way of making things look as if nothing has happened. There has been a disruption of the dialogue on the most important questions, a heavy blow has been dealt to the very process of nuclear arms limitation. The tension has grown dangerously. We know this, and you know this, too. In order to correct the situation, practical steps are required on the part of the U.S. side. This is not a matter of some sort of favors or concessions. It is necessary to return to the fundamentals which made it possible in the past to reach agreements, to

find mutually acceptable solutions to questions the sides were interested in, in other words,—to follow the principle of equality and equal security.

We see, so far, no signs that the U.S. is prepared to do so. What was said by the Secretary of State in Stockholm confirms that it is the case.

If the United States has an interest to continue an effective process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, it should seriously weigh the situation and come to proper conclusions. Practical positive steps in this direction would find us duly responsive.

I am convinced that this would considerably facilitate putting the totality of our relations on a more stable and constructive basis, which you speak in favor of in your letter.

I repeat, we are all for it. By the same token, we are for a dialogue—a serious, meaningful dialogue aimed at searching for points of contact and finding concrete solutions to concrete issues, which are numerous.

However, the stumbling block has been, so far, in the fact that we, for the time being, hear only calls in favor of a dialogue. If you, however, review the situation of the past years, you can see that with regard to our proposals to discuss important and acute problems we either have not received a substantive answer, or the reply has been a negative one. The question is, therefore, who stands for a genuine dialogue?

One cannot, we are convinced, speak of a desire to work for restraining the arms race and at the same time refuse to seek an agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Such a measure, large as it is,

would effectively help slow down the qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear arms. This has long been a ripe issue. Many states speak in favor of having it solved.

A definite step in this regard could also be the ratification of the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes signed a decade ago.⁴ We have not seen and cannot see now any convincing reasons why the United States does not do just that.

And why not try to look for a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of preventing militarization of outer space, while it is not too late to close this extremely dangerous channel of the arms race? We raise this issue as an urgent one which brooks no delay. In this context it is necessary also to solve the issue of banning and abolishing anti-satellite weapons. We have put forward our proposals. We would like you to read them once again and with more attention. They are based on the premise that the United States must have no less interest in solving this problem than the Soviet Union has. Is it, that the objective necessity has disappeared to exchange views, for instance, on such questions as reducing the military activities in the Indian Ocean and limiting conventional arms sales and transfers?

At the Stockholm meeting the Secretary of State spoke in the sense that the U.S. side understood the significance of the Socialist countries' proposals put forward at the Vienna negotiations and that those proposals were under study. Well, there has been enough time to carry out such a study. We are awaiting a concrete answer, so as to make it possible to reach agreement on this important matter.

Even from this list, it is evident that there is subject matter both for a dialogue and for straightening our relations step-

by-step, given the will to do so.

It is important at the same time that the readiness for a dialogue be also matched by practical deeds. The latter point, by the way, has a direct bearing on the regional problems, too, be it in Central America, Southern Africa or the situation in the Middle East, that you mentioned. You point out correctly that that region is in a state of a dangerously high tension now because of the situation in Lebanon. Of course, no one would disagree, exercising restraint in this regard is in order. But it is precisely the United States who is directly involved there with its armed forces, that can and should exercise such restraint. Above all, it must withdraw all the troops from there and the Navy forces from the adjacent waters.⁵ We are convinced that this would to a substantial degree diffuse the situation in and around Lebanon. This, in turn, would help galvanize the efforts in search of ways to a political settlement in the entire Middle East, which the Soviet Union has been consistently calling for. In other words, the United States can and must, if it wishes to do so, take real steps for the sake of peace in that region.

Briefly, one more matter. It would be only natural if the desire to improve relations and establish a productive dialogue were accompanied by the creation of an appropriate atmosphere. At any rate, the inflation of animosity is not helpful.

Mr. President, I will be ready to listen to what you think with regard to the thoughts and specific points expressed in the present letter, which have occurred to me in connection with your letter.

Sincerely,

Y. Andropov

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8291507, 8490115). No classification marking. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz explained that Dobrynin delivered this letter from Andropov during their meeting on January 30. (See [Document 165](#).) The Soviet Embassy provided the translation of this letter. A routing slip indicates McFarlane sent the memorandum to Reagan for information on February 1.

² See [Document 149](#).

³ See [Document 159](#).

⁴ See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

⁵ See [footnote 7, Document 152](#).

165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 30, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 30

I met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon to follow up on my meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm and reestablish contact with him before I left for Latin America.² Dobrynin had read a transcript of the Stockholm session, and we generally agreed in our assessment of it:

—We agreed that, as Gromyko had said, the meeting was “necessary,” and that it had produced a real exchange of views.

—Establishing a private channel for confidential communications, with Dobrynin the key interlocutor for the Soviets in Washington, was especially useful, and we should make a real effort to get something accomplished.

—Nuclear arms negotiations are on hold for now, so that the immediate future would see us concentrating on negotiations in the non-nuclear field and other issues.

On the nuclear talks, I said we are ready to talk and waiting for their ideas. He responded by suggesting that while they were not prepared to negotiate now, they want our thoughts on relating INF and START, and more generally any ideas we have for making progress on strategic arms. He hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate.

I raised human rights as a category we need to talk about, and expressed our particular concern about rising anti-semitism in the USSR. He gave the pro forma answer that anti-semitism is not and has never been Soviet policy.

We touched briefly on the Mideast, and I said that if regional tensions explode anywhere it is likely to be there.

I also brought up KAL. As I had with Gromyko, I said we hoped our representatives in Montreal could make progress toward agreement on technical steps to ensure that nothing like it ever happened again.³ Dobrynin confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas on this.

We concluded with a one-on-one session. Here I mentioned that we would be getting back to them on our idea for a joint space rescue project, and noted we hope for progress when MBFR talks resume. Dobrynin gave me the text of a letter from Andropov in response to your last letter to him, delivered in Moscow December 24.⁴ We will be transmitting this separately together with an analysis.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 11, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/29/1984-01/31/1984); NLR-775-11-13-3-2. Secret; Sensitive. A cover memorandum shows that it was drafted by Burt.

² See [Document 159](#). Shultz was on official travel to El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, and Barbados from January 31 to February 8.

³ In early 1984, the ICAO Council considered the report of the ICAO Secretary General requested by the resolution adopted at the September 1983 session (see [footnote 2](#), [Document 112](#)).

⁴ See [Documents 149](#) and [164](#).

**166. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Letter from Andropov and Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin gave George Shultz a letter from Andropov to you during their meeting January 30 (TAB A).² It is in reply to your letter of December 23.³ While it reiterates standard Soviet positions on most substantive issues, it does accept the necessity for an improved dialogue. In particular, it provides a broader formulation of what it would take to get the nuclear arms control process back in motion, thus creating more maneuver room on that issue.

There was little additional substance in the Shultz-Dobrynin conversation (TAB B).⁴ However, Dobrynin seemed eager to elicit more of our ideas on START and hinted that our views could influence their internal arms control debate. Shultz refrained from going further than we already have on this subject. Dobrynin also confirmed Soviet willingness to listen to our ideas about improving navigation aids on the Pacific route where the KAL flight went off course.

I will shortly provide a more detailed analysis of the Andropov letter and recommendations on where we go from here, but thought that you would want to take a look at the letter and Shultz's preliminary report immediately.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—(1/26/84–2/13/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and wrote at the bottom, “P.2 of Andropov’s letter—he suggests that *they* want an elimination of nuclear weapons? In Europe that is. Let’s take him up on that.” See [Document 164](#).

² See [Document 164](#).

³ See [Document 149](#).

⁴ See [Document 165](#).

**167. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 6, 1984

SUBJECT

What If Andropov Dies?

The sudden cancellation of Ustinov's visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene,² and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov's condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov's demise.

I believe that Andropov's passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov's successor.

Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the "pro" side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the "cons" are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than

Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.

My initial view is that the “pros” would slightly outweigh the “cons” if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President’s going if a successor has not been named.

You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday.³ I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don’t believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-2/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² In telegram 1455 from Moscow, February 8, Hartman reported: “The sudden postponement of a trip already announced, which was seen by both the Soviets and Indians as a substitute for an Andropov visit, cannot have been a decision taken lightly. It is possible that Ustinov’s health was the cause, given the heavy program prepared for him in India. It is also possible that a new turn in Andropov’s condition led the leadership to exercise caution about having such a key figure out of the country. At this moment we believe the evidence is too scanty to draw firm

conclusions about this virtually unprecedented last-minute cancellation.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840078-0581) ³ Shultz was on official travel to El Salvador, Venezuela, Brazil, Grenada, and Barbados from January 31. He returned to Washington on Wednesday, February 8.

168. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 7, 1984, 1201Z

1487. For Under Secretary Eagleburger Only From Hartman. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Dobrynin.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Just back last weekend, and am naturally anxious for a read-out on the Secretary's last meeting with Dobrynin,² part of which I understand was one-on-one. I would also appreciate the text of the high-level message that Dobrynin gave the Secretary.³

3. When the Secretary returns, it will be important to pick up on some of the things which were discussed at Stockholm—in particular, the strategic arms framework, the consulates agreement, and the exchanges agreement. I will send some thoughts on the exchanges agreement in a few days.

4. We all had a feeling there was a little bit of movement and we should be sure it doesn't stop for lack of imagination on our side. Important point to keep remembering these days is that any visible movement in the relation toward more constructive directions is in our interest and helps to knock down Soviet public campaign that things have never been worse. Therefore, we should let loose a few initiatives.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003-0057. Confidential; Nodis.

² See [Document 165](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

**169. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, February 8, 1984

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations in 1984

Ustinov's surprise cancellation of his visit to India once again highlights the Andropov health problem and the need for sobriety and caution in US-Soviet relations this year.² I would like to follow up my brief comments on Bill Casey's paper³ by some more extended analysis of (1) the Soviet leadership's situation at home and abroad; (2) Soviet options vis-à-vis the U.S. this year; and (3) our posture toward the Soviets in 1984.

The Soviet Situation

We have a policy framework that lets us move forward or back as the situation requires. The issue we will be confronting here in Washington is whether the Soviet internal situation makes it impossible to move forward in US-Soviet relations this year, if that is what we want to do.

There is no doubt that the Moscow leadership feels hemmed in at home and abroad, and is having difficulty making major decisions:

At home, even if Andropov continues in office, his physical condition will never let him establish the primacy previous leaders have had. He will be forced to fashion Politburo

majorities issue-by-issue from his sickbed. New departures are very difficult, and the pace of change will be painfully slow. Andropov began by proclaiming that he would use increased discipline on labor, management and dissent as one means to get the economy and country going again after the late Brezhnev drift. Discipline and repression have been hallmarks of his year-plus in office.

Some argue that we are witnessing a regression into neo-Stalinism and paralysis, but this picture is probably overdrawn. Discipline and repression there are, and they bear a cost in terms of initiative. But they have also helped justify the replacement of large numbers of senior and mid-level officials across the country with younger and at least in some cases abler people, and they have probably contributed to the significant upturn in industrial productivity and output in 1983 (agricultural output also rose for the first time in five years, but because of better weather).

Thus, there is new blood in the system, including the Politburo, a heftier economic cushion, and even some tentative, gingerly reforms. Everything is slow, but things do move. The evidence points less to paralysis than to uncertainty and maneuvering for and against change. Succession is certain to come sometime, and may already have started.

We do not know all the issues around which succession maneuvering will crystallize. But we do know our policy will be a factor in the debate and in the decisions.

For the Soviets themselves, the economy rather than the U.S. is the top priority problem. Recent visitors to Moscow find them even more preoccupied with their economic problems, and with the outlines of the 1986-1990 plan that

must be decided soon, than with INF. But there is a functional link. While the 1983 economic results were encouraging, the Soviets face a resumption of declining economic growth rates unless they take serious measures. In particular they need to increase investment and consumer spending. But this comes at a time when the pressure to increase defense spending also has grown. In recent years the Soviets have cut the rate of growth in defense spending from four to two percent, and increases for military procurement to zero. Even with decelerating defense outlays, however, the economy has continued to slow down. There is now a painful choice between accelerating defense spending to meet the enhanced security problem they face and concentrating on their economic needs—on which their long-term security equally depends.

The Soviets see themselves faced with a resurgent “Imperialist Camp” led by the U.S. For them this is a trend, rather than a fait accompli, and they hope it is still reversible. But if the trend continues, the prospect for them is not simply difficult but dangerous. They have spent the last year trying to reverse the trend by extrapolating from accepted policy lines. This has failed: the Soviet Union has lost rather than gained ground. Our rearmament program and alliance systems are intact; leaders with very robust approaches to the Soviet Union are in place for an extended period in the major allied capitals; and Soviet analysis points toward a Reagan reelection. So they must begin to think in terms of the next five years, and they must ask themselves what strategy is needed to defuse the growing western threat to their security and thereby free resources for the economy.

Soviet Options in a U.S. Election Year

For all the expertise and experience they have accumulated in Western Europe and the Third World, the Soviets continue to see the U.S. as their number one problem, and they know that the U.S. election is a crossroads. Barring Andropov's sudden disappearance, our election will be the largest single factor, foreign or domestic, forcing the Soviet leaders to make rather than defer decisions.

They would probably prefer to wait us out:

—They are genuinely angry at the President. From their point of view he has delivered some telling blows; they do not wish to help him get reelected; and they especially do not wish to be seen as crawling back to business-as-usual after these humiliations.

—Recent U.S. politics have been volatile, and it does not seem farfetched to Soviet leaders to hope that the President will stumble between now and November.

—The Soviets have the means to maintain a general level of anxiety which keeps pressure on us; to prevent us from resolving problems alone in key regional situations; and to exploit opportunities which may occur to pick up chips in the global sweepstakes.

But the Soviets also have the option of keeping the US-Soviet relationship active by doing some business. The President has given them that option, and they are suspicious that it is merely an election ploy. But it is neither unfamiliar nor unattractive:

—Like waiting us out, keeping things going is also "continuity." Very little change would be required: they would continue to build arms, promote "peace," keep western anxieties up, try to split our alliances.

—But standing pat after walking away from nuclear arms negotiations strengthens the Administration's claim that it is the USSR rather than the U.S. that is responsible for current East-West tensions.

—Furthermore, success in managing the U.S. relationship remains a key measure of Soviet leadership competence, and if we insist and persist, competence will require a measure of active dialogue with us this year.

—There may be problems that can only be dealt with if the U.S. and USSR are talking about them. Among regional issues, Zagladin mentioned Lebanon and Central America to the French.⁴ Further down the road, the Soviets are genuinely anxious about the costs of an arms race with American technology in new areas (ABM, space, etc.), and they want to slow us down.⁵ Fear and soft soap—"return to détente" and "return to the cold war," the alternating hot and cold showers of the past three years—have not helped. Negotiations might.

—The Soviet Union can afford to deal with the Americans, short of humiliating major concessions. In Soviet eyes, the USSR was not the expanding monster of 1980, and is no paper tiger now. Their INF "countermeasures" show to their own satisfaction that they have the resolve to compete; they are hurting us in Lebanon, Central America and elsewhere through arms supply; and their last resort—military strength—remains enormous.

There is no surefire way to predict which option the Soviets will choose. Larry thinks that over the past year the Soviets have run up to a number of favorable decisions in relations with us, and then backed away at the last moment—e.g. Shcharanskiy. Andropov's health problems are making

important decisions all the more difficult (and hard to decipher). We tend to be wary, and we should.

Nevertheless, most recent signs suggest that where the Soviets have made decisions, they have been in favor of keeping the option of doing business with the U.S. open. By mid-December, they had fallen back from the high-decibel war scare talk that accompanied initial INF deployments to the line that tensions are unprecedented, but the danger of war is not immediate. In Stockholm, Gromyko's harsh speech was followed by a rather different private line⁶ — nuclear arms control *nyet* (or not yet), other issues *da* (maybe)—not just with you but with other Western colleagues. Andropov's *Pravda* interview January 24 gave nothing away on substance, but resembled Gromyko's private presentation in its structure, and was notably more moderate than his previous statements in its tone.⁷

Moreover, Andropov has now introduced a more flexible formulation on resumption of nuclear arms control—that practical positive steps in the direction of an effective process would find the Soviets duly responsive. East European colleagues have told Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mojsov that START could be resumed by July.⁸ Careful and obedient Czech Prime Minister Strougal told Trudeau last week that the Soviets are trying to find a way to resume the Geneva talks by this summer, although some face-saving device might be needed.⁹

And, in the meantime, the last six weeks have been peppered with concrete diplomatic steps: agreement to and flexibility in the Hotline talks; agreement to meet bilaterally on nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna; agreement to begin negotiations on the Pacific Maritime Boundary here; Gromyko's proposal to resume MBFR on March 16, pointedly given to you first rather than to

another Foreign Minister; and the Soviet proposal in Montreal to form a USSR-Japan-U.S. group within ICAO to study practical steps to prevent another KAL.

In sum, there has been some backing away from the total belligerency of late November. Partly, this has been our doing. The announcement that you were going to Stockholm brought Gromyko there; the President's speech helped force a response in kind.¹⁰ Angry as they are, and under wraps as Andropov has been, the Soviets have been moving in the right direction. It will be, at least in part, up to the United States to determine how much further they move this year.

The U.S. Posture

We have put in place a sustainable strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union over the long term. We have made progress in implementing it. We are in a position to move forward on the dialogue element, by demonstrating the ability to establish a process of serious exchanges designed to find mutually beneficial solutions to real problems.

A stand-pat approach at this point could make it harder to keep the overall policy intact. Both the West Europeans and Japanese welcomed the President's speech partly because it provided long-hoped-for cover for their own desires to talk more to Moscow.¹¹ Foreign ministers will be doing so—Howe, Genscher, probably Abe—and heads of government will not be far behind; others may not follow, but Trudeau has led the way.¹² And, although American opinion is more solid, opposition politicians will be tempted this year to call for "results" in US-Soviet relations that they themselves could not deliver.

In order to continue to set the agenda, we need to continue to be active, and that agenda should include genuine content. Soviet practice is to respond: you saw an example of this in Stockholm, where Gromyko delivered a tirade, you kept your cool and appealed to him, and he came back with the most positive remarks this Administration has heard from him. The Soviets can field propaganda initiatives like non-use of force with ease; they have rarely been able to make the first substantive move. This will be even more true this year than usual.

The 1984 Agenda

I have given some thought to the areas where it ought to be in the interest of both sides to see movement this year. At this point, I think we could hope by the end of the year to have in place a work program of contacts and transactions with the Soviets that will have served (1) to prevent the relationship from deteriorating further, and (2) to create a process and a degree of momentum upon which we could build in 1985 and the years beyond. It is too early to tell whether the Soviets will actually agree to bring even minor matters like the Hotline to successful conclusion. However, if they become more convinced President Reagan will be reelected, and if we are offering things they want, the possibility of concrete results will increase.

The agenda could encompass the four topic areas we have identified to the Soviets:

—On nuclear arms control, the Soviets will have to sort out their approach before they return to negotiations, and it will not be easy. Even if they are moving toward a START/INF merger,¹³ there are many pros and cons, as you are aware, and they are clearly unsure of where they want

to go. It would be to our advantage to get back into dialogue and even back to the negotiating table. One way to hasten their decision-making would be to lay out some more specific ideas in the START area, as we originally contemplated for Stockholm. There has been a great deal of work on START substance in the interagency community, and there is more and more support for the idea of a common framework that you discussed with the President. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to reconfirm the President's support for this idea, and be ready to lay some of its elements before the Soviets early on.

—On non-nuclear arms control, the most promising is also the most modest—an accord on Hotline upgrade, where the technical side can easily be wrapped up by this summer. In MBFR, we should get Option Three approved and presented in Vienna. In CDE, it should be possible to establish a constructive working relationship between the U.S. and Soviet representatives and a serious discussion of the specific measures.

—On regional issues, candid discussion in bilateral channels might help us avoid direct US-Soviet confrontation, and could conceivably help produce parallel steps by the two countries that ease tensions or advance solutions to individual situations. Middle East issues remain the most urgent, but difficult. I think we need to look at ways to establish a more routine and serious dialogue among experts on a number of regions. I will have some thoughts for you on this subject shortly.

—On human rights, we have been running into a stone wall. But last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in response to the President's interest,¹⁴ and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that positive steps are not excluded. Potential priorities are one or more major

cases like Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Orlov, and movement on a number of lesser cases. The Soviets may choose to mask movement by ostensibly responding to appeals from others rather than us, but we are after results and can afford to respect their sensitivities.

—In the bilateral area, it is in our interest to go as far as we can toward agreement on and implementation of specific measures to prevent a repeat of KAL. If we can get that process underway, there are a few other steps put on the back burner by KAL that are worth considering.

The most likely candidates are things that benefit people or that get us in touch with the Soviet people on a reciprocal basis, in line with the President's own reaffirmation of commitment to this aspect of relations in his January 16 speech and again in the State of the Union message.¹⁵ That, after all, is our basic rationale for post-KAL steps to ensure the safety of air travelers. Our interest in the cultural exchanges agreement and the consulates has the same root, and I understand that Bud McFarlane and Jack Matlock favor moving ahead on these in the near future. I agree, although we should anticipate bureaucratic problems with cultural exchanges.

We might look at new ways to deal with the upsurge of interest across the country in renewing and expanding contacts with the Soviet Union. Wilson Center Director Jim Billington has raised this with me, and I agree with him that there is room to work with responsible people on the outside to limit exploitation of such contacts by the Soviets and by our domestic critics this year. For example, I believe we should now tell the American Council of Young Political Leaders that they can resume their exchanges with young Soviet political leaders. This has been an excellent, tough-

minded program in the past, with Mike Deaver a member of the ACYPL Board.

Congressional visits are another area that bears watching. There will be strong interest on the Hill in visiting the USSR and inviting Soviet "Parliamentarians" here in return. We should continue to brief outgoing delegations thoroughly on the Foley/Pell model to minimize the daylight the Soviets will try to open up between our branches of government,¹⁶ but at this point there are some reservations in our branch about giving the green light to return forays at congressional invitation. However, pressure from the congressional leadership may build, and we may need to reconsider. In that case, we should encourage hosts to broaden the Soviet delegations beyond familiar propagandists to include possible successor politicians like Gorbachev, Aliyev and Vorotnikov. They have had virtually no contact with Americans, and they are in the Supreme Soviet.

Conclusion

Our basic objective this year should be the one we adopted for our Soviet policy a year ago: to get a productive dialogue going at the pace and level justified by the Soviet response. Our realism and our new strength make dialogue possible; dialogue serves to keep the policy framework for realism and strength intact. If we find we are making substantial progress on the issues I have noted, it would be appropriate to consider your going to Moscow to push the process along, and inviting Gromyko to Washington (in keeping with pre-Afghanistan tradition) when he comes to the UNGA in the fall. With such a process underway, we would be able by the end of the year to point at a minimum to a serious effort by the Administration to engage the

Soviets on a broad front. There are a variety of further steps we could take in other areas, bilateral and multilateral, depending upon how far we want to go. We should damp down expectations for any specific agreements, but we might end up with a few small ones. And even if we do not, we would be well positioned both for 1984, and equally important, for 1985 and beyond.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1984-02/08/1984); NLR-775-11-14-5-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 8.

² See [footnote 2, Document 167](#).

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In telegram 984 from Moscow, January 24, the Embassy reported on comments made by Zagladin during a reception for a French-Soviet Arms Control Colloquium: "He struck the French as fairly up-beat on prospects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue. He was frank in describing certain arms control negotiations (presumably those dealing with nuclear weapons) as 'blocked.' He nonetheless indicated that there were other areas where the Soviet Union would welcome negotiations with the U.S. He then cited essentially the list of topics subsequently ticked off by Andropov in his interview as possible subjects for U.S.-Soviet dialogue: Space, CDE, etc. Zagladin went beyond Andropov, however, in suggesting that certain regional issues (he mentioned the Middle East and Central America) might also be candidates for bilateral progress. Zagladin concluded that progress in these two areas (arms control and regional) might create conditions which would open up those areas currently blocked." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams,

D840051-0486) For Andropov's interview, see [footnote 7, below](#).

⁵ This sentiment was indirectly expressed by Velikhov during his discussion with Horowitz. See [Document 163](#).

⁶ See [Documents 159](#) and [160](#).

⁷ In telegram 957 from Moscow, January 25, the Embassy reported on Andropov's *Pravda* interview: "Andropov has responded to President Reagan's January 16 speech by reiterating that the Soviet Union is ready for dialogue, while insisting that any US-Soviet dialogue for the foreseeable future be on Soviet terms. His written answers to questions by *Pravda* are less polemical than Gromyko's Stockholm speech (and indeed may be intended to repair some of the damage caused by that speech), but reveal no willingness to address US concerns on nuclear arms control, regional or human rights issues. He does hold out the possibility of progress in MBFR and passes up the opportunity to declare his August ASAT moratorium void in the wake of the US's recent ASAT test; nor does he address compliance. On INF, Andropov repeats his November 24 formula that the US and NATO must 'display readiness' to return to the pre-deployment status quo but adjusts somewhat his language on what Moscow would be prepared to do in response to such a display. The absence of a specific reference to START may be encouraging in that he has forgone the necessity of spelling out conditions for a return to negotiation. Andropov's answers reflect a reaffirmation of Soviet efforts since last fall to portray US-Soviet relations as at a dangerously low level and to deny the Reagan administration the opportunity to claim otherwise. But, in taking a slightly more positive public position than Gromyko's speech last week, it opens the door to US-Soviet dialogue just a crack more. This more positive gloss was spelled out to the French by Party official Zagladin yesterday." (Department of State, Central Foreign

Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840051-0019) The full text of Andropov's interview was printed in the *New York Times*, January 25, 1984, p. A6. For his statement of November 24, 1983, see [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

⁸ In telegram 32806 to Belgrade, February 2, the Department reported that Mojsov "said that some EE Foreign Ministers are speculating that START talks might resume in July, but that they are worried about the high level of emotional anti-U.S. feeling in Moscow and the limiting effect of the U.S. elections." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840073-0049)

⁹ Telegram 978 from USNATO, February 7, reported: "Strougal pointed to Andropov's latest 'appeal' to support his view that the Soviets want real progress (on INF), and he predicted (Soviet) movement in the second quarter of 1984." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840082-0415)

¹⁰ See [Document 158](#).

¹¹ In telegram 15036 to Stockholm, January 18, the Department commented: "Official reaction from our European allies was especially helpful, and much press coverage in the non-aligned nations also welcomed the President's remarks, expressing interest and hope that improved atmospherics would lead to early progress on arms control and a reduction of international tensions." It continued: "Press coverage in Asia was generally favorable, especially in Japan, with many commentators noting that the President's approach to Moscow was based on an upswing in U.S. power." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840035-0270)

¹² In telegram 350 from Ottawa, January 17, the Embassy reported that "in response to Parliamentary questioning Jan 16, Prime Minister Trudeau applauded the 'conciliatory' tone of President Reagan's Jan 16 speech on US-Soviet

relations and called on the Soviet Union to respond in kind. Trudeau welcomed what he saw as 'a different tone coming out of Washington' and the President's commitment to genuine dialogue between East and West." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840034-0074)

¹³ See [Document 161](#).

¹⁴ See [Document 74](#).

¹⁵ In his January 25 State of the Union address, Reagan remarked: "People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?" For the full text of Reagan's address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 87-94.

¹⁶ See [Document 79](#).

February 1984-June 1984 “Talking about each other rather than to each other”: Reagan, Chernenko, and U.S.-Soviet Stalemate

170. Editorial Note

171. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/4/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for action.

172. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR-Andropov Funeral (February 1984). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

173. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-02/11/84). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

174. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: "Many thanks, Bud."

175. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, February 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Hill wrote: "Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand delivered by Vice President Bush to the new General Secretary of the CPSU." Bush delivered the letter to Chernenko during their February 14 meeting in Moscow. See Documents 176 and 177. Chernenko was elected General Secretary by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 13.

176. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, February 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/13/84-02/14/84). Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and a stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw it.

177. Message From the Embassy in Italy to the White House

Rome, February 15, 1984, 0025Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (2/15/84-2/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-3-4. Secret; Via Privacy Channels; Niact Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed this cabled message, indicating he saw it. After leaving Moscow Bush traveled to Rome. He met with Foreign Minister Craxi at 8:50 p.m. on February 14. On February 15, the Vice President had a one-hour private audience with Pope John Paul II, and then departed for Paris. (Telegram 4367 from Rome, February 17, and telegram 3990 from Rome, February 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840107-0502 and D840096-0838, respectively.)

178. Message From the Embassy in France to the White House and the Department of State

Paris, February 15, 1984, 1640Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/15/84-02/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-1-6. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the message, indicating he saw it. Bush traveled from Rome to Paris and met with President Mitterrand at 6:30 p.m. on February 15. (Telegram 6302 from Paris, February 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840100-0072)

179. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, February 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400195. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [less than 1 line not declassified], Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Poindexter noted on a routing slip: "Bud, This is the paper you asked CIA for. JP." McFarlane wrote: "Many thanks." On a separate routing slip, Kimmit wrote: "JP: Should this be shared with Matlock, Fortier and Lehman?" Poindexter replied "yes."

180. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, February 15, 1984, 2-3:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron February 1984 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This meeting took place in Zagladin's office in the Central Committee Building. Matlock accompanied Bush to Moscow for Andropov's funeral and the meeting with Chernenko. Matlock wrote of this meeting: "As I entered the forbidding gray Central Committee Building under KGB escort, I realized that I had been trying to establish some sort of contact with the Central Committee staff ever since my first tour in Moscow in 1961. Now, after twenty-three years of trying, I was entering the inner sanctum of the

Communist system.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 94)

181. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/16/1984-02/20/1984); NLR-775-11-17-2-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Simons initialed for Dunkerley. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 16.

182. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, February 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

183. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, February 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, February 24, Dobrynin requested that the letter be brought to Reagan's attention. In a February 24 covering memorandum to the President, McFarlane wrote: "This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin delivered the attached letter to you from General Secretary Chernenko. Its tone is generally moderate. Standard rhetoric is included, but the commitment to a serious effort to solve problems lends to an improved climate for engaging the Soviets on a variety of subjects. Tomorrow morning I will send you a memorandum (see Document 185) which surveys the state of the relationship and proposes certain courses of action to get things moving. It reflects the thinking of George, Cap, the Vice President and several others. We would like to meet with you to discuss it next week and to receive your guidance as to which of several projects we should move out on. Separately, I am moving the bureaucracy ahead on certain START ideas which we would be prepared to exchange in the near future." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586)) In his diary on February 27, Reagan wrote: "N.S.C. briefing was on Chernenko's letter. We're agreed we are going to make our plans for response with George B., George S., Bud, Cap & me—no bureaucracy." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 322)

184. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 24, 1984, 1241Z

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 17, 1984 March 2, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis/Alpha; Stadis.

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 28, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 28.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 1, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) March 1984; NLR-362-6-22-2-7. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A note in the margin written by an unknown hand reads: "Orig handcarried to Res. [Residence] for Pres 3/1/84 pm." A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a March 1 memorandum to Matlock, returning a marked-up draft of this paper, McFarlane wrote: "Your paper is exactly what I was looking for. I have marked it up a little bit." He continued: "In short, we

should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, 'leaning forward' to make clear our commitment to solving problems. Please try and get this back to me today. I would like to send it to the President tonight." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, Briefing Material for President Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting 11/27/1985 (2/3))

187. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/02/1984-03/04/1984); NLR-775-11-22-2-3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 2.

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 2, 1984, 2:15-4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 1/2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This private meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House. In his diary entry for March 2, Reagan wrote: "into the Treaty Room for a top level & secret meeting with Amba. Hartman (Moscow), Bill Casey, Bud McF., Geo. B., Mike &

Jim & Gen. Vessey. Subject was a plan to move into communications with the Soviets. I'm convinced the time has come for me to meet with Chernenko along about July. We're going to start with some ministerial level meetings on a number of substantive matters that have been on ice since the KAL 700 [007] shoot down." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 324) Shultz, Weinberger, and Matlock attended the meeting, although not noted by Reagan in his diary.

189. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President.

190. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, March 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304). Top Secret. Drafted in the Department of State in accordance with the President's instructions on March 2. See Document 188. In a March 3 note to Shultz, McKinley wrote: "Mr. Secretary, Rick Burt,

Art Hartman, and Jack Matlock have all cleared off on this draft. Larry [Eagleburger] will receive a copy and may have some comments for you. Brunson.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive (03/03/1984-03/05/1984))

191. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (03/07/1984); NLR-775-11-27-2-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Simons. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 7.

192. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2c, 1984 Soviet Union Mar. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is unsigned. A handwritten note in the margin, however, reads: “Hand carried to the President by Secy 3/8.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office on March 8 and March 9. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The brief March 8 meeting was to discuss Scowcroft’s trip to Moscow. It seems more likely Shultz presented this memorandum to Reagan on March 9 during their weekly

private meeting. Reagan wrote in his diary: "George & I talked Soviets. He had a good meeting with Dobrynin who is very interested in getting some talks going on Cultural exchange, consulates in N.Y. & Kiev etc." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 327)

193. Editorial Note

194. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 12, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1984 #1. Secret. Sent for action. Lehman signed "Ron" next to his name. In a covering note to Lehman on March 13, Kraemer wrote: "Ron, Thanks for a copy of the attached. Basically a sound memo but I disagree that 'a summit may well be in the cards' and am very concerned re possible implication (almost advocating) 'simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.' Even 'simple' agreements require extensive (NSC/SACPG)-controlled preparations. Watch for the end run! P.S. I and Ken deGraffenreid (who works for Casey/McF. meeting agenda) should have had concurrence opportunity/line. Sven."

195. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, March 14, 1984, 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. This meeting took place in Harry's New York Bar in the Harley Hotel. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it. In a handwritten note to McFarlane dated March 15, Matlock reported: "As you can see from the attached, the meeting with Menshikov went very well—no new specifics, but clearly a decision to examine some modalities in ways that are not apparent in the formal dialogue. I was struck, once again, by the total lack of polemics. His desire to discuss INF concepts at some length seems to indicate that this is still the key issue for them—and they may be groping around for a way out. We should discuss the implication at your earliest convenience. I have heard nothing on Scowcroft's conversation yet, but assume you'll include me in any debrief." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1984) Regarding Scowcroft's mission, see Document 193.

196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. A Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Burt on March 13. (Department

of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Reagan's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

197. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, March 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, March 20, Dobrynin requested that this letter be passed to President Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2)) Reagan initialed the March 19 letter and wrote in the margin: "I think this calls for a very well thought out reply & not just a routine acknowledgement that leaves the status quo as is. RR."

198. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Top Secret;

Sensitive. Not for System. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Mar. 21 Mtgs. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In a memorandum forwarding the memorandum to Shultz on March 21, Burt suggested that the Secretary discuss how to respond to the Soviets—in particular, Chernenko's letter—during his meeting with the President on March 21. According to marginalia on Burt's memorandum, Shultz "didn't sign 3/21 but took." See footnote 4, below.

200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, March 23, 1984

Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files: FRC 330-87-0023, Box 2, Folder USSR 388.3 1984. Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: "As agreed by Bud McFarlane's Senior Arms Control Policy Group, I am forwarding a paper, prepared at my request, to form the basis of Tuesday's NSC discussion. It should elicit a spirited exchange. It is deliberately straightforward. I believe it is important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered-down consensus. Cap."

201. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 23, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. This paper was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis. Kimmit circulated the paper to agency representatives on March 24 under a covering memorandum that noted that it was “developed to support discussion of the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations (INF and START) at the National Security Council Meeting on Tuesday, March 27 at 2 p.m.”

202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1–30, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 26 covering memorandum to Shultz, Howe and Kelly wrote: “In accordance with your instructions, we have reworked both versions of the memorandum to the President on arms control. The major difference between them is that the first version at Tab A addresses START/INF alone, while the version at Tab B briefly mentions other areas of arms control as well. The argument for the latter is that the

Soviets have indicated that movement in other areas could help with resumption of nuclear arms control talks.” Shultz signed the memorandum at Tab B, which was sent by special courier to the White House on March 27 at 7:30 a.m. in preparation for the NSC meeting that afternoon.

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, March 27, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-104, NSPG 104. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. There is no drafting information on the minutes. Although titled as a “National Security Planning Group Meeting,” this is listed in the President’s Daily Diary as a National Security Council meeting and is listed at the Reagan Library as National Security Council Meeting 104. NSPG 104 took place on December 17, 1984. In a memorandum to Kraemer and Linhard, conveying draft notes of this NSC meeting, Lehman wrote: “Both of you should study the minutes and notes carefully. From now on we should view ourselves as a task force designed to lay out for Bud and the President the best gameplan for the next year. We can draw upon the interagency, but the time has come for us to put down on paper what it is we really think can and should be done in arms control this year in terms of tactics, issues, and public statements. In truth there is a vacuum and the President is obviously looking for someone or some process to fill it. We have no choice but to step in.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, SACPG—NSDD 137—Arms Control April 2, 1984)

204. Memorandum From the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Meyer) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon), and the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)

Washington, March 29, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, March 30, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a March 28 Information Memorandum, Burt briefed Shultz on Hartman's meeting with Dobrynin earlier that day. Shultz's handwritten note in the margin instructed Burt to "turn into a memo I can hand to the President on Friday. GPS." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984 Soviet Union, March).

206. National Security Decision Directive 137

Washington, March 31, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984]. Secret. In a March 30 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard forwarded a draft NSDD recommending it be sent to Reagan for signature. Linhard explained that the NSDD "tracks the NSC staff understanding of the guidance provided by the President and by you through Ron Lehman concerning the directions the President wishes to issue at this time. The contents of the draft have not been discussed in any way with anyone outside of the NSC staff." In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane listed the primary guidance in the NSDD and stated: "It also identifies Secretary Shultz as the primary Administration spokesman for arms control."

207. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, April 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

208. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, April 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2A, 1984 Arms and Arms Control, Mar.-May. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Gordon, Dobbins, and Dean. Brackets are in the original.

209. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron April 1984 (3). Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan on April 13, McFarlane wrote: "You will note that Dobrynin took a somewhat more receptive line on several issues than we have been hearing from Gromyko in Moscow—and markedly more positive than current Soviet public stance. I believe we should be cautious about accepting his attitude at face value, since he has a personal incentive to put the most favorable gloss on Soviet policy, and to push the idea that we can get further dealing exclusively with him. Nevertheless, we should not totally exclude the possibility that a policy debate continues in Moscow, and that Dobrynin's more forthcoming comments on some issues may reflect that, at least in part." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984)) Reagan initialed the cover memorandum, indicating he saw it.

210. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490488, 8490546). Secret; Sensitive. According to a typed note on a memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the memorandum was sent to the White House via courier at 4 p.m. on April 6. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

211. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, April 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April-June 1984. No classification marking. The letter was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Reagan on April 6. See Document 210.

212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13-04/18/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan's initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an April 16 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "We have prepared the attached memorandum to the President on your meeting with Dobrynin." (Department of State, Executive

Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) The State Department copy indicates Burt drafted the memorandum.

213. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, April 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 16-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R.F. Smith; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and G. Matthews (HA). Smith initialed for Simons and Matthews. This drafting information appears on the covering action memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly to Shultz. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. A typed note at the top of the covering memorandum reads: "Memo from Secretary to President LDX'd to White House on 4/18 —2045 MVS."

214. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, April 20, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations April 1984 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Although the

memorandum is uninitialed, McFarlane's marginalia (see footnotes 3 through 8, below), indicate that he received it.

215. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, May 8, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Subject File, Soviet (6). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: "Good paper. Many thanks."

216. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, May 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1-May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft on May 4; cleared by Pascoe and Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on May 8.

217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 9, 1984, 1040Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301-0204. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, the Mission in Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Bern, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/09/84-05/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. On a covering memorandum to Shultz from Burt, a typed note reads: "Sec/Pres delivered by Secretary 5/11 cdj." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) On May 11, Reagan had two meetings related to the Soviet Union. From 9:45 to 9:59 a.m., he met with Ambassador Hartman in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) He wrote in his diary: "He believes there is friction in the Polit Bureau [Politburo] & Gromyko is much of our problem. He doesn't feel I could have any success in appealing to the Soviets to come to the Olympics." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 346; brackets are in the original) Later that afternoon, Reagan met with Shultz and

McFarlane from 2:05 to 2:25 p.m. They were then joined by Casey until approximately 2:40 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: "George S. & I met with Bud M. It was mainly a report by George on his meetings with Soviet reps.—Ambas. Dobrynin etc. They are utterly stonewalling us." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 347)

219. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84–05/21/84). Secret. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane reported: "George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving—in full consultation with us—to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders." Reagan initialed the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

220. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84–06/01/84). Secret.

221. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, May 18, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 09T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files, Production Case Files, Box 3, Folder 32: SNIE 11/10/84/JX Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restrictions not declassified]. A note on the cover page reads: "This Estimate is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs, except as noted in the text. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State." It also notes as participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

222. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room

Washington, May 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84-05/21/84). Secret. There is no drafting information on the note. The note is based on Intelligence Information Cable

TDFIRDB-31512905-84. Reagan initialed in the upper right-hand corner of this note, indicating he saw it.

223. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, June 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Dobrynin presented Shultz with this letter and the attached talking points during their June 12 meeting (see Documents 224 and 225). A routing slip indicates Reagan was given this package during his June 14 daily briefing.

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30pm (3 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on June 13. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached are a Memorandum for the President analyzing the communications you received from Dobrynin June 12 and talking points based on this analysis for your use with the President today. You may wish to give the President the Memorandum when you see him." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-June 30, 1984 ES Sensitive

Documents) In a covering note to Shultz attached to another copy of both memoranda, Armacost, who replaced Eagleburger in May as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, commented: "Mr. Secretary, A good set of talkers. I suspect the Soviets are mainly in a quandary due to unresolved issues within their own leadership. Keeping the pressure on makes eminently good sense. I believe a proposal on ASAT along the lines we discussed yesterday would further confound their attempts to regain some initiative."

(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1984)

225. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

226. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, June 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron June 1984 (06/15/1984-06/20/1984). Confidential. Sent for information.

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, June 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-3-1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

228. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, June 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (3/09/1984–6/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-6-8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Outside the System.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)

Washington, June 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations May-June 1984. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: "RR—(On mtg w/ Doby) I want to lay out our concerns about their military buildup and relieve theirs over us being a threat." A handwritten note on another copy of this memorandum reads: "President ret'd original to RCM on 8-27-84. RCM gave original to Jack Matlock." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File —1984 (06/21/1984-07/26/1984))

231. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, June 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; Wnintel. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Martens, Simons, Palmer, J. Mayhew (INR/SEE), M. Mautner

(INR/SEE), J. Danlyk (INR/CE), D. Howells (INR/PMA), and N. Bellochi (INR). An unknown hand initialed for all clearing officials. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on June 28. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Shultz circled Montgomery's name in the "FROM" line and drew a line to his handwritten note in the margin: "INR: Pls prepare a careful ltr from me to Casey stating our concerns. Clear EUR. GPS."

232. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, June 28, 1984

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jun-1984). Secret.

170. Editorial Note

On February 10, 1984, the Embassy in Moscow reported: "As of noon Moscow time we cannot repeat cannot confirm or substantiate rumors that there has been a death in the Soviet leadership. A Western Embassy has just been told by a TASS staffer that there will be an official announcement this afternoon, but that it will not be as serious as we might imagine. This could possibly mean that it is not Andropov but another Soviet leader who has died." (Telegram 1647 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840090-0593) Within a few hours, the Embassy reported: "Soviet news media carried an official announcement at 1430 Moscow time that General Secretary Andropov died at 1650 Moscow time on February 9. No details concerning mourning period, funeral arrangements, or his successor were announced."

(Telegram 1651 from Moscow, February 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840090-0853) In telegram 1694 from Moscow, February 10, the Embassy commented that "Moscow has reacted with outward calm to the announcement of Andropov's death. Officially, there seems to be an effort to project an image of business as usual. Most scheduled performances have not been cancelled. Classical music dominates but does not monopolize the airwaves. MFA officials kept an appointment with PolCouns after the death was announced and have scheduled another call for Monday, February 13. Muscovites are going about their business with few signs of public grief." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840091-0769)

**171. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S. Representation at Andropov Funeral

Now that the Soviets have announced that the Andropov funeral will be held Tuesday, February 14, it would seem that the U.S. delegation will have to depart on Sunday, February 12 in order to arrive in Moscow on the 13th.

I understand from State that the President expressed reluctance to attend in a conversation with Secretary Shultz, since he did not want to seem to "pay homage" to a man of Andropov's character.² The President's instinct is unquestionably right on the question of seeming to honor Andropov, but there are other factors which he probably should weigh before making a final decision. They are the following:

—Attending for the primary purpose of having a meeting with Chernenko (assuming he gets the nod over the weekend as the new General Secretary) would be consistent with his policy of dialogue;

—It would diminish domestic and Allied criticism that the President has never talked to the Soviet leader and reduce future pressure to go into an unprepared summit—while not pre-empting a real summit if developments should unexpectedly make one desirable;

—It would avoid seeming out of synch with those Western leaders who are going to the funeral (as of now, Kohl and Trudeau for sure, Thatcher probable, and Mitterrand still a question mark).

—It would indicate clearly to the Soviet leadership that we are seriously interested in dealing with them.

It seems to me that these considerations somewhat outweigh the negative aspects, such as the implicit honor to Andropov's memory, and the risk of charges that he is playing politics. However, I think it would be well for him to wait until tomorrow morning, when more of the relevant facts will be clear, before making a final decision.

Recommendation:

That, unless Secretary Shultz is strongly opposed, you discuss the question with the President and suggest that he think over and sleep on the question, with an eye to making a final decision tomorrow morning.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/4/84-02/11/84). Secret. Sent for action.

² The President, who was on a short vacation at his ranch in California from February 8 to 12, received a call from Shultz on February 10 at 9:01 a.m. to discuss Andropov's funeral. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "Should President Reagan attend the funeral and thereby find occasion for his first meeting while in office with the top man in the Soviet Union? There was a brief flurry of debate over the question. It was an election year. The politicians were in favor of the president's leading our delegation. I was opposed. We

should not be running after the Soviets, I argued.” Shultz went on to note that King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt had scheduled official visits in Washington, which would have to be cancelled if Reagan left for Moscow to attend the funeral. He argued that these visits were a crucial “part of our continuing efforts to bring sense and stability to the Middle East.” And perhaps most importantly, “in a typically Reaganesque way,” the President believed “that to go to the funeral of a man he didn’t know and who had been an implacable adversary would be insincere and inappropriate.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 472)

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation and wrote beneath it: “He jumped the gun,” meaning the decision had already been made.

**172. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of
the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Andropov's Funeral and U.S.-Soviet Relations

In case the President is receiving a variety of recommendations that he should attend Andropov's funeral, he should be fully aware of the deleterious consequences of such a move.

Presumably the principal argument in favor of the President's attendance is that it will send a powerful signal that he is ready and anxious to improve relations with the Kremlin, and that therefore he is really a man of peace. This would be therefore yet another way that the President could underscore that America has regained its strength under his Administration and that we can now negotiate with the Soviets from our new position of strength more securely than before.

There are several major problems with this line of thinking which, if ignored, could yield political results that could inflict severe damage to everything the President has done so far to make the world a safer place.

*Confusion About the Nature of Renewed American
Strength*

The principal problem here is that this argument does not reflect a proper understanding of how and why the U.S. is stronger today than in 1980—and that a misunderstanding of this nature could work to undo the real sources of renewed American strength. The unspoken assumption is that we have revived our military power and that as a result we can face the Soviets more confidently and negotiate with them now that we have some chips to play with. This attitude is not only prevalent within the Administration—especially in the State Department—but is widespread even in conservative Republican circles on the Hill, where there is talk about cutting the Defense budget now that we have allegedly done so much to redress military imbalances.

The problem is that our military buildup consists mostly of promissory notes—and in real terms manifests itself today mostly in increased readiness and morale. Secretary Weinberger stated a few days ago to Congress that the Soviets have widened their margin of superiority over us in most categories even further.

The real source of our new national strength is in the moral-spiritual-political sphere—a measure of strength to which the Soviets pay very close attention. As a matter of fact, they see our moral-political strength as *the key criterion* in their measurement of the correlation of forces; for this is what constitutes our national will—our will to use force if necessary to defend our interests, our will to believe that our system has a future and is worth defending, and our will to recognize the realities of the world as they *are* and not as we would wish them to be.

Coddling Illusions and Wishful Thinking

If the President were to decide to attend Andropov's funeral, he would send the Soviets a major signal that this real strength was severely eroding. By going to Moscow and inevitably meeting with some Soviet officials, the President would be saying that he does not feel that he can ensure his reelection without coddling the illusions and wishful thinking of large portions of the electorate. Those illusions are that peace is achieved by better atmospherics and by such direct dialogue with the Soviets as is sufficient to clear up those "misunderstandings" which allegedly are the source of the U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship. These illusions are bolstered further by the wishful thinking that a reduction of the President's allegedly hostile rhetoric will "improve relations."

The reason, of course, why these notions are illusions is that they rest on the assumptions that the Soviets are not truly a *communist* power with communist objectives, and that therefore there are no fundamental political reasons why U.S.-Soviet relations should necessarily be adversarial. That this is an extreme form of wishful thinking with no basis in fact needs no explanation. It derives from that pervasive Western penchant, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick recently explained, to disbelieve the horrible. Large chunks of the American people simply do not want to believe:

- That the Soviets are communists;
- That they must therefore have unlimited international objectives;
- That the destruction of American democracy is one of those objectives;
- That the Soviets do not share the same concept of peace that we strive for;

- That the Soviets continue to have an enormous Gulag with millions of slave laborers;
- That the mass murders of innocent Afghans are actually going on today, right now;
- That visiting Soviet trade representatives, academicians, “journalists,” UN employees and Embassy personnel might actually be engaged in subversive actions that might conceivably do harm to our country;
- That the Soviets have actually broken various arms control agreements;
- That maybe the Soviets do not find it in their self interest to reach mutual, verifiable arms control treaties and comply with them;
- Etc.

An Improvement of Relations?

Some people may think that the question here is whether the President is more or less likely to get reelected by trying to win over the “wishful thinking” constituency by catering to their illusions. Indeed, the President can try such a strategy. Then, maybe his picture will appear on *Time’s* cover shaking hands with Ustinov, presaging a new improvement of relations, a new “generation of peace.” But would this represent a real improvement of relations, or would it be a deception of the world public that would merely reinforce the illusions of the wishful thinking constituency?

The fact is that it would not be a true improvement of relations—at least not as we would define those terms. A real improvement of relations could take place only: a) if it were conducted on our terms—i.e., by the Soviets exercising greater international restraint, withdrawing from Afghanistan, complying with arms agreements, stopping their military buildup, improving their human rights situation, etc.; or b) if it were conducted on Soviet terms—i.e., by the U.S. silencing itself about Soviet aggression, silencing itself about Soviet human rights violations, letting bygones be bygones after 61 Americans are shot out of the air, by negotiating, signing and complying with arms control agreements that the Soviets will violate or at least circumvent (thus permitting further shifts in the military balance in their favor), by doing absolutely nothing when we catch them violating such agreements, by desensitizing the public and the Congress about the necessity of further defense spending through such silence about Soviet behavior, etc. So long as the Soviets remain communists and so long as we are committed to democracy, there can be no other formula to “improve relations.” The best relations we can hope for are those where stability prevails, where the American people are under no illusions about the adversarial nature of the relationship, and where we are so strong that the Soviets will make no miscalculations.

A Message of Weakness to the Soviets

The fact is that an atmospheric “improvement of relations” would be a deception; and as such it would send a great signal of weakness to the Soviets. Before, Ronald Reagan showed the world that the Presidency could be won by telling the people the unadulterated truth. This was the real sign of American strength—because the people as a

whole were increasingly willing to face the ugly realities of the world, to reject disbelief in the horrible, and to tackle these realities with resolution and determination. Now, if reelection can only be won by coddling wishful thinking and calming public fears, the President will be telling the Soviets:

—That America is unwilling to face the truth and to hear the President tell the truth;

—That the electorate has thus forced the President to “tone down the rhetoric”—which in practice means, stop reminding the country about the nature of the powerful empire we face;

—That therefore the American people are really ostriches at heart;

—That Soviet disinformation efforts to convince the American people that the USSR is not truly a communist power any more have been successful;

—That Soviet propaganda to intimidate the American people has been successful; and

—That Soviet power is so great that America has been forced to meet the Soviets increasingly on their terms.

Acknowledging the Flaws of Past Policy

The President’s presence in Moscow now would also signal that his entire previous policy was flawed. It would acknowledge that before, he was not really a man of peace and that peace is not achieved by facing the truth, warning the people of dangers and building up the body, the

spiritual strength and thus the credibility of our deterrent forces.

Peace on Whose Terms

In his January 16 speech, the President already extended an olive branch to the Soviets. He asked them to improve relations on our terms—which is the only acceptable path. The ball is in the Soviets' court and it is their turn to respond. For the President to make an atmospheric gesture of the order of attending Andropov's funeral would be to play the role of a suppliant. It could even be perceived as an effort to compete with Walter Mondale² for Kremlin support in the election. Instead the greatest move the President could make toward achieving peace on our terms would be to show the Soviets he can get reelected without their help at all. The window of vulnerability is open today. The Soviets must be considering what they can do to demand American respect for all that power they have accumulated. Any sign of weakness now may encourage them that they can demand more respect than they have won thus far.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR-Andropov Funeral (February 1984). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

² Walter Mondale, front-runner among the Democratic candidates for President in the 1984 election.

³ McFarlane did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. Instead, he wrote beneath it: "The President decided, correctly in my judgment, not to go before your memo arrived John. I must say that it would strike him as a little pedantic in my opinion. You're preaching to the saved as you know."

173. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Impact of Andropov's Death on Soviet Policy

I see only minor modifications of Soviet foreign and domestic policy this year as a result of Andropov's death.

The current chill in U.S.-Soviet relations will probably continue, but the new leadership may want to reassure the Soviet people by somewhat dampening fears of a U.S.-Soviet clash which have been systematically generated for the past few years. Stopping, or at least slowing U.S. INF deployments in Western Europe will remain a high, if not the highest, priority of Soviet foreign policy. Tactics in pursuit of this objective may change, but not because of a change in leadership.

The relatively modest domestic reforms initiated under Andropov will probably continue, but perhaps implemented with less draconic measures. For example, we may, for the time being, not see any more Soviet officials executed for taking bribes.²

The continuity we will probably see in Soviet foreign and domestic policy would be explained by a general satisfaction of the majority of the Politburo with current policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a Soviet leadership in transition is not necessarily inhibited from making substantial policy changes. For example, soon after

Stalin's death in 1953, the new leadership initiated dramatic (by Soviet standards) changes in both foreign and domestic policy which continued through the transition period until Khrushchev completely took over in 1957. For example, the Austrian State Treaty was agreed to in 1955—early in Khrushchev's ascent to power. These post-Stalin changes were dictated by a deep concern about Stalin's foreign and domestic policies. I do not see a similar concern in today's Politburo.

I hesitate to speculate about the make-up of the new Soviet leadership, but I would guess that Gromyko and Ustinov will continue to wield considerable influence—insuring a continuity in foreign and defense policies. The selection of Chernenko as Chairman of the Funeral Commission is, of course, interesting. As you recall, Andropov was selected for this honor after Brezhnev's death; however, I see a more collective leadership, for the time being, with Andropov's successor probably moving more slowly to positions of real power than did Andropov, but who knows?

At this point, I see little realistic opportunity for us to influence the new leadership one way or the other. Strictly in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations (and disregarding other possible considerations), I would recommend that, for the time being, our attitude towards the new leadership be one of watchful reserve while keeping open lines of communication with the Kremlin.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–02/11/84). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it.

² Andropov started a campaign to eradicate corruption and bribery during his short tenure as General Secretary.

Stearman was likely referring to the case of Yuri K. Sokolov, a well-connected Moscow grocer, who was arrested on bribery charges and sentenced to death in November 1983. On November 28, the Embassy reported that "the severity of the sentence is no doubt intended to underscore Andropov's continued determination to make examples of the most egregious offenders regardless of their connections and presumed untouchability." (Telegram 14802 from Moscow, November 28, 1983; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830698-0865) Sokolov's sentence was evidently carried out under Chernenko in July 1984. (Seth Mydans, "Ex-Supplier of Moscow's Epicures Reported Executed for Corruption," *New York Times*, July 17, 1984, p. A6)

**174. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 10, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko: Initial Thoughts

I have not yet seen the Intelligence Community's assessment of the Soviet move in naming Chernenko head of the Andropov Funeral Commission,² but my initial thoughts are the following: —Naming him head of the Funeral Commission makes Chernenko the favorite to be named Secretary General. If he does not receive the title over the weekend, however, this will be a clear indication that there is still controversy in the leadership.

—If Chernenko is named to the general secretaryship, it will signify a clear victory by Brezhnev's cronies over Andropov's coterie, and possibly a victory of the traditional Party *apparatus* over the police types favored by Andropov.

—Naming Chernenko also means that the old men in the Politburo are not yet prepared to allow a generational change in the top leadership.

—Chernenko's stewardship, like Andropov's, could turn out to be brief. He is 75,³ and even if he wins a couple of rounds, may still have Andropov's protégés hemming him in in various ways. To the extent that he can consolidate his leadership, however, he may be able to ameliorate some of the neo-Stalinist tendencies introduced by Andropov.

(There is considerable circumstantial evidence that he opposed many of the moves, probably in self-interest.)

—Meeting the President briefly during the funeral could be a plus for Chernenko in the intra-Party struggle. (In a sense, the President would be granting to *him* an honor denied Andropov when he was alive.) Even if this should be true, however, it should not carry much weight in the President's decision whether to go, since we have no real reason to believe that Chernenko would necessarily be easier to deal with than others in the leadership. And he may not be around for very long.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–02/11/84). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: “Many thanks, Bud.”

² A February 11 memorandum, “Chernenko: Continuer of Brezhnev's Legacy,” could be the IC report referred to by Matlock. Reagan's initials appear on this memorandum, indicating he saw it. The memorandum noted that in recent months, Chernenko's public appearances and activity increased, as he used Andropov's declining health to “stage a political comeback.” The memorandum continued that Chernenko “emerged early as a staunch supporter of improved relations with the West, including the United States.” On the domestic front, he had “long advocated increased attention to the consumer goods sectors and to the social factor in domestic affairs. In recent pronouncements in the ideological sphere, however, he has taken a more conservative line.” (Ibid.) ³ Chernenko was 72, not 75, when he became General Secretary.

175. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Secretary: Washington, February 11, 1984

Please accept my condolences on the death of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov.²

Chairman Andropov had written to me on January 28, 1984,³ about the Soviet Government's concern for world peace and your willingness to pursue a dialogue aimed at solving some of the very real problems in our relations. I believe that this dialogue is so important that we should proceed with it as soon as your government is ready to do so. Therefore, I have requested Vice President Bush to deliver this letter to you.

As I made clear in my January 16 address,⁴ I have no higher goal than the establishment of a relationship between our two great nations characterized by constructive cooperation. Differences in our political beliefs and in our perspectives on international problems should not be an obstacle to efforts aimed at strengthening peace and building a productive working relationship. Indeed, in the nuclear age, they make such efforts indispensable.

In the months ahead, we will be ready to discuss with you the entire agenda of issues in which our two nations have an interest. We have specific ideas for moving the relationship forward. We will be interested in whatever ideas and proposals you may have to put forth.

One area where practical steps are possible is the reduction of strategic arms. When you are ready, we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow the differences between our respective positions. The common framework we are prepared to discuss would incorporate elements of the current proposals of both sides and permit forces that are not identical, while providing for a more stable strategic balance at lower levels.

We are prepared to talk about such a framework in diplomatic channels. But we also believe that we need to return to the negotiating table. This applies to intermediate range as well as strategic nuclear forces. Here too, the world expects us to resume our discussions and find solutions.

Another area where practical steps are possible is the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions. During the next round of negotiations in Vienna, the Western side will be prepared to introduce some new ideas. If the Soviet Union demonstrates significant flexibility in meeting our serious concerns about assuring effective verification, you will find us flexible regarding data.

A practical and business-like approach could also be helpful in reducing the dangers of wider confrontation in the many regional problems in which our two nations' interests are involved. We have had exchanges of views on southern Africa and on Afghanistan over the past several years, and more recently, Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have discussed Middle East issues at some length with Foreign Minister Gromyko. I see merit to further exchanges of views on developments in these areas.

We recently have had useful exchanges on a number of questions of bilateral interest. For my part, I am prepared

to move ahead in the areas we already have under discussion and to open up new avenues of cooperation as well, assuming there is interest on your side.

Let me conclude by seeking to lay to rest some misunderstandings which may have arisen. The United States fully intends to defend our interests and those of our allies, but we do not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people. We are prepared to deal with you in a manner that could establish the basis for mutually acceptable and mutually advantageous solutions to some of our problems.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Hill wrote: "Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand delivered by Vice President Bush to the new General Secretary of the CPSU." Bush delivered the letter to Chernenko during their February 14 meeting in Moscow. See [Documents 176](#) and [177](#). Chernenko was elected General Secretary by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on February 13.

² See [Document 170](#). On February 11, Reagan used his Saturday morning radio address to the nation to discuss the death of Andropov and U.S.-Soviet relations. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 191-192)

³ See [Document 164](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#).

**176. Memorandum From the White House
Situation Room to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, February 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Vice President's Meeting with Chernenko

An informal summary of the Vice President's meeting with Chernenko today was dictated to State by the DCM and passed to the Situation Room by phone.² Jack Matlock asked that it be passed to you immediately.

The meeting lasted ½ hour. The atmosphere was positive and quite upbeat. Chernenko did not depart from standard Soviet positions, but his emphasis was on the positive throughout. His main themes were continuity in the positions of the Soviet leadership—they were in favor of peaceful coexistence but would protect their security interests. They have no desire for military advantage.

On bilateral relations Chernenko said the state of relations was cause for concern. He pledged that the Soviet Union would do all it could in favor of good relations between the two countries. He took note of the President's expression of interest and cooperation and said it was up to the U.S. to take practical steps toward cooperation, citing in this regard the importance they attach to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. He also said the two countries should not transfer the arms race to other areas that do not now have significant armaments. Both sides need to work to keep regional conflicts from getting out of control. The Soviet Union does not believe confrontation between the two

countries is inevitable. This ended Chernenko's opening statement.

The Vice President then handed over the President's letter (in longer version) and went through his talking points.³ He mentioned the President's speech of 16 January and the possibility of a summit if conditions are right.⁴ He discussed regional issues, emphasizing the Middle East, START and human rights, and naming Shcharanskiy, Orlov and Sakharov in particular. After the meeting, the Vice President told the press that the session was constructive and useful. Our ambassador felt that the Soviet side, especially Chernenko and long time Brezhnev aide Alexandrov were particularly cordial. They thanked the Vice President profusely for coming. Chernenko's health appeared to the ambassador to be quite frail. He was short of breath and needed some help getting down stairs.

State comment: The Soviets have been making a real effort to downplay rhetoric. The embassy has the same impression. TASS has been restrained.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/13/84–02/14/84). Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and a stamped notation indicates McFarlane saw it.

² The Department of State summary is in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology, (02/11/1984–02/14/1984). The Vice President and his delegation met with Chernenko in Moscow on February 14, after Andropov's funeral services.

³ See [Document 175](#).

⁴ See [Document 158](#).

177. Message From the Embassy in Italy to the White House¹

Rome, February 15, 1984, 0025Z

491. Fm: The Vice President. To: The White House, The President. Info: Bud McFarlane, NSC. I'm sending you this message from the plane following my meeting with Chernenko.² We will be sending a detailed report shortly, but I want to give you my first impressions of the new Russian leader, impressions shared by Howard Baker who was great to have along.³

Despite reports that he might be ill and lacks the intellect and authority of Andropov, Chernenko seemed in command of the situation. He seemed alert, in good health, with a sparkle in his eye, and somewhat younger than his years. He did almost all of the talking on the Soviet side and what he had to say was, in my view, encouraging. He asked me to tell you that we can have better relations; that he believes it is possible to do so. He said that it is by no means certain we will have a fatal confrontation; that we are not inherently enemies. I told him that we, too, were ready for dialogue and progress.

Chernenko is no pushover, but he does seem open and treated us graciously. He gave the clear impression that there is somebody at home in the Kremlin with whom we can do business.

Bud might want to pass this to George Shultz. Now off to Rome to see Craxi, and the Pope in the morning, Mitterrand in Paris in the afternoon, then home.⁴

I'll have the small Mexican plate if lunch is on Thursday.
George.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (2/15/84-2/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-3-4. Secret; Via Privacy Channels; Niact Immediate. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed this cabled message, indicating he saw it. After leaving Moscow Bush traveled to Rome. He met with Foreign Minister Craxi at 8:50 p.m. on February 14. On February 15, the Vice President had a one-hour private audience with Pope John Paul II, and then departed for Paris. (Telegram 4367 from Rome, February 17, and telegram 3990 from Rome, February 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840107-0502 and D840096-0838, respectively.)

² See [Document 176](#).

³ Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee), Senate Majority Leader.

⁴ Brackets were placed around this paragraph by an unknown hand.

178. Message From the Embassy in France to the White House and the Department of State¹

Paris, February 15, 1984, 1640Z

202. Fm the Vice President. To: The White House for President Reagan Eyes Only, SecState for Secretary of State Shultz Eyes Only, Director, Central Intelligence Agency Casey Eyes Only, Moscow for Ambassador Hartman Eyes Only. Subject: My Meeting With Chernenko, February 14, 1984.

1. The meeting began with Chernenko, reading from a prepared text, expressing to us the gratitude of the Soviet leadership for honoring the memory of the late General Secretary Andropov. He asked me to transmit this sentiment to you. He asked me also to inform you that the Soviet Union was retaining continuity in foreign affairs. He said this meant that the USSR was pursuing the absolutely clear goals of consolidating peace and reducing the threat of war, as well as of pursuing peaceful co-existing between states with different social systems with a view to promoting beneficial cooperation between all states. At the same time, he said the USSR would safeguard its security interests, as well as those of its allies and friends, against any attempts to impinge on their security. Chernenko wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of striving for unilateral military-strategic advantage. The Soviet objective was to preserve under all circumstances the established balance with a view to ensuring peace. The U.S. Government should be absolutely clear on this.

2. Chernenko then said he wanted to set forth the Soviet assessment of the current state of USSR-US relations and of their prospects for the future. The current state of relations, he said, had to be a cause for concern, adding that in his opinion Washington also recognized this. For its part, the Soviet Union would do everything it could to prevent alienation between our two countries, and to promote a constructive interaction between them, based on mutual respect. Chernenko asked me to inform you that the Soviet Union was in favor of smooth, better yet, good relations with the U.S. He asked whether this was possible, and, answering his own question, replied that it certainly was.

3. He then took note of your expression of intent to cooperate with the USSR, and of making the world a better and more peaceful place for all. This required, he said, that relations be based on the concept of equality and equal security, on mutual trust, mutual respect for each other's interests, and that non-ideological differences should not be introduced into Soviet-American relations. This latter point was critical. Otherwise, the relations would be spasmodic and, what was most important, would lead to mistrust rather than mutual trust. Chernenko went on to say that it was primarily up to our two countries to insure stability and prevent the threat of a nuclear arms race, and to proceed with arms limitation and reduction.

4. Chernenko said that to be candid, the Soviet Union believed it was up to us to take practical steps in this direction. The U.S. was in a position to take these steps, he said, without in any way harming its prestige or its interests. He said the Soviets had no convincing reason why the U.S. could not follow their example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear arms. The Soviet leadership was convinced that this would help relax the

international situation. All that was required was a political will and a desire to reverse a dangerous course of events.

5. Chernenko continued by saying that there were many issues requiring solutions and many that were capable of being solved. The U.S. Government was familiar with these issues. The Soviet policy of pursuing mutually acceptable accords—and he then emphasized, mutually acceptable accords—remained unchanged. Among the most important and pressing problems he would mention arms limitation and reduction, stopping the spread of the arms race to new areas, and resolving regional conflicts, taking into account the legitimate interests of the parties. To be candid, the bilateral relations between our two countries were devoid of meaningful content, he said. This constituted the Soviet approach and the position of the Soviet Union. He then said he hoped that you and your administration would draw the relevant practical conclusion. This would permit an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations and in establishing the kind of relations which would promote peace. Chernenko told me that the Soviet leadership did not believe in the inevitability of a confrontation. The Soviet and U.S. peoples had not inherited hostility toward each other, he said, adding that he did not want such hostilities to occur in the future.

6. I thanked Chernenko for his remarks and noted that Chernenko had had a very busy day and that he had several traumatic days behind him. I told him that Senator Baker and I had come to offer our sincere condolences. He thanked me for this sentiment.

7. After handing over your letter,² which I told him reflected your sincere feelings, I told him that I was absolutely convinced that, in fact, we did not want to be drawn into any kind of conflict with the Soviet Union. As

you had said in your January 16, 1984 speech,³ the U.S. was prepared to build a relationship based on constructive cooperation. Just as Chernenko had said, we, too, believed that good relations were possible. We, too, recognized that there were differences between us, and like the USSR, the U.S. would defend its own interests and those of its allies. However, the U.S. did not wish to challenge the security of the Soviet Union or its people. We, too, agreed that the time had come to move from words to deeds.

8. I went on to say that in the U.S. view, the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Minister Gromyko had identified areas in which progress was possible in the coming months⁴ and we wanted to make a beginning towards a better and more productive relationship. If real progress on the issues were made—if there was a prospect for serious progress—then you remained interested in a meeting at the highest level.

9. I told him that we especially wanted to avoid conflicts over regional issues. The Middle East was the Middle East, and thus was always difficult. With respect to Lebanon, in particular, we were not seeking a conflict with the Soviet Union, I said, nor were we seeking a permanent U.S. presence there.

10. I then emphasized that the U.S. wanted to move forward on arms control. We believed that START was one area in which constructive steps were possible toward achieving our mutual goal of reducing strategic offensive arms. We were ready, I told him, for serious negotiations. Frankly, we would be interested in hearing the Soviet side's ideas on how to reduce the differences between the two sides on START. We believed it useful to focus on the area of trade-offs between Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages. Our overall objective was to find a framework

for a general reduction of strategic arms which, both sides agreed, had so far eluded us.

11. Noting his statement concerning interference in the domestic affairs of the other country, I said we knew how seriously the Soviet Union viewed this matter. However, it would be most useful if we were able to find ways for taking practical steps—and I emphasized that they should involve quiet diplomacy—in the area of human rights. A number of these cases had become important U.S. domestic concerns. I told him that they had heard various names from us in the past, but I wanted to take this opportunity to mention Shcharanskiy, Orlov and Sakharov.

12. With the meeting drawing to a close, I remarked that there was far more to discuss, but that I wanted to end on the note on which I had begun, namely that the U.S. was ready for better relations with the Soviet Union. We were aware of the difficulties, of course. But we had not come to Moscow to assign blame or to escalate the rhetoric. This should be a new beginning. We were prepared to meet them half way.

13. He thanked me for my remarks, expressing his gratitude to me for taking the time to come to Moscow at such a difficult moment. He asked that this sentiment also be expressed to you. He said that my visit was a human kind of gesture, a good gesture which went in the right direction. The Soviet side hoped for further steps towards improving relations between us. Even this brief discussion, he said, had shown that we had things to talk about, and that there were issues which could be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis. He said that through no fault of our own, we shouldered the task of leading two great powers, the USSR and the U.S. This being the case, he said, we should pursue an honorable policy in order that future

generations remember us as good leaders, wise and kind individuals whose goal was the well being of all. He finished by again expressing gratitude to you and thanking me and Senator Baker for attending the funeral.

14. As I departed, Chernenko remarked that he had not had an opportunity to read your letter, but promised to study it and provide a response if one was appropriate.

15. As I reported in my earlier message,⁵ I was basically encouraged by the meeting.

16. I thought you would be interested in Ambassador Hartman's observations. His experience gives him an excellent perspective. Ambassador's comments:

Chernenko received Vice President with Gromyko, Dobrynin, Alexandrov and another assistant with Sukhodrev as interpreter. He read his opening statement in a strong voice but with his usual slurring of words. He appeared fit and in good humor. His dress was immaculate; suit well-tailored, shirt well-made. Both he and Gromyko were at pains to be pleasant and welcoming. Chernenko had slight shortness of breath as he began to read. He did not wear glasses which were on table in front of him. Gromyko made only one attempt to add or correct by being more explicit in saying that, if there were points in President's letter that required response, there would be answer after they had a chance to study letter. Alexandrov, earlier near receiving line and during meeting, made special effort (unlike other recent contacts) to convey a friendly message and express his own appreciation for Vice President's visit.

In sum, Ambassador had an impression of Brezhnev revisited. Unlike Andropov who was coldly, humorlessly

intellectual, Chernenko appears to be the old wily Russian peasant-type but with an over-lay of having run a Politburo secretariat for many years. There is also no doubt that the memories of Andropov were fading fast as this new leader enjoyed every moment of the ironic situation he found himself in—a loser who became a winner. Many were struck, however, by the sight of an unknown individual holding Chernenko's arm firmly; Chernenko was the only Politburo member who appeared to be aided down the steps (twice) from the top of the Lenin mausoleum. Would there be another rendezvous in fifteen months?

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/15/84–02/16/84); NLR-748-25-12-1-6. Secret; Via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Reagan initialed the message, indicating he saw it. Bush traveled from Rome to Paris and met with President Mitterrand at 6:30 p.m. on February 15. (Telegram 6302 from Paris, February 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840100-0072)

² See [Document 175](#).

³ See [Document 158](#).

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ See [Document 177](#).

179. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 15, 1984

The Impact of Chernenko's Succession on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Arms Control Policy

Summary

Past statements by Konstantin Chernenko, and his initial speeches as Party leader, suggest that he is personally inclined toward greater efforts to reduce tensions in US-Soviet relations and to promote negotiation of outstanding issues. In all likelihood, he sees such a policy as a necessary adjunct to the Soviet Union's growing defense capabilities—which he also has been careful to support in recent days—in ensuring the security of the USSR. However, the continuing strong position of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov, who have clearly been playing a major role in foreign policy decisionmaking, and Chernenko's lack of an independent power base seem to make it unlikely that dramatic new initiatives or abrupt shifts in policy toward the US are imminent. We believe that the coming weeks are more likely to bring further moderation of Soviet rhetoric, continued cooperation with the US on working-level issues, and possibly some tinkering with the foreign policies inherited from Andropov. [*portion marking not declassified*]

A major unresolved issue is when and under what conditions to resume arms control talks with the US. In the final weeks of the Andropov regime, the Soviets had hinted at a willingness to resume substantive exchanges in this field, while maintaining that new initiatives by the US were needed to break the deadlock. Chernenko's accession is likely to give new impetus to this positive strain in Soviet policy, and to heighten Soviet watchfulness for any signals from Washington. [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. Chernenko was a vocal supporter of Brezhnev's policy of improving relations with the US. In the later years of Brezhnev's regime, Chernenko publicly defended that policy against those within the hierarchy who had begun attacking it following the downturn in relations after the invasion of Afghanistan. Although Chernenko's responsibility during Andropov's tenure was for ideology rather than foreign policy, his initial statements as General Secretary suggest that his inclinations have not changed. His accession speech alluded prominently to the theme of peaceful coexistence, avoided direct criticism of the US, and cited the need to settle international problems through "serious, equal and constructive talks."² His eulogy for Andropov struck a similar tone.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. On the other hand, Chernenko has also taken pains since becoming General Secretary to underscore the need for maintaining a strong defense. In the past, he was a leading advocate of increased spending for production of consumer goods, and his initial speech as General Secretary suggests that he continues to be. He therefore probably considers it politically imperative as well to assure representatives of the defense sector, particularly Ustinov, that he is not a threat to their interests. Moreover, despite his apparent

policy preference for providing greater incentives to the Soviet worker and consumer, his duties as General Secretary now confer upon him the heavy responsibility for seeing to the military defense of the homeland, whether or not he assumes chairmanship of the Defense Council. If he proceeds in the future on the basis of his past apparent preferences, he may attempt to convince the power elite over time that a less confrontational approach to bilateral relations and a broader, more constructive dialogue on outstanding issues is the natural complement to the defense effort in ensuring the security of the USSR. The extent to which he can achieve this will depend on the power sharing arrangements and compromises that went into his investiture—issues on which we now have no clear picture. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. For now, Chernenko's personal inclinations are unlikely to be the paramount influence on Soviet foreign policy. He lacks both an independent power base and experience in foreign policy commensurate with that of Gromyko and Ustinov. Therefore, they almost certainly will—at a minimum—remain key policymakers in that field, and in the recent past they were the principal Soviet spokesmen giving voice to the sharp downturn in US-Soviet relations. In December, Ustinov accused the US of seeking military superiority and charged that the deployment of new US missiles in Europe had wrecked the chances for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement at the INF talks. In his speech in Stockholm at the CDE last month, Gromyko said that statements by the US regarding its readiness to talk while continuing to deploy missiles were "verbal camouflage," and that the USSR will not participate in talks that serve as a "cover for militarist plans."⁴ His speech at Andropov's funeral was notably sharper in tone than Chernenko's.⁵ [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Chernenko's accession therefore is unlikely to produce any immediate initiatives or sharp shifts in Soviet policy. Instead, its effects are likely to appear gradually. Soviet rhetoric, which already had begun to moderate under Andropov, probably will become still less confrontational. Cooperation with the US on working-level issues, which had continued under Andropov, is likely to be maintained and could become more active. The new leader is likely to undertake an ongoing reexamination of the positions inherited from his predecessor and, where he feels reasonably confident of getting Politburo support, to adjust them to accord with his own views. As important as the US-Soviet relationship is to Moscow, however, the top priorities of the leadership now are almost certainly the working out of power balances within the Politburo and setting the course on domestic issues, where there has been conflict during the past year. For now, Chernenko's past policy preferences will have to be tempered by his concern about his immediate political interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Conflicting statements by Soviet officials in recent weeks suggest that no final decision had been reached prior to Andropov's death on when or under what conditions to resume arms control talks with the US. Some officials had continued to sound pessimistic, while others hinted that the Soviets were prepared to resume substantive exchanges. The latter usually alluded to the need for a positive signal from the US, and Soviet public statements maintained that a US initiative was essential for a resumption of the principal negotiations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. Under Chernenko, the Soviets almost certainly will continue sending positive signals, and these could even intensify. They are also likely to continue to maintain that the onus remains upon the US to take an initiative that

would enable the major arms negotiations to resume. However, while Chernenko may be restricted by the views of Gromyko and Ustinov in exploring possible new approaches to an arms agreement, his own influence also will be felt—perhaps increasingly—as he brings the weight of his new position to bear. This could mean that any new US proposal would receive a more sympathetic hearing than would have been the case under Andropov. It does not mean that Soviet bargaining over any such proposals is likely to be less rigorous. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400195. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared by [*less than 1 line not declassified*], Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Poindexter noted on a routing slip: “Bud, This is the paper you asked CIA for. JP.” McFarlane wrote: “Many thanks.” On a separate routing slip, Kimmit wrote: “JP: Should this be shared with Matlock, Fortier and Lehman?” Poindexter replied “yes.”

² For the text of this speech on February 14, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984) pp. 4-7.

³ For the text, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984) pp. 9-10.

⁴ See [footnote 3, Document 159](#).

⁵ For the text of Gromyko’s speech at Andropov’s funeral, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 7 (March 14, 1984), pp. 10-11. An excerpt of his remarks was printed in the *New York Times*, February 15, 1984, p. A7.

180. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 15, 1984, 2-3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, First Deputy Chief, International
Department, CPSU Central Committee
Stanislav Menshikov, assistant to Zagladin
Unidentified Soviet notetaker
Jack Matlock, NSC

Matlock opened the conversation by saying that he regretted disturbing Zagladin during the sad and busy period he was going through, but he wished to take advantage of his presence in Moscow to deliver a reply to the message conveyed by Zagladin through Dr. Horowitz of Senator Kennedy's staff.² Following his meeting with Zagladin on January 19, Dr. Horowitz had conveyed Zagladin's remarks to the White House, as Zagladin had requested. That message had been considered at high levels in the White House, and he wished to provide, in this informal fashion, our reaction and comment.³

As we understood the message, it had essentially two parts: that great powers must allow each other "elbow room" in order to avoid dangerous confrontations, and that although relations between our countries were very bad, they could be improved with mutual effort, and that a Soviet analysis had indicated that a good place to start might be to work jointly on a treaty to ban chemical weapons.

Zagladin confirmed that this was the essence of the message given to Dr. Horowitz.

Matlock observed that we agree on the matter of "elbow room." We felt that we had in fact observed that principle

in practice, and said that if the Soviets viewed the matter differently, he would convey any specific complaints they might have to Washington for consideration. He added that, in our view, the Soviets sometimes restricted their own "elbow room" by their public statements which diminished their own flexibility.

Regarding work on a treaty banning chemical weapons, the U.S. is serious in its desire to reach agreement on a treaty. As Secretary Shultz announced in Stockholm, we would be tabling a draft treaty at the CD in Geneva in coming months. It would be global in its coverage rather than regional, for reasons Shultz had explained to Gromyko in Stockholm.⁴ But from our point of view, verification will be the key to a viable treaty, and it is clear from our analysis that verification procedures must go well beyond the sort of national technical means incorporated in previous arms control agreements. We know from long experience that the Soviets resist most forms of on-the-spot verification, yet they will be essential to any treaty acceptable to us. Unless the Soviet approach to verification changes substantially, therefore, we may have great difficulty coming to an agreement on this subject. For this reason, we wonder quite frankly whether CW is really the best place to start. Since we are serious in our intent to negotiate as many differences as we can, we think it might be useful to discuss the matter frankly, and to see if there are any other candidates at hand which might present fewer difficulties. Does Zagladin have any other ideas?

Zagladin (who took detailed notes himself on the above) said that it was important to allow each side elbow room. As he had told Horowitz, the Soviets recognized the dependence of the U.S. and its Allies on oil from the Persian Gulf, and would understand if circumstances should require action by the U.S. to sustain the flow.

As for a CW treaty, the Soviets have no problem with a global approach. They will study our draft and the verification provisions carefully, and maybe there will be fewer problems there than the U.S. anticipates. As for other areas, does the U.S. have any ideas?

Matlock said that we wondered if START is not an area which would benefit from our joint consideration. It is, after all, the central issue between us so far as arms control is concerned. And although the problems are large, they do not seem insurmountable to us if the Soviets are willing to show the sort of flexibility we can offer. Progress in this area would be an important achievement in its own right, and could have a beneficial effect on our cooperation in other areas.

The U.S. has made clear that it does not seek to restructure Soviet strategic forces to the detriment of the Soviet Union. We believe both sides would benefit from moving toward systems providing greater stability, but how we do that is subject to negotiation. We are prepared to examine possible trade-offs between those elements of our forces which cause the Soviets greatest concern, in return for Soviet willingness to constrain those systems in their arsenal which give us concern. He is no expert in this area and this is not an appropriate time to discuss our ideas in detail, but Gen. Scowcroft would be visiting Moscow in March with a group from the Dartmouth Conference, and we feel it would be useful if he could be received privately at the policy-making level for a frank, informal and unbinding discussion of possibilities. The purpose would, of course, *not* be to negotiate, but simply to provide an opportunity for discussion with an expert who is thoroughly familiar with views in Washington.⁵

Zagladin replied that two things were needed to move the relationship forward: an improvement in the atmosphere, and some concrete steps which would demonstrate that agreements are really possible. On the latter, the Soviets would take a careful look at our CW proposals. Otherwise, their agenda was covered in Andropov's January 28 letter to the President.⁶ For example, U.S. ratification of the TTBT and PNE treaties, mentioned in that letter, would be considered as a clear signal that progress is possible. Regarding START, he would be glad to talk to Scowcroft when he is in Moscow.

Matlock said that we had already gone a long way to improve the atmosphere, but had yet to observe much restraint in Soviet rhetoric. As for concrete steps, we agree they are necessary, and we hope to help identify some in conversations such as this one.

So far as START is concerned, *Zagladin* continued, the Soviets see two problems. The first relates to the effect of the U.S. proposals on the structure of Soviet forces. Soviet forces are structured differently from U.S. forces both because of the historical development of the forces on each side, and because of geography. The U.S., for example, is much better situated to deploy submarines since it has many easily accessible ports. The Soviet Union, in contrast, has few, and they do not provide easy access to the oceans. The Soviets, however, are not against more stable systems in principle. Maybe this problem can be solved in negotiations.

The second problem for the Soviets is the fact that the U.S. deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe has introduced a new strategic factor. Since these systems can strike the Soviet Union, they must be considered strategic, and this is for them relevant to START.

Matlock countered that, if this is the case, then the U.S. must consider the SS-20's as strategic in the same sense, because they can strike our Allies, and we are bound by treaty to consider an attack on them as an attack on us.

Zagladin said that he took the point, but in that case the U.S. should not argue that British and French systems cannot be considered. Indeed, the idea that "Nitze floated with Kvitsinsky" just before the INF talks broke down could have been the basis for settlement if the U.S. had wanted one.⁷

Matlock said that our understanding is that this was Kvitsinsky's idea and that Nitze had made it clear that it could hardly be accepted by Washington. The reasons are clear. The British and French systems are actually irrelevant to the central issue in INF. In his view, the central issue is the Soviet attempt, represented by their deployment of the SS-20's in Europe, to decouple American and West European nuclear security. This simply cannot be accepted by NATO and the U.S. Indeed, it does not even seem in the Soviet long-term interest. For even if it should succeed, and it will not, it would produce dangerous instability in Europe, and probably a growing desire on the part of the Germans for their own national deterrent. These would be developments hardly in the Soviet interest. The British and French systems are not Alliance systems and do not provide the necessary coupling of U.S. and West European nuclear defense. They are, furthermore, in no sense a threat to the Soviet Union, given the enormous disparity in their size and that of the Soviet arsenal.

In short, we feel that the Soviets were never willing to deal with the central issue in INF, and that is why an agreement has eluded us. We regret that we must deploy, but so long as the Soviets insist on keeping some SS-20's there must

be a counterbalance, and this is totally consistent with Soviet long-range security interests. But we would like to find ways to keep deployments to a minimum, and are willing to continue negotiating.

Zagladin then referred to the danger posed by the short flight time of the Pershings.

Matlock said that their flight time was the same as that of the SS-20's to Western Europe.

Zagladin agreed, but said that the great accuracy of the Pershing II's made them a particular threat.

Menshikov joked that "if you feel you need a counter, why don't you just buy SS-20's from us and deploy them in Western Europe?"

Matlock replied, "if that's an offer, you may have a deal," and added that he thought too much was made of short flight times. The fact is that any nuclear missile flight time is too short. Whether the flight time is 40 minutes or 4 minutes, any missile launch could be tantamount to suicide. We should therefore concentrate on making sure that neither side will ever feel it must launch a missile against the other. This is a vital interest for both of us.

Zagladin agreed with the latter thought.

Matlock then observed that, speaking entirely personally, the exchange on the capabilities of our various weapons suggested to him that it might be useful to arrange some way for our military leaders and experts to meet and talk over some of these things. It seemed clear that the Soviets, for example, were exaggerating the capabilities of some of our weapons, and drawing inferences which we would consider quite unwarranted. Maybe we do the same

sometimes. Talking about it would not solve basic problems, but might clear the air a bit and give each side a chance to air its specific concerns.

Zagladin indicated that this was worth thinking about. He then stressed that what is needed now are deeds.

Matlock replied that we agree completely. He noted, however, that *Zagladin* seemed to imply that the deeds must come from us. From our point of view, they should come from them. We have serious and basic problems with many Soviet actions and policies. *Zagladin* is familiar with them and there is no need to catalog them. In our view, there is no basis for expecting us to make the first step—although we have, in fact, tempered our rhetoric without a corresponding adjustment in Soviet statements. Note, for example, the contrast in tone of the Shultz and Gromyko speeches in Stockholm. Perhaps, in our informal discussions, we should try to find ways that we can move jointly on substantive issues.

Zagladin said that this, in fact, is a good time to make a “fresh start,” and said that they would consider carefully what *Matlock* had said. He added that they would be very busy during the period leading up to the March 4 Supreme Soviet “elections,” but that his assistant Stanislav Menshikov planned a trip to New York March 6 for a scheduled conference, and he hoped that he might have a response to our conversation by then, when the General Secretary’s “election” would have occurred. [Note: in a technical sense, *Zagladin* seemed to be referring to Chernenko’s “election” to a seat in the Supreme Soviet. This, however, is an utter formality and a foregone conclusion. He may, therefore, have been hinting that Chernenko is expected to be made Chief of State by “election” as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme

Soviet. If this is in the works, however, it is most unlikely to occur before March 8, since the Supreme Soviet normally meets several weeks after "elections" are held, and these will not occur until March 4.]

Matlock said that he would be pleased to arrange a meeting with Menshikov while the latter is in the U.S., and that Menshikov should let Hartman know of his precise travel plans, so that appointments could be arranged.⁸ He added that any messages for him could be passed through Hartman, who can communicate directly with the White House.

Matlock added that, before leaving, he would like to share with them a few purely personal observations, as an individual who knows the Soviet Union well and also has the perspective of one who has worked in the White House for several months. First, he urged Zagladin and his colleagues to study most carefully the President's January 16 speech, noting that it reflects the President's considered views about the direction he would like the relationship to move.⁹ He noted, for example, the stress throughout on cooperation and a desire to solve problems. If the Soviets are concerned over the atmosphere of the relationship, then they could find many openings in the speech which could serve as a basis for improving it.

Regarding the President personally, *Matlock* said that it was clear that the Soviets misunderstood him. Yes, he does not like communism and is profoundly disturbed by many Soviet policies and actions. At the same time, he is genuinely a man of peace and understands clearly the necessity of the U.S. and USSR managing their inevitable ideological rivalry peacefully. He will defend our interests vigorously, but is also prepared to address real problems

and to solve them in a way which does not threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

Matlock then noted that some commentators in the press had suggested that the President's call for dialogue and negotiation was politically motivated. This was a mistake—although we can anticipate that everything he does this year will be seen by some in this light—because the President really does not need agreements with the USSR to be re-elected. If we are able to agree on some things, this will be good. But if we aren't, it will be very clear to the American people that it is not President Reagan's fault, but rather Soviet intransigence. In sum, even though the issues will be debated in our campaign, the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is most unlikely to affect any votes. The real reason the President is calling for a dialogue is that he genuinely wants to make strides toward arms reduction during his stewardship. He wants it on his record.

If the Soviets wish to wait until 1985 to deal, then that will be their decision. If the President is reelected, his position will not change. He will be neither harder nor softer. But if we lose a year, the advance of technology may make the issues even more complicated. And the Soviets should bear another factor in mind. That is, that President Reagan can deliver on any agreements he signs. That has not always been certain with American presidents, and we can understand the frustration of other countries when they must deal with an American president who may not be able to mobilize the support of 67 senators to ratify treaties. History shows that American conservatives are better able to deliver than liberals.

Menshikov commented at this point that they knew a treaty signed by President Reagan would be ratified, but their problem was how to get him to sign one.

Matlock replied if they would make some realistic offers, they might find it easier than they think.

It was then agreed that Menshikov would get in touch with Matlock when he comes to the U.S. in March. As he departed, Matlock gave Zagladin a couple of pictures of Zagladin and his wife taken at a dinner Matlock hosted in 1981. Zagladin thanked him and reiterated, "It's a good time now to make a fresh start."

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron February 1984 [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This meeting took place in Zagladin's office in the Central Committee Building. Matlock accompanied Bush to Moscow for Andropov's funeral and the meeting with Chernenko. Matlock wrote of this meeting: "As I entered the forbidding gray Central Committee Building under KGB escort, I realized that I had been trying to establish some sort of contact with the Central Committee staff ever since my first tour in Moscow in 1961. Now, after twenty-three years of trying, I was entering the inner sanctum of the Communist system." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 94)

² See [Document 163](#).

³ Matlock recalled that he requested this meeting with Zagladin "with the approval of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz" to respond to the message sent through Horowitz in January. (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 94)

⁴ See [Document 159](#).

⁵ The Dartmouth Group went to Moscow in mid-March. See [Document 193](#).

⁶ See [Document 164](#).

⁷ See [footnote 4, Document 137](#).

⁸ See [Document 195](#).

⁹ See [Document 158](#).

**181. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, February 16, 1984

SUBJECT

Analysis of Soviet General Secretary Chernenko's Meeting with the Vice
President in Moscow

We have reviewed the record of the Vice President's exchange with new Soviet General Secretary Chernenko immediately following the Andropov funeral.² In particular, we have compared Chernenko's remarks with those of Andropov to the Vice President in November 1982 on the similar occasion of Brezhnev's funeral.³

—Given the immediate needs of the situation for Chernenko to stress the continuity and unity of Soviet policy during this transition, it is not surprising that a fair portion of his prepared presentation to the Vice President closely tracked familiar Soviet themes and Andropov's own comments of fifteen months before. He reiterated the public principles of Soviet foreign policy (peaceful relations on the basis of "equal security" and "non-interference") and expressed regret at existing strains and mistrust in U.S.-Soviet relations. Like Andropov, he affirmed at some length Soviet interest in improving relations, but noted such improvement now required "practical steps" from the U.S. side.

—What was noticeably *different* in Chernenko's presentation was the relative lack of any language accusing the U.S. of being responsible for the current downturn in

relations. We were, for instance, struck by the fact that the new General Secretary made no expression of Soviet anger or regret over, or even any mention of, the U.S. INF deployments. In his 1982 meeting with the Vice President, Andropov had devoted some time to “frank points,” asserting that “it was not the Soviets who took the initiative to worsen relations.” While Chernenko gave nothing away on actual substance, there was none of this accusatory lecturing tone to his remarks.

—Emphasizing that the Soviet Union sought “mutually acceptable” solutions, Chernenko specifically cited several general problem areas where U.S.-Soviet progress might be both desirable and possible: the limitation and reduction of arms, curbing the extension of the arms race to areas where it did not presently exist, the cessation of regional conflict, and the improvement of bilateral relations. (By way of contrast, Andropov did not mention regional problems in the 1982 meeting; Chernenko’s listing of important topics now parallels the agenda for U.S.-Soviet affairs you have presented to Gromyko—with the exception of human rights). As a step which the U.S. might take to relax tensions, Chernenko identified a non first use of nuclear weapons pledge similar to that already given by the Soviet Union.⁴ He showed some sensitivity to the need not to interject “ideological differences into U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations,” saying there should be a clear demarcation between the two.

This exchange was, of course, constrained by the short time available and the general mood of the occasion. It did not demonstrate any substantive shift on the Soviets’ part. Nonetheless, rhetoric and atmospherics are important in the Soviet context and for that reason, it was noteworthy that Chernenko and company apparently made a deliberate

effort to give an upbeat cast to the Vice President's meeting.

In the days to come, we will be sending you our further thoughts on possible follow-up.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/16/1984-02/20/1984); NLR-775-11-17-2-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Simons initialed for Dunkerley. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 16.

² See [Document 178](#).

³ See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 234](#).

⁴ See [footnote 3, Document 8](#).

**182. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, February 18, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention.² Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

—*Economic*: Here we have already won.

—*Imperial*: A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.

—*Ideological*: An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.

—*Psychological*: The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are “the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves.”

—*Thermonuclear*: The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.

We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

—With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

—With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

—With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

—*Dealing with the Soviet Leaders:* We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.

It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

—*The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation*: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov was moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greater expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The article is attached but not printed. In a January 28 memorandum, McFarlane tasked Matlock with summarizing Billington's article, "A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue," which was printed in the *Washington Post* on November 20, 1983, p. F8. "It seems to me that there is much in common between Jim's

prescriptions and your own," McFarlane commented. "I would like to infuse the President with an historical appreciation of where we stand in the relationship and what we can expect in the way of the Soviet leadership (goals and strategy). Finally, given what I believe we share (a basic pessimism toward any near-term movement away from the deeply Stalinistic values held by the current senior generation of leaders), we ought to propose how we should proceed so as to avoid catastrophe in our strategic relationship while seeking to at least keep alive the hope of an alternative future among the successor generation. I would like to get this to the President as soon as possible." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/23/84))

³ In a February 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock reported, in relation to private foundation money, cultural exchanges, and even trips of U.S. business leaders to Moscow: "I had two extended discussions with Billington about his ideas." He continued: "Basically he feels, and I strongly agree, that some means must be found to direct foundation money into new channels, so that we do not have a private-sector dialogue dominated by the Arbatovs and Zhukovs, as it has been up to now." He concluded: "it should be possible to implement some of Billington's ideas without major changes of U.S. policy or larger commitment of federal funds. We must, however, do what we can to encourage effective goal setting and more effective briefing of U.S. participants." (Ibid.)

183. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, February 23, 1984

We appreciate the kind feelings transmitted on your behalf by Mr. Bush at the hour of sorrow for the Soviet people.

In your letter you expressed some thoughts with regard to Soviet-American relations and spoke in favor of putting them on a constructive basis.²

I told Mr. G. Bush and would like to reaffirm it to you personally that our approach of principle to dealing with the United States remains unchanged.

This approach reflects a joint view of the Soviet leadership and enjoys a full support of the entire people of our country.

In conducting our foreign policy we will continue persistent efforts with the aim of strengthening the peace and lessening the danger of war. We will stand for a peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, will seek to develop an equal and mutually advantageous cooperations with all countries, if they are ready, on their part, to do likewise. This, of course, applies, in full measure to the United States, too.

In practical terms, this means also that our positions laid down, in particular in our message to you of January 28,³ remain in force. Therein, we clearly expressed our view as to the present state of affairs concerning the issues of

nuclear weapons in Europe and in the area of strategic weapons, as well as with regard to the arms limitation and reduction process as a whole. We are expecting your reaction.

I would like, Mr. President, that you and I should have a clear understanding from the very beginning on the central matters of the relations between the USSR and the USA. These are the matters of security. The Soviet Union does not seek a military superiority, nor does it seek to dictate its will to others, but we will, of course, be safeguarding the interests of our security and those of our allies and friends from any attempts to damage those interests.

I believe, you will agree that in a nuclear age we must not allow the irreparable to take place, be it through design or mistake. We are not seeking a confrontation with the U.S. Such a confrontation would hardly be in the interests of your country, either. If you and I have a common understanding on this point, then it should be put into effect also in practical deeds.

From this standpoint it is important that restraint be exercised in everything, in matters big and small, and that both sides display the high degree of responsibility which is required by the interests of international security and stability. As a minimum, it is necessary to do nothing in the practical policy, that could exacerbate the situation and cause irreversible changes in Soviet-American relations as well as in the international situation as a whole.

We are convinced that it is impossible to begin to correct the present abnormal and, let's face it, dangerous situation, and to speak seriously of constructive moves, if there is a continuation of attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security

of the other side, if actions are taken prejudicing the legitimate interests of the other side.

There is another important point which the U.S. leadership must clearly understand: not only the U.S. has allies and friends. The Soviet Union has them too; and we will be caring for them.

We look at things realistically and have no illusions that it is possible to carry on business in total abstraction from the objective differences which exist between a socialist country and a capitalist country.

For instance, our morality does not accept much of what is endemic to the capitalist society and what we consider as unfair to people. Nevertheless, we do not introduce these problems into the sphere of interstate relationship. Just as we believe it is wrong and even dangerous to subordinate our relations to ideological differences.

These are the considerations of a general nature which I thought necessary to convey to you. As to the specific areas where the Soviet Union and the U.S. could, right now and with no time lost, move in a constructive way, those have been outlined by us, including in the message that I mentioned. I would like to expect that a positive reaction on your part will follow.

We have always been resolute advocates of a serious and meaningful dialogue—a dialogue that would be aimed at searching for common ground, at finding concrete and mutually acceptable solutions in those areas where it proves realistically possible.

In conclusion I will emphasize once again: a turn toward even and good relations between our two countries has

been and continues to be our desire. And such a turn is quite feasible, given the same desire on the U.S. side.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, February 24, Dobrynin requested that the letter be brought to Reagan's attention. In a February 24 covering memorandum to the President, McFarlane wrote: "This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin delivered the attached letter to you from General Secretary Chernenko. Its tone is generally moderate. Standard rhetoric is included, but the commitment to a serious effort to solve problems lends to an improved climate for engaging the Soviets on a variety of subjects. Tomorrow morning I will send you a memorandum (see [Document 185](#)) which surveys the state of the relationship and proposes certain courses of action to get things moving. It reflects the thinking of George, Cap, the Vice President and several others. We would like to meet with you to discuss it next week and to receive your guidance as to which of several projects we should move out on. Separately, I am moving the bureaucracy ahead on certain START ideas which we would be prepared to exchange in the near future." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586)) In his diary on February 27, Reagan wrote: "N.S.C. briefing was on Chernenko's letter. We're agreed we are going to make our plans for response with George B., George S., Bud, Cap &

me—no bureaucracy.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 322)

² See [Document 175](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

184. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 24, 1984, 1241Z

2217. For the Secretary From Hartman. Subject: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Summary. As the dust settles from the second Soviet leadership change in 15 months, I am persuaded that we should use this opportunity to test once again whether our relations can be moved forward. I also conclude that the time for such moves is limited and we will not get something for nothing. End summary.

3. Based on your meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm,² on the short exchange here with Chernenko,³ on a tete-a-tete lunch that I had with Dobrynin the day after the funeral,⁴ on Senator Cohen's meetings Monday with Acting Chief of State Kuznetsov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko,⁵ and on a long discussion with MFA USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh,⁶ the following points emerge:

—The Soviets' reaction to the President's January 16 speech has been frankly disappointing.⁷ You saw first-hand with Gromyko the depth of their skepticism. For the post-Andropov period as well, all of our contacts with them indicate that they remain weighted down by their distrust of our motives.

—Nevertheless, the new leadership thus far has shown a greater willingness than Andropov to match our shift toward a less strident tone. This could be expected in a post-succession “honeymoon”, but the fact is that Chernenko’s public statements as General Secretary have been far more restrained than Andropov’s first remarks. Chernenko and his colleagues have not yet repeated nor referred to Andropov’s September 28 and November 24 remarks,⁸ which were particularly hostile to the U.S.

—Andropov’s death also coincided with a major Soviet review and reappraisal of their arms control position. At the moment they seem to be looking at a wide range of options. This was hinted at by Gromyko in your conversation and has been indicated to us by several recent interlocutors and confirmed to the French by General Chervov during the week of Andropov’s death. This reappraisal provides the context for the fact that Soviet leaders post-Andropov have been exceedingly coy about any reference to the condition that we must be ready to return to the status quo ante in INF.

—Finally, despite Chernenko’s familiar, aging image, the structure of the Soviet leadership is different from the Brezhnev or Andropov periods. Chernenko is surrounded, not only by Ustinov, Gromyko and Tikhonov, but also by a younger array of leaders, one of whom—Gorbachev—already seems to be number two. A new generation is inexorably coming to the fore.⁹

4. While there is not yet much hard evidence, it appears that the new leadership—for all its apparent stand-pattism—is not just a continuation of Andropov or a throw-back to Brezhnev, that it has at least decided to convey a different and slightly more positive public signal to us on East-West relations, and that it is engaged in a review of arms control

policy and possibly East-West policy in general. Because of this possible approach to a fork in the road, I think that it is a particularly good moment to put something specific and positive into the equation from our side.

5. While the Soviets could answer the President's letter with something positive,¹⁰ I think that they are unlikely to go much beyond Andropov's last letter.¹¹ As long as what we suggest is based on our own clear interests, I see no harm and much political gain from trying to mold their response and in the process attempting to overcome some of their suspicion. We should understand, however, that keeping bilateral channels open or even developing new ones will not be enough. Unless our next moves are significant and substantive, we are not going to convince people here that there is a real possibility of doing business on a mutually satisfactory basis.

6. Here are some suggestions which I know that you are looking at but which I would put high on the priority list:

—First, we should make an effort to reactivate discussion of the major strategic issues before the Soviets' arms control review has reached any final conclusions. Brent Scowcroft's early March trip would be an ideal time to conduct a thorough airing of strategic issues.¹² He should be prepared to discuss in detail the implications of our framework proposal—something I sense the Soviets have not adequately explored as yet. We should make clear that Brent has been authorized by the President and expects to talk to policy-makers, not simply to Academy of Science people. (Dobrynin, for self-serving but also I think for valid reasons was negative on people floating around without a clear Presidential mantle.) The Soviets can be counted on to provide the proper interlocutors. If we can let them know soon enough of Brent's mission and its status, they

will probably be prepared to keep their positions open in this area until they have had a chance to hear him out.

—Second, we should generate some positive momentum on bilateral issues. Proposing early dates for negotiations on an exchanges agreement and on consulates would meet this objective. Both agreements are squarely in our interest and thus should not be linked to Soviet performance in other areas, e.g., air safety. Moreover, while the Soviets have tended to denigrate such bilateral issues as non-central, they could not fail to respond affirmatively since they already did when we first raised them last summer before the KAL debacle. I have reviewed our recent drafts of the exchanges agreement and am convinced we can button up our negotiating position within two-three weeks of hard work.

—Finally, we should also move quickly to give an unmistakable signal of our seriousness on arms control. I know that it is difficult to get clear decisions in Washington at this time. Therefore, I would look for something doable with a minimum of fuss and talk. If our objective is to avoid serious consideration of a CTB, I would propose ratification of the PNE and TTBT treaties.¹³ It would respond to a concern the Soviets themselves have raised about our willingness to confirm negotiated agreements. It would also allow us to turn the “deeds not words” appeals back toward Moscow. The treaties do not carry the political baggage of SALT II, and we would be able to utilize their existing verification provisions to gain practical experience with the compliance problem on testing. If those provisions proved inadequate, we would have stronger grounds both for seeking renegotiation of the two agreements and for countering criticism of our CTB position. Of course we should move on TTBT/PNE only if we are reasonably sure of a positive reception in the Congress.

7. I am deliberately soft-pedaling a summit. There is no reason to believe the Soviets would be interested now, given the state of the relationship. Nor at this stage do I see any significant advantages from our point in raising this issue. If we can take the kind of steps I've suggested above, and the Soviets respond, the summit option would fall naturally into place—and the Soviets would be much more likely to respond positively if we proposed it.

8. What I have sketched out seems to me a minimal agenda for getting the kind of movement in the relationship that we want. In places we will have to compromise—the Soviets are not going to give us something for nothing. But each area I have identified is one in which progress is in our own interest. As always, timing is key. If many more weeks drag on with no tangible progress, the opportunity presented by the Chernenko succession will be lost and the hard-line arguments in the Kremlin—that not enough time is left for significant progress before the American election and that what progress is possible will simply assist President Reagan's re-election—will assert themselves more and more strongly. If we are to move, it should be now. I hope that some decisions will be taken in the next week or two and I look forward to a discussion of follow-through when I am in Washington beginning March 17.

Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 17, 1984 March 2, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis/Alpha; Stadis.

² See [Document 159](#).

³ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

⁴ In telegram 2142 from Moscow, February 22, the Embassy reported that Dobrynin and Hartman had lunch on February 15. No formal report on this lunch meeting has been found. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840115-0672)

⁵ Senators Cohen and Biden went to Moscow on a visit sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences from February 16 to 20. In telegram 2222 from Moscow, February 24, the Embassy reported that the primary purpose of the visit was to explain the “concept of a strategic force build-down with a range of Soviet Academy and Institute officials.” The Embassy continued: “The highlights of the visit were Senator Cohen’s meetings with the First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Kuznetsov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko. Both admitted to gaining in understanding of the build-down concept from the Senator’s briefing, but neither gave any hint that the official Soviet rejection of it as enunciated in Geneva and in public might be under review. Kuznetsov maintained that it was up to the U.S. to take the first step to repair the bilateral relationship, and he suggested that ratification of the TTBT and the PNET would be a good place to start.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840121-0901)

⁶ In telegram 2142 from Moscow, February 22, the Embassy reported that the DCM had a discussion with Bessmertnykh during a reception for the Cohen-Biden delegation at Spaso House on February 17 regarding the Special Flights Agreement. Other than this brief summary, no formal report of this conversation has been found. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840115-0672)

⁷ See [Document 158](#).

⁸ See [Document 120](#) and [footnote 4, Document 141](#).

⁹ Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, a full Politburo member and the Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, had been a protégé of Andropov during his short tenure. Under Chernenko, Gorbachev rose to “Second Secretary” on the Politburo. (Telegram 2185 from Moscow, February 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840119-0871)

¹⁰ See [Document 175](#).

¹¹ See [Document 164](#).

¹² Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group visited Moscow in March. See [Document 193](#).

¹³ See [footnote 6](#), [Document 31](#).

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 28, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Your Meeting with the President, March 2, 1984, 2:15 p.m.

Your meeting with the President is designed to set the framework for our policy towards the Soviet Union for the rest of this year.² You will want to get the President's blessing on moving forward with the Soviets in your next talk with Dobrynin and in Art Hartman's next conversations with Gromyko. It is also important that Brent Scowcroft have substantive things to say during his meetings in Moscow in ten days if he is to have credibility as a channel on nuclear arms negotiations.³ At this point, content is the key to whether we can move forward.

The material you sent the President for the meeting was changed quite substantively by Jack Matlock and Ron Lehman before Bud McFarlane sent it on to the President.⁴ Some of the NSC's updating of the first paper is quite good. However, they also saw fit to gut the substance on START,⁵ eliminating the Framework paper in toto, and introduced some dubious conceptual comments, e.g. Chernenko "needs you more than you need him, and he knows it."

The paper now reflects the better tone we have been hearing from the Soviets since Chernenko took over and the slight widening of opportunities Chernenko may represent. In a nutshell, the Soviets are reticent about helping the President this year, but they are keeping their

options open, and under Chernenko the signs are multiplying that they could well decide to get something serious going with us before the election. It argues we should recognize that major breakthroughs are not in the cards and keep public expectations—including expectations of a summit—low at the outset.

But the paper states that we should also begin to put serious content into the dialogue all along the line, and be willing to go to the summit if the Soviets are willing to respond with concrete steps that take our concerns into account. If they are not, the fault will demonstrably be theirs, and not ours. If they are, we may get some agreements this year, and should lay a solid basis for some serious forward movement beginning in 1985.

On substance, the paper divides the issues and sets forward proposals in the four normal agenda areas. It also talks about channels and timing, noting that we need to organize ourselves for confidential, leak-proof substantive dialogue, through Dobrynin and Hartman, through Brent Scowcroft (when he goes to Moscow with the Dartmouth Group beginning March 8) and possibly through a visit to Moscow by you. And we need the kind of bureaucratic streamlining here that will “pre-position” us for movement on a whole range of issues. Your task in the meeting will be to obtain agreement for movement forward in all areas.

The fundamental flaw in the rewrite is that it eliminates any real substance on START and drops the separate paper on the Framework. As it stands now, there is little left to talk with the Soviets on nuclear arms control issues other than the vague suggestions of tradeoffs that we have offered in the past. The Soviets will not take such an approach as a serious one. During the meeting tomorrow or following it in a separate meeting, it will be important to

get the President's blessing on a more substantive approach.

The problem will be a critical one for your dialogue with Dobrynin and Scowcroft's talks in Moscow. If Brent is sent to Moscow with no more than what is proposed in this paper, the Soviets will be confirmed in their suspicion that our talk of dialogue is no more than an election-year ploy. What he has to say will be a test case of "U.S. seriousness" for the Soviets. If there is nothing new, Brent will be discredited; even worse, you and the President will be discredited and the possibility of getting something serious going with the Soviets this year—including a summit—will not be realized.

Specifically, we believe that Brent should be authorized to convey to the Soviets just what sort of trade-offs we envision and how they might come together in a START package. At the very least, he will have to be able to say explicitly that we are prepared to trade our agreement to limit missiles and bombers together, as the Soviet Union has suggested, in exchange for Soviet agreement to sufficient limits on the ballistic missile capabilities that are important to us. He should be able to describe how such an arrangement could involve two parallel networks of limits and sublimits, one on delivery vehicles (as emphasized by the Soviet side), the other on warheads (as emphasized by the U.S.); and explain how such an approach would not require that we build identical forces. His pitch would be keyed to the need to find agreement on the principles of such a reductions scheme, which could then allow the two delegations in Geneva to hammer out the actual numbers and other details.

The attached suggested talking points (Tab A)⁶ are designed to allow you to shape the conversation to get the

President's blessing on putting substance, particularly on START, into the dialogue with the Soviets, obtaining a consensus on the bilateral, regional, and human rights steps discussed in the paper, and securing agreement on the ideas on timing and channels included in it. They include both the ideas of sending Brent to Moscow and a discussion of the framework. I leave it you whether you want to do this with others present or only with the President. A copy of the paper as it was sent to the President is also attached. (Tab B)

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁷

Washington, undated

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE

What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984?
What should be our approach?

I. Premise

Chernenko's selection as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party may provide an opportunity to put our relations on a more positive track. Even before Andropov died, there were signs that the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an intensified dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their hostile rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine privately proposals for solving some problems.

As a Soviet leader, Chernenko has many initial weaknesses. He may have come to power as the head of a relatively weak coalition, and his freedom to maneuver may be severely circumscribed. His public image is not strong, and he may well turn out to be only a brief transitional figure. Nevertheless, he probably does not view himself in that light, and we can assume that he will attempt to consolidate his power and put his own stamp on history. In that effort, an ability to improve relations with the United States would be an important asset to him, and to be seen publicly dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image greatly in the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you need him, and he knows it.

This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic decisions will continue to be made by a collective—essentially the same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is likely that this collective had already begun to recognize the need for the Soviet Union to adjust some of its policies before Andropov died, and Chernenko's accession could hasten that process. The change of the face at the top could make it easier to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past failures on the “previous administration.”

To say that these things *could* happen is, of course, not the same as saying that they *will*, or even that the odds favor them happening—The Soviets still harbor a deep and fundamental hostility to your Administration, are tough and cynical bargainers, and will be reluctant to do anything that they believe would facilitate your reelection and vindicate your policy of strength.

Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States in establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call for dialogue and your desire to

reduce tensions and solve problems. Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive results could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their policies sufficiently to make this possible. But if they continue to resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a position by late summer or fall to make clear that this is their fault, not yours.

For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid raising public expectations for a summit or any specific accords with the Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating leverage with the Soviets, and leave a public impression of failure if they refuse to deal with us realistically. In private, however, we should promptly begin to explore the possibilities for moving ahead in some important areas, and to test Chernenko's willingness and ability to meet at least some of our legitimate concerns. If we play our cards right, we may well be able to induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the improvement in relations and summit which would be very helpful to him personally.

On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy is so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt to negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions without a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it clear that we will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing to meet our legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only maximize whatever chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but would provide a sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the Soviets are unable to get their act together until then, or if they hold back for fear of helping you get reelected. We should not, of course, attempt to stimulate their interest by making prior concessions of substance. This would only encourage them

to continue on their track of trying to get concessions from us without making any of their own. Indeed, our aim should be to obtain some prior concessions from them, particularly if you are to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can hardly pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan or make major decisions of strategic significance. But he can deliver on such matters as human rights cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.

All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more content into the dialogue; and to search for more efficient modalities. We should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your January speech, but need to concentrate particular attention on issues where the Soviets can find a direct interest in responding. Regarding modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record frankness and which are isolated from leaks.

While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever that may be at a given moment), we should also expand opportunities for more broad and effective contacts with a wider public, particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the successor generation).

II. The Substance

It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human rights field by releasing the Pentecostalists; this year it could be somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while keeping public expectations low unless and until something concrete materializes.

A. Regional Issues

In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will be difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our near-term objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange regarding the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion would massage Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of sorts). It might also serve to alert us and them to particularly delicate aspects which should be taken into account in policy making. Being seen in consultation with the Soviets on these issues helps allay public anxieties and can increase leverage with other parties. Conceivably, the process could lead to reciprocal unilateral actions which might defuse particularly dangerous aspects of regional conflicts, although this is likely to occur only if relations in other respects improve.

The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest is the Middle East—Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we should steer away from tactical discussions and asking them to do favors, i.e., UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger strategic discussion to stress the danger of events spiraling out of control of either of us and producing an Israeli-Syrian confrontation which would have serious dangers for both of us.

There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues, where we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of their present “splitting” tactics. And in general we believe our emphasis on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates more routine, substantive exchanges among experts on various regions.

B. Arms Control

Strategic arms limitations represent the central arms negotiations between the US and the USSR. However, for the last three years, INF issues have set the mood for a

number of negotiations. Having threatened to walk out of negotiations and to deploy "countermeasures," the Soviet Union is now following through.

Sufficient face-saving formulas exist for the Soviet Union to return when they wish, although they will be very reluctant to return to INF. We should not make concessions to bring them back to START and INF, nor should we create obstacles to their return. Resumption of talks will be accelerated if our allies are firm, major defense programs proceed, walkout is not rewarded, and domestic pressures are controlled.

Nevertheless, the United States can and should take steps designed to enhance the prospects for arms control "windows of opportunity." Resumption of more normal negotiations is most likely in multilateral fora or in low key bilateral negotiations such as the "Hotline" upgrade talks, especially if the United States is not perceived as gaining significant public diplomacy advantages. This is consistent with the current Soviet effort to keep political pressure on the Alliance and this Administration.

If, however, the new leadership in Moscow should decide that a major US/USSR arms control initiative might be in their interest, then START is the most likely arena for movement. Prior to the Soviet walkout from START we had indicated that we had some flexibility in basic approaches to trade-offs between areas of US and Soviet interest. Clarification of approaches to these trade-offs could play an important role in creating the climate for agreement in principle or a resumption of negotiations.

Although the Alliance is adamant that we should not make concessions in order to get the USSR to return to the INF talks, Moscow's unwillingness to discuss Soviet LRINF

systems presents it with a political vulnerability. The United States and its allies should continue to press on this issue. As long as the Soviet Union believes that it can put the West on the defensive with the public in areas such as INF deployments and space arms control, it will see less incentive to negotiate on other issues.

MBFR is important not because an agreement is likely this year or next, but because we have an opportunity to demonstrate that we are serious in our negotiating intent. Our opening position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the overall message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously. The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM's such as the hot line will have a higher profile than hitherto.

C. Human Rights

While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on human rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in the context of improving relations, and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that they see some improvement. We should continue to focus on major cases like Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would be useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a precondition.

D. Bilateral

In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz' meeting with Gromyko opened up a number of possibilities. Gromyko responded positively to the need to examine specific

measures to prevent another KAL. Since then, the Soviet representative at ICAO has proposed a US-Japan-USSR group to look at such measures.⁸ We have developed a set of specific measures. Our objective should be to reach agreement on these measures this year.

We also should take steps which improve our direct communication and contact with the people in the Soviet Union—to give practical effect to your own stress on talking directly to the people in your January 16th speech and again in the State of the Union. That is the objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly supported in recent letters to the Congress and the Administration by Ukrainian-American organizations) and a cultural exchanges agreement.

By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit exploitation by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups dominating this area, we should try to establish a mechanism for better guidance and coordination of private efforts. This could be used to encourage those with a tougher-minded track record in dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of Supreme Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to meet possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev. However, we will want to weigh carefully the risks of negative exploitation.

In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal indications are not promising. There are a

variety of other areas of cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.

III. *Channels*

There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.

We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but recognize that it is unlikely that he will be candid, both out of fear his letters will be leaked and in order to protect his negotiating positions. Nonetheless, it is one means of being certain that our views are getting through to the leadership without distortion. And it could help to provide some momentum. (At the moment the ball is in Chernenko's court, since you sent him a letter with the Vice President.)⁹

We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full range of our concerns.

On the critical START issue, in the absence of negotiations in Geneva, the Secretary's talks with Dobrynin will be the main channel. As a parallel process we should consider intensifying unofficial informal discussions. Brent Scowcroft is going to Moscow in March and would be able to set forth our views more fully and directly than passing through Dobrynin.

If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As noted earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our specialists should meet. In addition, we should consider sending a group of middle-level policy officials to Moscow

to cover a broad range of subjects and touch base with key Soviet organizations, including the Central Committee. And military-to-military discussions are a possibility: discussion of such matters as strategic doctrine or comparison of each other's threat assessments might be useful topics.

IV. Timetable

The following timetable is possible:

—Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days: further on START framework and propose some of other consultations.

—Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East discussion by specialists and/or discussions by policy planners.

—Scowcroft: Brief him on our approach to use privately during his planned trip to Moscow beginning March 8.

—Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push for this yet but wait and see how other issues develop. If the Soviets seem interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or early June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to Washington to see you when he is here in September for the UNGA.

V. Bureaucratic Preparation

If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of interest to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to sustain momentum. This may require some adjustment of our bureaucratic procedures to make quick decisions possible. It would be useful to clarify as many immediate issues as we can, and to “pre-position” approved

negotiating plans, to be used as developments warrant. A list of the more important U.S.-Soviet issues with summaries of their status is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹⁰

Washington, February 18, 1984

CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

I. ARMS CONTROL

START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion. Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday). *Prospects.* If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).

INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted channels. *Prospects.* Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any

negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P-IIs must also deal with SS-20s.

MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification. *Prospects.* Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to respond to Soviets soon.

US-SOVIET CBMs: Status. January session moved us forward on upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. *Prospects.* Follow-on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some agreement with Soviets.

CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive notification measures. *Prospects.* We should pursue private dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.

NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round of highly technical and essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both sides see them as valuable

mechanism for policy coordination in this area. *Prospects.* Soviets have proposed and we are ready to agree to another session for December.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months; once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification discussion. *Prospects:* Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up bilateral discussion proposal in interim.

NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only after it is ratified. *Prospects:* An interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance report to Congress.¹¹

ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S. ASAT system absent talks with Soviets.¹² Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets. *Prospects:* Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. *Prospects.* A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon. *Prospects.* Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid miscalculation.

AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet "experts" talks in Moscow in July 1982. *Prospects.* As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and prove we support UN process.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since. *Prospects.* Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a better feel for the dilemmas they face.

KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis ASEAN states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue. *Prospects.* No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to decrease aid to Hanoi.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after Stockholm;¹³ Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain. *Prospects.* Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures—through quiet diplomacy or to public figures—in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in relationship.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and

Shcharanskiy is still in jail. *Prospects.* Again not good, although, again, gestures are probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet diplomacy.

IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights. *Prospects.* New round is expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations.¹⁴

KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. *Prospects.* Soviets have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shootdown, and results could take months.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary

reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing must be right. *Prospects.* A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm. *Prospects.* Draft proposal is far advanced, but would require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). *Prospects.* If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.

SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January. They have yet to respond. *Prospects.*

Soviets have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.

COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status.

Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December efforts to set up a meeting. *Prospects.* Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.

PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. *Prospects.* To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract major Soviet figure to U.S.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement, which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in June. *Prospects.* U.S. could propose renewal in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.

JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has thus not met since 1978. *Prospects.* We could propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive response on other economic steps.

FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen. Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since Afghanistan. *Prospects.* Approval of an 18-month extension would permit improved planning by U.S. fishermen. USG could consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.

CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in force on the environment, health (including artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. *Prospects.* Agreements could be given additional content by USG side with the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.

NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: Status. A number of agreements were allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and basic sciences and engineering. *Prospects.* Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of agreements, and in these cases, affected agencies also [favor] new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret;

Sensitive. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 28.

² On February 9, in a memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached is the paper commissioned at the last session of the Saturday morning Soviet group for possible discussion with the President. I put it together with Jack Matlock and Jeremy Azrael, and with substantial help from Mark Palmer. It will probably need to be revised somewhat before going to the President. But I would like your guidance on whether it is generally on the right track." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology, 02/09/1984-02/10/1984) The attached paper was the first draft of "U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Framework for the Future," jointly written by State and NSC Staff. In a February 22 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "The more positive line coming out of Moscow since Andropov's death and the Vice President's meeting with Chernenko underline the need to look once again at the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have thus taken stock of where things now stand between us and what steps might be pursued in various areas if we want to see things move forward this year. Attached is a package worked out jointly with my people and the NSC staff for your review." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Included in this package were the Framework paper, a summary of START options, and a checklist of U.S.-Soviet issues.

³ Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group delegation made an official visit to Moscow in March. See [Document 193](#).

⁴ In a February 24 memorandum to the President, McFarlane explained: "A paper suggesting a framework for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984, written on the basis of discussions by the small group organized by George Shultz,

is attached at Tab A. It provides a background for the meeting we have scheduled next week (see [Document 188](#)) to discuss where we go from here in dealing with the Soviets.

"The second attachment reviews the major issues now current in U.S.-Soviet relations and describes in a nutshell where they stand." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (February 1984) 2/2) As noted by Burt, some revisions were made by the NSC Staff in the final version that was sent to the President.

⁵ In a memorandum to Shultz on February 24, McFarlane informed him that the START paper would be discussed in the Senior Arms Control Policy Group the following week, and therefore was not included in the package to the President. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, February 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

⁶ The talking points are attached but not printed.

⁷ Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. First drafted by Burt, Matlock, Azrael, and Palmer according to Burt's February 9 memorandum and revised in the State Department and NSC Staff (see [footnotes 2](#) and [4, above](#)).

⁸ U.S., Soviet, and Japanese negotiators began meeting in Washington on February 26. See [footnote 9, Document 372](#). For the issues under discussion, see point two, "KAL Safety Measures," in Section IV of the attached Checklist. Discussion of safety in the North Pacific air routes also continued at the ICAO in Montreal.

⁹ See [Document 175](#).

¹⁰ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Burt, Palmer, and Howe according to a draft in the file.

¹¹ See [footnote 11, Document 159](#).

¹² The Tsongas Amendment to the 1984 Defense Department Authorization Act, which “unanimously passed” in the Senate, “prohibited the expenditure of funds for tests of explosive or inert ASAT weapons (i.e., exempting directed-energy weapons) against objects in space, unless the President determined and certified to Congress that: 1) the United States was endeavoring in good faith to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union for a mutual, verifiable, and comprehensive ban on ASATs; and 2) that pending such an agreement, such tests were necessary for national security.” (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, September 1985, pp. 99–100)

¹³ See [Document 165](#).

¹⁴ See [footnote 8, Document 284](#).

**186. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 1, 1984

SUBJECT

Action Plan for U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is a paper setting forth alternative action plans for U.S.-Soviet relations. It will provide useful background for our meeting on the subject tomorrow.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff²

Washington, March 1, 1984

**U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Program of Action for 1984**

Background

The Soviets are holding to the position that it is up to us to make the next step. Their main motivation is doubtless to bring pressure to bear on us to make concessions in advance, in order to satisfy public opinion. Other contributory factors may be that they are unable to reach agreement on initiatives of their own, and—to a degree—that they genuinely doubt our good faith in proposing negotiations.

Their stance is unreasonable and we should avoid steps which undermine important substantive positions.

Initiatives, however, are not necessarily the same as concessions. The Soviet stance does not give us the opportunity to *shape the agenda to our advantage* by carefully considered initiatives. There are some steps which are to our net advantage; in other areas, largely cosmetic alterations on our part could be used both to defuse domestic and allied pressures and to attempt to elicit more substantial concessions on the Soviet part.

We should also bear in mind that some of our positions are likely to come under intense public and Congressional pressure in this election year. Minor modifications in advance of that pressure can preserve negotiating leverage which might be undermined if we stand pat and the pressures grow.

A Fundamental Choice

We should decide at the outset whether:

(1) We will engage with low expectations and focus on the easier peripheral issues.

(2) We will in fact attempt to achieve some major breakthroughs, while recognizing that they may not be possible given the disarray in the Soviet leadership.

The first option ("Modest Scenario") would require some expansion of the dialogue and some steps in bilateral areas where solution favors our long-term interests (e.g., exchanges, consulates).

The second option ("Ambitious Scenario") would require, in addition, some movement—either cosmetic or conceptual—in our arms control positions. While concessions on basics are neither required nor desirable, we must be prepared to concede enough in form to make it possible for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. And we must be prepared to consider innovative ways to achieve our basic objectives.

The Modest Scenario

This would involve moving rapidly to resolve some bilateral issues which are in our own long-term interest (exchanges agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York), pressing for Soviet cooperation in establishing better navigation aids on the airline route KAL 007 should have followed, trying to settle other outstanding bilateral issues, and expanding the dialogue into a number of regional and general topics. On arms control, however, we would merely discuss the potential of our existing proposals and wait for Soviet movement before changing any of ours. On human rights, we would continue to make representations, but would not offer concrete incentives (other than an improved atmosphere) for better performance. An illustrative scenario is at TAB A.³

The Ambitious Scenario

This would test the limits which might be achieved this year and would include all the items in the Modest Scenario plus the following:

(1) An attempt (initially in informal channels) to get START and INF off dead center by proposing a new START framework and indicating that, in resumed negotiations, we would accept a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" solution to

INF, to include some, but not all planned Pershing II deployments. (This would address the most important immediate Soviet concerns.)

(2) An attempt through private channels to agree on a series of independent or joint steps by which the Soviets would take specified actions in the human rights area, which would in turn trigger certain actions by us on bilateral issues, provided the Soviets refrain from going after additional “targets of opportunity” in the Third World or on their borders.

Significant movement on these points would provide an adequate basis for a successful summit meeting, which could produce renewed negotiations on START/INF and/or an agreed “work program” on other issues. If the Soviets fail to move on any of them (as they well might), the initiatives could be made public in late summer or early fall to prove Soviet intransigence.

An illustrative scenario is at Tab B.⁴

PROS

- Would maximize whatever chances exist to make significant progress this year.
- Could be used eventually, whether it works or not, to bolster our public diplomacy.
- Could provide the basis for a successful summit.
- Since any alterations in our position would, for the most part, be contingent upon prior or simultaneous action by the Soviets, implicit concessions could not easily be pocketed.

—If successful, it would vindicate our policy of strength and could be used to keep public support behind future efforts to deal realistically with the Soviets.

CONS

—Soviets may not be either able or willing to make the hard decisions rapidly enough to make it work.

—Premature leaks could endanger the whole process.

—Making proposals contingent upon Soviet actions does not totally remove the danger that they would try to pocket changes in our positions without corresponding changes in theirs.

—Even if successful, this course might lead to public euphoria, which could undermine necessary support for our defense programs. It might also be interpreted as a signal that we have written off Afghanistan, Poland, and other important issues which would remain unsolved.

Public Diplomacy

Whichever option we choose, it will be essential to *minimize public expectations during the next few months*. If we raise expectations at this point, we hand the Soviets a powerful lever to make our policy seem ineffectual just as the result of their inaction. For several months to come we should be very guarded in our predictions, both on the record and on background, and should not encourage expectations either of a summit or of major breakthroughs.

Such a stance would enhance the impact of a summit (if a productive one can be arranged) and of any substantial progress in the relationship. In the absence of major

progress, however, it would permit us to explain in late summer what we had attempted and to place the blame squarely on the Soviets.

Recommendation:

I would endorse proceeding on the basis of the "Ambitious Scenario," bearing in mind that we will have to gauge each step we make as a function of the quality of Soviet responses to earlier actions. In short, we should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, "leaning forward" to make clear our commitment to solving problems.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) March 1984; NLR-362-6-22-2-7. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A note in the margin written by an unknown hand reads: "Orig handcarried to Res. [Residence] for Pres 3/1/84 pm." A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a March 1 memorandum to Matlock, returning a marked-up draft of this paper, McFarlane wrote: "Your paper is exactly what I was looking for. I have marked it up a little bit." He continued: "In short, we should maintain our policy of firmness and of making no preemptive concessions but with evidence of good faith, 'leaning forward' to make clear our commitment to solving problems. Please try and get this back to me today. I would like to send it to the President tonight." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, Briefing Material for President Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting 11/27/1985 (2/3))

² Top Secret; Sensitive.

³ Tab A, an undated timeline of the “Modest Scenario,” is attached but not printed.

⁴ Tab B, an undated timeline of the “Ambitious Scenario,” is attached but not printed.

⁵ Tab C, an undated “Issues in the Scenarios” paper, is attached but not printed.

**187. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, March 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Election Speech

Chernenko has just completed his election speech.² Overall the speech is consistent with the line Chernenko took with the Vice President.³ He toughened up the rhetoric for the public audience, sticking for the most part to standard Soviet formulations on individual issues, but the main thrust was a willingness to move forward if the U.S. takes the appropriate steps.

According to our early readouts of the speech, Chernenko said that detente had struck deep roots and that curbing the arms race is the main task before our countries. While critical of U.S. international policies (but not as tough as Gromyko), he takes note of U.S. statements in favor of dialogue. He does not put down our statements, merely commenting that good intentions can be taken seriously only if supported by real actions. He affirms Soviet interest in concrete solutions to problems and calls for U.S. action on TTBT/PNET, CTB, Demilitarization of Outer Space, Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, and a Chemical Weapons treaty. Agreement on these issues could, in Chernenko's words, signal a real watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations. He claimed this was what the Soviet Union wants, but it is now up to the United States.

On nuclear arms negotiations, Chernenko said that the U.S. had turned the talks into a propaganda forum, a game which the Soviet Union would not play. He said the Americans had created “obstacles” to talks on both European and strategic nuclear weapons by the INF deployments in Europe. He did not use the earlier Andropov formula for a Soviet return to the talks (U.S. “readiness” to return to the *status quo ante*), but conditioned it to “removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our measures in response).” This formulation is sufficiently vague—as with other recent variations—to allow for a tougher or looser interpretation in practice.

Chernenko criticized, in standard terms, U.S. “aggressive policies”, our supposed militarism, policies in Lebanon, Grenada, and Nicaragua, and our placing of missiles in Europe. He put in a special note of support for Cuba and reaffirmed Soviet interest in developing normalization of relations with China. His closing listed standard Soviet declaratory “principles” on “preventing nuclear conflagration.”

A large part of his speech, as usual, was given over to internal politics. Chernenko praised Andropov generously, but reaffirmed his own strong emphasis on promoting the well-being of the Soviet people. He said, in fact, that security expenditures over the past five years had not been financed by curtailing social programs. He gave a harvest figure for last year of over 190 million metric tons, below what we had predicted but reasonably good from their point of view. Chernenko’s delivery was again not particularly good and he missed reading part of his text in the critically important U.S. section.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/02/1984-03/04/1984); NLR-775-11-22-2-3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 2.

² For the full text of this March 2 speech, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 9 (March 28, 1984), pp. 1-7. Excerpts of the speech were printed in the *New York Times*, March 3, 1984, p. 5. An extensive analysis of Chernenko's speech is in telegram 2616 from Moscow, March 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840140-0467)

³ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

188. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 2, 1984, 2:15-4 p.m.

PRIVATE MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
DCI Casey
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
General Vessey
Ambassador Hartman
Mr. Matlock

The President opened the meeting by observing that he felt the time had come to think of something between a get-acquainted meeting and a full summit with the Soviet leader. Such a meeting would allow them to talk about the situation and to lay plans for the future. Protocol indicates that Chernenko should come here if there is another meeting. Perhaps the Olympic Games in Los Angeles would provide an opportunity. There does seem to be a change in the Soviet attitude recently. While he is not going soft, it seems to him that there may be things that he could do by direct communication that others cannot.

Secretary Shultz observed that we need to keep the question of a meeting up front in our minds, but that we must concentrate on how we get there.

The President said that Chernenko's letter seemed to open a door in that he said things that had not been said before.²

Secretary Shultz remarked that we are getting mixed signals. Chernenko's speech today had some positive elements,³ but Gromyko's recent speech had been quite negative, and the Soviet speech had blasted us in the UN and there was the UNIFIL veto.⁴ If they take us up on our overtures, that will be fine, but if not . . .

The President noted that they had moved last year on the Pentecostals, which seemed to be a signal, but that KAL had intervened to turn everything around.

Secretary Shultz then outlined the state of play: We are making preparations for a wide-ranging discussion. We must do it in a managed framework. We should make sure all communications are official. We need to put meat on the bones and to decide both on substance and a schedule. We have many issues under discussion and there are tough questions in each.

The President said he has the feeling that he is the villain so far as the Soviets are concerned. Either Chernenko meant that they are prepared for a serious discussion in his letter, or else this is just propaganda. In either case, we must answer the letter. We should level with him and make clear that our negotiations have to be a two-way street.

Ambassador Hartman remarked that on the question of a summit, the Soviets will want to have some real substance. They would consider a summit just to talk a political act, and therefore unacceptable. Preparations, therefore, are an important part of getting into a discussion at a summit.

The President observed that he was not against talking substance now. But we should keep in mind that we want a meeting. September had been suggested, but that would be

too late; July would be better. Perhaps he could invite Chernenko to the Olympics.

Secretary Shultz said that we still have time to work on the issues. We can do hard work in March and April. Although we would get more mileage out of the President going to Moscow, and he would have a crack at communicating with the Soviet people, it is their turn to come here. But once they get the idea that we want a meeting, they will try to use it.

Secretary Weinberger said that he agreed that we should aim for something between a get-acquainted meeting and a full-fledged summit.

The President pointed out that he was thinking of a meeting to break the ground. We have a lot of things to deal with. Why not get together and talk them over.

Secretary Shultz mentioned that the Soviets would have their own agenda to push.

The President added that we should seek some safeguards against regional wars.

Secretary Weinberger observed that so far as the location is concerned, he would consider the Olympics best. It has good associations of peace, friendly competition and the like. It would be a mistake to go to Moscow, since that would seem too eager. We should take some topics out of the agenda and work on them. But it is important to approach them with caution. They want us to stop many things we are doing, and it is to their advantage to get us to stop. We should bear that in mind. A meeting to set an agenda would be preferable.

Mr. McFarlane suggested that we think about what we can achieve this year. We agree on the value of a meeting, and must address how we get from here to there. There seems three dimensions to the question: What to say, When to say it, and Who says it.

He then handed out a suggested action plan,⁵ pointing out that each step had to be gauged by how much good faith the Soviets exhibit and what sort of results are obtained. The purpose of the plan was not to set a concrete agenda, but to set goals.

Regarding channels, he observed that an unofficial channel may be good or bad. It was noted in the game plan because the Soviets may not fully understand our position. They do not seem to understand the "trade-off" concept in a concrete sense, and a private, unofficial explanation might be helpful. We of course should not put on someone else the job of negotiating arms control.

The President observed that the action plan contained some of the things they could hear from him. We have been talking about each other rather than to each other.

General Vessey said that the time schedule presented problems. There will be problems on the Hill in defending the defense budget this spring. Support for our strategic modernization program is wavering. The Russians will not want to help the President get reelected. With the defense budget, the deficit and the election year combined, we could have trouble in the spring. Support for the MX in particular seems to be wavering.

Secretary Weinberger agreed that pressures are building. But we should aim for a meeting and the President could make our points there.

Matlock said that it was important to let the Soviets know our thinking in advance. Otherwise they might not agree to a meeting, and in addition might be inclined to reject proposals made without advance preparation and discussion.

The President said that he understood, but that he would like to have a chance to see if he could sell something. He thought he should show them that he is not the sort to eat his own young.

Ambassador Hartman observed that Chernenko had brought a tonal change to the Soviet stance. It will be valuable to test whether this represents any movement on substance.

McFarlane observed that two or three things are emerging: First, a meeting would be useful; Second, for us to propose it now would give the Soviets leverage; Third, that we have a problem on the Hill, since there is skepticism regarding the dialogue. All of these things seem to be served by an intensified agenda for the dialogue. We should decide the agenda to start on now, and perhaps we should think of monthly meetings like this to monitor the process. Then we can see when we have enough at hand to proceed and plan the meeting.

Secretary Shultz observed that a meeting in mid July during the Olympics is probably desirable, but we cannot reach a final conclusion on that now. If we say we want a meeting to set the agenda rather than establishing the content in advance, the Soviets are likely to play around with it. Since their signals are mixed, the right way to proceed would be to keep in mind the probable desirability of a meeting in July, but to test it in discussions. Their agenda is known. Our answer on the desirability of a

meeting is likely to be “yes” if one fruitful topic emerges in the arms control area.

The President suggested, in regard to the action plan, that we first answer the letter. It should sound forthcoming, and should have some proposals in it. This would be our defense against their using the letter for propaganda. But there must not be a hint that we are talking about a summit. Then, we should proceed with the other things, and if matters progress, we can invite Chernenko to the Olympics.

Casey observed that there were some issues on which the Soviets had not said no. These would be fruitful to pursue. But he was dubious about getting into START, because it is such a contentious issue within the U.S. Government.

Shultz remarked that he seemed to be saying that we cannot discuss anything important because we don't have the capacity to determine our position. He could not agree with that.

The President said that his reply to Chernenko's letter should mention Chernenko's line about the danger of the present situation. And it could refer to things like the hot line.

Casey pointed out that it might be useful to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf, since we want to minimize the chances of confrontation.

Weinberger said the question of nuclear terrorism might also be an appropriate topic.

Shultz remarked that we have not managed to come up with a proposal in this area yet.

Casey offered the judgment that there is no way START can be completed this year.

Weinberger said that a few other things might be possible.

Hartman pointed out that, for the Soviets, START represents the central question. There seems no harm in testing whether progress is possible. At the very least, it would avoid Soviet use of the issue for propaganda purposes.

Vessey observed that we must go at it in a way to produce something. Otherwise our problems on the Hill may be insuperable.

The President noted that he could say in his letter that he recognizes the problems our negotiators have had in getting across what we have in mind, and then provide further explanation.

The Vice President mentioned that Bill Verity, U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council was just back from a trip to Moscow and had seen Prime Minister Tikhonov. He was received by Tikhonov because he was perceived as being close to the President. Tikhonov had talked about both trade and political relations.⁶ On trade, he had spoken of the need to break the impasse: the Soviet Union has forty billion in trade with Europe, but almost none with the U.S. Grain is merely a "thin thread." He complained about the Aeroflot closure in the U.S. and said that the Soviets feel that the U.S. wants the death of their system. He also mentioned the ban on nickel from Cuba. Then he also talked about the Soviet "no first use" proposal, the proposal for an ASAT moratorium, and INF. On the latter he asked rhetorically how there could be zero if the British and French had systems. The Soviets, he said,

had experienced false reports of U.S. attacks and worried about the dangers of accidental missile launches. In sum, he said U.S.-Soviet relations were the worst ever and that the Soviets felt they were getting no proposals from the U.S. side.

Having mentioned all this, however, Tikhonov said that Chernenko “yearns for peaceful relations.” And Giffen, Verity’s aide, who has visited the Soviet Union some forty times, felt that there is great respect for the President because of his strong leadership and his ability to get the INF deployments through. Therefore, the Vice President wondered whether we might not go forward and have a meeting on ways to lower fears, and explore something to guarantee against accidents.

Weinberger observed that there is no doubt that confidence building measures provided the area where there is most likely to be some agreement. Nevertheless, the Soviets have so far refused to break these issues out of START and INF.

Hartman noted that the Soviets do not want them to become a substitute for START and INF.

Weinberger reiterated that the CBM’s could move rapidly if the Soviets would allow it.

McFarlane observed that Hartman is right. The Soviets view arms control as central. A dialogue will not be credible if it does not include this dimension. Regarding START, an interim agreement may be possible.

Shultz suggested that it might be well to go through the list of issues on the agenda. The Soviet position may be that nuclear arms are a *sine qua non*, but many bilateral questions are available. He then listed the following:

—*Hot line upgrade*: We are now down to technical questions, and this should be completed in April.

—*Technical measures for air safety*: The question is under discussion in the ICAO in Montreal. There is a high probability that the Soviets will agree to something.

—*Renewal of Long-Term Economic Agreement*: Relatively simple to do if we decide to go ahead.

—*Search and Rescue*: Talks with the Coast Guard. Something can probably be worked out.

—*Consulates*: The main interagency difference on exchanging consulates in Kiev and New York is that the FBI wants to keep the total number of Soviets in the U.S. constant, and therefore to require them to take personnel from elsewhere to staff their consulate in New York, while State wishes to establish a reciprocal quota in each city, which would be an add-on to present numbers. [Matlock noted that the exchange of New York for Kiev is inherently advantageous to the U.S., since the Soviets already have hundreds of officials at the U.N. and we have no one in Kiev.]

—*Exchanges Agreement*: The interagency work on a draft agreement is not complete, but much work has been done. The central issue with the Soviets is likely to be a demand by them that we return defectors, which of course we cannot agree to. [Hartman noted that exchanges in general work in our favor.]

—*Consular Review Talks*: These are hung up on the issue of entry/exit points allowed diplomats. State wants to add San Francisco and Baltimore to our list in exchange for Brest and Nakhodka from the Soviets, but the FBI does not agree to the inclusion of Baltimore.

—*Cooperative Agreements*: We could increase activity under those cooperative agreements which are still in force, in the agricultural, housing, environmental protection and health areas. Since Afghanistan we have prohibited high-level contacts under them (although we approved Agriculture Secretary Block's visit to Moscow last year), and we could lift this to stimulate greater activity.

Shultz continued his presentation by saying that, as we work these bilateral issues, it is assumed that we will also continue to make representations on human rights.

He pointed out, however, that for the Soviets, START is the central issue and he wondered whether the Soviets would move much in other areas unless we can achieve some progress here. Perhaps there are ways to break through and find a different framework. The Soviet agenda, he added, includes the following:

—*START/INF*

—*Non-Use-of-Force Treaty*

—*No First Use of Nuclear Weapons*

—*Comprehensive Test Ban*: Here we do not agree because of verification problems.

—*TTBT and PNET*: They are pressing for ratification. Perhaps we could agree to do so if we could get agreement on an on-site observation of calibration tests.

—*ASAT*: Soviets want a moratorium and negotiations. We don't want a moratorium, but we might agree to discuss the issues.

—*MBFR*: We are working on a position with the Allies to present at the next round of negotiations.

—*Regional Issues*: Several might be subjects of discussion with the Soviets.

Shultz concluded by saying that we could select some issues from this list and try to get some worked out. He had the feeling that the Soviet willingness to go along will depend on whether we are willing to talk about START.

Weinberger observed that TTBT and PNET might provide grounds for discussion, but it is dangerous to get into the subject too much. He felt that the interagency process was much maligned. It is, however, the one process which insures that the President has clear all the options available for his consideration. We must not give up the interagency process; it need not be slow. There are a lot of subjects potentially available to discuss with the Soviets, and if we get into them our positions should be the result of the interagency process. As for START, there is a disadvantage to taking the discussions out of Rowny's hands. All of these things can and should go forward, but the IG process is necessary.

Shultz remarked that there is much to be said for the interagency process, but that two things are wrong with it:

First, it includes many people and a third of them don't mind going to the press. We can't run the process without leaks. Second, it takes forever. They follow a consensus approach and have trouble moving rapidly.

McFarlane observed that it used to work that way, but it is not inevitable.

Weinberger said that if the President directs that something be decided by x date, it will be. If we can't solve the leaks, we can't solve anything.

The Vice President noted that the interagency process can be used to clarify the issues without referring to a specific meeting or the overall framework of negotiations.

Baker pointed out that this meeting was in fact an interagency process since all the agencies directly involved were represented. He noted that there is a 120-day deadline for arranging a meeting, and if everything is farmed out, nothing will be accomplished.

McFarlane said that there was nothing in the scenario which could not be done, utilizing the interagency process. He noted that if people outside the group see things being done without consulting them, they are likely to argue against the policies in public. This is less likely if they feel part of the process.

Baker felt that the policies would be opposed in the IG's in any event.

McFarlane said that if all are given a chance to participate, the President will have the high ground and this will diminish opposition.

Shultz summed up the preceding discussion by saying that there is agreement on some of the issues; in some of the others we know the arguments of the various agencies. Some of the issues, such as START, have the potential for a "blow-up." But we must include some of the Soviet agenda in the dialogue in some way.

Vessey suggested that we pick out at least two items from the Soviet agenda—maybe TTBT, ASAT discussions and

START.

Weinberger stated that it is vital that there be agreement on these matters. The interagency process need not be slow or leaky, and the President can make decisions as he wishes, but the process should be used.

Shultz pointed out that we have March and the first part of April, but it will be difficult to consult during the trip to China,⁷ and we will have to focus on the European Summit in May.⁸ When we get back there will be the Republican Convention. This just emphasizes the point Jim Baker was making—we don't have much time for delay.

Dobrynin had asked to come in to see him. He was sick, so sent the Chernenko letter over by messenger. But Shultz had given him an appointment for Wednesday, March 7. He felt that if we are going to move, it is time to start talking turkey.

Casey said the immediate task is to answer the letter.

The President directed that the letter go right away.

McFarlane suggested that we prepare to reopen the talks on consulates and a cultural agreement, and to continue negotiations on the maritime boundary issue.

Vessey noted that we need some sign to Congress that we are making progress or we won't get the strategic modernization program through this spring.

Shultz observed that if there is something going on, people will sense it. It is most important for everything to go on privately.

Weinberger wondered what we should be conveying to Congress.

Shultz said that when people like Cohen and Biden come in, we could just say something like "more is going on than you think." They will get the idea.

Hartman noted that if nothing is going on, however, the Soviets will blow it by passing the word that there is no substance in our positions.

McFarlane observed that we won on MX last year. This year it may take more. We can reassure Congress that we are working on it.

The President then directed that we start with a reply to the Chernenko letter, get going on some of the things discussed, and aim for a meeting in July.

Shultz mentioned the agenda he wished to take up with Dobrynin.

Hartman noted that many people knew he was in town, and wondered if it was all right for him to say that he had met with the President. The President agreed.

The meeting ended shortly before 4:00 P.M.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 1/2. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. This private meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House. In his diary entry for March 2, Reagan wrote: "into the Treaty

Room for a top level & secret meeting with Ambassadors Hartman (Moscow), Bill Casey, Bud McFarlane, George Bush, Mike and Jim and General Vessey. Subject was a plan to move into communications with the Soviets. I'm convinced the time has come for me to meet with Chernomirkov along about July. We're going to start with some ministerial level meetings on a number of substantive matters that have been on ice since the KAL 707 [007] shoot down." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 324) Shultz, Weinberger, and Matlock attended the meeting, although not noted by Reagan in his diary.

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 187](#).

⁴ The Soviets vetoed General Assembly Resolutions 38/38A and 38/38B regarding funding for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon on December 5, 1983.

⁵ See [Document 186](#).

⁶ Verity was in Moscow from February 27 to March 1 and met with Zimmermann on March 1, giving a full account of his meetings. Zimmermann reported in telegram 2589 from Moscow, March 2, that while there was "strong support for U.S. trade from several ministers" there was "consistent Soviet skepticism about the sincerity of the President's January 16 speech on U.S. readiness to establish a better working relationship with the USSR." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840139-0724) For the President's speech, see [Document 158](#).

⁷ From April 26 to May 1 Shultz accompanied President Reagan on a State visit to China.

⁸ Shultz accompanied President Reagan to Ireland and the United Kingdom June 2–9. The primary purpose of the trip was to attend the G-7 Economic Summit in London June 7–9.

**189. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, March 6, 1984

SUBJECT

Your Reply to Chernenko and Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Issue

How you should respond to Chernenko's letter of February 23, 1984,² and what steps we should take now to put substance in the dialogue.

Facts

You instructed us, at the meeting March 2,³ to prepare a forthcoming response to Chernenko's letter, for delivery by George Shultz to Dobrynin March 7.⁴ Secretary Shultz also requested authority to inform Dobrynin that we are prepared to resume negotiations on opening consulates in Kiev and New York and on a cultural exchanges agreement, and to urge Soviet cooperation in arranging for improved navigation aids on the North Pacific airline route and Soviet movement on the maritime boundary issue. There was also discussion of the desirability of conveying to the Soviets privately and informally examples of possible START trade-offs and an indication that, if INF negotiations were resumed, we would carefully consider a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" formula as an ultimate outcome.

Discussion

A letter, drafted in conformity with your instructions, is attached at TAB A.⁵ It has George Shultz's approval.

On the bilateral issues mentioned, I believe it is in the U.S. interest to move ahead in these areas, and therefore recommend that George be authorized to proceed as he suggests.

So far as START and INF are concerned, we have kept the language in your letter general, with a stress on our flexibility, because we consider it undesirable to go on record with new proposals. Nevertheless, I believe that we should do what we can to give the Soviets incentives to keep these two negotiations separate and to get back to the table as soon as possible. Engaging the Soviets in a more substantial dialogue on these issues would also provide incentive for a meeting, one objective of which could be to agree upon a framework for future negotiations in both.

Therefore, it seems desirable to have Brent Scowcroft, when he is in Moscow next week, convey privately and unofficially our thoughts on what sort of trade-offs might be acceptable to us in START, and an indication of our objectives in INF.⁶ This would give the Soviets time to chew on the ideas and give us an unofficial reaction before they are dealt with in a more formal manner.

Recommendations⁷

1. That you sign the letter to Chernenko at Tab A.
2. That you authorize George Shultz to tell Dobrynin that we are prepared to reopen negotiations on the exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York and on a cultural

exchanges agreement, and to urge Soviet cooperation in establishing better air navigation aids in the North Pacific and in settling the maritime boundary issue in the Bering Sea.

3. That you authorize me to develop some examples of the kinds of trade-offs which would meet our common concerns in START and to brief Brent Scowcroft. He would then convey them privately to his Soviet interlocutors and also indicate our willingness to consider a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" outcome to INF, if negotiations are resumed.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490586). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President.

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 188](#).

⁴ See [Document 192](#).

⁵ Tab A is printed as [Document 190](#).

⁶ Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group visited Moscow in mid-March. See [Document 193](#).

⁷ Reagan checked and initialed the "OK" option beneath all three recommendations.

190. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. General Secretary: Washington, March 6, 1984

I have given careful thought to your letter of February 23 and welcome your desire for a turn toward better relations between our countries.² I agree with you that an improvement in United States-Soviet relations is feasible.

I am also pleased to see how quickly you have been able to pick up the burdens of your heavy responsibilities. My letter carried by the Vice President was intended to ensure that the occasion of your meeting would be used for our continued dialogue.³ Our tasks of leading the world's two most powerful nations are not easy and perhaps we two are the only ones who have the full understanding of these burdens of maintaining world peace. It is for that reason that I want you to know, Mr. General Secretary, how much I value the importance of communicating with you directly and confidentially.

It seems to me that our dialogue has reached a point where, as you said in your letter, we should look for specific areas in which we can move our relationship in a more positive direction. As for some of the principles you address in your letter, let me reiterate what I wrote to the late General Secretary and have stated publicly: the United States has no desire to threaten the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Nor are we seeking either military superiority or to impose our will on others. I agree with you that we have an obligation to our peoples and to the world

not to allow a nuclear conflict to occur and that this requires restraint in our actions.

You wrote also of “attempts to upset the balance of forces and to gain military advantages to the detriment of the security of the other side.” I agree that such attempts are dangerous. Yet, in our view, many actions of the Soviet Union in recent years would represent just such attempts.

But it is not my purpose to debate these matters here. Our views are well known. We should, instead, move beyond mutual recrimination and attempts to assess blame and find concrete steps we both can take to put our relations on a more positive track. To move this process forward, I would like to re-state once again our position on certain fundamental questions and then to make some specific suggestions as to what we might do concretely.

I think that we both begin with the premise that our strategic nuclear relationship lies at the center of our concern for future peace and stability in the world. I have the feeling that the significance of what I have tried to say recently on this subject is not appreciated by your side. Therefore I would like to explain some of these concepts and suggest a way to achieve a better understanding of our mutual positions.

The strategic arms talks have always had as an important stumbling block the fact that our forces are not constructed—for understandable reasons of history and geography—along the same lines. We are concerned about the current imbalance in large, MIRVed, land-based systems in favor of the USSR, which we consider to be the most destabilizing category of nuclear systems. You have criticized our proposals as one-sided and an attempt to restructure your

forces without any attendant change in our forces. This is not our intent.

Our purpose is to achieve significant reductions in the strategic systems of both sides. Such reductions need not result in identical force structures. The balance we seek must obviously take account of the interests of both sides. That is why in my earlier communications I suggested that we explore what types of reciprocal concessions might bring our interests into better balance.

In my letter presented by the Vice President I went further and suggested that we have ideas on concrete ways to narrow differences between our respective positions. The trade-offs we are prepared to discuss would, I believe, bridge the proposals of both sides and provide, as I said, a more stable balance at lower levels.

The question of intermediate range nuclear arms also continues to be one that should be addressed by our two governments. We have put proposals forward that could form the basis for agreement on this question and we believe it would be in the interests of both of us and the world to return to those negotiations. If your side has new ideas on how to proceed, we are ready to give them serious consideration.

Beyond questions involving strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces, you and we have a broad agenda of arms control issues which offer opportunities for concrete progress. We are prepared to discuss in diplomatic channels our views on each of the areas you mentioned in your speech of March 2.⁴ As you know, our view is that a central problem in these areas is ensuring that any agreements are verifiable. We will take a serious attitude towards exploring possibilities in a constructive dialogue.

In several arms control fields, we have specific ideas for your side to consider. During the next round of the discussions in Vienna on MBFR, we will have ideas for moving the process ahead. On chemical weapons, we will have ready soon a draft treaty providing for a global ban on the production and stockpiling of these weapons. I also believe that the CDE Conference in Stockholm offers possibilities for concrete progress.

You have expressed concern about new American defense programs, particularly those related to ballistic missile defense. One of the reasons we believe it is important to resume discussions of strategic weapons issues in Geneva is that this would provide us an opportunity to discuss ballistic missile defense questions as well. You will recall that we suggested such an approach last year. Our offer remains in force.

Both sides also have expressed concerns about the other's military build-up, the threat we each perceive and the necessity to put in place measures which could help in time of crisis. Should we consider more direct consultations between those responsible for our defense?

One specific area that offers an opportunity for early agreement is improvement in our hotline. The discussions among our experts have gone well. We will deliver to your side technical information in the next few weeks, and anticipate another round of discussions early this spring.

In addition to arms control, I believe that regional issues are also an important topic for our dialogue. You underlined the importance of these issues in your meeting with Vice President Bush.⁵ Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have taken the initiative in recent months to give you our thinking on a number of critical regional questions.

We are prepared to intensify these regional consultations. One area of immediate concern to both sides is the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

Another major objective of mine is to develop a better working relationship in areas of practical interest to both our nations. I believe our governments can agree on the mutual benefits of establishing consulates in Kiev and New York, as well as negotiation of a new exchanges agreement. And we can benefit from developing a package of measures to facilitate travel and the work of our diplomats through resumption of consular review talks. We are prepared to move ahead in all three of these areas.

We are also prepared to reinvigorate a number of existing agreements and to review seriously those coming up for extension. There are steps that we can take to increase activity under our agreements for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, environmental protection, housing and health.

I am pleased that our representatives at the International Civil Aeronautics [*Aviation*] Organization in Montreal are discussing specific measures countries can take to enhance the safety of civil aviation. Agreement on such measures would be a significant step forward.⁶

There are other areas where I believe we could usefully work together. For example, I would like to reiterate our offer to conduct a simulated space rescue. This is the kind of practical cooperation which our two governments should be seeking to build a basis of greater confidence.

Mr. General Secretary, following his visit to Moscow, Vice President Bush conveyed to me your message that we should take steps to ensure that history recalls us as

leaders known to be good, wise and kind. Nothing is more important to me, and we should take steps to bring this about. For example, last year the agonizing situation of the Vashchenko and Chmykalov families was resolved.⁷ I was touched by this gesture. In my view, this shows how quiet and sincere efforts can solve even the most sensitive problems in our relationship. Similar humanitarian gestures this year also would touch the hearts of all Americans.

Therefore I conclude, as you did, that “a turn toward steady and good relations between our two countries” is desirable and feasible. I am determined to do my part in working for that end.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304). Top Secret. Drafted in the Department of State in accordance with the President’s instructions on March 2. See [Document 188](#). In a March 3 note to Shultz, McKinley wrote: “Mr. Secretary, Rick Burt, Art Hartman, and Jack Matlock have all cleared off on this draft. Larry [Eagleburger] will receive a copy and may have some comments for you. Brunson.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive (03/03/1984–03/05/1984))

² See [Document 183](#).

³ See [Document 175](#).

⁴ See [Document 187](#).

⁵ See [Documents 176](#), [177](#), and [178](#).

⁶ See [footnote 8, Document 185](#). On March 6, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution condemning the use of armed force that resulted in the destruction of KAL 007 and deploring the Soviet failure to cooperate in the search and rescue efforts. (Aviation Council Faults Soviet," *New York Times*, March 7, 1984, p. A4)

⁷ Reagan was referring to the release of the Pentecostalist families. See [Documents 12, 34, 38, 39, 62, and 74](#).

**191. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, March 7, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Agenda

We have reviewed Chernenko's most significant statements since he was elected General Secretary February 14—his remarks to the Vice President that day, his letter to the President February 23, and his "election" speech March 2—to identify the issues in U.S.-Soviet relations he is presently concentrating on.² His letter to the President adopted the agenda set forth by Andropov in his January 28 letter by stating this was the Soviet position and calling for U.S. responses.³ A review of the results is attached.

Briefly, the "Chernenko agenda" is as follows: START/INF, a non-use-of-force treaty, U.S. matching the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a CTB, U.S. ratification of the TTBT, an ASAT ban, Western response to Eastern moves in MBFR, and "resolving regional conflicts." In his March 2 speech, i.e. the "public" version, Chernenko laid special stress on:

- Ratification of TTBT/PNET and resumption of CTB talks.
- Adoption of nuclear no-first-use, nuclear free zones, etc.
- No militarization of outer space.

Chernenko did not specifically cite ASAT, nor did he raise the non-use of force treaty or MBFR. He dusted off the old Soviet nuclear freeze proposal which had not been given much stress earlier.

The only really new twists were on START/INF and CW:

—In describing US INF deployments, Chernenko said that the US had “created obstacles” to negotiations, and that “it is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our countermeasures) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord.” It is not clear from the context whether Chernenko is implying any new flexibility on resuming negotiations. Like the earlier “display a readiness” formula, there is sufficient ambiguity regarding the precise conditions under which the Soviets might agree to return to Geneva.

—Chernenko was upbeat on CW. He said that the prerequisites “are beginning to ripen” for a resolution of the question of a complete CW ban, and alluded to the new Soviet proposal for continuous inspection of stockpile destruction.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴

Washington, undated

THE SOVIET AGENDA

In his February 23 letter to the President, Chernenko emphasized the continuity of Soviet policy toward the United States, stating that the positions set forth in Andropov’s letter of January 28 remain in force. Below we

set out the Soviet agenda for relations with us as given in the two letters and in Chernenko's remarks to the Vice President. Included are areas in which we might be responsive and which we cannot, with problems and timing for our position:

START/INF: Chernenko listed arms limitation and reduction first as one of the "most important and pressing problems" in the meeting with the Vice President. The Andropov letter characterized U.S. efforts to upset "the regional and global balance" through P-II/GLCM deployments as "disrupting dialogue on the most important questions." It stated the U.S. needed to take "practical, positive steps" to return to the fundamentals of equality and equal security in nuclear arms negotiations, but carefully refrained from offering any specifics in this regard.

—Soviets are indicating the priority they attach to START and INF but argue the U.S. is not serious about exploring mutually acceptable solutions. East Europeans say Soviets will return to talks if they believe we are interested in substantive discussions. Presentation of our START Framework could be the crucial element to move back to START negotiations into which the Soviets will probably want to merge INF.

Non-Use-of-Force Treaty: In Andropov's final *Pravda* interview,⁵ Chernenko's exchanges with the Vice President and other Western leaders,⁶ and Gromyko's eulogy at Red Square,⁷ special priority and emphasis has been given to the Soviet offer of a non-use-of-force agreement of the sort the Eastern bloc is pushing at the CDE in Stockholm. U.S. acceptance would, the Soviets assert, be a major positive gesture.

—We have traditionally resisted political declaratory measures of this sort because they do not make a real contribution to increased confidence and security. In addition, the Soviets have yet to show any seriousness in considering our own more concrete CBMs at Stockholm. However, it might be possible to work out a bilateral framework for onward multilateral negotiation at Stockholm in which we agree to some form of new non-use-of-force statement (essentially keyed to language already in the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act) in exchange for explicit Soviet acceptance of the sort of notification/observance CBMs we are seeking. There could be some objections to this in the bureaucracy if it appeared we were not getting enough in return. I will have a separate memorandum for you on this possibility.

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Chernenko told the Vice President the Soviets see no reason the U.S. cannot follow their example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

—The U.S. position of not giving up the option to use nuclear weapons to counter a massive Soviet conventional attack has been a consistent part of NATO strategy for decades. There is no possibility for a change in our position on this issue.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB): As part of his case that U.S. is not serious in curbing the arms race, Andropov in his January 25 [28] letter cited U.S. reluctance to seek a CTB agreement.

—We cannot be responsive on this one. There is USG agreement that it is not in our interests to enter a

CTB regime at this time because of verification uncertainties and testing requirements to maintain our deterrent forces.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT): Andropov stated Moscow could not see “any convincing reason” for continued U.S. failure to ratify the TTBT/PNET.

—Considerably more chance for movement than on CTB. EUR is looking at a new option that would move the treaties toward ratification conditional on Soviet agreement to on-site measurement of the calibration shots already called for in the TTBT. Unlike our current position (which the Soviets have rejected several times), this would not require reopening the treaty for negotiations, but would give us some improvement in verification of Soviet nuclear testing. There will be some resistance in the Executive Branch and in the Senate to such a move in light of past compliance ambiguities.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) Ban: Andropov urged a favorable U.S. response to the Soviet call for an ASAT moratorium and ban.

—The Soviets will make this a major propaganda theme and are likely to find considerable resonance among the Allies and on the Hill. There are major verification problems involved and strong institutional resistance within the USG to any ASAT-related moves. An interagency group is currently studying outer space CBMs (of much less interest to Moscow). To avoid leaving the field entirely to the Soviets, we will need to push the bureaucracy hard to come up with some concrete proposals—whether forms of ASAT limitations, confidence-building

measures or both—that may be put forward to the Soviets for new negotiations in this area.

MBFR: Andropov prodded for a positive U.S. response to the Eastern proposals tabled in Vienna last summer.

—We hope to indicate to the Soviets during the upcoming MBFR session our readiness to exchange data if Eastern figures fall within an acceptable range. We have yet, however, to bring the allies completely onboard this position or to flesh out within the USG the precise parameters of the Soviet data we are prepared to accept. It is too early to predict if the Soviets will consider this position, when tabled, sufficiently flexible to move the process forward.

Regional Issues: Chernenko listed “resolving regional conflicts” as one of the most important problems for us to discuss. Andropov called for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the territory and waters of *Lebanon*.

—Regional issues are a prime agenda item of ours and will be discussed regularly in high-level meetings between us. Chernenko’s inclusion of this point is actually a nod to our standard agenda. The MNF withdrawal satisfies part of Andropov’s *Lebanon* demand, although the Soviets will continue their pressure against the presence and activities of Sixth Fleet units in the area.⁸ While we need to ensure through more periodic exchanges that the Soviets do not misperceive our intentions, the opportunity and desirability of more constructive engagement with the Soviets on the Mideast remains extremely limited.

U.S.-Soviet Atmospherics: Andropov made a point—explicitly reaffirmed by Chernenko—of the need to avoid the “unhelpful inciting of animosities.”

—The President’s January 16 speech demonstrated our own interest in toning down the rhetoric on both sides.⁹ We need to continue to display special sensitivity on this point. While some of Gromyko and Ustinov’s recent comments have carried some familiar tough talk, Chernenko’s own statements to us have been markedly free of the sharp tone so characteristic of Andropov.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (03/07/1984); NLR-775-11-27-2-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Simons. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 7.

² See [Documents 176-178](#), [183](#), and [187](#).

³ See [Document 164](#).

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

⁵ See [footnote 7](#), [Document 169](#).

⁶ See [Documents 177](#) and [178](#).

⁷ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 179](#).

⁸ See [footnote 7](#), [Document 152](#).

⁹ See [Document 158](#).

192. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, March 7, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for almost an hour and a half Wednesday afternoon, with notetakers present except for a brief private exchange at the end. I used the meeting (1) to present and explain your letter to Chernenko;² (2) to show we had studied Chernenko's agenda and elicit some comments; and (3) to suggest some follow-up steps. Dobrynin appeared to be in a constructive mood, called our exchange a good effort and the most detailed discussion in three or four years, and promised to be back to me quickly.

I opened by saying that you and your key advisors had carefully considered Chernenko's letter of February 23, that you had taken decisions and that I had a reply to deliver.³ After he had read it, I said I wanted to go over the specifics of your proposals and to hear his comments. You had reports that Moscow does not believe you are sincere in calling for dialogue and is worried about being threatened. These doubts and fears are without foundation, I said: you sincerely want dialogue, and our military programs do not threaten the security of the Soviet Union or its allies.

On the specifics, I made the following points:

—We consider nuclear arms control central to our relationship (Dobrynin said the Soviets agree), and we think the Soviets should respond to the idea of trade-offs

that deal with the asymmetries in the strategic balance. So far they had not done so, and we are willing to pursue it in our private dialogue. On INF, I said we have good proposals on the table, but are willing to listen privately to any ideas they may have.

—On MBFR, I said we recognized they had made some moves on verification, and in the upcoming round we will have some ideas which could lead to flexibility on data if they are willing to pursue verification seriously.

—On chemical weapons, I said we will be ready to table a draft treaty, perhaps in a month or two, though in this as in so many other areas verification poses real problems.

—On strategic defense, I said our position is that we continue to regard the START negotiations as the appropriate forum to discuss these issues, and if the Soviets are prepared to resume there we will be prepared for such discussions.

—On military-to-military conversations, Dobrynin responded to my general suggestion that they might be useful by asking whether we had anything specific, such as regular consultations, in mind. I said we had not developed our ideas, but might envisage one meeting to see what came of it.

—On hotline upgrade, I noted that our meetings had gone well, said we would be getting back to them soon with the technical information required, and concluded we hoped the next meeting would take place soon and produce an agreement.

—Turning to bilateral issues, I told him that we were willing to move ahead if the Soviets were. This included beginning talks on new consulates in Kiev and New York,

talking about a new exchanges agreement, and resuming consular review talks. Similarly, we wished to energize cooperation in the fields of housing, agriculture, the environment and health by getting more senior people involved. The sooner we could reach agreement on air safety measures in Montreal the better, I said. I briefly reiterated that our proposal on a simulated space rescue mission is on the table.⁴ I concluded by recalling that Dobrynin had been asking for concrete and specific proposals, and that we had made some, and hoped to move ahead. Dobrynin said he had noticed, but asked only if our ideas included doing something about the ban on Aeroflot operations here; I said they did not, but if the Soviets had a proposal we were prepared to look at it.

—Finally, turning to human rights, I urged permission for Sakharov's wife to go abroad for medical treatment. Dobrynin said he did not know where this stood, but she had gone abroad before, and he would look into it.

Turning to Chernenko's February 23 letter and the agenda the Soviets had identified, I reminded Dobrynin of our earlier agreement when we initiated our confidential talks: both sides were free to discuss any issue they wanted to bring to the discussions. Thus, I told him that while we had disagreements with various items on their agenda, we would be prepared to listen to their views in our confidential channel. I then touched on the following points:

—I noted we had already dealt with START, INF, MBFR and CW.

—On a non-use-of-force agreement, I said we do not support declaratory proposals because they do not change the actual military situation but we remained ready to

listen to their arguments. I also noted that when our ambassadors at the Stockholm CDE conference got together, theirs declined to discuss the confidence- and security-building measures we have proposed.

—On the comprehensive and threshold test bans (CTB and TTBT), I took the position that the major verification uncertainties made it unprofitable to move on CTB. We had earlier made some proposals on TTBT verification, but the Soviets had shown no willingness to explore them. I reiterated our interest in exploring ways of improving TTBT verification. Dobrynin asked me if we were prepared to negotiate on CTB; I said we were not, but we were prepared to listen to Soviet ideas in the private channel.

—On anti-satellite weapons, I noted that the Soviets have a system deployed while we do not, and that verification problems were once again extremely difficult. However, I reiterated once again our general formulation that we could use the private channel to explore Soviet ideas.

—On the nuclear freeze, I pointed out that it would be excessively difficult to negotiate and that we believe we should concentrate on negotiating reductions, and therefore on START.

Turning to regional issues, I touched on Arab-Israel issues and on the Iran-Iraq war.

On Lebanon, I told Dobrynin that we are disappointed with the abrogation of the May 17 agreement,⁵ which will make it harder to get Israeli withdrawal, but that we will stay engaged, and that we have no desire for a permanent military presence in the area. We are concerned with Syrian ambitions and by what they mean for the Palestinians as well as other parties in the area. I told him

that the most threatening situation in the Middle East was not the Lebanon situation per se, but the possibility of conflict between Syria and Israel. I said that in the current situation the Soviets should be cautious. Dobrynin suggested that we work together on the Palestinian problem as a way of making real progress.

On Iran-Iraq, I said Soviet comments showed a misunderstanding of the situation, and proceeded to recount what we had been doing to help end the war by diplomatic means. The important thing is freedom of navigation, I said, and we would act to protect it if it were threatened, and we would be helpful if oil production were threatened with disruption. U.S. objectives were thus limited and proper. The United States was not seeking to exploit the current situation in the Gulf to expand its influence. Dobrynin replied that the freedom of international waters is enshrined in international law, but the Soviets question whether U.S. intervention in a crisis would not widen the crisis. I stressed in reply that the forces we have in the area are there to deter a crisis, and that the chances of a crisis are fairly low; but disruption would be very serious.

Summarizing my overall presentation, I told him that your letter showed that the United States was willing to take some steps, and we would be waiting for the Soviet reply, to see whether the Soviets were ready.

I then went briefly through the follow-up steps we envisage, depending on their reactions to our proposals: resumption of MBFR March 16; tabling a draft chemical weapons treaty in a month or two; agreement on hotline upgrade this spring; proposing another meeting on the Pacific maritime boundary soon; contact in Washington on consulates next week; tabling a draft exchanges agreement

in Moscow in the next few weeks; proposals to activate various bilateral agreements in the same timeframe; and readiness to explore START and INF if the Soviets are. On TTBT we had various possibilities for improving verification in mind, and I urged Dobrynin to look at this issue.

Dobrynin said this had been a good effort. On START and INF, he had to say that the Soviet position was that we should begin at the beginning, looking to the situation before the U.S. began its INF deployments, and that this was a strong position. But in general he called this the most detailed U.S.-Soviet exchange in three or four years, and added that he thought Chernenko would reply to your letter promptly.

In the private meeting, after again praising your letter as constructive, Dobrynin returned to CTB, pressing on the question of renewing negotiations. I reiterated that we saw little future in such efforts, but were prepared to listen to what the Soviets had to say. At the same time, I again pushed the idea of improving verification for the TTBT, and Dobrynin indicated that they might look at this issue again.

Dobrynin then made some comments on the Soviet leadership situation. He referred to Gorbachev as a man of promise who was on the way up, but I sensed he felt he had some way yet to go. Concerning Chernenko, he did not run him down (as Henry Kissinger claims he did in private recently), but he did stress that being in charge is different from simply being aware of issues, and that Chernenko has begun to feel the weight of his responsibilities.⁶

In the Soviet Union, Dobrynin said, one must persuade to lead—Khrushchev had been removed for not bringing people along—and now that we have a dialogue underway, it will be important to keep it in “recognized channels.” He

did not elaborate, but the message seemed to me to be that Chernenko must build consensus as he moves along, and that it would be a mistake to try to avoid Gromyko, since this might turn him into a wrecker.


¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2c, 1984 Soviet Union Mar. Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is unsigned. A handwritten note in the margin, however, reads: "Hand carried to the President by Secy 3/8." According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office on March 8 and March 9. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The brief March 8 meeting was to discuss Scowcroft's trip to Moscow. It seems more likely Shultz presented this memorandum to Reagan on March 9 during their weekly private meeting. Reagan wrote in his diary: "George & I talked Soviets. He had a good meeting with Dobrynin who is very interested in getting some talks going on Cultural exchange, consulates in N.Y. & Kiev etc." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 327)

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Document 188](#). Chernenko's February 23 letter is [Document 183](#).

⁴ The Soviets rejected the proposal on March 13. See [footnote 10](#), [Document 372](#).

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz explained: "On May 17, 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed, at Qiryat Shemona Israel and Khaldah in Lebanon, 'The Agreement on Withdrawal of Troops from Lebanon.' Under the terms of the agreement, each country would respect the sovereignty and territorial rights of the other; the state of war between them was terminated." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 220) Documentation on this is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981–](#)

1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982-March 1984 .

⁶ In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote of Chernenko's election to the post of General Secretary: "The election of Chernenko at the age of seventy-two, when he was already weakened by emphysema, did not bring about any serious changes in Soviet foreign policy." He continued: "Chosen by the Politburo as a deliberately transitional figure, he usually joined the majority of the Politburo's members and guided himself by their mood. He was the most feeble and unimaginative Soviet leader of the last two decades." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 551)

193. Editorial Note

On March 8, 1984, President Ronald Reagan met with General Brent Scowcroft; Secretary of State George Shultz; Chief of Staff James Baker; the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane; Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs of the NSC Staff; and Ronald Lehman of the Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate of the NSC Staff, from 1:02 to 1:15 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

Scowcroft was scheduled to travel to Moscow from March 10 to 12 with the Dartmouth Conference for three days of meeting with Soviet officials and scholars on U.S.-Soviet relations, nuclear arms control, and other bilateral issues. The Dartmouth Conference, which started in 1960 aimed to create a sustained, non-governmental dialogue between leading U.S. and Russian citizens. Although Scowcroft served as the Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, his visit to Moscow with the Dartmouth Group was not in an official capacity. As Shultz recalled in his memoir: "We proposed to ask Brent Scowcroft, who was one of a group of private citizens—the 'Dartmouth Group'—who held periodic meetings with the Soviets, to serve as a private channel of communication during the week of March 8." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 473) During the March 8 meeting in the Oval Office, Scowcroft received talking points on START and INF and a letter from Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, evidently drafted by Matlock. In the letter, Reagan told Chernenko: "I believe the time has come for us to examine closely how we can make progress in the relationship and particularly in the area of nuclear arms reductions. An informal exchange of views may assist us in this effort." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State

File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490236, 8490283, 8490304))

A few weeks earlier in February, while in Moscow for former Soviet General Secretary Andropov's funeral, Matlock raised Scowcroft's upcoming visit during a meeting with Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department (see [Document 180](#)). Matlock later recalled of this meeting that after some discussion of "our respective positions on INF and START," he suggested to Zagladin that "they continue the dialogue with General Brent Scowcroft, who would be coming to Moscow the following month for a meeting of arms control experts. Zagladin agreed that this would be a good idea and assured me that he would receive Scowcroft and, if possible, arrange for him to call on Chernenko." Matlock continued: "When I returned to Washington and reported that Scowcroft would be received in the Central Committee to discuss START and INF, we considered this a signal breakthrough in establishing direct communication with the Soviet leaders. Scowcroft was briefed on the administration's positions and agreed to conduct exploratory talks, particularly regarding the sort of trade-offs Reagan had in mind in his March letter to Chernenko [see [Document 190](#)]. However, Secretary Shultz insisted that we ask Gromyko to arrange for Scowcroft to meet Chernenko, ostensibly to deliver a letter from the president. I was not in the meeting when it was decided to handle the visit this way, but when I was asked to draft the letter to Chernenko, I told McFarlane I doubted it would work. In the first place, it was aiming too high. Of course, we hoped that Scowcroft would be able to see Chernenko, but the real communication had to be with members of his staff. And asking Gromyko to arrange the meeting immediately put it in an official context that Gromyko wished to avoid. McFarlane conceded that this might be

right, but it was too late to change our approach. Scowcroft was leaving within hours, and he needed a letter from the president.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pages 94-95)

In a memorandum to Shultz on March 12, John Kelly, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, reported: “We learned by secure phone this morning from Art Hartman that Gromyko told him yesterday Chernenko would not be able to see Scowcroft. He commented that this was ‘no way to do business.’ Gromyko offered instead Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov. Art did not respond but he and Brent believe that Brent should not agree to see Komplektov. They view this as an insult calculated to emphasize that there is no way around Gromyko on foreign policy issues.” Kelly continued: “Brent also had asked to see Zagladin in the Central Committee. He bumped into Zagladin at a reception for the Dartmouth Group and told him about his mission. So it is likely that Chernenko will learn from another source than Gromyko that Brent is carrying a message and is ready to talk, but very unlikely that a meeting with Chernenko will occur.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Two days later, the Embassy delivered a similar verdict: “The head of the US delegation described the three-day meeting of the Dartmouth Conference Arms Control Group in Moscow as the worst in 25 years of personal participation in US-Soviet consultations. In spite of the high level of the US group, the Soviets stuck to an uncompromising, polemical line and showed little interest in exploring compromise solutions to arms control problems, even on the fringes of the formal sessions.” (Telegram 3043 from Moscow, March 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840168-0365)

As Matlock later wrote in his book: "The result was what I had feared: Gromyko flatly refused to arrange the appointment, but offered a meeting with his deputy, Georgy Korniyenko, which Scowcroft rejected." (From the telegram noted above, it seems Matlock meant Viktor Komplektov instead of Korniyenko.) Matlock continued: "Then, to make matters worse, the whole incident became public knowledge after Scowcroft returned to the United States. Whoever leaked the story was, in effect, cooperating with counterparts in the Soviet Union who wished to block further negotiation on arms reduction and continue the arms race." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 95)

**194. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, March 12, 1984

SUBJECT

Casey Note on Arms Control

Casey's Prognosis on Arms Control

On March 6, CIA Director Casey sent you the attached note (Tab A)² on "Next Steps in Arms Control" as a follow-up to the March 2 meeting on East-West Relations.³ You will be meeting with him this Thursday,⁴ and he may bring it up.

Casey's basic theme is that any quick arms control agreement with the Soviet Union will have to be simple in both substance and process. For that reason, and because he believes Chernenko will not be allowed too much leeway on central issues, Casey notes that progress in START and INF "is unlikely over the next few months." Instead, the Director suggests that we look at some of the issues that Chernenko raised on March 2,⁵ noting his emphasis on chemical weapons and the Soviet offer of improved verification. Casey also suggests opportunities exist in talks on crisis communications, KAL prevention talks, consultations on regional issues, and issues in the SCC. The Director believes that progress on one or more of these issues could pave the way for a summit which could, in turn, pave the way for arms control progress next year.

Comments on Casey's Paper

For the most part, we already have underway a program that meets Casey's recommendations. The Shultz initiatives on the New York/Kiev consulates, the hotline discussions, bilateral reciprocity agreements, and the Bering Sea issues all move in the areas where he believes progress is most likely. It remains to be seen whether these will be sufficient for a summit. The same applies even more to CW and SCC discussions. Although we will table a CW treaty early this year, it is extremely doubtful that there will be progress sufficient to highlight a summit simply because of the magnitude of the task. The few areas in the SCC where we might reach agreement will be overshadowed by compliance issues which are not likely to be resolved this year.

Thus, we are left with the prospect that any summit will be either (1) justified on the merits of a face-to-face meeting and highlighted only by the conclusion of a number of little agreements, or else (2) highlighted by some certifiable progress on a central issue such as START or INF. The former is more likely than the latter which will require a decision by the Soviet Union that any concessions they make may give the President a major political victory. This, in turn, would undoubtedly lead the Soviet Union to demand significant concessions on our part. Indeed, that seems to be what the Soviet Union is signaling; namely that if we make sufficient concessions (ratification of TTBT—despite the compliance issue, enter into CW bilaterals—perhaps thereby also reducing the sting of accusations of non-compliance, enter into talks on space arms control—ASAT and SDI, or some similar gesture or combination of concessions) then they may be willing to return to the START talks and set the stage for a summit. They might

also drop their demands that we remove our LRINF missiles before INF talks can begin again.

In short, a summit may well be in the cards, but Director Casey is undoubtedly correct in that any new substantive agreements worth highlighting will have to be “simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.” We may ultimately find that time and political circumstances preclude the announcement of any arms control breakthrough at a summit.

Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you thank Director Casey at your next Thursday meeting for his memo on arms control and ask him what the agency believes are the Soviet Union’s motivations for a summit.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1984 #1. Secret. Sent for action. Lehman signed “Ron” next to his name. In a covering note to Lehman on March 13, Kraemer wrote: “Ron, Thanks for a copy of the attached. Basically a sound memo but I disagree that ‘a summit *may well be* in the cards’ and am very concerned re possible implication (almost advocating) ‘simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity.’ Even ‘simple’ agreements require extensive (NSC/SACPG)-controlled preparations. Watch for the end run! P.S. I and Ken deGraffenreid (who works for Casey/McF. meeting agenda) should have had concurrence opportunity/line. Sven.”

² Tab A is attached but not printed. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Casey wrote: "It is my view that the only way that what we talked about on Friday [the March 2 meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations] is likely to work is to focus on simple agreements that do not require extensive preparation or get into great complexity. The attached note makes this case."

³ See [Document 188](#).

⁴ March 15.

⁵ See [Document 187](#).

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval by McFarlane. No record of a meeting between Casey and McFarlane was found.

195. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, March 14, 1984, 11 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Stanislav Menshikov, International Department, CC CPSU Secretariat
Jack F. Matlock, NSC Staff

Menshikov began the conversation by asking what was behind the *New York Times* story that Hartman may have discussed a summit with Gromyko Sunday. He said that he had no report on the Gromyko meeting, since he was in New York at the time.

I told him that Vogel, the German SPD leader who originated the report, must be imagining things.² To the best of my knowledge, the subject did not come up. I added that it seemed to me that our respective positions on a summit were the same: one could be useful if it were properly prepared so that it would lead to progress in our relations, but that this point had not yet been reached.

Menshikov agreed that this was, indeed, their position. He then said that a month had passed since our conversation in Moscow,³ and they had had time to consider the situation. Chernenko's speech of March 4 had been intended to stress both substantive continuity in the Soviet positions and a willingness to work for improvement.⁴ Additionally, they had taken note of our conversation regarding a chemical weapons treaty and had attempted to signal their cooperativeness by the statement in Geneva. I interjected that it was a small step indeed, and Menshikov agreed, but said it was intended as a response to my comments on the difficulty of verification in our

conversation in Moscow, and that they had found our public reaction encouraging.

Menshikov continued, saying that he had word that the “consultations with Scowcroft had begun,” but nothing more, so he did not know how they were going. Maybe they will clarify some possibilities.⁵

He then said that he left Moscow before the text of the President’s letter arrived.⁶ I told him that the President had proposed a number of steps to improve the bilateral working relationship, and had made a number of fairly general comments on arms control issues, but that we hoped that Scowcroft could convey more specific ideas on some of them during his visit.

Menshikov said that they had noted our interest in START and are still considering the possibilities. They are not ready to resume negotiations. But they are interested in exploring ideas privately and unofficially. I told him that is precisely what we hoped to do, but that they should understand that we wish to consult on START possibilities because we feel it is in both countries’ interest to do so. We do not feel we have more pressing needs in this area than the Soviets have.

He then observed that they understood that we were not interested in INF. They assumed we intended to continue deployments as scheduled. As for their side, they would have to consider further countermeasures (he used the Russian word *otvetnye mery*, which means literally “measures in response”), in accord with what actually happens. I said that this was not an accurate understanding of our position: while it is true that Soviet policy had given us no alternative but to continue deployments as scheduled, we still hoped that negotiations could be

resumed so as to arrive at lower levels, and in fact to move toward zero. As for Soviet counter deployments, we saw no justification at all for them, since we believe the NATO deployments scheduled do no more than redress the imbalance caused by the introduction of the SS-20's.

Menshikov then asked about the other arms control issues: did the President deal with the Soviet proposals in his letter? I said that he offered to discuss them, but did not comment on each in detail.

Menshikov then reviewed their list, asking first why we resist the "non-use-of-force" proposal. I told him that our problem with it is that it does not address a real problem. It involves only reiteration of obligations we have already undertaken in signing the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The fact that force and the threat of force continue to be used by parties to general obligations of this sort suggests to us that this is not a very useful way to proceed. It seems far more useful to deal with the actual problems and see if we cannot solve some of them. The Western package of CBM's in Stockholm, for example, deals with some of the real problems in developing confidence that force will not be used.

He then asked about the status of our consideration of a draft treaty on chemical weapons. I told him we hoped to table one in Geneva in April, but that our work was not yet complete on the text. He observed that they were operating on the assumption that one would be tabled soon, and it was important not to drag out the process too long without producing something concrete to discuss. I reiterated that we hoped to have something on the table before the current CD session in Geneva ends.

Regarding MBFR, he said that they understood that we would be making a proposal when the negotiations resumed in Vienna, and that this would be important. I told him that we would indeed have a proposal which we hoped would move negotiations forward, but that it might be introduced a week or so after the session began, since we were still coordinating it with our Allies. If the Soviets respond favorably, we will be prepared to go further. To this, Menshikov warned that we should not expect speedy replies, observing "You know how we do things; the Politburo will have to consider it and discuss it, and we just cannot answer important questions quickly."

Menshikov then asked why ratification of the TTBT and PNET is such a difficult question for us. "That should be an easy one for you," he observed. I explained that the problem is in the verification provisions. Since the treaty was negotiated, we had found that we could not verify with confidence the level of testing. We had called their attention officially to our doubts, and they also have claimed that some of our tests have gone over the threshold, which suggests that they are having the same problem. We wonder, therefore, why they resist discussing measures we might take to improve the verification provisions. We both have experience in verification accumulated since the treaties were signed, which should be reflected in our discussions before the treaties are put into legal force.

Regarding discussion of space systems, Menshikov said that they understood our position to be that we were not willing to discuss the issues unofficially, but would do so only in the context of official negotiations. I told him that there seemed to be a misunderstanding on this score: I was unaware that we had taken a position against unofficial discussions. As for negotiations, we do have problems,

since our studies have demonstrated the difficulty both in defining the systems to be covered and in verifying compliance. And, of course, the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on testing ASAT systems is bound to be unacceptable to us, since they have a tested system deployed and we do not. But I undertook to obtain clarification on the point regarding our attitude toward unofficial discussions of the issue.

I then observed that the continued Soviet insistence that we must continue to take steps to “prove” our good faith was troublesome and unjustified. This approach was quite noticeable in Gromyko’s comments to Hartman Sunday.⁷ Yet, they should recognize that we have already taken a number of steps to improve the relationship, and they can hardly expect us to continue on this course if they are unwilling to show the same readiness. I cited our lowering of the polemics—not yet fully reciprocated on the Soviet side—as well as the President’s proposals in his recent letter for bilateral steps to improve the working relationship.

In this connection, I said that though I was aware that it was a delicate issue for them, I would be remiss if I failed to point out the importance to our relationship which Soviet treatment of persons like Shcharansky, Bonner, Sakharov and Orlov has, and the importance of allowing Jewish emigration to get back to a normal level. We recognized that the Soviets had difficulty negotiating in this area, and we would not press them to do so officially (though we have to keep mentioning the problems), but that if they wished to send a signal of their good faith, moves in this area would be noted by the President.

Menshikov let this pass without comment, and turned the conversation back to INF. He observed that our present

course seemed destined to result in a spiraling arms race, and wondered if we did not realize that deployments in Western Europe could continue to encounter opposition. He referred to my comments in Moscow about the problem of decoupling (implying that they understood and accepted them) and asked whether our INF position was based primarily on military or political considerations. I told him that one cannot separate the two, since political acceptability is based importantly on military balance and feasibility. Nevertheless, that said, I felt personally that the political question was the dominant one; we could not be flexible on that, while we could consider possible variations in the military arrangements necessary to preserve it.

Menshikov then raised the problem of British and French systems. He said that they understood that the positions taken by Britain and France gave us little choice, but could we really expect Soviet military planners not to take these systems into account? I asked if Soviet military planners contemplated a contingency whereby they might attack Britain or France. Menshikov said of course not. I replied that, in that case, I saw no reason at all for Soviet military planners to worry about these systems. They are simply too small to be relevant to the strategic balance. Furthermore, anyone who understands anything about the political process in our countries and the nature of the Western alliance should know that using these systems in any hypothetical first-strike scenario is simply out of the question. So even if they don't believe us when we say we would never launch a first strike (and they should believe this, because it is true), there is no reason for them to fear that British and French systems are relevant to that question.

I added that, entirely aside from the positions taken by the British and French governments, we do not view their

nuclear systems as relevant to the basic issue in INF. The fact is, they provide no umbrella of nuclear deterrence for the other NATO Allies. This is potentially a very sensitive issue, particularly in Germany, and if it is perceived that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is in doubt, the consequences could be profound and, indeed, contrary to Soviet national interests. For these reasons, we feel that maintenance of an adequate and stable American nuclear umbrella for NATO is no threat to the Soviets, but actually in their interest, if they take a long-term view and are genuinely interested in peace and stability in Europe.

Menshikov observed that, if we did not exclude the possibility of reaching some agreement in INF, would not the proposal discussed by Nitze and Kvitsinsky last November have some possibilities? If we think of it as a “build-down” from 572 weapons, then we could arrive at a figure without mentioning British and French systems. Of course, he added, the idea came up too late in the negotiations to be explored fully, particularly when there was the “unfortunate leak” to the Germans, but could we think about it now?

I told him that I was far from an expert in these matters, but in my personal view we would have great difficulty arriving at an acceptable solution by this route. The problem is that, by Soviet count, this would still leave them with a substantial SS-20 force, and NATO with nothing. So we have the basic problem with the umbrella and decoupling. Perhaps, instead, the Soviets could look again at the proposals the President made at the UN in September; these opened several important doors.⁸ For example, the idea of a global ceiling with the U.S. taking only part of it in Europe left a lot of room to discuss specific numbers. And our offer to discuss the mix of cruise and Pershing II's reflected a willingness to be flexible on this

score as well. I recalled that, when we talked in Moscow, he and Zagladin seemed particularly concerned with the Pershings; if this is the case, they should note that we have offered to negotiate the mix.

Menshikov then said, "I'm just thinking out loud now, but if you do want to get back on a negotiating track, we'll have to find some way that takes account of our current position. Now, if you came to us and said something like, 'You say we must withdraw our LRINF missiles if negotiations are to resume. Let's talk about the conditions under which that might be possible' . . . , and then outlined how you thought negotiations might develop. Well, if you took that approach, we would listen—and maybe this could give us a basis."

I told him I would relay this thought, and Menshikov concluded our discussion of START and INF by saying that we should now wait to see what the reaction in Moscow will be to what Scowcroft says.

Before we parted, Menshikov remarked that they are now receiving a "flood" of American visitors in Moscow, many claiming ties to the White House, and asked how they should regard them. I told him that we receive many prospective visitors and brief them in general on our policies, but that unless we specifically indicate to the Soviets otherwise (as we did with Scowcroft), the visitors should be considered only private citizens, whose ideas are their own.

Menshikov also remarked, regarding concrete proposals, that while these were necessary in formal negotiations, they are not necessary in conversations such as the one we were having. He made clear that the Soviets had found our exchanges useful, and asked how we should proceed. I told him that we too found them useful, and would continue to

communicate our ideas in whatever way both of us find most acceptable. I pointed out that we both are most likely to find a way to make progress on some of the issues before us if we can get an informal understanding of each other's positions in advance, and that this required a means of communication not subject to leaks. For this reason, we had held knowledge of our conversations to a very small number of individuals—six or so.

Menshikov said they would make every effort to avoid leaks, but that knowledge of our conversations had been conveyed to more people in Moscow: the Politburo, including of course Chernenko, had been informed of our previous discussion, and had approved continuation of the contact. (He then qualified this by saying, "not all of them, but the core members"—presumably meaning either those involved in foreign policy and security or, possibly, those that are Moscow based.) He added that Gromyko had approved our conversations, and that Troyanovsky was aware of the meeting today. He presumed, but was not certain, that Dobrynin had been informed.

I told him that it was not our intent to cut anyone out, but only to preserve the privacy of the contact. On our side, Shultz and Eagleburger had been briefed, but others in the State Department had not. Art Hartman is of course in the loop, and any message they may have can be passed through him, or in his absence, through Warren Zimmermann.

Regarding contacts with the Embassy in Moscow, Menshikov said that this would be possible *provided* Hartman makes it clear that it is a message from me. He said that, for bureaucratic reasons, they could not grant appointments to members of the Embassy in general, and this was the reason, for example, that neither Zagladin nor

Alexandrov was able to receive Art last year. (This was a reference to Art's efforts to get letters directly to Andropov's staff.) However, if Hartman says he wants an appointment to deliver a message from me, they will receive him, and Gromyko has approved this procedure.

So far as our meeting today was concerned, Menshikov noted that he may have made a mistake when he inadvertently mentioned to David Rockefeller that he would be seeing me. He said that during a call on Rockefeller, the latter had asked him if he would be talking to anyone in the Administration. Menshikov told him he had an appointment with me, and he realized later that he probably shouldn't have, but thought that Rockefeller would not spread it around or draw the conclusion that the appointment was anything more than casual.⁹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for Mr. McFarlane. Not for System. This meeting took place in Harry's New York Bar in the Harley Hotel. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it. In a handwritten note to McFarlane dated March 15, Matlock reported: "As you can see from the attached, the meeting with Menshikov went very well—no new specifics, but clearly a decision to examine some modalities in ways that are not apparent in the formal dialogue. I was struck, once again, by the total lack of polemics. His desire to discuss INF concepts at some length seems to indicate that this is still the key issue for them—and they may be groping around for a way out. We should discuss the implication at your earliest convenience. I have heard nothing on Scowcroft's conversation yet, but assume you'll include me

in any debrief.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological Files, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1984) Regarding Scowcroft’s mission, see [Document 193](#).

² Hans-Jochen Vogel and Chernenko met in Moscow on March 12. On March 17, in telegram 79152 to the Mission in Geneva, the Department reported: “In a United Press International dispatch, the *New York Times* reported from Moscow (quote) the visiting West German opposition leader said . . . that the United States and Soviet Union had discussed the possibility of a meeting between President Reagan and Konstantin U. Chernenko, the Soviet leader.” The telegram continued: “A spokesman for the United States Embassy, Frank Tonini, denied that the possibility of a summit meeting had been discussed. ‘We understand that there has been some speculation in Moscow that a U.S.-Soviet summit was discussed during Ambassador Hartman’s call on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on Sunday,’ Mr. Tonini said. ‘I am authorized to state that the question of a summit did not come up at that meeting. The Ambassador was there to review a range of bilateral and arms control issues.’ (unquote)” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840177-0601) For an account of the Hartman-Gromyko discussion on March 11, see [Document 196](#).

³ See [Document 180](#).

⁴ This is likely a reference to Chernenko’s March 2 speech. See [Document 187](#).

⁵ See [Document 193](#).

⁶ See [Document 190](#).

⁷ Sunday, March 11. See [Document 196](#).

⁸ See [footnote 3, Document 120](#).

⁹ David Rockefeller was Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations.

196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's Meeting with Gromyko March 11

Art Hartman tells me that he met with Gromyko for two and a half hours Sunday to discuss your letter and my talk with Dobrynin March 7.² Gromyko was careful to say his response was "preliminary" and that we will get an early formal reply to your letter, which has been passed to Chernenko. Art feels Gromyko may not yet have fully familiarized himself with what we have presented. That said, however, he was also very tough.

After Art had begun by stressing your sincerity and the very specific character of our message, Gromyko spent an hour and a half complaining that we had killed off a whole series of agreements and had not yet offered anything to move us forward in a constructive way. The chief items were:

—START and INF, where the policy of the Administration makes talks impossible after the U.S. had "paralyzed" SALT II;

—other arms control items—TTBT, outer space, CW, nuclear non-first-use, non-use of force—where the U.S. had refused to ratify, was ignoring Soviet proposals or was making promises of a kind it had not delivered on in the past; and

—bilateral cooperation agreements (environment, health, etc.) which the U.S. had "cast aside."

In rebuttal, Art told Gromyko that he was defining negotiations in a one-sided way, that we need a give-and-take process and adjustments on each side, and that we should add deeds that address real problems to international life, rather than just words. He stressed that Gromyko was misunderstanding your intentions if he thought we are just repeating the importance of dialogue: you had made substantive decisions and are ready to move forward. Gromyko concluded that he was not convinced.

Art thinks that part of Gromyko's point was to prove that we cannot go around him; the fact that TASS immediately announced the meeting had made no progress suggests that he also continues to fear we will exploit any dialogue between us to prove we are in business-as-usual. It was not an encouraging meeting, but it is hard to draw conclusions from it, and both Art and I agree we should wait for the formal reply to your letter that Gromyko promised. In the meantime, we should do what we need to do here to be ready to move on the issues you identified in your letter.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. A Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Burt on March 13. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Reagan's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² For the President's letter, see [Document 190](#). For a record of the March 7 Shultz-Dobrynin meeting, see [Document 192](#).

197. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, March 19, 1984

I have carefully read your letter of March 6.² And I am responding to it also taking into account the additional comments made by your Ambassador in the conversation with A.A. Gromyko and by Secretary George Shultz to our Ambassador in Washington.³

In doing so, I intend to address the main issues of a principled nature, as some clarifications in greater detail will be given to the Secretary of State by our Ambassador who is receiving appropriate instructions to this effect.⁴ I also assume that you are already familiar with the views which were expressed on our side by A.A. Gromyko in the said conversation with Ambassador Hartman.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that, like yourself, I value the importance of our correspondence which makes possible a direct exchange of views on the cardinal problems of relations between our countries and the international situation.

In this regard I would like to note two points in your letter: the stated desire to improve relations between the USSR and US and your concurrence that specific measures are required to that end.

It is precisely from this perspective that I wish to express our considerations on the questions you raised and explain the way we see the possibility for a constructive turn in

Soviet-American relations, considering the special role and responsibility of our countries in international affairs.

I, too, am not in favor of engaging in our correspondence in mutual recriminations, and this is not my purpose. At the same time it is obviously difficult to hope to move forward while not remaining on the ground of reality. In other words, we assess and will continue to assess the intentions of the United States first of all by the practical policy it pursued and currently pursues, by concrete positions the U.S. side maintains on the security issues. And, frankly speaking, so far we have seen no encouraging signs in this regard.

Having initiated the deployment of its missiles in Western Europe, the United States is, thereby, creating an additional strategic threat to the Soviet Union. It is impossible for us to ignore it. This step has become the main obstacle on the path of negotiations, it has undermined in general the process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

From your letter it does not transpire at all that the United States is prepared to remove that obstacle and deal on the only possible basis of equality and equal security. From the explanations provided by the Secretary of State it follows all too clear that there are no changes in the U.S. position either on the strategic or "European" nuclear arms. The essence, and details, too, of this position are sufficiently known to us; any additional "clarifications", in whatever form they are offered official or unofficial—will not of themselves help in this matter and will not be able to change our view of this unconstructive position.

I would like you, Mr. President, to have a correct understanding of this. Attempts to somehow sidestep the

deadlock will not be productive. But, we are convinced, there is a way out of the obtaining situation. Our view of what that way should be is known to you. I believe there is no need to state again in specific terms our position in this regard.

I would like to hope that your government will be able to take a broad and long-term view of this matter and will draw conclusions which would make it possible to give an impetus to the solution of the problem of nuclear arms—a central problem, as you recognize, in our relations.

We are for solving this problem in a most radical manner, with no detriment, of course, to the security of either side, while maintaining the existing balance of forces and strengthening the strategic stability.

I would like to point out in this connection that the development of large-scale ABM systems would be in direct contradiction with the objectives of strengthening stability—and you in your letter speak in favor of strengthening stability. It is not that the Soviet Union has some sort of a special concern in this regard. The United States must be concerned about it to an equal degree. After all, the inescapable consequence of the implementation of such plans can be only one thing—an arms race in all directions whose magnitude it is difficult even to imagine today. What is needed is not the negotiations on what such systems might be, but a resolute and unequivocal renunciation of the very idea of creating such systems. A clear and unambiguous stand in this regard would prove to be also a weighty reaffirmation of the commitment of our two countries to the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems which is of unlimited duration and which is an important element in the package of the existing limitations in the area of strategic arms.

The policy of the Soviet Union—which with all due force was emphasized in my speech of March 2 that you mention⁵—has been and will continue to be oriented in a practical way toward a cessation of the arms race and not toward transferring that race into new areas, toward specific agreements leading to a real reduction of the war danger and strengthening the security for all peoples.

In furtherance of the views set forth in the said speech and with account taken of the interest that, as I understand, you expressed in your letter, we propose that the USSR and U.S. undertake on a priority basis the following:

1. Initiate without delay—making a public announcement to this effect—a concrete discussion aimed at reaching an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of space and the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. We are prepared to conduct such negotiations at the level of specially appointed delegations and at the beginning stage through diplomatic channels if the U.S. side finds it more convenient.

Without prejudging the outcome of this issue at the present time, one might, as a practical matter, proceed on the understanding that initially such an agreement would include the relevant obligations of the USSR and U.S., laying at the same time a basis for working out a broad international agreement, a draft of which could, by our mutual consent, be submitted, for instance, for consideration at the Geneva disarmament conference.

The question of anti-satellite weapons would then be solved either in the framework of such bilateral discussions on the general problem of the prevention of space militarization or as a major separate step leading in this direction.

2. Make, jointly or in parallel, a statement on the intention of the USSR and U.S. to implement the idea of nuclear weapons freeze and on their readiness to begin in this regard a meaningful exchange of views on the matter. The subject of such a discussion could be possible forms of freeze accord (a bilateral agreement, unilaterally taken obligations), the scope thereof, etc.

3. Resume, in agreement with the British government, the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general ban of nuclear weapon tests. We believe that, given the goodwill, it would be possible to count here on rapid progress, considering a substantial amount of positive work done at the previous stage of the negotiations.

4. You know, Mr. President, that in my speech of March 2 I spoke in favor of having the nuclear powers adhere in their mutual relations to certain norms. This would meet the urgent requirements of the present day and help create such a climate that would raise the level of trust in international affairs, thereby facilitating the prevention of nuclear war and curbing of the arms race.

There is no doubt that the incorporation of such norms into the practice of Soviet-American relations would bring about a qualitative change in these relations and place them on a secure and stable basis.

We expect the United States to give a most serious consideration to this initiative and respond to it in a positive way.

Mr. President, we have taken note of what you said with regard to the questions of chemical weapons and the Vienna negotiations. In this regard, too, we maintain positions that are constructive and far-reaching. We will, of

course, give a careful study to the promised U.S. proposals when they appear at the negotiating table. It is important, though, not to repeat the past unproductive experience, if there is a genuine desire to solve those issues that have been long outstanding.

We hope that positive results will be achieved at the Stockholm conference. We regard confidence-building measures as a large-scale political problem requiring, also, appropriate major decisions. In Stockholm it is not only proper, but necessary, too, to negotiate agreements on the no-first use of nuclear weapons and on the non-use of force in general. Equally, we are for implementing other measures which should be directed precisely at building confidence and which should not pursue some different objectives.

I would like to see the U.S. side being prepared to act in such a manner. It would undoubtedly contribute to a success in the work of the Stockholm conference.

You mention regional problems. I think the developments of the past years have shown graphically that the absence of interaction between our countries has a negative impact also on the settlement of regional problems and, accordingly, on the general situation in the world.

The main thing in such interaction is that each side be guided by broad interests of peace and not seek benefits for itself at the expense of the interests of others. I am sure that an exchange of views between the USSR and U.S. on relevant regional problems in such a context would undoubtedly be useful.

You will recall that in the course of the previous correspondence readiness was expressed on our part to

jointly intensify the search for ways leading to an overall political settlement in the Middle East. Today, too, we continue to be ready for it. In this regard there definitely exists a subject matter for an exchange of views. I am confident that, acting in such a manner, our two countries would in a practical way contribute to the relaxation of the continuing dangerous military and political tension in that region, which would also have broader positive results.

As to the question of the Iran-Iraq war, that you touched upon, you will recall that the Soviet Union from the very outbreak of that war has been consistently coming out—also in the contacts with the leadership of Iran and Iraq—in favor of putting an end to the senseless bloodshed. We have supported the activities of the mediating missions and the political efforts of the UN. The USSR intends to continue to act in the same spirit. In this regard we ourselves have done nothing—and we believe that other countries should act likewise—that can additionally exacerbate the situation and induce the parties to the conflict to take even more dangerous actions the consequences of which would go beyond the immediate area of the conflict. This first of all concerns any demonstrations of military nature, no matter what pretexts are being used for carrying them out.

In conclusion I would like to touch briefly on the area of bilateral relations between our countries. We have always been and remain to be advocates of active and really meaningful ties in a variety of fields, mutually beneficial and equal ties. The experience of a relatively recent past shows that this is possible.

If the U.S. side is truly ready at the present time to correct the abnormal situation that has developed in our bilateral relations as a result of its actions, it could be a welcome thing. We will judge if such a readiness is there by the

practical steps the U.S. side will be taking in furtherance of the general concepts contained in your letter. We are instructing our Ambassador in Washington to discuss in greater detail these questions with the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Attachment

Oral Remarks From Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin⁶

Washington, undated

First. In Moscow a careful consideration has been given alongside with the President's letter to what was said by you, Mr. Secretary, in the conversation on March 7. In the course of that conversation a broad range of questions was addressed with regard to Soviet-American relations. Regrettably, you, Mr. Secretary, in your comments confined yourself, in fact, to the statements of a general nature within the framework of the already known positions of the U.S. side.

One has to state that from those statements no real movement can be perceived in the positions of the U.S. in the direction of putting Soviet-American relations on a steadier course. Indeed, one cannot take for a constructive approach stated readiness of the U.S. side "not to object to continue to listen to additional arguments" of the Soviet side or to expect the Soviet side to come up with some new initiatives in matters whose solution has been blocked by actions of the U.S. Such an approach is in no conformity with the statements in favor of setting up business-like discussions.

Second. Whether or not the administration really intends to work for correcting the relations between our countries, we judge and will continue to judge not by words, not by declarations, but by specific actions.

Let us take an important question of principle in our relations. Recently, we have found ourselves being intensively persuaded that the United States allegedly is not striving for military superiority and does not wish to create a threat to our security. But this does not square at all with the U.S. official concepts and programs in the military area. Quite tangible material things are involved here. We are witnessing a build-up of the U.S. forward based forces, including nuclear forces, along the perimeter of our country which is continuing and getting even more active. We also know the tempo of the general military build-up that is going on in the United States and the scope of appropriations allocated for that purpose. Given all this, mere verbal assurances sound unconvincing.

Such is the reality on the basis of which we draw one conclusion—the U.S. is not giving up attempts to assume domineering positions in world affairs. We will resist it in a most resolute fashion, we will not permit the military balance to be upset.

Third. Our position of principle on the issues concerning the limitation of nuclear arms—both offensive and defensive—was presented in an exhaustive way in the letter of K.U. Chernenko and the conversation of A.A. Gromyko with Ambassador Hartman.

Fourth. We proceed on the assumption that the U.S. side will give a careful and constructive study to our proposals regarding the priority steps which should be taken for the purpose of a genuine reduction of the military threat.

The question of preventing the militarization of space is an acutely urgent question. Otherwise, a very dangerous situation is to develop. The issue of anti-satellite weapons is one of the important elements of this problem. It is futile for the U.S. side to try to allege that it will find itself in an unequal position, should it agree to ban such weapons. This is not so. We propose that an agreement be reached not only to prohibit the development of new anti-satellite systems, but also to eliminate the already existing systems of such kind. Thus, we have in mind a truly radical and equal approach, whereby, the problems of verification, too, would be much easier to solve. The desire of the Soviet side to find a mutually acceptable solution is convincingly manifest in the fact that the Soviet Union has initiated a unilateral moratorium on launching into space any types of anti-satellite weapons. It was a clear signal, and the fact that the U.S. side has so far not responded to it in a proper way tells us a lot. However, it is not yet too late to stop, and our proposals open up a path to the solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons equitable to both sides.

We believe a freeze to be a real means to put an end to the process of a quantitative and qualitative build-up of nuclear weapons. The arguments put forward by the U.S. side against such a step, the doubts it expresses in this regard are not convincing either on their merits or in relation to the result that the implementation of that idea would lead to. In the course of the proposed discussions we could present additional considerations in order to spell out further specifics of our position.

We are raising the need to resume the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests in the belief that an agreement on this subject could be a weighty indicator of the intentions to work for ceasing the rivalry in the development of nuclear weapons.

The same purpose would be served also by the ratification of the known treaties of 1974 and 1976. Currently the U.S. side is justifying its position with regard to those treaties by the alleged "imperfection" of the mechanism of verification contained therein, although this mechanism has not been so far tried in practice. It is just as unconvincing as the earlier made assertion according to which the ratification of these treaties would have impeded the trilateral negotiations or the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty. Indeed, treaties are signed in order to be put into force and to be operative and not to be covered with dust on the shelves.

Fifth. To implement the important idea of principle put forward in the speech by K.U. Chernenko on March 2, with regard to the need that the relations between nuclear states be governed by a set of certain norms, we are prepared to begin discussing this matter first of all between the USSR and U.S., as the most powerful nuclear states bearing a special responsibility for maintaining the international security. We are ready to conduct an exchange on this subject with a view to achieving an appropriate agreement in this regard.

Sixth. The issues of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and confidence-building measures are being considered at multilateral fora. The interests of ensuring forward movement at those negotiations would be served by employing also a method of bilateral Soviet-American consultations which can be usefully conducted both in the capitals and in the venues of those fora.

Seventh. As to the question raised by the U.S. side regarding consultations between military representatives of the USSR and U.S., it is impossible to regard this

question out of the context of the general situation in our relations. Should there be positive changes in the nature of Soviet-American relations, the usefulness of such consultations, too, could be considered.

Eighth. As a matter of principle, the Soviet side is for having talks on regional problems when it proves necessary and when the purpose is to achieve a settlement of conflict situations with account taken of the interests of all parties. To put it briefly, we are for constructive interaction, and, by the way, we have with the United States a rather positive experience of such cooperation.

There is yet another side of this matter: the interaction becomes effective when it is reinforced by mutual restraint. This is true of all situations fraught with conflict or a dangerous flare-up. The recent developments, including those in the Middle East and in Central America, have shown that attempts to use forceful methods and a direct armed intervention aggravate both the situation in those regions and the overall situation in the world.

In connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict we would like to emphasize the following: the actions of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf area, the threats to use military force there, to put it bluntly, exacerbate the situation even further. The Soviet Union believes that no obstacles should be created to the freedom of navigation, including that in the Strait of Hormuz. But to be sure, no one has the right to arrogate to himself the role of some sort of a traffic policeman over international lines of communication.

Ninth. The approach of principle that the USSR maintains regarding the bilateral relations with the U.S. has been repeatedly made known to the U.S. side, also in connection with the specific questions it raised.

We want to see the affairs in that area proceed in a normal, steady fashion, rather than be determined by some expedient considerations. The determining factor here must be the mutual interest of the sides.

The Soviet side is for reinvigorating the existing agreements between the two countries, for revitalizing those of them which have become paralyzed. And, of course, if we do have agreements, they must be implemented to the full extent, and not partially or selectively. It is not so much a matter of formality here, say, of the level the contacts are carried out on. The main thing is to have normal contacts, beneficial to each side.

There is, of course, a number of agreements (on the World ocean study, fisheries, preventing incidents on the high seas, facilitating economic, industrial and technical cooperation) which are expiring this year. We would like to have a clarification as to what the U.S. side means saying that it is prepared "to review seriously" these agreements. At any rate, one can hardly regard as displaying a constructive approach the formal extension of agreements which in fact are devoid of real content.

Improvement of the hotline. This is a concrete technical question discussed by the experts of the two countries. We are waiting from the U.S. side for the promised technical proposals regarding the introduction of a facsimile communication facility. Such proposals will be studied, whereupon we shall be able to present our views as to the timing of the next round of negotiations.

We believe that the U.S. side has now a clearer understanding of our position on the delimitation of the sea areas and continental shelf in the Chuckchee and Bering Seas and in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. We continue to

be in favor of resolving these issues—in an equitable way in accordance with the sides' legitimate interests and rights. The announcement by the U.S. side that sea bottom areas are open for bidding in the regions which are a subject of the Soviet-American negotiations, runs in direct contradiction to such a solution. This is yet another example of how the practical steps of the U.S. do not square with its declared readiness to improve Soviet-American relations.

We shall be drawing appropriate conclusions from the further conduct of the U.S. side in this matter and will see whether it will refrain from actions which would seriously complicate the on-going negotiations.

Consular negotiations. We are for continuing those and we shall be ready to look at questions which can be discussed in that area.

With regard to Consulates-General in Kiev and New-York there have already been quite a few zigzags on the U.S. side. We shall study what the U.S. has to say this time on this subject in order to ascertain what the intentions are in this regard. The very existence of consular offices, of course, their functions have nothing symbolic about them, they serve a practical purpose in dealing with certain questions of bilateral relations, in safeguarding the interests of the citizens of the country represented by a Consulate-General. Accordingly, whether the work of a consular office is effective depends directly on the state of affairs in various areas of relations between the countries, including those in the field of transport and communications.

For that reason, the resumption of the Aeroflot flights to the U.S. has an important practical significance for the

effectiveness of the work of our Consulate-General in New-York. Incidentally, in a direct practical way, it applies also to the question of all kinds of exchanges, including those in the cultural field. Obviously, each side in carrying out such exchanges has a right to choose at its own discretion the airlines it finds most suitable also in terms of convenience and financial considerations. For the Soviet side this again is the question of Aeroflot flights, and we proceed on the assumption that the U.S. side will take a positive decision in this respect.

Taking into account the intention expressed by the U.S. side, we are prepared to discuss questions related to negotiating a general agreement on contacts and exchanges, including cultural exchanges. At the same time we proceed on the assumption that the American side should resolve the problem of a principal nature, that of securing proper conditions for the stay in the U.S. of Soviet participants in such exchanges, which otherwise cannot be carried out in a normal way.

Well, indeed, it is high time for the U.S. authorities to take, after all, effective measures to ensure the safety and normal conditions for Soviet offices and citizens in the U.S. What is required here is an elementary observance of generally recognized norms in relations among states, and it must be done. Failure to take appropriate measures would have most serious consequences, and the statements by the U.S. side regarding its readiness to improve relations would remain an empty phrase.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8401238). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from

Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a covering letter to Shultz, March 20, Dobrynin requested that this letter be passed to President Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2)) Reagan initialed the March 19 letter and wrote in the margin: "I think this calls for a very well thought out reply & not just a routine acknowledgement that leaves the status quo as is. RR."

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Documents 192](#) and [196](#).

⁴ Reference is to the attached oral remarks.

⁵ See [Document 187](#).

⁶ No classification marking. Reagan initialed the first page of the oral remarks.

**198. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, March 19, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Thoughts on Where We Stand

We have gotten some very mixed signals from the Soviets recently. On the one hand, Dobrynin seemed very upbeat after seeing the President's letter,² and Menshikov was relatively positive in his conversation with me last week.³ But we also have the curious treatment of Brent,⁴ Gromyko's hard-line approach in his meeting with Hartman,⁵ and the very rigid Soviet position taken in talks with the Dartmouth group last weekend.⁶ Is there any sense in this pattern?

First, we should not be surprised that the Soviets continue to maintain a fairly rigid line on matters of substance at this point. They obviously want to test how far they can push us before they begin moving in our direction. Therefore, we should not be surprised either by Gromyko's stance with Hartman, or the line taken by Soviet interlocutors with the Dartmouth group.

Brent's treatment is more problematical. I believe that either a decision was made over last weekend to harden the Soviet position, or else his treatment was a reaction to our effort to have him see Chernenko, without advance warning. Menshikov was clearly under the impression last Wednesday that he was meeting with Zagladin, so this

meeting must have been planned and expected when Menshikov left Moscow March 8. The letter and the effort to secure an appointment with Chernenko may, however, have caused problems. Gromyko could have seen it as an effort to bypass him, or as an effort to obtain a publicized meeting which we could present as constituting negotiations on START. In any event, his treatment could well have reflected such protocollary and bureaucratic factors rather than a refusal to listen to what we have to say on this subject.

If this is the case, it would suggest that we should not jump to conclusions about the Soviet position at this time. Chernenko's reply to the President's letter will provide the most authoritative indicator, as will Soviet willingness to move ahead expeditiously on some of the bilateral measures mentioned in the President's letter and by Shultz to Dobrynin.

At this point, I believe our stance should be to wait for the next Soviet move and avoid showing too much eagerness. Nevertheless, we must recognize that time is slipping by, and that a meeting can probably not be arranged on the spur of the moment. Therefore, we should continue to prepare our positions as rapidly as we can so that if there is Soviet movement, we will be able to move rapidly.

We also need to give some thought to how the timing of a meeting affects our tactics. If July is the optimum time, then we would need to have the question under discussion by early May at the latest. If the possible agenda is not shaping up by then, the President will need to decide whether he wants us to pursue some of the topics more aggressively (at the risk of losing some negotiating leverage), or of reconsidering the possibility of shooting for a meeting in September in connection with the UNGA. In

either case, however, we must recognize that if we want the meeting more than they do, they will have an advantage, since by stalling they tend to increase our incentives to give them something. It might be useful to discuss this factor with the President privately, in order to obtain his thoughts and guidance.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Top Secret; Sensitive. Not for System. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

² During their March 7 meeting, Shultz gave Dobrynin a letter to Chernenko from the President. See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Document 195](#).

⁴ See [Document 193](#).

⁵ See [Document 196](#).

⁶ See [Document 193](#).

199. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Chernenko's March 19 Letter and Accompanying "Oral Remarks"

We have given some thought overnight to what this message really means.

The overall thrust is that the Soviets are skeptical of your offer of dialogue, and very wary of working with us at least until we have put more on the table. As a response to your last letter,² the message came fast (thirteen days after yours); and it passes up the chance to indulge in the kind of sharp language we have been hearing from Soviets in public these last two weeks. On the other hand, it does go in for some very self-serving argumentation, and it is extremely careful when it comes to specific issues. In brief, while Chernenko did not slam any doors, he did not open any either.

The whole message, in general, is permeated with the fear that we will trap them into sham dialogue and exploit it for electoral purposes to prove that business-as-usual is going on. To some extent, this wariness probably reflects the intense competition for power among the Soviet leaders. We knew the Soviets were suspicious. This letter shows how far that is the case.

Turning to specifics, the message avoids engaging us on START and INF. The argument is that there is nothing in our current position that provides for serious negotiation. Chernenko asserts that our new INF missiles present a new

strategic threat. It may be they understand we will not withdraw them without a negotiated agreement, but do not know how to proceed without legitimizing our deployments. This dilemma would explain why Chernenko says he sees no need to restate the Soviet position explicitly, and no additional "official or unofficial" clarifications from us will help "of themselves." They may well have concluded that for the time being they are better off waiting for a change in the political situation in Europe or here before looking at the negotiating problem again.

Instead, they are pressing their own agenda on other issues. He restates the same tired, sterile agenda for non-nuclear arms control set forth in Andropov's last letter of January 28 and Chernenko's March 2 speech.³ Chernenko identifies four top priorities: renunciation of space weapons, a nuclear weapons freeze, resumption of comprehensive test ban negotiations, and agreement on norms of conduct among nuclear powers. More constructively, he then calls for use of our bilateral channel to facilitate progress in multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons, MBFR and non-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use of force agreements together with confidence-building measures at Stockholm. The "oral remarks" add ratification of the TTBT and PNET treaties to this list, and also suggest favorable consideration of military-to-military contacts, if overall relations improve.

Both Chernenko's letter and the "oral remarks" are relatively positive with regard to your suggestion that we need more regular consultations on regional issues. The stress is on the Middle East and especially Iran-Iraq, and they are suspicious of our intentions in moving forces toward the Gulf. But the oral remarks also state that "we are for constructive interaction, and we have a rather positive experience of such cooperation with the United

States.” This may be no more than a masked reference to the aborted October 1977 joint statement on the Middle East, but it amounts to a green light to further exchanges on such issues.

Chernenko essentially transfers the action on bilateral issues to the Foreign Ministry, which gives wary responses to the issues you raised in your March 6 letter. They start with a warning that these matters should proceed in “normal, steady fashion, rather than be determined by some expedient considerations,” i.e. election-year tactics. On the issue of consulates, they seek to link movement to our lifting the Poland/KAL sanction against Aeroflot operations here, thus creating an additional burden to progress. But they close no doors, not even on the Pacific maritime boundary negotiations where we announced last week we would be accepting bids for exploration in the disputed area. And they do engage the Soviets to respond to whatever we can come up with.

I think we ought to be firm and candid in responding to Chernenko’s arguments that we are responsible for an impasse, in refusing to be drawn into negotiation of the non-starters he puts up front, and in keeping the dialogue focussed on genuine issues where real progress could be made if the Soviets are willing. When we reply, we should make it clear once again that it is Soviet SS-20 deployments that caused the INF problem; that the Soviets have an anti-satellite weapon deployed and we do not; and that they too have research and development programs in the strategic defense field. We need not be polemical, but we should keep these facts before them.

At the same time, we should continue to define steps that would be in both our interest and the Soviet interest, and to put them on the table.⁴ We have in fact made a few small

moves implementing your March 6 letter. On the hotline, we have sent along technical information and proposed another meeting; we have proposed another session of the Pacific maritime boundary talks; and we have asked formally whether the building prepared for us in Kiev is still available, as a preliminary to negotiations. We are at work here to produce a draft chemical weapons treaty, and we are working with our Allies on some new ideas to put into MBFR. But it is in fact not much so far, and if we are to have a credible record available in case of need, there will need to be more to it than that.

I will be back to you with suggestions for a draft reply to Chernenko and some thoughts on next steps.⁵

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Mar. 21 Mtgs. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In a memorandum forwarding the memorandum to Shultz on March 21, Burt suggested that the Secretary discuss how to respond to the Soviets—in particular, Chernenko’s letter—during his meeting with the President on March 21. According to marginalia on Burt’s memorandum, Shultz “didn’t sign 3/21 but took.” See [footnote 4, below](#).

² See [Document 190](#).

³ See [Documents 164](#) and [187](#).

⁴ In his covering memorandum to Shultz (see [footnote 1, above](#)), Burt suggested the “next steps should be the following: 1) On Friday when you see the President, you might go over the letter and discuss the line you propose to take with Dobrynin. 2) Then call Dobrynin in next week (he expects to be working again by the middle of next week) to go over the Chernenko letter and ‘oral statement.’ The purpose would be to obtain a better feel for the Soviet

position before we draft a reply for the President. 3) Draft a response for the President to consider by the end of next week. 4) Proceed with the Soviets where we think it is in our interest—from Consulates to CDE—prodding the interagency process for appropriate U.S. positions where we do not yet have them.”

⁵ Shultz met with Reagan at the White House at 1:35 p.m. on March 21 (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary), and seemingly delivered this memorandum to the President, but it was not discussed until their regular Friday meeting on March 23. From Reagan’s diary entry it is clear they discussed the Soviets during this March 23 meeting: “George Shultz, Bud & I met for a strategy session on where we go with the Soviets. I think they are going to be cold & stiff-necked for awhile. But we must not become supplicants. We’ll try to get agreement on a few lesser matters.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 331)

200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 23, 1984

SUBJECT
Arms Control Strategy

In the last eleven months of his Administration, President Carter abruptly changed his policy towards the Soviet Union, withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration, instituting sanctions in response to the invasion of Afghanistan and proposing 5% real growth in defense spending. But the change came too late to regain the confidence of the American people: the voters in large numbers ignored the new policy by voting against the old. Indeed, Carter's shift seemed to vindicate the criticism that led up to it: by abandoning his established policies and appearing to embrace new and contradictory ones, Carter himself seemed to acknowledge that he had been weak in the face of Soviet strength. Candidate Reagan's steadiness of purpose stood in sharp and winning contrast.

There now remain fewer than five months until the party conventions and only eight before the election. Strategic decisions bearing on our conduct of East-West relations, especially arms control negotiations with the Soviets, must be made soon if President Reagan is to appeal to the electorate on the basis of a clear, coherent philosophy of arms and arms control.

Between now and November it must be a central element of Administration strategy to convey in a consistent manner a sense of the President's approach to East-West relations—an approach based on the strength of our re-armament

coupled with a continuing search for militarily significant, balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreements that diminish the threat to our security and that of our allies.

This Administration has rightly rejected Soviet proposals that would codify their monopoly of intermediate missiles, freeze U.S. forces in urgent need of modernization, and permit the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces. And while we must continue to probe the attitude of the new Soviet leader toward arms control (and his ability to shape Soviet policies), we must not abandon the properly demanding standard for agreement that has distinguished the approach of this administration from that of its predecessors. Above all, we must not permit the merit of our security policy to be tested by whether we achieve an arms control agreement or bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. For try as we might, the Soviet leaders may well seek to deny President Reagan a fair agreement, precisely so that his "failure" to achieve one will damage his re-election prospects and bring into office a Democratic administration, ready to agree to terms more favorable to the Soviets and certain to slow the rebuilding of our defenses.

After all, it is only this President's strategic modernization program that promises to restore America's strategic strength and dissuade the Soviet leadership from the attempt to reach decisive superiority. Opposition to that program has become a central theme of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. And opposition to much of our modernization program and arms reduction philosophy, together with support for SALT II, the freeze and other arms control measures rejected by the President, has already become a campaign theme of the Democratic Party and its leading candidates. While an agreement manifestly tilted in the Soviets' favor might lure them from their

current intransigence, it is most likely that Moscow will do nothing that might help re-elect a President who has mounted the most effective challenge to Soviet power in more than a decade: "Better to wait—and hope—for Mondale or Hart."²

The Soviets are tough bargainers, even in adversity. If they sense that the Administration is negotiating with one eye on the ballot box (and there will be plenty of commentators to suggest that we are) they will be tougher still. They have shown no sign of letting up on the demand that we remove (or at least halt) INF deployment in Europe as a precondition for a return to the START/INF talks. (In recent days they have repeated this demand to Senators Cohen and Biden, to Brent Scowcroft and the Dartmouth group, and to SPD leader Vogel).³ Even if they were to return to Geneva, or agree to a summit, it would be risky in the extreme to take such a tactical move as a softening of their basic unyielding position. An acrimonious summit, or an October breakdown of renewed talks might well figure in a Soviet strategy to undermine the President's re-election. (Even Khomeini, who had every reason to believe he had Carter over a barrel, preferred to hold the hostages until Inauguration Day).

It is important for the Administration to make an early judgment as to whether the Soviet government under Chernenko is likely to be more accommodating between now and the election than it has been since President Reagan took office. Our strategy since January has been predicated on the assumption that there is at least a fair chance for an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, including an arms control agreement on terms that the Reagan Administration could defend. Private diplomatic activity, public pronouncements and our approach to the compliance issue have all been aimed at coaxing the

Soviets along a path of accommodation. The result has been disappointing. And while we must explore any genuinely promising opening, we must not drift toward November in the hope that a late break-through will obviate the need for a re-assertion of this Administration's record and philosophy.⁴

If we judge that there is little prospect that the Soviets will become more tractable in coming months, we should develop *now* a strategy reflecting that judgment. And, far from using a muffled voice on the need for firmness and perseverance in dealing with the Soviet Union, the President should stress the continuing validity of his rearmament program and his approach to arms control. With respect to arms reductions, we should elaborate the themes that have guided our policy for the last three years: insistence on sharp reductions, the need for full verification (especially in light of Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements), the flexibility inherent in our willingness to "build down" and to "trade off" our advantages against theirs, and dissatisfaction with the past approach to arms control in which agreements like SALT I and II actually led to a startling increase in nuclear weapons. We also should be more assertive (although moderate, almost clinical in tone) on the issue of Soviet violations and their walk-out from the Geneva talks.

The Administration's handling of two important issues illustrates the dilemma of the policy choice the President now faces. Until now the Administration has deliberately down-played the Soviet walk-out from Geneva and the Soviet record on compliance. In both cases we have, for the last four months, taken pains to encourage the Soviets to return to the negotiating process by withholding criticism of their actions. "Not justified" is about the strongest comment we have made on the Soviet withdrawal from the

Geneva talks. And a dispassionate *sotto voce* bill of particulars has been the extent of our comment on the Soviet record of non-compliance, with the single exception of our wholly justified, two-year long attack on "yellow rain."⁵

It is now time to ask whether this policy of restraint, which has been met by an unrelenting Soviet attack on the President and his policies, will achieve its intended effect of eliciting an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. If we conclude that it is unlikely to move the Soviets to constructive negotiations, then it is fair to ask whether we are wise to forfeit a more assertive argument centered on the facts and merits of these two issues.

These are not only issues on which the Soviets are vulnerable; they are also issues the American people can understand.

Every poll conducted on the subject confirms that the American people believe that the Soviets will, if given an opportunity, cheat on their international obligations. The fact of their record of violating SALT II, the ABM Treaty and other agreements could be profitably amplified to support the President and diminish the weight of the Mondale/Hart appeal for new "quick fix" agreements even less verifiable than the present ones—the freeze, the threshold test-ban, ASAT, and the like.

The same holds true of the Soviet walk-out. With the Democratic National Committee running television spots that portray Ronald Reagan as the first President since John Kennedy who is not presiding over a nuclear arms negotiation, surely we can begin to drive home the point that the Soviets have broken off the Geneva talks because we would not accept a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles.

However conscious we in Washington may be of the Soviet walk-out and their compliance record, they'll forget it in Kansas if we continue to be inaudible on the subject.

It may be argued that we can go on with our current strategy, watching and waiting, adopting neither an approach that is appropriate to Soviet recalcitrance and stalling through November, nor one that assumes a breakthrough before the election. The trouble with this view is that time is passing—days and weeks are going by in which we are not mounting a defense of the President's three-year record in the conduct of East-West arms control—with all the ammunition at our disposal. As we approach the national conventions there is a risk that we shall lose the initiative—that vigorous explanation of our policies mounted in the aftermath of the Democratic attack on them will sound defensive and thus unpersuasive.

A more assertive defense of our record and philosophy need not—indeed should not—sound strident, hostile, or pessimistic. Nor would it rule out a continuing private effort, through the President's correspondence with Chernenko or the Shultz-Dobrynin channel, to probe for signs of Soviet flexibility. We have a good story to tell, an admirable record to explain and defend, and we should get on with it.

In the nearly 15 years since the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, the Soviets have added some 7,950 medium and long-range nuclear missile warheads to their arsenal—an increase of 515%. *Fully 3,850 of these warheads, an increase of almost 65%, have been added since the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979.* And despite the permissive terms of the agreements between us, the Soviets have resorted to circumvention and violation to sustain a fifteen year strategic build-up of unprecedented proportions.

This dismal history would be reason enough for a new President to try a different approach. And Candidate Reagan's criticism of SALT II, echoed by the Senate Committee on Armed Services which declared it contrary to our national security interests, set the stage for this Administration's effort to obtain sharp reductions, better verification and, in general, agreements that, while more difficult to negotiate, would yield results of military significance.

The "zero option" was one such proposal.⁶ And while it was unacceptable to the Soviets, its embrace by the President turned a tide of opinion that had been running against us and helped to sustain a successful U.S. INF deployment. Above all it was a concrete expression of our desire for an agreement that offered the reality, and not merely the appearance, of a significant and understandable reduction in nuclear arms.

Similarly, our proposal for START, which departed in fundamental ways from SALT II, was—and remains—a sound expression of the arms control objectives that this Administration has put forward as an alternative to the cosmetic results of its predecessors. The 10 major changes that we have subsequently made to the 1982 START proposal, including the "build down" and the offer to balance U.S. against Soviet advantages in the reductions process, has positioned us well to argue that we have been fair, flexible and responsible.⁷ We have negotiated on a broad front, adjusting the elements of our position to encourage the give and take of negotiation. At the same time, and it is this that distinguishes the President from his critics, we have properly refused to travel the path of the Soviet approach—an approach that would allow a 45% increase in ballistic missile warheads and that is structured along the lines of SALT II.

For some weeks a number of experts drawn from the departments have been exploring new “frameworks”⁸ that might be put to the Soviets in the hope of advancing towards a resumption of negotiations and possible agreement. Adoption of a new “framework” or “structure” that parallels SALT II would almost certainly entail abandonment of this Administration’s attempt to break out of the SALT II mold. And since it is only prudent to assume that any such framework we might table would form the basis for further negotiation, it is likely that, in due course, we would find ourselves negotiating largely within the SALT II structure. Were this to happen, we could face the election with something like the SALT II Treaty on the table in Geneva.

Given the history of the conduct of the negotiations thus far, the Soviet walk-out, the broad Congressional support that our current position has attracted (particularly the build down feature) and the flexibility inherent in the President’s willingness to trade off U.S. for Soviet reductions, it is fair to ask whether a new “framework” at this stage would serve our interest. It would certainly create confusion. It would almost certainly run counter to the underlying logic of the position we have taken from the beginning. And it would diminish the clarity of the President’s position as we enter a period in which the defense of that position will be crucial to our domestic politics.

The Soviets have recently adopted a strategy of pressing for concessions on arms control issues other than START or INF. Most of these—chemical weapons, anti-satellite weapons and nuclear testing—entail multilateral negotiations, under United Nations auspices, where serious negotiation is difficult and the opportunity for propaganda is great. Moreover, all are complicated by extreme, if not

insurmountable, verification problems. And taken together, this new Soviet agenda seems aimed at obscuring their Geneva walkout.

The urgent requirement before us is to settle on a working assumption about likely Soviet arms control strategy and to fashion an appropriate response. Given the risks of basing a U.S. strategy on unfounded optimism, a policy of defending the President's record and philosophy, while remaining poised to move if the Soviets desire, should form the keystone of our public policy. We should move quickly to put such a policy in place, and to develop a broad strategy for its implementation.

With all of the above being said, it is still desirable, I believe, to try to secure Soviet agreement at least to consider some or all of the following:

- (a) Renegotiation of the TTBT *with* effective verification;
- (b) A ban on chemical weapons with full rights to on-site inspection for purpose of verification;
- (c) Notification to the other side of *all* ballistic missile tests;
- (d) Agreement *not* to encrypt test parameters;
- (e) Notification of all *major* military exercises.

Some or all of the above, even though it is not "arms reduction," might help us hold the Aspin-Dicks⁹ types who voted for MX last year "if we would be more forthcoming on arms reduction," and could help us with the public opinion of the world, and would not hurt us if the Soviets

agreed. It might put them on the defensive—or they might agree to talk with us. Either result would be good.

I'd be glad to develop further details if you wish.

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files: FRC 330-87-0023, Box 2, Folder USSR 388.3 1984. Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: "As agreed by Bud McFarlane's Senior Arms Control Policy Group, I am forwarding a paper, prepared at my request, to form the basis of Tuesday's NSC discussion. It should elicit a spirited exchange. It is deliberately straightforward. I believe it is important that this issue not be obscured by the tendency to produce a watered-down consensus. Cap."

² Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado), who ran for President in 1984, lost in the Democratic primary to Walter Mondale.

³ See [footnote 5, Document 184](#). Reagan wrote in his diary on March 6: "met with Sens. Bill Cohen & Joe Biden. They've been to Russia & are all wrapped up in 'Arms Reductions.' I suspect that at least one of them (J.B.) doesn't believe I'm sincere about wanting them." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 325) For information on Vogel's trip to Moscow, see [footnote 2, Document 195](#), and [footnote 3, Document 201](#). Regarding Scowcroft and the Dartmouth Group, see [Document 193](#).

⁴ Needless to say, we must be prepared, on short notice, to engage the Soviets in negotiations should they resume. Our current approach to START—and in particular, our willingness to "trade-off" reductions in our potential advantages for reductions in theirs—is broad enough to

permit rapid negotiations should they be willing. It is unlikely, however, that we could achieve closure on a complete draft treaty before November. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ Reference is to U.S. charges that the Soviet Union was using chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Secretary of State Haig raised the issue with Gromyko in January 1982; see [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 137*](#)⁵. A Department of State fact sheet released in February 1982 stated that the Soviet Union and its allies were "well prepared to wage chemical warfare." (*Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 33-36)

⁶ See [footnote 2, Document 2](#).

⁷ Reagan signed NSDD 33, "U.S. Approach to START Negotiations," on May 14, 1982. See [*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 168*](#)⁷.

⁸ See [Document 185](#).

⁹ Reference is to Congressmen Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) and Norman Dicks (D-Washington).

201. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 23, 1984

Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984

Summary

The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START, while simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues, and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START, without making themselves appear so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the Administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviet Calculus

1. Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations; the need to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet political position in Europe—including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment—and calculations regarding the US election campaign. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the US that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the present Administration by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparently believe that if they appear unyielding, the Administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF, and probably are sensitive to the possibility that by suspending arms control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and belligerence. Moscow nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches at this level, as well as public commentary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-basing countries—particularly the Social Democrats in West Germany—to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed missiles—along with announced basing sites—will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be tempered, however, by the concern to avoid the charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact

countermeasures. Moreover, Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for them to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks

6. Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn had suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In talks on 10-12 March with senior US arms control specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference,² as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party,³ the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations,⁴ some implying and others asserting outright that neither negotiation could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn from Western Europe. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-woods" formula.⁵ By rejecting both the walk-in-the-woods formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential avenues which some Soviets had speculated as recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment schedule and taking the UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first secretary [*1 ½ lines not declassified*], also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He also raised the possibility of an INF negotiation involving the US, USSR, France, and the UK. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin has taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations in discussions with correspondents than the general line would indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the Administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed. [*portion marking not declassified*]

10. The Soviets almost certainly realize that they eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and START negotiations. However, while the Soviets hope to use negotiations to limit US strategic programs, their R&D programs provide them with the capability to compete with or without arms control agreements. Strategic offensive systems currently in development and flight-testing provide the Soviets with the basis for

improving their strategic capabilities under SALT II Treaty limits or those of their START proposals, as well as in the absence of any arms control constraints. There is room under SALT II and the Soviet START position for their new MIRVed SLBM systems (the SS-N-20 and SS-NX-23), the ALCM-equipped Bear H and Blackjack heavy bombers, and the MIRVed SS-X-24 ICBM. Further, the claim by the Soviets that their single-RV SS-X-25 is a “modernized” SS-13 is intended to permit deployment of this system as well. While the Soviets at START have thus far insisted that long-range SLCMs and GLCMs be banned, they are testing such systems and are well-positioned to deploy them in the absence of a ban on them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. The Soviets have proposed talks for an agreement that would eliminate existing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and ban testing and deployment of all space-based weapons. In addition, they have announced a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons in space, as long as the US refrains from such tests. Their immediate aim probably is to preclude the development and deployment of the US direct-ascent ASAT interceptor, while their longer term aim is to prevent the US from translating its technological capabilities into systems such as space-based lasers that could be used both for ASAT weapons and for ballistic missile defense. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects for Progress on Other Issues

12. Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary—particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the demilitarization of space—could prepare the way for a “dramatic breakthrough” in US-Soviet relations despite the

impasse in START and INF.⁶ The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears intended to improve the Soviet image as a proponent of arms control and reduced international tensions despite the USSR's continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals and public positions:

- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;
- resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, suspended by the US;
- an agreement to limit weapons in outer space;
- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons; and
- an agreement to ban chemical weapons, where he said conditions for an accord are “beginning to ripen.”

He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there would be effective control of the “whole process of destruction—from beginning to end.” Reliable sources have told the US delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

that the Soviets are preparing to table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that the USSR attaches high priority to initiating “unofficial” talks with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. A Central Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov, arrived in the US recently with the primary purpose, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of helping organize such a conference. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Menshikov, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] said that there is no need for the US and USSR to resolve differences on INF and START before engaging in a dialogue on other security issues, such as chemical warfare and space weaponry. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. Chernenko’s claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:

- a freeze on further INF deployments, particularly Pershing IIs;

- an agreement to take into account UK and French systems; or

—an agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems the Soviets consider most threatening—SLCMs, ALCMs, MX, or the D-5 SLBM.

The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to specific US initiatives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on “norms” to govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown. Chernenko, however, raised this possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could lead to a “breakthrough” in relations, perhaps to signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable significance. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the talks lies in the possibilities they offer for wedge-driving between the US and its allies. This view probably has been strengthened by Western press

reports of differences between the US and West Germany over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets would be unlikely to accept Western proposals on verification to the extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an agreement on the non-use of force as a step toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal, and although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them on more substantive issues. [*portion marking not declassified*]

19. Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among them could be part of

a package to improve bilateral relations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics

20. While the ultimate authority for approving arms control policy rests with the Politburo, the formulation of key decisions in this area takes place in the Defense Council, a group of about half a dozen political and military leaders. Functioning as the Defense Council's executive secretariat, the General Staff—through its Main Operations Directorate—coordinates the flow of information to the Defense Council decisionmakers. This arrangement assures the military a highly influential role in the arms control policy-making process. Information and policy proposals are channeled through the General Staff from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Military Industrial Commission, and specific Central Committee staffs, notably the International Department and International Information Department. Individuals from the Academy of Sciences and probably the personal secretariats of Politburo members can also inform Soviet leaders on arms control issues, but do not have access to the details of military plans and programs. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. Of those highly visible Soviet spokesmen on arms control issues, three have inter-agency access to official arms control policy information. They are Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov, his first deputy, Sergey Akhromeyev, and Nikolay Chervov, chief of the Main Operation Directorate's Treaty Negotiating Directorate. Vadim Zagladin of the International Department and Leonid Zamyatin of the International Information Department are believed to have some limited inter-agency access, as do high-level officials of the Foreign Ministry. Public figures of

prominence such as Aleksandr Bovin, an *Izvestiya* commentator, and Georgiy Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, probably have little information on the specifics of the formulation of arms control beyond that gleaned through personal connections with other members of the political elite and from instructions on the party line. *[portion marking not declassified]*

22. Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov's death. *[portion marking not declassified]*

23. We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture. *[portion marking not declassified]*

24. The evidence at least suggests therefore that the Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on significant arms control issues. *[portion marking not declassified]*

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9-May 10, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents.

Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. This paper was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis. Kimmit circulated the paper to agency representatives on March 24 under a covering memorandum that noted that it was “developed to support discussion of the status and prospects for major nuclear arms control negotiations (INF and START) at the National Security Council Meeting on Tuesday, March 27 at 2 p.m.”

² See [Document 193](#).

³ Chernenko met with Vogel in Moscow on March 12 to discuss INF deployments and arms control. (Telegram 2949 from Moscow, March 13; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840164-0707)

⁴ The merger of START and INF negotiations had been discussed by U.S. policymakers since the Soviet walk-out on November 23, 1983, in Geneva (see [Documents 145](#) and [161](#)). At the March 27 NATO Special Consultative Group meeting, chaired by Burt, there was a discussion of deployment status and options for moving forward with the Soviets: “The SCG discussed U.S. and Italian papers on Soviet options, with the common conclusion that there were reasons to think that the Soviets might believe a START/INF merger would not serve the USSR’s interests.” (Telegram 2424 from USNATO, March 29; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840205-1029) Papers and analysis on consequences of a START/INF merger are in telegram 1891 from USNATO, March 12; telegram 7181 from Rome, March 16; and telegram 82042 to multiple Western European posts, March 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840161-0901, D840176-0323, and D840184-0805, respectively)

⁵ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 6](#).

⁶ See [Document 187](#).

202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 27, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control in 1984

This is a critical year for arms control. In the United States, voters will choose between two very different visions of how to conduct the process. In the Soviet Union a new leadership faces a choice between continuing to stress propaganda aspects of arms control or returning to the more serious and confidential discussions of an earlier period. It will be an important year for our European Allies, who are just emerging from the trauma of INF deployment, who face major uncertainties about the future policies of both Moscow and Washington, and who must respond to strong demands from their own publics to revitalize the East-West dialogue.

Thus far, the Soviets have maintained a tough line on the central nuclear arms control issues, continuing to assert that a resumption of START and INF negotiations is impossible without major U.S. concessions. They have expressed skepticism over your call for a more constructive dialogue. Their reaction is dictated by a number of factors. First, they have taken a self-acknowledged political defeat on INF, which will take time to absorb. Second, their leadership situation, uncertain for half a decade as Brezhnev weakened, only to be replaced by an ill Andropov and now by Chernenko, still seems to be evolving. Finally, the Soviets must balance their probable preference for a Democratic victory in November against their clear incentives to negotiate seriously before the elections in

view of the likelihood that they will be dealing with you for four more years.

Suspicious of our motives, Chernenko in his letters to you has nonetheless expressed a cautious interest in testing our seriousness about arms control dialogue. Thus, while stonewalling on START/INF, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to move ahead bilaterally on several lesser matters, underscoring their interest in MBFR, CW, TTBT, ASAT and hinting at a compromise between our respective positions at the Stockholm CDE conference. They have stressed various possible declaratory measures as well. In doing so, they have suggested that progress on these issues could lead them to initiate a substantive dialogue on the more basic problems, including nuclear arms control.

Some of these Soviet offers (such as a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge) would clearly be to our disadvantage and are non-starters. In other areas, the development of new Western proposals are already underway; we should be in a position to present initiatives to the Soviets in the Vienna MBFR talks and the Geneva CW negotiations in the coming weeks. We have interagency groups examining questions related to outer space arms control and the limited nuclear testing bans and expect to continue our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the fringes of the CDE in Stockholm. Specific opportunities for progress in some of the fields may become possible.

We should clearly recognize the difficulties involved and not put ourselves in the position of rewarding Soviet intransigence. We do not see the likelihood of a major breakthrough in either START or INF in the near future. Nonetheless, as Art Hartman has noted, the leadership situation in Moscow and accompanying Soviet policy decisions has not yet been finalized. It is possible, for

instance, that we may see a more activist Chernenko if he is elected to the Chairmanship of the Presidium later this spring. Because we cannot predict the course of Soviet action with any certainty, it would be a mistake to build our strategy solely on the likelihood of the Soviets adopting a more positive approach. It would be equally self-defeating for us to assume in the current situation that the Soviets will make no move at all this year. We need to be prepared to deal quickly and effectively with either prospect.

If we find that the Soviets are not disposed to take more than minor steps forward with us this year, you ultimately may want to move beyond our current emphasis on confidential diplomacy to enunciate publicly a vision of U.S. arms control policy for your second term. Such a declaration, which might contain new initiatives, would be an effective response to the political pressures which inactivity on nuclear arms control will inevitably engender as the year progresses. At the same time, such a statement would set the Western agenda for 1985 and could pave the way for a resumption of nuclear negotiations in the new year, both in perception and reality.

In sum, we must be ready to engage in serious, substantive arms control discussions whenever—and indeed whether—the Soviets signal they are ready to resume business. I know there are those who feel that our best tactic with the Soviets, with our Allies, and with our public is to rest upon our arms control record of the past three years, call upon the Soviets to return to Geneva, and emphasize non-compliance and the difficulties of verification. They would argue we should refrain from putting forward, or even looking internally at, any new steps until the Soviets do so. There is logic to this approach—why should we negotiate with ourselves when our arms control objectives are correct and our arms control principles are sound? There is

also a certain emotional appeal—the Soviets walked out; why should we make concessions to bring them back? I subscribe to the logic and reject any notion that we should—or need to—compromise any of our basic goals. At the same time, however, one must examine the effect of this approach upon the three audiences we must seek to influence.

For the Soviets, this is the most convenient U.S. strategy, the one that plays best to the strengths of their own position, and which puts the least pressure upon them for change. Under such an approach the Soviets would not be forced to react to new U.S. initiatives, their inflexibility would not be revealed anew, and their accusations of U.S. inflexibility would, over time, be given added weight by some.

For our Allies, this approach creates the greatest incentive for uncoordinated initiatives on their part to build bridges to the USSR, and to suggest ways to get the nuclear negotiations back on track. Europe's Foreign Ministers (UK, FRG and Portugal) and heads of state (France) are already booking their reservations in Moscow. The flurry of such visits throughout 1984 will create its own momentum for new initiatives.

Finally, such a stand pat approach, if it is to work, requires that we persuade our public throughout the balance of this year that the Soviets will accept in this Administration's second four-year term those arms control arrangements which they refused to adopt in the first. This will be a difficult case to make. The Soviets will not give us any help.

The evolution through 1984 of our arms control strategy obviously must depend upon a number of factors, including Congressional pressures on the defense budget and

strategic modernization program, Allied actions, and the Soviet response to our current overtures. It will require that our approach retain a degree of flexibility, that we continue our quiet exploration of possible new steps in START/INF, and that we look closely at possible areas for movement on selected secondary issues as well.

We need not make a decision on the details of any new approach at this time. I feel strongly, however, that we should not, by ceasing our preparations now, rob you of the ability to make such a decision at some appropriate moment in the future.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1-30, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 26 covering memorandum to Shultz, Howe and Kelly wrote: "In accordance with your instructions, we have reworked both versions of the memorandum to the President on arms control. The major difference between them is that the first version at Tab A addresses START/INF alone, while the version at Tab B briefly mentions other areas of arms control as well. The argument for the latter is that the Soviets have indicated that movement in other areas could help with resumption of nuclear arms control talks." Shultz signed the memorandum at Tab B, which was sent by special courier to the White House on March 27 at 7:30 a.m. in preparation for the NSC meeting that afternoon.

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, March 27, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Arms Control Discussions (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

George P. Shultz

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Director William J. Casey

JCS

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA

Director Kenneth L. Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION

Ambassador Edward Rowny

WHITE HOUSE

Robert C. McFarlane

NSC

Ronald F. Lehman

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by focusing the discussion on two questions: (1) what is the Soviet strategy toward arms control, and (2) what does that imply about

our behavior for arms control, for dealing with our allies and for handling Congress? The CIA paper indicates that the Soviet Union is following a two pronged strategy aimed at diverting attention away from their walkout of START and INF and yet permitting them to keep the high ground by treating other issues such as ASAT, CDE, "no first use," etc.² The Soviet Union has been implementing that strategy through private groups and Congress to get the United States to engage on the Soviet agenda. We also have a positive agenda: CBMs, Hotline, MBFR, CW, and others. (S)

The United States can compile a positive agenda as well. We have the community of advisors looking at CIA study and asking how we should deal with the Soviet Union in arms control. Mr. President, you have received from your advisors and have read a number of papers expressing views as to how best to proceed.³ Overall, there is much agreement. For example, everyone agrees that we should reject the Soviet agenda and establish our own agenda. However, there is also some disagreement on what should be our positive agenda and how we should deal with negative Soviet behavior such as non-compliance and the walk-outs. In short, we do not have complete agreement on how we validate the record of three years of effort. Today, we will hear from the President's key advisors. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that his paper begins by asking the question, "What is the interest of the Soviet Union in reaching an agreement this year?" and it concludes with the answer that there is very little evidence that they are interested in an agreement. We need to focus on the content of an agreement, not on agreement for agreement's sake. The Soviet Union has little interest in giving the President a victory. They would only give him an agreement for which he could not take credit. What are they interested in then? A SALT II agreement that did not

provide for reductions. To get an agreement, they will require us to make major concessions. Those who talk of a new framework are really talking about going back to SALT II 1/2. The Soviet Union has walked out of three talks. We should make our case based on the merits. The zero option was very popular and the only reason it was rejected was because the Soviet Union wanted a monopoly. They walked out because we would not agree to their having a monopoly. We want more than a piece of paper; we want real reductions. They are violating SALT II; SALT II means we won't worry about throw-weight. We should be vigorously defending our proposals and pressing the Soviet Union to return to the table. That doesn't mean that there are not things we can negotiate now. We should press to renegotiate the TTBT. We can negotiate a full ban on chemical weapons with full verification. We can negotiate notification of ballistic missile tests and Hotline improvements. If we become too eager, the Soviet Union will sense weakness. And even if we get them back to the negotiations, they can set you up for a later walkout when it will hurt most. The reality is that no one across the table is in charge—they have a collegial organization. Chernenko is not only not responding, he wouldn't even receive the letter that Scowcroft carried. We should emphasize our proposals, we should make clear that we are ready, and we should speak out on the compliance issue. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded with ten do's and don'ts, really, six don'ts and four do's. (1) Don't base policy on speculations about the Soviet Union. (2) Don't negotiate with ourselves or Congress. (3) Don't make concessions for the purpose of getting Soviets back to the table, but we can reorganize our positions to make them more presentable. (4) Don't get into the position where you need an agreement. (5) It is a mistake to change our positive posture on arms control into a negative one because this

risks loss of publics, the Congress, and our allies. (6) Don't rest on past work; let's keep working to be prepared. The process is veto prone and therefore we can't let fear of leaks delay the effort. (7) We must continue to set positive messages that we are prepared to deal across the board—look at START and INF for better ways to present our position. (8) We should be prepared to take parts of the Soviet position and shouldn't be against everything in SALT. The Secretary of Defense uses the word “framework” as if it were a swear word. We need to move on MBFR and we need to go further, depending on the Soviet response. We should move quickly on the CW Treaty and the Hotline. We should move on CDE and we could move on TTBT if we could manage a decision to take it on forthrightly. (9) We should look at the fundamental differences between us and the Soviets in START. You can debate over whether START or INF is more important, but I don't see how you can move on START without considering INF. (10) We should look to see what is important for us, and with all due respect to the CIA analysis, they could be wrong. (S)

Director Adelman said that he agreed with much of what had been said. *Adelman* reminded the President that he worked with the campaign during the hostage crisis and negotiations with Iran and he saw the dangers of setting oneself up for an agreement—the risks are great. To answer the mail, we must show that we have sound policies and are serious about arms control. We need to identify areas where movement is possible. In INF, *Adelman* and *Nitze* have identified a proposal that would have the Soviets reduce to a level which we would stop at. We could negotiate such a step or it could be a declaratory policy. We could attempt to reach a US-Soviet understanding on non-proliferation. We could develop rules of the road or proper behavior through space-CBMs in the CD. We should work with our allies to set the stage for a policy of no early use of

nuclear weapons—we can look at different ways to package this and move slowly and cautiously. (S)

General Vessey put forth a military view. We must maintain the momentum of our defense build-up at the highest levels possible. We must protect the President's strategic modernization program. We must keep the Alliance together, and we must cap or reverse the Soviet military build-up—Soviets can't or won't negotiate until after elections. The Scowcroft coalition and support on the Hill need tending. Allies are not carrying the load. (S)

Director Casey agreed that we must make judgments about the Soviets but argued that we have a fair amount of history. We can assume that Moscow is not anxious to help the President, but they don't want to appear intransigent. They believe that treaties in START and INF are out of reach. Clearly, the prospects for getting an agreement are remote. We should continue to assess our own interest. We can accomplish something on second order issues. At CDE, we can trade Western confidence building measures for a non-aggression pact. (S)

Ambassador Rowny recognized that there was not a consensus on how to get the Soviet Union back to the table, but believed that they might even return on their own. The Soviet Union didn't really explore what was in the trade-offs for them. They may come back when they see that there is really something in it for them. If we show a little ankle, maybe a little thigh, then you can get movement. There is no chance for a full START agreement this year, and speculation on an Interim Agreement is dangerous. Vladivostok is a better precedent, an aide memoire is safest. The Soviet Union never closed the door on START; they still want to limit D-5 and ALCM. (S)

Ambassador Nitze agreed that we should seek US objectives, but we are already clear on that. The issue is tactical. It is not impossible to get an agreement, but 90% chance you won't. It is wholly unlikely that Moscow will negotiate seriously in an election year. What does one do? One does the CW treaty—that is a perfectly solid thing to do. There is no chance the Soviets will agree to that. But it is dangerous to be solidly engaged in START or INF in an election year. (S)

Secretary Weinberger commented further that he didn't disagree with Secretary Shultz's ten points, only with the interpretation of them. At this time, we will have to pay a very high price to get an agreement. We have all agreed that we shouldn't make any concessions to get them back to the table. All agreed that we don't want to get into a position where we must have an agreement. We can keep up our work, but we don't want to further weaken our proposals. We can keep sending messages that we are ready to negotiate, but that is hard to do in an empty room. I agree that we should do what we can do in lesser areas, but I'm very worried about space arms control. Also, talk of a START "framework" is a codeword—I'm opposed. (S)

The *President* suggested that we are all not as far apart as it might seem. There is no question that the Soviet Union is trying to make us look non-cooperative. I believe the Soviets want to avoid the onus for having walked out of Geneva. In my answer to the letter from Chernenko, we should recognize that we have opposite views on who is threatened. We should cite their quotations that are threatening to us; we should cite their build-up. Then we could cite the fact that in the 1940's, we proposed to do away with all these systems and they said no. Nineteen times since then, we have tried to reach agreements, for example, Eisenhower's open sky proposal. We can't go on

negotiating with ourselves. We can't be supplicants crawling, we can't look like failures. I've read the papers and made some notes. Let me share them with you. They want to avoid the onus of walking out, therefore, it is unlikely that they will give us anything in START and INF right now. We want an agreement, but we want a good agreement. I do not intend to make unilateral concessions to get them back to the table, but I believe we must have a full credible agenda on arms control. Maybe we could build a record. Mitterrand believed that they would give us the cold shoulder for several months, therefore, we will need to do lesser things, MBFR, chemical weapons, confidence building, notification of all ballistic missile tests, agreement not to encrypt, and CDE. But we shouldn't let them off the hook on START and INF; we must keep the pressure on. To do this, we need solid, flexible positions on both START and INF. (S)

The *President* continued, I don't want to fall into the trap of SALT II, but if there are some things that are good, then we shouldn't ignore them simply because they are a part of SALT II. For example, having a launcher limit isn't wrong, so long as it is matched by warhead and throw-weight limits. In short, we need a position which takes part of their approach and melds it with ours so that they have a fig leaf for coming off their position. I think my letter to Chernenko should be substantive and positive along these lines, and stressing that they have an obligation to resume START and INF talks. Perhaps we should offer to have Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze engage in private talks with the Russians. I would like to table the chemical treaty before we set off for China.⁴ I think the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should accelerate their work and present me with options for new START/INF positions within a few weeks. This is for us, not for the public. Maybe we should consider a speech in a few months to bring out our record. George (Shultz), I

want you to be our public spokesman on arms control. Leaks and gratuitous backgrounders have got to stop. I understand we have procedures for dealing with clearing testimony. I think we should work in private channels, but we will not crawl, we will build a record. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we have our instructions and now we have to get down to work. (S)

The *President* asked if anyone had any disagreements. (S)

Secretary Weinberger expressed concern that the President's guidance not be misunderstood. In a few days, the *New York Times* may be reporting that the President has ordered new proposals on START and INF. Aren't we talking about what we didn't say, but could say, about our proposals? (S)

Ambassador Rowny noted that the Soviet Union has not listened to all that we had to say in Geneva. (S)

Ambassador Nitze volunteered that what we were really talking about was fleshing out our positions. (S)

The *President* said that Director Adelman had a good idea on INF about their reducing to a level which we would reach at the end of 1985. Something like that might be an option worth looking at. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that some of our allies might use this as an excuse not to do what must be done on deployments. (S)

Director Adelman agreed with Secretary Weinberger. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that we should agree that we will fill out our position. (S)

The *President* noted that his letter to Chernenko offers an opportunity to get their attention. Have we given enough attention to the fact that they have a climate of insecurity? (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that we will press on with the guidance, noting that we will make no pre-emptive concessions, flesh out our positions and be ready if they return, and prepare to table a chemical weapons treaty before the China trip. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-104, NSPG 104. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. There is no drafting information on the minutes. Although titled as a "National Security Planning Group Meeting," this is listed in the President's Daily Diary as a National Security Council meeting and is listed at the Reagan Library as National Security Council Meeting 104. NSPG 104 took place on December 17, 1984. In a memorandum to Kraemer and Linhard, conveying draft notes of this NSC meeting, Lehman wrote: "Both of you should study the minutes and notes carefully. From now on we should view ourselves as a task force designed to lay out for Bud and the President the best gameplan for the next year. We can draw upon the interagency, but the time has come for us to put down on paper what it is we really think can and should be done in arms control this year in terms of tactics, issues, and public statements. In truth there is a vacuum and the President is obviously looking for someone or some process to fill it. We have no choice but to step in." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, SACPG—NSDD 137—Arms Control April 2, 1984)

² See [Document 201](#).

³ See [Documents 200](#) and [202](#).

⁴ Reagan was scheduled to make a State visit to China from April 26 to May 1.

204. Memorandum From the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Meyer) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon), and the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)¹

Washington, March 29, 1984

SUBJECT: [1 line not declassified]

[8 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]

[1½ lines not declassified] General Atkeson strongly recommends that NFIB Principals meet [less than 1 line not declassified]. He believes we should ask NSA to reexamine what we know about Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. Was the Soviet response what we would expect if in fact they were anticipating a first-strike? Did we detect additional anomalies which were not brought to Community attention at the time? Note the attached NID item from 10 Nov 83, which does suggest that the Soviets responded to Able Archer 83 in an unusual fashion.²

5. You should be aware that on 3 April the US will begin a set of exercises led by NIGHT TRAIN, a worldwide procedural nuclear command post exercise. These will include a live firing of a naval Poseidon missile. If in fact the Soviets were scared by Able Archer, these upcoming exercises could really frighten them. This raises the question of whether you want to make the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials aware of the possibility that the Soviet level of concern may be considerably higher than generally believed.

Herbert E. Meyer

Attachment

Intelligence Report³

[location not declassified], March 20, 1984

[11 pages not declassified]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; *[codeword not declassified]*.

² See [Document 134](#).

³ Top Secret; *[codeword not declassified]*.

205. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 30, 1984

SUBJECT

Conversations with Dobrynin and his Deputy

Over lunch the past two days, Art Hartman and Rick Burt have separately had constructive conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin and his Deputy Sokolov. The talks will provide a good basis for my meeting with Dobrynin on Monday² (assuming his swollen foot has healed sufficiently for him to come to the Department) and for Art's meeting with Gromyko on Tuesday. The main content of the conversations is given below.

Treatment of Scowcroft: Dobrynin told Art that Moscow had thought our Scowcroft effort was a trick. The people there (read Gromyko) are "very sensitive" about these things, he said, and we should have taken time to better prepare the way. Art responded that we had taken the time, that he had discussed the trip with Dobrynin and had gone over it in detail with Gromyko.³ He added that the Soviets had missed an important opportunity to talk with Scowcroft. Dobrynin confirmed that the offer of a Deputy Foreign Minister was a deliberate action to respond to a U.S. "trick".

U.S.-Soviet Atmospherics: Art complained about the message the Soviets are passing out in Moscow, noting that while Dobrynin says they want to move ahead, his people in Moscow are telling everyone there is no hope in dealing with the Administration. Dobrynin said this had not come from official Soviets, "only Arbatov, who has non-

governmental duties". Art noted that Arbatov, Falin, and others had turned off an important group of Americans. Dobrynin promised to report Art's complaints about the treatment of the Dartmouth group to Moscow. Art also asked why people were being told in Moscow that U.S. efforts were merely election-year politics. Dobrynin said that "maybe this was so, but why wait?", adding that over the years they have learned that regardless of the promises made in Presidential campaigns, once in office the foreign policy approach remains essentially the same.

START/INF: When Dobrynin raised next steps in our dialogue, Art noted that we have put a full agenda on the table, but the Soviet side has not been very responsive. He noted that our START ideas put forward in September had considerable promise and should be given careful study. Dobrynin said they had not found them all that interesting. Art also told Dobrynin the present Soviet position on INF is hopeless and we are waiting for them to come forward with a more reasonable position.

TTBT: When Art mentioned TTBT, Dobrynin commented that if the U.S. could do something in this area (even if we make an effort on the Hill and it fails), it would make an important impression on Moscow. Rick was specifically invited to lunch by Sokolov to discuss TTBT.⁴ During their conversation, Rick noted the impasse created by the Soviet position against renegotiation and our need to resolve political and verification problems. Sokolov suggested the Soviets might agree to a separate understanding on verification to be negotiated and made public following U.S. ratification of the TTBT. Rick said any agreement would have to be reached beforehand so that it would form part of our rationale for asking the Senate to ratify the agreement. Sokolov said this might be possible if the U.S. side agreed not to make public either the separate agreement or the

fact it was being negotiated until the time the President announced he was seeking ratification.

CTB: Both Dobrynin and Sokolov asked about CTB and were told there was no chance to move forward on this now. They suggested we look closely at TTBT instead.

Outer Space: Both Soviet diplomats also said Moscow was very concerned about outer space and hoped we could move to negotiations on ASAT. Art pointed Dobrynin to your last letter to Chernenko.⁵ Dobrynin said they know their ASAT technology is poor and assume ours is great. We must see if it can be kept under control now, he said, because if it is not, the Soviet side will do all it can to catch up. Sokolov told Rick Moscow is willing to take all necessary steps to dismantle their ASAT system as part of an agreement to ban all such systems. Rick said we wanted to know what steps they would be willing to take that would allow us to verify their system had been dismantled. Sokolov said he would get back to us on this subject.

CDE: Sokolov said that in response to our complaints, they had decided to allow their Ambassador in Stockholm to have more leeway in discussions with Jim Goodby at CDE. Rick said we noted the change and, as a result, Goodby had invited their man to Washington for further discussions.⁶ Sokolov commented that the Soviets were afraid we would exploit such a visit to show the world it was "business as usual" between us. Rick suggested we discuss the public rationale beforehand and Sokolov seemed interested. Dobrynin asked Art about our position on their Non-Use-Of-Force proposal at Stockholm, adding that they know we are not interested No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Art reminded Dobrynin that we also have some things on the table there (our transparency measures) that we want.

Other Arms Control: When Art noted that we will put forward our CW treaty soon, Dobrynin indicated he knew we would not reach an agreement on this issue, but he praised the effort nevertheless. They agreed that the Hotline issue is going well and that we should be able to get an agreement in the next round.

Bilateral Issues: Both Soviets were upbeat on moving forward on the bilateral issues. Dobrynin was optimistic on the maritime boundary negotiations. He confirmed that the Soviets are ready to move ahead on an exchanges agreement "as soon as you are". He said they were also interested in moving on the Consulates. In this connection, Dobrynin commented that they know full well we want these agreements to get deeper into Soviet society, but that on their side they need the foreign exchange from cultural groups and he needs a Consulate in New York. Rick asked Sokolov about the apparent Soviet effort to link the Aeroflot issue with opening of the Consulates. When Sokolov suggested a tie to an exchanges agreement instead, Rick told him such linkages sounded like a runaround to us and that each issue should be negotiated on its merits. Sokolov appeared to accept this. Rick also emphasized the need for them to take constructive steps in Montreal on the technical measures we have discussed to increase the safety of the Northern Pacific airways.

Regional Issues: Although regional issues were not discussed at any length, Dobrynin did indicate to Art the strong interest they had in engaging us more deeply on the trouble spots around the world. He mentioned the Middle East in particular in this regard, bring up Gromyko's pet project for an international conference. Art said they should be able to do better than that old proposal.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (March 1984) 3/3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a March 28 Information Memorandum, Burt briefed Shultz on Hartman's meeting with Dobrynin earlier that day. Shultz's handwritten note in the margin instructed Burt to "turn into a memo I can hand to the President on Friday. GPS." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984 Soviet Union, March).

² Monday, April 2. For a record of this meeting, see [Document 209](#).

³ See [Document 193](#).

⁴ According to telegram 92817 to Moscow, March 30, Burt met Sokolov for lunch at the Soviet Embassy, where they discussed TTBT, CTB, space arms control, CDE, and bilateral issues. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005-0227)

⁵ See [Document 190](#).

⁶ In an April 28 privacy channel telegram from Goodby in Moscow to Shultz, Goodby reported: "In this message I forward my personal impressions of the discussions here during the past days. I spoke along the lines we agreed in Washington. Grinevski did not tip his hand very much, but evidently the Soviets are prepared to negotiate some concrete confidence building measures in the context of an understanding on reciprocal assurances against the use of force. The outlook is for hard sledding, however. Grinevski had problems with our proposals on exchange of information and on notifications of mobilization activities. Our key concept of notifying 'out of garrison activities' also seemed to trouble him. On the other hand, he stipulated that the Soviets were prepared to negotiate agreements for advance notification of certain military activities above a specified numerical level (which he declined to identify), invitations of observers to such activities, and some form of

verification.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat,
S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52,
April 1-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents)

206. National Security Decision Directive 137¹

Washington, March 31, 1984

US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984 (U)

After giving the matter considerable thought, I have reached the following conclusions concerning how we should deal with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control during this year. (C)

First of all, I believe that we have the opportunity to deal with the Soviet Union from more of a position of strength than in previous years. This is due to the progress that we have made over the last three years in a number of areas. Perhaps of greatest importance is that we have established the basis for a national, bi-partisan consensus in support of our strategic modernization program. Based on this consensus, this critical modernization program is now moving from the discussion stage, where it had been stalled for a number of years, to the deployment of fielded capability. (C)

With the continued help of all those involved, steady progress in implementing our strategic modernization program will help us gradually to reverse the existing adverse trends in certain key indicators of the strategic nuclear balance. In doing so, it will provide us the basic leverage we need to do more than simply negotiate arms control agreements. It will, over time, generate the incentives to the Soviet Union needed to put us in a position to negotiate meaningful and effectively verifiable agreements, agreements that both enhance world stability and our security, and that permit significant reductions in

the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
(C)

In addition, over the past year it has become clear that the Soviet Union has failed in its attempt to drive a wedge in the linkage between the United States and our NATO allies. Over the last few years, we have had nearly continuous, intensive consultations with our NATO partners. This process has also added to our strength. Our allies have not only stood squarely by us as we implemented the negotiation track of the 1979 NATO "dual track" decision.² They have also sustained the NATO LRINF modernization decision and deployments are currently in progress in the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. (C)

As a result of this Soviet failure, the Soviet Union is now in the difficult position of seeking means to avoid their clear responsibility for walking away from both the START and INF negotiations. However, no matter what they now choose to do, the legacy of their actions will continue to haunt them and the mantle of responsibility will sit heavy on their shoulders. (C)

Given this situation, I believe that the United States should stay firmly on the high road that it has traveled thus far in pursuit of meaningful, equitable, verifiable arms control involving significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. This means that we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement. We will not entertain proposals which involve preemptive concessions to attempt to entice the Soviets back into negotiations before they sincerely wish to sit with us and solve problems. And, we will not reward Soviet intransigence, thus turning their policy failure into victory and dissipating the strength we

have accumulated due to the principled, yet flexible stance that we have taken over the last three years. (C)

On the other hand, maintaining the high road does mean that, while we avoid the pitfalls cited above, we will continue vigorously to conduct a sincere, positive effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. While encouraging the Soviets to return to the START and INF tables in Geneva, we will remain ready to talk at any time and in any place without preconditions. We will take every appropriate opportunity to explain patiently the virtue of our sound, flexible positions in both START and INF. We will use every appropriate avenue to explore ways of finding appropriate ways to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union. We will remain prepared to discuss means of trading areas of U.S. advantage of concern to the Soviet Union for areas of Soviet advantage of concern to the United States and our Allies. And, we will make full use of time during which we wait for a positive Soviet response to fully prepare ourselves to exploit opportunities that may present themselves for making progress towards meaningful agreements that meet our criteria. (C)

Toward this goal, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) will complete, on a priority basis, its current efforts toward identifying and evaluating for me the full range of potential U.S. options in the START and INF areas under likely alternative scenarios. This work should address options which flesh out and enhance our current position. However, it should also identify the key differences between the U.S. and Soviet positions, and identify options that could, under certain conditions, bridge those differences. I do not intend nor will I permit us to repeat the mistakes made by previous arms control agreements. However, if elements of previous agreements

put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them. Finally, the SACPG work should also address likely Soviet initiatives and prepare us to appropriately respond to them. (S)

This SACPG activity should serve as the primary clearing house for the various ideas that have been suggested about these topics. This work will have the priority support of all agencies and should be completed with a report submitted to me by May 5.³ (S)

It is essential that the task given to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group be accomplished promptly, thoroughly, and on a close-hold basis and without the unauthorized disclosure of the nature of the work or the various options being studied. Taken out of the proper context, the unauthorized disclosure of this task could be misinterpreted with severe consequences to the fundamental interests of the United States. The National Security Advisor will clear in advance any statements used in Congressional testimony, in consultations with our Allies, made on the record or on background with the press, and made publicly as related to this task of the Senior Policy Group. (S)

We will exploit opportunities as they present themselves to provide the Soviet Union further information about the flexibility that is inherent in the U.S. START and INF positions. To this end, I would like a letter drafted for my signature to the leader of the Soviet Union. This letter should note that I recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union do hold opposite views on who is threatened. It should explain fully the basis for the U.S. concern, citing Soviet statements threatening to the U.S. and the record of Soviet arms build-up. It should note the history of U.S. initiatives aimed at reducing tensions. It should make clear

the continued, sincere U.S. interest in meaningful, equitable and effectively verifiable agreements which would reduce the size of nuclear arsenals. It should highlight the flexibility in the current U.S. positions and our readiness to find appropriate ways for trading U.S. areas of advantage that are of concern to the Soviet Union for Soviet areas of advantage that are of concern for the U.S. and its allies. Finally, it should make clear the readiness of the U.S. to resume both the START and INF negotiations and should encourage the Soviets to reopen a constructive dialogue with us on these matters. (S)

A draft of this letter should be available for my review by April 7.⁴ (S)

We will move forward in those other areas in which there may be prospects for progress toward meaningful agreements. For example, the U.S. draft Chemical Warfare Treaty will be tabled before the end of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. (S)

Ongoing work on the full range of the U.S. arms control agenda (to include additional confidence building measures, nuclear testing, and space related issues) should be reviewed by the Senior Arms Control Policy Group. This work should be brought to a timely conclusion. (S)

In addition to these actions, we will intensify our efforts to explain publicly the principled positions we have taken in the various nuclear arms control negotiations over the last three years. We have established a record about which we should be proud. We must ensure that that record is known and understood. (C)

A detailed plan for accomplishing the task of publicly explaining our positions in START and INF should be

developed. This plan should outline the major themes to be stressed and the mechanism for most effectively presenting these themes. This plan will be prepared and submitted for my approval by April 14.⁵ (C)

Finally, as we implement the steps I have directed, it is essential that clarity and coherence of this Administration's position on arms control be maintained. To that end, the Secretary of State will serve as the Administration's chief spokesman on arms control. Congressional testimony and all major statements on arms control will be cleared in advance through the National Security Advisor. (C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984]. Secret. In a March 30 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard forwarded a draft NSDD recommending it be sent to Reagan for signature. Linhard explained that the NSDD "tracks the NSC staff understanding of the guidance provided by the President and by you through Ron Lehman concerning the directions the President wishes to issue at this time. *The contents of the draft have not been discussed in any way with anyone outside of the NSC staff.*" In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane listed the primary guidance in the NSDD and stated: "It also identifies Secretary Shultz as the primary Administration spokesman for arms control."

² See [footnote 3, Document 2](#).

³ Not found.

⁴ Shultz sent a draft of this letter to Reagan on April 6. The letter was signed and sent to Chernenko on April 16. See

[Documents 210](#) and [211](#).

⁵ An April 14 memorandum from Hill to McFarlane transmitted a “memorandum recommending a public diplomacy strategy for START and INF,” in accordance with NSDD 137. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, NSDD 137, 03/31/1984 [US Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984])

**207. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, April 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Social Contact with Soviet Citizens: Current Attitudes

I had an interesting and lengthy conversation with two Soviet "Americanologists," during dinner the evening of April 2. The two Soviets, Georgy Skorov (one of Arbatov's deputies) and Stanislav Filippov (a specialist in U.S. law, now with the Soviet patent agency) are not at the policy-making level by a long shot, but are members of the politically aware and relatively well-informed upper intellectual class.

My wife and I invited them to dinner because we had gotten to know them well in Moscow, and they had been socially accessible and occasionally helpful (as for example with advice on how to deal with Arbatov, for whom there is no love lost on their part).

They seemed mainly interested in hearing my views on U.S. perceptions of U.S.-Soviet relations at present—not so much on our concrete positions, as on our motivations. But in the course of our long conversation, they expressed several views of possible interest. Those that struck me in particular were the following:

—Soviet specialists on the U.S. believe that the President will probably be reelected, and are convinced that the Soviets can do nothing to damage his reelection chances.

They believe, however, that if they cooperate—particularly in resuming negotiations on INF and START—this will help him. They are unwilling to do this, and will probably wait until November.

—Chernenko's leadership is relatively weak in security areas, and it is more difficult to get decisions now than it was before Andropov fell seriously ill. Chernenko is, however, "not a crazy," and won't do anything dangerous.

—Soviet decision making is plagued by a number of "really primitive people" in key positions. They don't understand the West or the U.S., are convinced we are out to get them in every way we can, and are capable of reacting in truly stupid ways.

—Even relatively well informed Soviet citizens are confused about the facts. Filippov questioned me closely about whether we really had evidence that the Soviets had used chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and when I assured him we had, the distress was evident on his face. He observed, in what can only be described as personal agony, "I didn't know that. I really didn't. But I know you are an honest man and wouldn't lie." He then turned to Skorov (his brother-in-law), and said, "How could those idiots of ours do a thing like that."

—Access to Soviet media—even if greatly circumscribed—can have a deep effect if used wisely. Filippov recounted how he had attended many meetings of Soviet citizens to discuss relations with the U.S. (Though he did not say so, these were obviously organized by the regime to whip up anti-American sentiment.) The theme of the meetings usually centered on describing various U.S. "iniquities," but Filippov said that he was struck by how often someone could comment on my July 4 TV speech of 1981, saying

something like, “Well, it sounds pretty bad, but I remember a couple of years ago the American ‘Ambassador’ was on TV, and he said . . .” The citizen would go on to paraphrase a couple of lines and observe, “Now he seemed an honest man, and a serious man, and he wanted peace. So maybe it’s not as bad as you say. We shouldn’t forget that side of America.”² The point Filippov was trying to make was that we need more communication with the Soviets which is not perceived as threatening or demeaning. Implicitly—and doubtless inadvertently—his observation also explained why the Soviet regime resists our access to their media—it does, in fact, undermine their propaganda when it runs counter to the stereotypes they are purveying.

As they were leaving, Skorov and Filippov remarked that they had not reported to the Soviet Embassy that they would be seeing me. If they had done so, they said, the Embassy might have ordered them not to, and at the very least they would have been subjected to lengthy briefings regarding what they should say, and required to submit detailed reports later. (They presumably pointed this out to ensure that I should not mention our dinner to anyone in the Soviet Embassy.)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Matlock served in Moscow as Chargé d’Affaires from January to September 1981. As he recalled later in his book, he “was offered five minutes of prime time on Soviet television to deliver a message to the Soviet people on our national day. It was normal Soviet practice to offer foreign ambassadors such an opportunity once a year, but U.S.

Ambassador Thomas Watson had been refused the year before because his planned address contained a reference to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.” Matlock concluded: “The impact of this brief presentation surpassed all expectations. For years, Soviet citizens would quote back things to me I said on television that day. It was so unusual for them to hear a foreign representative challenge Soviet propaganda stereotypes—even with cautious indirection—that people noticed and remembered.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 20–21)

**208. Information Memorandum From the
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the
Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, April 5, 1984

SUBJECT

NSDD-137; U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Strategy for 1984

The White House has issued an NSDD² (attached) setting out the President's decisions on our nuclear arms control strategy based on the March 27 NSC discussion.³ On the whole, the thrust of the NSDD is favorable to us and can be used to support our continuing efforts to move forward on START and other arms control issues.

Continuing Approaches to the Soviets: In an apparent bow to OSD, the NSDD cites several times the virtues of our current positions and states: "we will not compromise our principles by chasing expedient agreement." At the same time, however, it also notes that we should "use every appropriate avenue to explore ways . . . to bridge the distance between the requirements of our principled positions and the legitimate concerns of the Soviet Union," specifically citing trade-offs.

Priority Study of START/INF Options: To that end, the SACPG is directed not only to flesh out our current proposal, but to complete its evaluation of "options that could under certain conditions bridge [U.S.-Soviet] differences" by May 5. In this connection, the NSDD notes that while the previous arms control mistakes should not be

repeated, “if elements of previous agreements put in the right context meet our needs, we should not ignore them”—an implicit rejection of the OSD argument that the Framework concepts of State, JCS and ACDA are too similar to SALT II.⁴

Chernenko Letter: A draft letter is requested for Presidential review by April 7; it is tasked in general terms to cite again the flexibility of our position, express our readiness to explore trade-offs, and replay our readiness for constructive dialogue on START/INF.

Other Arms Control Items: The NSDD states the draft CW treaty will be tabled before the end of the current CD round. It states ongoing work on nuclear testing, space-related issues and additional CBMs should be “brought to a timely conclusion.”

Protecting Against Disclosure: The NSDD emphasizes the need to protect the ongoing SACPG work from unauthorized disclosure, and, in this regard, states that Congressional testimony, consultations with our Allies, background statements to the press and public statements are to be cleared in advance through Bud McFarlane.

Public Affairs Handling: The President calls for intensified efforts to explain publicly the U.S. arms control record, setting an April 14 deadline for a detailed plan to do so (we would note in this regard, State already has underway a special arms control speakers’ course at FSI; you are, moreover, scheduled to give a major arms control address to the League of Women Voters in early June).

Coordination of the Administration Position: Finally, citing the need for “clarity and coherence,” you are designated as “the Administration’s chief spokesman on arms control.”

Testimony and all major statements are to be cleared through McFarlane.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2A, 1984 Arms and Arms Control, Mar.-May. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Gordon, Dobbins, and Dean. Brackets are in the original.

² See [Document 206](#).

³ See [Document 203](#).

⁴ See [Document 185](#).

209. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin Monday afternoon to discuss the state of play of the relationship following your exchange of letters with Chernenko.² He held to the rigid Soviet positions on START and INF, but showed interest in other arms control issues. We agreed to go ahead on several bilateral items. We also agreed on discussions on regional issues, including the Middle East, and confidential preliminary discussions on outer space.

To start off, I professed to be puzzled about where things now stand, noting that we have been hearing things from Moscow that seem different from the confidential exchanges we have been having and your correspondence with Chernenko. I noted we were ready to move forward, questioned if Moscow was, and asked for his personal assessment of the last Chernenko letter, the “oral remarks”,³ and the recent Moscow line.

Dobrynin claimed the letters and “oral remarks” were self-explanatory. He said our dialogue covered three areas—nuclear arms control/security, regional, and bilateral issues—and proceeded to give his views. On nuclear issues, they had “invited” us to remove obstacles to negotiations, i.e., to reverse our INF deployments. They had also proposed concrete actions on other issues such as non-militarization of space (including ASAT), the nuclear freeze, test ban negotiations, and the “nuclear norms”—some vague

declaratory measures including no-first-use. Dobrynin asserted the Soviets were very serious about this list which, he added, could be discussed in diplomatic channels or through special envoys.

He also noted that the Chernenko letter proposed discussion of regional issues, particularly the Middle East, and bilateral issues, including such things as the consulates, agreements that would soon expire, fisheries, and artificial heart research. Dobrynin said they were ready to sit down with a calendar and discuss these issues concretely.

In response, I made the following points: 1) We want reductions in nuclear arms, not a freeze which would be as complicated to negotiate as START. I pointed out that even they had come out for reductions from SALT-II in their START proposal. 2) We want to talk about INF but have no intention of withdrawing our missiles as a precondition. I again told him we have ideas on both INF and START and are ready to negotiate on these issues. 3) We were disappointed that Brent Scowcroft was not received by the Soviets at a proper level. There was no attempt to bypass anyone and we had used diplomatic channels to ask for a meeting. Summing up, I reiterated that we consider the nuclear issues to be of central importance for our two countries.

Dobrynin said he came to the conclusion from my comments that there is no way to make progress on nuclear issues. I told him I disagreed; we believe progress can be made.

Dobrynin returned again to outer space. I told him we were working on this issue and gave him a copy of our unclassified report to Congress.⁴ We are interested in

achieving something in this area, I said, but do not now see a way to do so because of verification problems. I noted we had proposed discussions on space and strategic defense at START but they had not been interested. I said we continued to be willing to discuss this issue but it had to be recognized that there are real problems with verification.

Dobrynin said we need to discuss this issue now, adding that this question could become the most dangerously destabilizing factor in our relationship. I asked if he were willing to discuss this in private diplomatic channels, rather than begin negotiations in publicly acknowledged talks. Dobrynin said that they were willing. We both agreed to think about how to organize these exchanges and who should participate, and then discuss this subject again.

I turned aside his questions about the possibilities to discuss a nuclear freeze and the CTB, noting again that the former is simply not a good idea and that the latter has profound verification problems. When he pressed on the CTB issue, I told him I would inform you of any new ideas that the Soviets might have on the subject.

I then said we plan to table our CW draft in Geneva later this month and hope to have a new proposal in MBFR by the end of the round on April 16 in Vienna. In this regard, I told him that if the Soviet side reacted positively to our steps in MBFR, there could be some further motion in the Western position. On CDE, I said we were glad to see the substantive discussions between Ambassadors Goodby and Grinevskiy, noting Goodby's invitation for Grinevskiy to come to Washington. Dobrynin said Moscow would decide on whether Grinevskiy should come.

On the Hotline talks, I noted we had recently conveyed technical information to them and looked forward to

meeting at the end of April. (Dobrynin and his deputy seemed surprised we had not been informed by Moscow of a starting date.) I also told him we were working on a draft agreement that we hoped to pass to them before that meeting. Dobrynin said that sounded fine.

Dobrynin then again moved to the Middle East, saying we needed an exchange of views on steps to greater stability in the region and to work for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He noted these discussions could be "very secret." I said we were ready for discussions on regional problems, but that we would need to set an agenda of the issues to be discussed and decide who would participate. I told Dobrynin we were interested both in sharing information and working on damage limitation to avoid potential crises between us, noting that the Iran-Iraq war was a good subject for discussions. We need to start modestly, I said, to see if progress can be made, indicating I had in mind something along the lines of Chet Crocker's talks with them earlier on Africa.

Dobrynin and I agreed we would give them our ideas on an agenda for regional discussions and the level of the talks. I stressed that even if we have our experts conduct some of these talks, it would be important that Gromyko and I keep close control of these discussions through our respective ambassadors.

On bilateral affairs, I said that we would talk with them this month on our ideas for revitalizing some of the bilateral agreements (on agriculture, health, housing, and the environment) currently in effect. To Dobrynin's questions about expiring agreements and fishing quotas, I said we would have to study them on a case-by-case basis. When I raised the Consulates issue, Dobrynin said they also wanted to talk about Aeroflot. I told him we would discuss

that only as a separate issue. I also said that the shutdown of the KAL plane was still an emotional issue in the United States and they should take some positive steps on our suggestions in Montreal for improving the Pacific air routes.

When I asked about the building for our Kiev Consulate, Dobrynin noted that Art Hartman is planning a trip there soon and would be able to get an answer on the building question. I noted we would propose the text of an exchanges agreement in the next two weeks and suggested that the Consular Review Talks resume in Moscow in May. Dobrynin agreed. When I also mentioned we would propose a new time for the Coast Guard search and rescue talks, Dobrynin seemed unfamiliar with them but agreed to raise this with Moscow.

I noted his positive remarks to Art on the Maritime talks. Dobrynin said yes, he thought that progress could be made.

I then said that Dobrynin had suggested only three areas on the agenda, we had a fourth—human rights. I noted the positive reaction here to the emigration of the Pentecostals, suggested it would be useful for them to take further steps on human rights, noting the case of Shcharanskiy. Dobrynin said his position on this was well-known. When I again suggested something in the human rights area would be helpful to the overall relationship, he said he had been telling American Jewish groups that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would help on the emigration issue.

Finally, Dobrynin asked if you would be responding soon to Chernenko's letter. I said a letter would be forthcoming, but we wanted to hear what Dobrynin had to say and what Gromyko had to say to Art Hartman in Moscow the

following day before discussing a reply. I then once again urged that the Soviet side reconsider its position on the START and INF talks, emphasizing the central importance of this issue.

When Art met with Gromyko on Tuesday,⁵ Gromyko seemed most interested in southern Africa and outer space. He read Art an oral statement on southern Africa, emphasized the value of past discussions of this subject, and seemed interested in having Chet Crocker talk with them further. He restated Dobrynin's points on ASAT, suggesting we had no interest in discussing space issues. Art repeated my points that we do not want negotiations, but that we were willing to have confidential discussions. It was clear Gromyko was not completely informed of Dobrynin's discussions with me of this issue.

I have attached a separate memorandum laying out next steps to be pursued in our dialogue with the Soviets.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1984 (3). Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Reagan on April 13, McFarlane wrote: "You will note that Dobrynin took a somewhat more receptive line on several issues than we have been hearing from Gromyko in Moscow—and markedly more positive than current Soviet public stance. I believe we should be cautious about accepting his attitude at face value, since he has a personal incentive to put the most favorable gloss on Soviet policy, and to push the idea that we can get further dealing exclusively with him. Nevertheless, we should not totally exclude the possibility that a policy debate continues in Moscow, and that Dobrynin's more forthcoming comments on some issues

may reflect that, at least in part.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984)) Reagan initialed the cover memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Monday, April 2.

³ Attached to [Document 197](#).

⁴ For Reagan's letter transmitting the report, see “Arms Control for Antisatellite Systems, letter to the Congress”, March 31, 1984, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1984, p. 48. For the report, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 204-219.

⁵ Telegram 4074 from Moscow, April 3, reported on Hartman's April 3 meeting with Gromyko. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005-0326)

⁶ Attached but not printed.

210. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 6, 1984

SUBJECT

Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter

We have drafted a response to Chernenko's March 19 letter (attached),² taking into account my meeting with Dobrynin last Monday, Art Hartman's exchange with Gromyko last Tuesday,³ and the guidance you provided in NSDD-137 on nuclear arms control strategy.⁴

The letter serves a number of the policy objectives you stressed at the March 27 NSC meeting:⁵

- it counters the Soviets' arguments about an alleged U.S. "threat" by describing some of the Soviet actions and military programs which make them appear a threat to us;
- it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to arms control and our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements; and
- it attempts to reassure the Soviets we are not a threat, and to "get Chernenko's attention," by expressing our readiness to consider in the CDE a non-use of force undertaking if the Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building measures we have proposed.

On this last point, the Soviets at all levels have been asking for just such a "concrete signal" from us. Although they are now giving somewhat more attention to outer space arms control, they also have been signalling for months that they consider our attitude toward non-use of force as a kind of

litmus test of U.S. "seriousness" in the arms control field. Chernenko's April 4 message to the Socialist International cited non-use of force once again.⁶ By highlighting our willingness to move in reciprocal fashion on this issue, therefore, our proposed letter provides tangible evidence for Chernenko of your commitment to moving the relationship forward.

The Soviets today invited Jim Goodby to Moscow for consultations with his Soviet counterpart; we are now working on the dates. This would be an opportunity to begin exploring the idea.

Jim Goodby is confident that our Allies will support our pursuit of a trade between non-use of force and CBMs at the next round of the CDE. In fact, the Allies and he have been planning on the Western countries agreeing to a working group discussion of non-use of force—which would represent implicit acceptance of it. Gromyko, however, may try to obscure the significance of our willingness to have working group discussions unless we broach the idea directly with Chernenko—only through the letter can we ensure that you will get credit for our move.

Without this language on CDE, there will be nothing in this letter to get Chernenko's attention. Pending your approval of the proposal, we have put the relevant language in brackets.

In addition to the above, our proposed reply reviews the rest of our arms control agenda (our paramount interest in START and INF; our disappointment that the Soviets have failed to take up the offer of private exploratory exchanges; and our desire for progress on CW and MBFR). The subsequent discussion of regional problems takes into account Gromyko's interesting *démarche* on southern

Africa⁷ and my agreement with Dobrynin to more intensive exchanges on regional issues, including the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The letter concludes with paragraphs on bilateral issues and human rights, noting in particular your regret at Chernenko's failure to respond to your appeals for humanitarian gestures.

Bureaucratic Considerations: In NSDD-137, you requested a letter to Chernenko be drafted focusing on START and INF—the flexibility we have shown to date, our readiness to reopen talks anytime, anywhere, etc.—and refuting Soviet allegations about the U.S. threat. We believe our draft, while perhaps not going into all the detail envisaged in the NSDD, fulfills its main requirements without neglecting other areas of our agenda. For this reason, we believe that this letter should be sent now, and that it not be coordinated with the other agencies. Based on previous experience, reaching consensus in the SACPG on anything specific will take weeks if not months. Moreover, I believe strongly that, as a general rule, the drafting of Presidential correspondence should not become the province of the bureaucracy. Of course, as constructive ideas develop from the process launched by the NSDD, they can be incorporated into other letters to Chernenko.

A Final Point: A Supreme Soviet session has been called for early next week, and it is widely anticipated in Moscow that the meeting will “elect” Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium, the titular Head of State. Thus our draft includes bracketed language congratulating Chernenko on his new appointment, and addressing him as “Mr. Chairman.”⁸

If you approve our proposed reply, I would envisage having Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow next week. I would at the

same time call in Dobrynin to give him a copy, as well as to continue our discussions of last Monday.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached reply to Chernenko's March 19 letter.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490488, 8490546). Secret; Sensitive. According to a typed note on a memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the memorandum was sent to the White House via courier at 4 p.m. on April 6. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

² The draft is attached but not printed. The final version of the letter, sent to Chernenko on April 16, is printed as [Document 211](#).

³ See [Document 209](#) and [footnote 5](#) thereto.

⁴ See [Document 206](#).

⁵ See [Document 203](#).

⁶ For a summary of this message, see Serge Schmemmann, "Chernenko Affirms Soviet Stand on Reviving the U.S. Arms Control Talks," *New York Times*, April 5, 1984, p. A14.

⁷ See [footnote 5](#), [Document 209](#).

⁸ In telegram 4494 from Moscow, April 11, the Embassy reported: "As expected, the April 11 Supreme Soviet session named Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840237-0672)

211. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, April 16, 1984

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary Shultz.² I welcome the fact that you too recognize the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

First of all, I would like to reiterate my congratulations upon your assumption of the new and responsible position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I look forward to productive working relations with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our peoples.

In looking at the present state of affairs between our two countries, I believe it will be useful to reflect upon our differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by your people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany, but I cannot understand why our programs can be considered threatening. On the contrary, in our view there are many Soviet actions and military programs which we and our Allies consider to be threatening to our own vital security interests.

For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near our borders, and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan, in close proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.

Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the United States and our Allies. This build-up may initially have been designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has nonetheless continued unabated.

Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, five new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and at least thirteen modernized versions of existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater numbers.

In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only nation to deploy an active anti-ballistic missile system; moreover, your deployment of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide ABM

defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns we have raised with you have not been alleviated.

As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to the United States and our Allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater threat to the security of the western alliance—both in quantitative and qualitative terms—than previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.

These are some of the realities of the international situation as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I doubt, however, that we can make progress in reducing the tensions between our countries, or in reducing the high levels of armaments, if either of us is unwilling to take into account the concerns of the other.

As for myself, I am prepared to consider your concerns seriously, even when I have difficulty understanding why they are held. I am willing to explore possible ways to alleviate them. But solutions will elude us if you are unable to approach our discussions in the same spirit, or if you demand concessions as an entry fee for the discussions themselves.

As for the negotiations now underway, I believe the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity for both our countries to take steps to reduce some of the

apprehensions about each other's military activities. I was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances against the use of force and the context in which such an agreement can be reached. You have asked for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms control, and your representatives have specified that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I am pleased that our Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.

There are many other arms control topics where we hope to move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid basis for progress on the related issues of data and verification. In the Conference on Disarmament, the Vice President will table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons on April 18. In addition to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.

While the foregoing issues are important, and while there may be other arms control areas—including those raised in your letter—where steps forward could be made, we have always considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced proposals that would substantially reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons systems on both sides. We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet shown such flexibility, or taken advantage of the opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in the START and INF negotiations.

I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the “obstacles” that supposedly stand in the way of further negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context of an agreement between the two sides.

Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our representatives to sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that is consistent with the security interests of both our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating further the meaning of “equality and equal security.”

I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might have on how to proceed.

I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the objective of establishing a more productive dialogue on regional issues. I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more detailed discussions of developments in southern Africa—as Foreign Minister Gromyko has suggested—because there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the states in the area, and of all those who value stability and prosperity there.

The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of your personal commitment to

seeking an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.

To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our interest in supporting this principle of international law serves all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the area.

With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral agreements. My representatives will continue to present specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.

I must add that I am disappointed that you did not respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues.³ Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will continue to give them serious consideration.

To conclude, let me state once again that the United States is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into

our dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in this direction. Real progress, however, will require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

I look forward to receiving your comments on the thoughts I have expressed.⁴

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April-June 1984. No classification marking. The letter was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Reagan on April 6. See [Document 210](#).

² See [Documents 197](#) and [199](#).

³ See [Document 190](#).

⁴ In a handwritten note at the end of the letter, Reagan wrote: "P.S. Mr. Chairman, In thinking through this letter, I have reflected at some length on the tragedy of scale of Soviet losses in warfare through the ages. Surely those losses which are beyond description, must affect your thinking today. I want you to know that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the Soviet people. The truth of that statement is underwritten by the history of our restraint at a time when our virtual monopoly on strategic power provided the means for expansion had we so chosen. We did not then nor shall we now. Our concern and urgent purpose must be the translation of this reality into a lasting reduction of

tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that goal.”

212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 17, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, April 16, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon. I gave him your letter to Chernenko,² made a few points about your thinking in sending it, and touched on some of the doubts we have concerning Soviet willingness to move forward with us. I also suggested a number of concrete forward steps we could take in the near future. I noted that discussions could continue with Ken Dam and Rick Burt in my absence between Wednesday and May 3.³

In presenting the letter, I told Dobrynin that you value your private exchanges with Chernenko. You were disappointed with the tone of some recent Soviet statements, including Chernenko's April 9 interview with *Pravda*,⁴ but you want to use this correspondence to move things forward.

I said that you had been giving thought to the Soviet charge that our programs threaten them, and therefore went into some detail in your letter about the legitimate grounds we have for seeing a threat in Soviet actions and programs. Nevertheless, I said, the most important thing is that both sides take into account the concerns of the other.

I drew special attention to your hand-written postscript as evidence of your thinking and testimony to how deeply you feel.

Going over the highlights of the letter, I pointed to your treatment of the Stockholm negotiations as a direct response to points Chernenko had made: we are prepared to discuss reciprocal assurances on non-use of force if they are prepared to negotiate seriously the confidence-and-security-building measures we have proposed. Chernenko had referred to this in his *Pravda* interview and called for a concrete signal in arms control; you had now provided this signal. In this connection, I said that we accepted their invitation to Ambassador Goodby to come to Moscow for further discussions.

On START and INF, I said you had reiterated that we are ready to move forward in private discussions and have some ideas, and that we fail to understand why they will not engage us confidentially on these central issues. They must realize, I said, that making removal of our missiles a precondition for further talks is a non-starter.

On MBFR, I noted you had said we hope to present some new ideas before the end of the current round in Vienna.

On chemical weapons, I pointed out that the Vice President would be tabling our draft treaty in Geneva Wednesday, and gave him a copy of the text.⁵ I said we considered our draft to be a constructive proposal, although we know it will be hard to negotiate, since verification is a very serious problem. On the other hand, the issue itself is serious. Since World War I, use of these weapons had stopped until very recently, and although the Soviets disagree with us about use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, we should both recognize the danger that use in the Iran-Iraq war presents. In addition to discussions in the Geneva conference, therefore, I said we had some thoughts to present on a bilateral basis if the Soviets were ready for such an exchange.

At that point, speaking personally, I said I had encouraged efforts to move US-Soviet relations forward, but had to say frankly that I was not sure the Soviets were ready. We had seen polemics out of Moscow, a "deep freeze" in their language, which made me wonder about Soviet readiness to move. I told Dobrynin there were plenty of people who were ready to offer their analysis of current Soviet behavior; but in government discussions I stressed that we should not speculate, and that we should make an effort to improve things. This was especially true in the area of nuclear weapons, where neither side should lay down preconditions.

Moving to outer space arms control, I recalled that during our last discussion I had given Dobrynin our report to the Congress on this subject, and had thought he had agreed to beginning private discussion with me on this topic.⁶ However, Art Hartman's conversation with Gromyko April 3 had suggested otherwise.⁷ Dobrynin objected that I had been very negative, and that he had come away with the impression that we would only listen in any confidential discussions. I replied that we were not predisposed to be negative, but that verification would remain a very difficult problem in this area; we were willing to talk without preconditions, but the verification problem would not go away. This exchange left me unsure whether the Soviets are prepared to accept discussions on this basis.

I then raised a subject I told Dobrynin he wouldn't like: human rights. Your letter expressed disappointment that Chernenko did not respond to the appeal in your March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues, and this was a real concern. We were pleased with reports that scientist David Goldfarb may soon be allowed to leave, and that binational spouse Yuri Balovlenkov has been asked to submit his papers. We hope he and others like him will be permitted to

join their American spouses. But the Shcharanskiy case remains unresolved, and we have concerns about both Sakharov and his wife.

Referring to the language in your letter on regional issues, I then turned to them, and said I had two proposals to make:

—On southern Africa, Gromyko had suggested to Hartman that another round of discussions would be useful, and I said Assistant Secretary Crocker would be prepared to meet with a Soviet counterpart in a third country in late April or early May.

—On the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I suggested that Dobrynin and I meet for a special session accompanied by experts, and that he might wish to have someone come from Moscow for this purpose. In response to his question, I said I would be ready after my return from Asia, and reiterated the importance of talking about the Iran-Iraq situation in light of chemical weapons use there.

I then raised a number of bilateral issues:

—On new consulates, I said we would be ready to begin discussing details as soon as Rick Burt returned from Europe at the end of this week.

—On minor consular issues, I said we expect to have ideas for another round next week.

—On an exchanges agreement, I said I hoped Art Hartman would be able to table a draft text in Moscow next week.

At our last meeting, Dobrynin had asked about bilateral agreements expiring this year, and I gave him a status report:

—On fisheries, I noted that we had agreed this week to extend our agreement for eighteen months, and that we are looking at what else might be done in this area.

—On the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement, I said we expected to have a response for the Soviets soon, and I was optimistic about the possibility of an extension.

—On the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement, I said the Navy expected to propose renewal during the regular talks scheduled for May in Moscow.

—On the World Oceans Agreement expiring in December, I said we would be reviewing it in our normal process.

We touched briefly on our hotline upgrade talks, and here I pressed for a Soviet response to our proposal for another round at the end of the month. Dobrynin said he expected no problems, but it is being reviewed “in our White House,” so it is impossible to predict with certainty.

Dobrynin asked if I had checked with you about our position concerning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. I said I had, and the position remains unchanged.

Finally, after reading your letter, Dobrynin asked what the language about Soviet unwillingness to take advantage of opportunities for discussion on START and INF referred to. I said it referred to discussion in our private channel.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13-04/18/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan’s initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an April 16 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: “We have prepared the

attached memorandum to the President on your meeting with Dobrynin.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) The State Department copy indicates Burt drafted the memorandum.

² See [Document 211](#).

³ Shultz accompanied Reagan on visits to China from April 26 to May 1, then South Korea from May 1 to 2.

⁴ In an information memorandum to Shultz dated April 9, Burt provided analysis of Chernenko’s *Pravda* interview, noting that the “thrust of Chernenko’s remarks on the possibilities of improved U.S.-Soviet relations can only be considered as unhelpful. They reflect a special Soviet sensitivity to and fixation with the possibility that the Administration might win public relations benefits from a supposed U.S.-Soviet thaw without paying Moscow an appropriate price. We will doubtless continue to hear this theme in one form or another throughout the year. At the same time, however, Chernenko also makes a special point of denying that the Soviets are in any way trying to wait out the 1984 U.S. elections. His reply that the situation can improve whenever the American leadership shows ‘realism and a responsible approach to relations with the USSR’ may have been generated to deflect such Western criticism, but also has the effect of leaving open the door to such improvement—even with the current U.S. administration still in office. Not surprisingly, Chernenko reaffirmed a Soviet hardline on START/INF, putting the onus on the U.S. and NATO to ‘take measures to restore the situation.’” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) For the text of the April 9 interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 234–238.

⁵ For a record of the Vice President's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1984, pp. 40-43.

⁶ See [footnote 4, Document 209](#).

⁷ See [footnote 5, Document 209](#).

213. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Sakharov Plans to Go on Hunger Strike

Elena Bonner, Sakharov's wife, has left with our Embassy in Moscow several documents "to hold until her return". They indicate that Sakharov had planned to begin a hunger strike April 13 and to request our Embassy to offer Mrs. Bonner temporary refuge during the hunger strike.² His goal was to obtain a positive response to Mrs. Bonner's longstanding request for permission to go abroad for medical treatment. A medical problem—phlebitis—apparently caused him to postpone the hunger strike. Mrs. Bonner is due back May 7 from Gorkiy, Sakharov's city of exile, and there is a strong possibility that he will begin the hunger strike shortly thereafter.

A Sakharov hunger strike would receive enormous world attention. We would come under great pressure to grant Mrs. Bonner the refuge Sakharov requests, which would further complicate matters. It would be very difficult for the Soviets to give her exit permission while she was staying in our Embassy. Moreover, once having taken refuge in our Embassy, Mrs. Bonner would be unable to play a decisive role in seeking to end Sakharov's hunger strike, and the life-threatening consequences would be even more acute. The major diplomatic confrontation that would ensue would very likely bring the rest of our dialogue to a standstill which, depending on the outcome, could endure for some time.

I think that the best chance for heading this off is for you to make a personal appeal to Chernenko to grant exit permission to Mrs. Bonner. She has been abroad twice before for medical treatment and there appears to be no problem such as state security which would keep her from going again. If we were able to tell Mrs. Bonner that such a private request had been made, we would have a good chance at persuading the Sakharovs not to undertake public steps, such as the hunger strike and request for refuge, which would undercut your efforts. A draft letter is attached for your consideration.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 16-30, 1984, Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R.F. Smith; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and G. Matthews (HA). Smith initialed for Simons and Matthews. This drafting information appears on the covering action memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly to Shultz. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. A typed note at the top of the covering memorandum reads: "Memo from Secretary to President LDX'd to White House on 4/18 —2045 MVS."

² In the covering action memorandum to Shultz forwarding this memorandum to Reagan, Kelly noted: "There is convincing evidence (Tab A) that Sakharov plans to go on a hunger strike soon and to request the U.S. government to provide temporary refuge for his wife." Kelly attached at Tab A telegram 4699 from Moscow, in which the Embassy reported: "Before departing for Gor'kiy on April 12, Elena Bonner gave EmbOffs 'for safe-keeping' copies of three separate appeals drafted by Sakharov: one to Chernenko, one to the USG, and one to 'friends the world over.' In the

appeals Sakharov announces the beginning of a hunger strike and asks, inter alia, that the USG grant Elena Bonner temporary refuge in the Embassy for the duration of the strike. The hunger strike, announced for April 13, was presumably delayed." The telegram continued: "Bonner made it clear that she was not at this moment asking for any action on the appeals." The Embassy warned: "There will be great public pressure for us to grant refuge should the hunger strike take place and Sakharov's request be made public." The summary concluded: "Given the current low ebb in our relations with the Soviets, we expect our involvement would be ineffectual, merely stiffening the Soviets' resolve not to appear to give in to foreign pressure. The Soviets might welcome the prospect. As we observed during the prolonged stay of the Pentecostal families, to shift some of the public pressure from themselves to the United States, with Bonner's presence here attributed more to a lack of will on our part than to Soviet intransigence, our inclination is to try to persuade Bonner, if she raises the issue, that our participation would not serve a useful purpose."

³ A signed copy of this letter was not found; it is unclear if it was sent.

**214. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, April 20, 1984

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Current State and Next Steps

I have the following thoughts on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, which you may wish to consider in case there is discussion on the subject with the President and Secretary Shultz during the China trip.

1. The public stonewall the Soviets have erected to our positions is disappointing, but should not be unexpected. In my view, we are on the right course both in dealing with them, and in positioning the President on the high ground for the political debates which will intensify this year. Both objectives will be served by continuing our position of leaning forward, short of course of making major substantive concessions without a quid pro quo.

2. Although Malcolm McIntosh's analysis is in general very accurate,² it seems to me that he may underestimate the intensity of the debate which I believe is going on in the Soviet leadership over policy toward the U.S. The odds are that he will prove to be right that the Soviets will be unable to change course importantly before late next year. But, given the debate, the pressures on the Soviet system, and the differences among personal interests of the principal players (and we can only guess at the precise nature of

these), we should not exclude the possibility that some fundamental decisions could be made this year.

3. Attempting to maximize whatever chance still exists for the Soviets to deal with us seriously this year is fully consistent with the requirements of our public diplomacy—which should remain our top priority in the coming months.³

4. The President's desire to meet with Chernenko during the Olympics now seems increasingly impractical. Does he still exclude the possibility of working toward a meeting in connection with the U.N. session in September?⁴ That obviously presents problems of timing, but it is probably more realistic than hoping for an opportunity at the Olympics.

5. The Soviet handling of the Olympics will in fact be an important element in the relationship. If they stay away, they will step up propaganda to a degree that a shift in the tone of their dealing with us will have to wait a certain cooling off period. This raises the question of whether we should do anything else to attract them to the Olympics.

a. I start from the premise that we have already bent over backwards to meet their demands, and should go no further. Certainly, we should not handle their participation in any way that presents a serious security threat, or that smacks of groveling to persuade them to attend.⁵

b. On the other hand, being familiar with Soviet psychology, I must say that the leadership probably has serious concerns about the potential for harassment of their team and officials, and takes seriously the campaign by private organizations to lure their athletes away. They probably

believe that many of these activities have official USG connivance.

c. Given this attitude, we might wish to consider two steps—which could be taken in early May—which might operate to alleviate some of the concerns:

(1) The President could write Chernenko assuring him that his Olympic team will be welcome and will be treated in full accord with principles of the Olympic Charter. The letter should be carefully drafted to avoid any implication that he is begging them to come, but I believe that such a message could have some effect on the Soviet decision, particularly if it were made public.⁶

(2) Word could be passed through Dobrynin that if any senior Soviet officials desire to attend the Olympics, we will be pleased to arrange appropriate invitations for them. This would imply that their counterparts here would invite them, and would also convey the implication that we do not plan to stage any “provocative” (in their eyes) actions which would embarrass them.

6. We should also consider carefully whether we should make one more effort to suggest an overall framework of interaction for the rest of the year. I could, for example, test such an idea with Zagladin in May. We would obviously have to think carefully what we put in it, but a package which should be attractive to them might include:

a. renewing START and INF negotiations along the lines Scowcroft was willing to discuss;

b. the CBMs/NUF trade-off at Stockholm;

c. submitting TTBT and PNET treaties for ratification, subject to some further arrangements on verification; and

d. beginning negotiation of some aspects of ASAT (e.g., weapons directed at high orbital systems).

Such a package would go far to address those items on the Soviet agenda which are not *prima facie* pernicious. It should be clear, of course, that what we are suggesting is a package deal, and that the sequence will be important (e.g., we must get back to INF and START before there can be negotiations on any aspect of space systems).⁷

7. If we can do it, I believe an unofficial but authoritative proposal along these lines would get serious consideration. While the Soviets have to work themselves out of the policy corner where they have positioned themselves, I believe they recognize the President's strength of leadership and, behind all their hurt feelings rhetoric, they would like nothing better than to demonstrate that they can deal with him. But Chernenko has to be able to argue that he is getting something, or else the charge that he is only helping the man who wants to do them in will prevail.

8. The idea of suggesting a meeting in Moscow of an interagency team from here to review the U.S.-Soviet agenda (and determine whether a Gromyko-Shultz meeting would be useful before the UN session in September) might be useful in this context. I understand that Rick Burt has suggested to Secretary Shultz that a team including Burt, Rodman, Perle and myself go to Moscow for a tour d'horizon and counterpart meetings. If accepted by the Soviets, such an effort might not only clarify Soviet intentions on some of the issues, and their willingness to consider a more forthcoming stance, but also would provide an opportunity for a private meeting with Zagladin where some of the issues could be pursued more directly and unofficially. (Alternatively, of course, there are other ways to arrange such a meeting if the Soviets desire one.)

Obviously, these matters require a good deal of thought, but I offer them now because I believe that if we are to move at all along these lines, it should be no later than sometime in May.⁸

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations April 1984 (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Although the memorandum is uninitialed, McFarlane's marginalia (see [footnotes 3](#) through [8](#), below), indicate that he received it.

² Malcolm Mackintosh was a prominent British Sovietologist during the Cold War era, who served in the Foreign Office and then continued to advise the government on the Soviet Union and intelligence matters after his retirement. It is unclear to which analysis Matlock was referring.

³ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁴ McFarlane wrote below: "No."

⁵ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁶ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁷ McFarlane wrote in the margin: "agree."

⁸ McFarlane wrote at the end of the memorandum: "Jack—The Pres would benefit from an analysis of the internal personal political interplay going on in the Kremlin now as it affects foreign policy. Could you prepare that please working with whomever you think best. Bud."

**215. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of
the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, May 8, 1984

SUBJECT

Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement

Once again another U.S.-Soviet agreement is up for reactivation or renewal. Once again the issue appears all by itself and out of context. Renewal of such an agreement seems innocent enough. It does not appear to pose the risk of a technology transfer hemorrhage, nor does it appear to pose a significant hostile intelligence threat. Its political impact seems relatively insignificant: not too many people pay attention to meetings between environmental officials at the Under Secretary level.

The problem with this is that it is part of a pattern of a wide variety of agreements that are appearing before us for renewal one by one.² The real policy question here is whether this is a pattern to which we want to subscribe at this time. Other issues which form the pattern include: the reactivation of U.S.-Soviet Health agreements, the U.S.-Soviet Fishing relationship, the Agricultural Cooperation agreement, the agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, the Consular agreement, the Exchanges Agreement and others. (The ones listed are only those which have appeared in recent weeks.)

Taken together, these add up to a relationship of wholesale cooperation with the Soviets that amounts to a revival of

the "detente" relationship established by President Nixon. These types of agreements were to help diminish the fundamental political tensions between the two systems not only by their intrinsically cooperative nature, but because they formed a web of relationships which were organically linked so as to provide a system of incentives for the Soviets to behave in a more moderate fashion. Fully recognizing that we had more to offer the Soviets in these various fields than vice versa, the threat of U.S. withdrawal from these accords was to serve as the stick accompanying the carrots. Even though it was recognized that these agreements were not truly reciprocal, it was nevertheless part of the price we were willing to pay to supply both the positive and negative incentives of a "linkage" policy so as to encourage in particular Soviet good faith in arms control.

If somebody is articulating the philosophy behind the current renewal of U.S.-Soviet agreements, I have not heard it. Perhaps the strategy underlying this has appeared in secret documents which I have not seen. What I have been able to see is a rather underarticulated policy of "intensified dialogue." But, this expression cannot explain an entire foreign policy strategy.

Is the current policy a repetition of the Nixon policy of "linkage" and incentives? Or are we willing, as it appears, to give more and more carrots to the Soviets regardless of their external behavior?

Today they are conducting a major escalation of their attack on the innocent people of Afghanistan. Yet the reactivation of the Environmental agreement as well as others involves lifting of Afghanistan sanctions which, though imposed by President Carter, we have chosen to retain for three and a half years. The Soviets are harassing

the Sakharovs with new intensity. They have rejected countless of our good-faith efforts to get them to return to several negotiating tables in spite of their dubious record of treaty compliance. On top of this, their policy seems pointed, as much as ever before, toward an open attempt to take sides in a U.S. presidential election. How else to explain their decision to pull out of the Olympics?³

Under these circumstances, I believe the entire package of agreements should come under review and should be postponed until such time as the Soviets are willing to take even a few steps—much less move halfway—toward reaching some kind of mutual code of behavior with us.

Unless we begin to treat these agreements more directly as part of the entire strategic relationship with the USSR, and in doing so link them to Soviet external behavior in a way that establishes a coherent system of incentives, the Soviets will interpret our actions as signs of weakness and will have no incentive to mitigate the various types of aggression which they and their proxies are currently conducting around the world. Clearly we must continue our efforts to demonstrate that we in fact want peace, but the challenge we face in trying to do so involves avoiding adopting the position of a supplicant for Soviet good will.

From a variety of indications, the Soviets appear to believe that they can paint the President as a warmonger to assist his electoral defeat and by tarring him this way, induce him to make concessions in symbol if not substance. They are looking to see if we are conscious of the nature of the signals we send them and if those signals are ones of strength or weakness.

Renewing agreements in the absence of a clearly defined and articulated strategy will only be seen as a sign of

weakness—especially a sign that we fear their anti-Reagan propaganda campaign so much that we are willing to reach even for Environmental agreements in hopes of mitigating it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Subject File, Soviet (6). Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it, and he wrote in the margin: “Good paper. Many thanks.”

² Shultz and Dobrynin discussed a number of these agreements in their April 16 meeting. See [Document 212](#).

³ See [Document 217](#).

**216. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, May 8, 1984

SUBJECT

Soviet Turndown on Meeting with Soviet Scientists

The Soviet rejection of your invitation to meet with visiting Soviet scientists Velikhov and Sagdeyev is one additional example of Soviet reluctance to do business with us on anything but their own terms.² The Velikhov turndown, coupled with Dobrynin's failure to date to respond to your offer of private space arms control discussions may indicate the Soviets want renewed ASAT negotiations and nothing else. We are continuing to work in the interagency ASAT group to come up with an agreed Administration position on space arms control as quickly as possible.

The Soviet rejection was foreshadowed this weekend by Soviet behavior at a conference on the ABM Treaty sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists.³ The conference sponsors invited Brent Scowcroft to attend the dinner opening the conference. Scowcroft joined Velikhov, Sagdeyev, Paul Warnke, Bill Colby and others at the head table. At the end of dinner Velikhov quickly excused himself, passing up the opportunity for an after-dinner conversation which the sponsors had hoped would ensue. Instead, Velikhov left a member of his delegation, one of Arbatov's deputies, for an extended discussion with Scowcroft.

It was also apparent during the conference that the entire Soviet delegation had little latitude for discussion. They repeated standard Soviet positions and refused to be drawn into anything which might foreshadow their position in future negotiations. With few exceptions the delegation passed up nearly every opportunity to explore specific ABM Treaty-related issues in depth, much to the frustration of the American sponsors.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1-May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft on May 4; cleared by Pascoe and Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on May 8.

² In a telegram to Shultz, Dam informed him: "Rick Burt is sending you a cable raising the possibility of your meeting with the Deputy Head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Yevgeniy Velikhov, but in the end advising a meeting at the Schneider/Burt/Howe level. You should be aware that I will be seeing Velikhov at a purely social dinner, an invitation accepted by my wife as an opportunity to practice her Russian. EUR sees no problem with my attendance at this affair.

"You might consider meeting with Velikhov. You won't have many opportunities to meet with a Soviet who is very well connected with the Soviet leadership, doesn't work for Gromyko, and has a solid record as a scientist, academic, and government official. I am told he is a very articulate spokesman for the Soviet line on SDI, space arms control, etc. You might keep this thought in mind as you read Rick's cable." (Telegram Tosec 40050/118238 to Shultz, April 21;

Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840006-0129)

³ The Soviet scientific delegation was scheduled to be in the United States from May 4 to 11. They attended a symposium sponsored by the Federation of American Scientists, "Defending the ABM Treaty," from May 4 to 7, and participated in the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences from May 8 to 11. (Telegram 112642 to the Mission in Geneva, April 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840253-0271)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 9, 1984, 1040Z

5689. Subject: Moscow's Olympic Boycott—A Morning After Analysis.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Three main factors lay behind Moscow's decision to boycott the Los Angeles games.² The proximate cause of yesterday's announcement, however, was probably a new development neither side could have foreseen in advance.

3. Soviet misgivings about participation in the Games have been evident for some time and have their roots in the following:

—A lingering desire to pay us back for “spoiling” the 1980 Moscow competition;³

—Traditional concerns over defections of athletes;

—The growing incompatibility of participation with Moscow's efforts to portray U.S.-Soviet relations as in a state of crisis due to Reagan administration policies.

4. Of these, the first must be considered a constant which, while it set the emotional backdrop for the May 8 decision, would not have been sufficiently compelling in its own right to precipitate it. The last factor has taken on increasing importance as Moscow's calculated sulk has deepened, and was probably a major factor in deciding to stay home. The defection problem has in all likelihood assumed greater

prominence over the course of recent months, as Soviet plans for dealing with the problem (their “Olympic attaché”) have been upset and they may have begun to believe their own scare stories about concerted FBI efforts to encourage defections and anti-Soviet demonstrations. We reported last week a dissident-based report that Ustinov and the KGB were lobbying hard against going.

5. It seems likely that these three sets of concerns came together last month (presumably when the leadership, its party/government house in order after Andropov’s death, had time to focus on the issue) to produce the first hint that the Soviets would stay away—their April 10 call for an emergency IOC meeting. In the wake of the Lausanne meeting two weeks later, however, Soviet Olympic officials were upbeat in assessing prospects for attendance, specifically denying Moscow would participate in a “boycott.” Soviet media criticism of preparations subsequently adopted a less hostile tone, and even began featuring coverage of athletes preparing for the Games. We had word from Soviet contacts in a position to know that training was continuing through last week, and that athletes were planning on being in Los Angeles. All of this suggests that, as recently as a week ago, there was strong internal support for participating in the Olympics, and that those favoring staying home had not yet carried the day.

6. What probably tipped the balance in their favor and precipitated yesterday’s announcement was the early May failure of a Soviet exchange professor, Kozlov, to board a plane for the USSR after confused signals that he might wish to seek asylum in the U.S. The incident quickly got into the public domain, leading the Soviets to make public diplomatic protests of the USG’s handling of the incident.

7. It seems likely that the continuing Kozlov incident coincided with the final stage of Moscow's consideration of whether or not to attend the Olympics—a decision which would have had to be made no earlier than June 2. The impact may well have been to demonstrate that even a carefully selected, mature individual with a family in the USSR could not be relied upon not to become a media event. The potential for similar embarrassment of turning loose an entire team of young, world-class athletes amid the temptations of Los Angeles may thus have taken on an immediacy for Soviet policymakers it did not have before Kozlov's refusal to embark. In the context of the generally tough line on the U.S. currently prevailing in leadership circles here, it would have taken a strong, confident voice to have argued against a boycott. As we have seen too often of late, there is no evidence such a voice exists in the current leadership.

8. As to timing, it seems to us most likely that those opposing participation (and we have no reason to believe there were divisions within the Politburo itself on this point) wanted the decision announced quickly to cut off further internal lobbying on the issue. It is possible, however, that, knowing how difficult the move would be to explain domestically, the leadership calculated that an announcement on the eve of the Victory Day holiday—when patriotic fervor could be counted upon to be at a yearly high—might quell any doubts.

9. Comment: The impact of yesterday's announcement, of course, will fall most heavily on Soviet interests. Moscow's justification of its boycott is unconvincing, and the efforts the Soviets will presumably make to keep their allies and clients home seem likely to strain ties with those states. Coming on top of their action last week against Elena Bonner and Sakharov⁴ —to say nothing of their handling of

the KAL episode last fall—the move will reinforce perceptions of Soviet callousness with respect to world opinion, as well as of Soviet negativeness and of defensiveness on East-West issues. Without any help from us, in short, the Soviets have shot themselves squarely in the foot.

Zimmermann

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301-0204. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, the Mission in Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Bern, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

² On May 8, the Soviet National Olympic Committee announced that they were “compelled to declare that the participation of the Soviet athletes in the 23rd Olympic Games in the city of Los Angeles is impossible. To act differently would be tantamount to approving the anti-Olympic actions of the American authorities and the Games’ organizers.

“In adopting this decision, we do not have the slightest wish to cast aspersions on the American public or to cloud the good feelings that link our countries’ athletes.” The full text of the Soviet statement was printed in the *New York Times*, May 9, 1984, p. A16.

³ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "We knew the Soviets, with their sense of reciprocity, would have the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow on their minds. Nevertheless, we proceeded on the assumption that the Soviets would attend. After an April 24 meeting of the Olympic Committee in Lausanne, the head of the Soviet National Olympic Committee announced, 'There will be no boycott. That is our principal position. The Soviet Union never intended nor intends at the present to take a political decision of a boycott.' But on May 8, the Soviets reversed themselves, issuing a statement in *Tass* saying that the United States was conniving with 'extremist organizations' that aimed to create 'unbearable conditions' for their delegation and athletes, an apparent reference to their fear that anti-Soviet demonstrations by human rights activists would embarrass them in Los Angeles. We had, in fact, bent over backward to meet all the Soviet concerns and had developed a plan for 17,000 people to be involved in Olympic security." The Soviets claimed 'inadequate security for their athletes' and announced 'they would not attend the Olympics,' We denounced their action as unjustified and a 'blatant political action.' We knew that security was not the problem: the Soviet action was their way of retaliating against Jimmy Carter's decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow as a protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet statement implied that Moscow hoped to heighten tensions and hurt President Reagan's chances for reelection. That didn't pan out for Moscow." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 474-475)

⁴ The *Washington Post* reported that Bonner had been "placed under investigation for defaming the Soviet state" and barred from leaving Gorky. (Dusko Doder, "Sakharov Reported Fasting to Win Travel Permit for Ailing Wife," *Washington Post*, May 9, 1984, p. A28)

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 11, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, May 10, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this morning. He was accompanied by his No. 2 man, Sokolov, and Rick Burt was with me. He had asked to come in on instructions from Moscow to give some responses to proposals we had made.

The responses dealt with outer space arms control and opening new consulates in Kiev and New York, and he handed over papers (attached) on these two issues.²

After reading the paper on outer space, I commented that the two sides seem to have different ideas. We had proposed discussions without preconditions; they seemed to be proposing discussions linked to negotiations. While we were not necessarily negative on negotiations, he knew of our concerns on verification. But we would look at their paper and get back to them.

After reading the paper on the consulates, I commented that the Soviets seem to be making agreement on Aeroflot operations a precondition for moving forward. Dobrynin replied that this was not so; rather, they were proposing parallel or even later discussion of Aeroflot. They think they can satisfy our concerns on Kiev, and are prepared to help. At the same time, he said, opening consulates is more in our interest than theirs, since it would give us an "entirely new point" in the capital of the Ukraine. As a practical

matter—and he stressed that it was a practical and not a political matter—opening up in New York would not make much sense without Soviet travelers to take care of.

I then pointed out that there is a range of other issues where we are awaiting Soviet responses. I mentioned our proposals for bilateral discussions here in Washington on chemical weapons; for experts' talks on southern Africa; for an exchange on the Middle East; and for a concrete date to resume talks on consular housekeeping matters. I also noted we are awaiting a suggestion for a date to resume negotiations on the Pacific maritime boundary, and a lifting of their beach ban on our Moscow diplomats in response to the lifting of the ban on theirs in Glen Cove, New York. Dobrynin said answers would be forthcoming in due course.

Continuing, I said that on various other issues they had raised with us, our responses were pretty much in hand. However, I said, we have to ask ourselves whether it makes sense to move forward on them. We have to ask ourselves if Soviet policy is not to shut down meaningful U.S.-Soviet discussions at this point. If it is, so be it. In any event we are puzzled.

I then went on to raise three issues—the Sakharovs, the Soviet scholar in their Embassy, and the Olympics—where the problem is not just substance but what the Soviets are saying. On these issues, I said, we are not telling the Soviets what they should do, but we do expect them to stick to the facts.

On the Sakharovs, I pointed out that both I and Eagleburger had raised the issue privately with Dobrynin, and that these démarches were designed to encourage the Soviets to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical

treatment. In response, TASS had then alleged that U.S. Embassy personnel and Mrs. Bonner had coordinated a plan for Sakharov to go on hunger strike and for her to seek refuge in our Embassy. The fact is, I said, that U.S. officials did not at any time discuss either a Sakharov hunger strike or a Bonner temporary refuge with Mrs. Bonner. There is thus no foundation for the TASS statement.³ The facts in it are wrong. We had tried to handle the issue privately, not publicly, and the Soviets had blown it up. We think they made a mistake. Sakharov is a Nobel Prize winner, and Mrs. Bonner fought and was wounded in the War. But the point is that the facts the Soviets are stating are not correct.

On the Soviet scholar Kozlov, I said we have no desire to keep him in this country, and when we talked to him he did not indicate he wanted to stay. It was on that basis that we gave him permission to board the plane April 30. But the Soviets have now alleged through TASS that he was subjected to blackmail at the airport, isolated for a long time from their Embassy staff and ultimately prevented from departing.⁴ This is absolutely not the case, I said. The facts are that we talked to Kozlov to ensure that he was not being hustled out of the U.S. involuntarily; that there was at least one Soviet official present with him at all times; and that he himself decided not to board the plane despite repeated urgings by the Soviet official present. Once again, therefore, the facts are not as the Soviets allege.

On the Olympics, I said that this was once again a decision for the Soviets to make. If they changed their minds, their athletes would be welcome at the Games. But they have alleged through TASS that at the April 24 Lausanne meeting, the IOC found the complaints of their Olympic Committee to be just and substantiated; that U.S. authorities continued to interfere in affairs within the

exclusive competence of the Los Angeles Committee; and that U.S. authorities were conniving with extremist organizations which aim to create “unbearable conditions” for their delegation and athletes.⁵

The facts, I said, are that the IOC did not make the finding TASS describes; that the U.S. Government has not interfered in LAOOC affairs (nor has the LAOOC ever claimed it has), but has worked with the LAOOC on issues within the sole competence of the U.S. Government at the committee’s request; and that there has been no connivance with nor encouragement of these groups, that we have bent over backwards to meet all Soviet concerns, and have met them. I said I could run through a long list of facts about the tremendous effort we had made to meet Soviet concerns. For instance, we would have 17,000 people involved in Olympic security, and we were prepared to spend up to \$50 million to assure it, including \$500,000 for the Soviet ship alone. We had taken every imaginable step to ensure that Soviet athletes were safe and able to compete in the Olympics.

Overall, I said, it was hard for us to see how the effort we had undertaken over a year ago to make progress in our bilateral relationship was going anywhere but downhill. The concrete efforts we had made had been pretty much rebuffed. There seemed to be a Soviet effort underway to close down the avenues of U.S.-Soviet discussion. I said that I assumed our diplomatic channel would stay open, but noted on the other hand that they were not even permitting scientists like Velikhov to talk with us.⁶

For our part we believe that the right posture is to be reasonable, ready to talk, and ready to make progress whenever the Soviets are. But, I concluded, the picture from our point of view is bleak.

Dobrynin objected to this analysis. I had asserted that the Soviets are trying to cut off efforts to create better relations, he said. That was not the Soviet intention. They wanted "better, even normal" relations with us. This was, is and will remain the goal, regardless of the Administration in power here.

He said he could not see a single issue where the Soviets are saying no. The single exception was temporary: the agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and their Academy of Sciences, which Arbatov had received last-minute instructions not to sign as long as Kozlov was in the U.S. This agreement could be signed as soon as the Kozlov case was resolved. On all other issues, Dobrynin said, they think progress can be made.

On the comprehensive test ban, for example, all they were suggesting were negotiations, even if they did not reach conclusions, and the U.S. was refusing to talk. They are still awaiting our answer on the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement. They are prepared to deal with the Administration on everything, if we are willing to meet them halfway. This was true of nuclear testing, of consulates, of the hotline.

Overall, Dobrynin said, it seemed to the Soviets that this Administration was seeking to cut all ties with the Soviet Union except in agriculture. My conclusion that the Soviets are seeking to cut ties is wrong: they are prepared for better relations; but he had to ask where we are prepared to move.

Turning to the specific points I had raised, Dobrynin started with the Sakharovs. Their "people" got the information that Mrs. Bonner had been to the Embassy and given us a letter asking to stay there during Sakharov's

hunger strike. Their government had to act on that information. It was a coincidence that it had acted while we were making our démarches. We had "three fellows" (i.e. U.S. Embassy officers) going around with this family. Mrs. Bonner was a Soviet citizen, not ours. And we are dealing with a woman with anti-Soviet intentions. The Soviets had treated Sakharov well. He was in a big city with all facilities. Mrs. Bonner had gone abroad three times for eye treatment, when everyone knows that Soviet eye doctors are the best in the world. And when she goes abroad she meets with people who are working against the Soviet Union.

On Kozlov, Dobrynin went on, Rick Burt had been there at the airport and asked him his intentions twice, and it was clear he did not want asylum here. The Soviets had now brought in two doctors, and appreciated our giving them visas. Kozlov had been in California on his own, and they had had no contact with him until he arrived in Dulles. Burt pointed out that he had in fact been with a Soviet official on his trip across the country. I cut this short by commenting that we were not trying to keep Kozlov, and that his case had been handled in the proper way. Nevertheless, Dobrynin went on, we are still insisting on an interview; he asked what our aim could be, and what we would do if Kozlov said he wanted to stay here. In the end, however, he suggested that Burt and Sokolov be in touch to work out the case, and we will continue to talk with the Soviet Embassy about this matter, ensuring that Kozlov's rights are protected.

We also had a discussion of ratification of the nuclear testing agreements. I will be reporting to you separately on this issue.

Attachment

Summary of Papers Provided to Secretary of State Shultz by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin⁷

Washington, May 10, 1984

POINTS HANDED OVER BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

The question of *preventing the militarization of outer space*, as was emphasized by the Soviet side in the course of recent contacts, is acute and urgent. Solutions to this effect must not be delayed. Hence, the need to hold appropriate negotiations with an aim of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

In this regard, we would like to be clear as to the real position of the U.S. side. It is all the more necessary, since initially the U.S. side declared its negative attitude to an exchange of views on the issue of preventing the militarization of space, although later it did express in general terms readiness to discuss this problem without any preconditions. It is also known that two months ago the U.S. government in its report to the Congress maintained that it did not deem it necessary to enter into official discussions on the space issue. Should it be understood that the said position is now becoming invalid? For it is obvious that those two things are incompatible.

So, if the previously declared negative position of the U.S. is discarded, we propose that the two sides, in parallel and simultaneously, make an official statement to the effect that they have agreed to begin discussions of the problem of preventing the militarization of space.

The discussion through diplomatic channels should accordingly be focused on coming to an agreement, with no time lost, on the practical questions concerning the time of

the negotiations, their venue and the level of representatives or delegations. We believe that no difficulties should arise in this respect.

It would seem that in the course of this exchange of views the agenda of the negotiations could be agreed upon in more specific detail. As has already been said, we prefer that there should be a comprehensive and full scope discussion and solution to the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Our specific views in this regard have been outlined to the U.S. side. At the same time, we do not rule out the possibility of discussing, for example, the question of a mutual complete renunciation of anti-satellite systems separately, in parallel with the negotiations on the problem as a whole.

It is clear that in order to ensure the necessary conditions it is important for the sides not to take actions contrary to the goal of the negotiations, that is, to refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons into space. For our part, we have been doing precisely that.

Regarding the *consulates-general in New York and Kiev*. On the question asked by the U.S. side with respect to the buildings earlier allocated for a U.S. consulate-general in Kiev, we can say that in principle this is a solvable problem. The main thing, however, as has already been indicated, is that the practical usefulness of the opening of the consulates-general will be considered in the light of the attitude of the U.S. side to the resumption of Aeroflot flights to the U.S. Again for purely practical reasons, this also applies to some other matters in the area of bilateral relations.

Accordingly, we shall be waiting for the results of the review of the question of Aeroflot flights, which was

promised by the U.S. side.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/09/84-05/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. On a covering memorandum to Shultz from Burt, a typed note reads: "Sec/Pres delivered by Secretary 5/11 cdj." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, May 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) On May 11, Reagan had two meetings related to the Soviet Union. From 9:45 to 9:59 a.m., he met with Ambassador Hartman in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) He wrote in his diary: "He believes there is friction in the Polit Bureau [Politburo] & Gromyko is much of our problem. He doesn't feel I could have any success in appealing to the Soviets to come to the Olympics." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 346; brackets are in the original) Later that afternoon, Reagan met with Shultz and McFarlane from 2:05 to 2:25 p.m. They were then joined by Casey until approximately 2:40 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: "George S. & I met with Bud M. It was mainly a report by George on his meetings with Soviet reps.—Ambas. Dobrynin etc. They are utterly stonewalling us." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 347)

² One paper, not two, covering both outer space arms control and the consulate issues, is attached and printed below.

³ The statement was released on May 4. (Serge Schmemmann, "Tass Says Sakharov Wife Sought U.S. Haven," *New York Times*, May 5, 1984, p. 7)

⁴ The statement, which reported that the Foreign Ministry delivered a protest to Hartman, was released on May 2. ("Moscow Charges U.S. With Detaining Soviet," *Washington Post*, May 3, 1984, p. A36)

⁵ See [footnotes 2 and 3, Document 217](#).

⁶ See [Document 216](#).

⁷ Secret; Sensitive.

219. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Sakharov

Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth day.² In view of his fragile health, time is already running out for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike. According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr. Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.

The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the Sakharovs:

—We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with Dobrynin).³

—The Department has released two public statements condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.⁴

—We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third World capitals to request the help of host governments and international political organizations in convincing the Soviets to cease their pressure on the

Sakharovs. Some governments have already responded, and there is a possibility that Mitterrand may precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's case.

—We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.

—We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow will not take place as planned.

—USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

—We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.

—Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of an upcoming trip to the USSR.

Action Plan for Additional Efforts

In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.

—At this time we do not recommend that you make either a private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response, both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation. The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on Sakharov.

—We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international nature of concern about the Sakharovs.

—We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades,⁵ to determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation short of tragedy.

—We will also be going privately to other governments who have persons the Soviets want (such as the West Germans and the Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their part to trade for Sakharov.

—We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.

—I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20–22 trip to Moscow.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84–05/21/84). Secret. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane reported: “George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving—in full consultation with us—to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.” Reagan initialed the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Sakharov began his hunger strike on May 2 because his wife, Elena Bonner, was not permitted to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment. The Politburo extensively discussed Sakharov’s hunger strike and Bonner’s medical situation from April to July 1984. For documentation on these Soviet deliberations, see Rubenstein and Gribanov, eds., *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov*, [Documents 169–175](#), pp. 284–298.

³ See [Document 218](#). On May 2, Burt called Sokolov regarding the Sakharov case. (Telegram 129312 to Moscow, May 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840286–0384)

⁴ On May 8, the Department of State spokesman issued the following statement regarding the Sakharovs: “The Department of State is strongly concerned about press reports that Andrei Sakharov has been on a hunger strike

since May 2 and that his wife, Elena Bonner, has been charged with slandering the Soviet state, which could lead to as much as three years' confinement. The refusal of the Soviet authorities to reveal any information about the present welfare and whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence to these reports. Dr. Sakharov has been trying for many months to obtain permission from the Soviet authorities for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment, something she has been allowed to do three times before. He has apparently been driven to this extreme action by the continued refusal of the authorities to even respond to his requests. The Soviet handling of this matter has been inhuman and incomprehensible."

(Telegram 135441 to various Western European posts, May 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840300-0373)

⁵ Wolfgang Vogel was an East Berlin lawyer with contacts in the East and West who engaged in "spy trading" during the Cold War. See Craig R. Whitney, "Spy Trader," *New York Times Magazine*, May 23, 1993.

**220. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, May 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Phone Call to Dobrynin on Sakharov

As you know, Andrei Sakharov is beyond the two-week point in his hunger strike. I had an idea, which I have discussed with George Shultz, who agrees, which might make a difference in Soviet thinking. Basically, we propose that you call Dobrynin (as opposed to a meeting which would attract attention) and make a plea for the Soviet leadership to reconsider. I have worked up talking points (attached). If you agree with this, the sooner you have an opportunity to do it, the better. No one, and I stress no one, knows about this except George and me. It seems to me best that it stay that way.²

Attachment

Talking Points for President Reagan³

Washington, undated

TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN

—Anatoly, I would have asked you to come and see me, but I know what I have to say touches on a delicate subject, and I thought it best to give you a call so we don't risk any press attention.⁴

—Would you let Chairman Chernenko know that I'm very concerned over the situation that has developed with Mrs. Bonner and Sakharov.

—I've been careful not to make any public statements, because I don't want anyone to get the idea that I am bringing public pressure on your government.

—But, you know, if a tragedy occurs, it could have the most serious implications for our relationship. I wouldn't be doing my duty if I didn't point this out while the situation can be resolved.

—The fact is that the American people will never be able to understand why a sick woman shouldn't be allowed to travel abroad to get an operation. And if either of the Sakharovs dies under present circumstances, that will make a lot of things more difficult than they are already. I think you will agree that relations are bad enough as it is.

—So I hope you'll pass these thoughts on to Chairman Chernenko. Let him know also that I consider this a purely private conversation. If he makes a humanitarian decision, he can be sure that I won't mention this conversation in public and I certainly won't try to claim any credit or use it politically.

—You know, I had really hoped that our relations could be improved. We have some real problems, but I've made a number of decisions which I hoped could start us on a better road.

—Right now I'm puzzled by your government's actions. I just don't understand why we can't get down to business and settle some of the problems between us.

—Let your people know that I'm still willing to try to settle our problems if they are. I keep being asked to make some new gesture, but every time I make one, they slap me in the face. And, you know, I could ask the same. But we'll never get anywhere if we keep up this "Alphonse and Gaston" act.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84-06/01/84). Secret.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke to Dobrynin on Saturday, May 19, from 9:53 to 10:03 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation was found.

³ Secret.

⁴ In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote: "On May 19, a Saturday morning while I was at home, I got a call from the president himself from Camp David. He said he wanted to make a personal and confidential request to Chernenko to permit Bonner to leave for medical treatment. Some reports said that she was in very poor health, and God forbid that she should die now. If so, Reagan thought, angry American public opinion would drive our very difficult relations to the lowest conceivable level. Reagan remarked that he did not question the high level of Soviet medical science, but, 'What if she dies in the Soviet Union? There will be no end of trouble. If she is to die, let her die here. At the very least, nobody, hopefully will blame me for that.' Reagan added in a conciliatory tone that, of course, he was not in a position to judge just how critical Bonner's condition was but he was acting only on unofficial information he had. I promised to relay his request to Moscow promptly. I considered Reagan's intervention as something of a goodwill gesture." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 552)

221. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11-10-84/JX

Washington, May 18, 1984

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

—We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain

uncompromising on many issues. There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet "war scare" propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the

growth of Soviet military capabilities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States. [*portion marking not declassified*]

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political

struggle over the rest of the decade. [*portion marking not declassified*]

DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1983. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events:

—*INF response*: Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of patrols by E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast [*less than 1 line not declassified*]; forward deployment [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start of deployment [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

of 925-km range SS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.

—*Response to NATO exercise*: Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted “Able Archer-83,” a nuclear release command post exercise.

—*Soviet exercises*: Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 [*1½ lines not declassified*] featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivability training including the dispersal of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] operational Northern Fleet SSBNs supported by a large number of ships; and the use of survivable command, control, and communications platforms, possibly in a transattack scenario.

—*Berlin air corridors*: Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.

—*Afghanistan*: Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panjsher Valley, and initiation on 21 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.

—*East Asia*: Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first

time; positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.

—*Caribbean*: A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.

—*Troop rotation*: Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities listed above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we address five explanatory hypotheses:

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated across the board to achieve political effects through posturing and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies; to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by “peace” groups on

Western governments; and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan's reelection prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington's rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventuality.

c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military action in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to alarm, but to desensitize the United States to higher levels of Soviet military activity—thus masking intended future moves and reducing US warning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership have lessened policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

—To create a tense international climate that fosters “peace” activism in the West and public pressure on Western governments to backtrack on INF deployment, reduce commitments to NATO, and distance themselves from US foreign policy objectives.

—To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.

—To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been supplemented with the boycott of the Olympic Games. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued consumer deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society. This message is also being disseminated [*less than 1 line not declassified*] within the Soviet and East European [*less than 1 line not declassified*] bureaucracies, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]:

[*12 lines not declassified*]

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is

largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. First, we believe that there *is* a serious concern with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and momentum of the US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow condemns INF deployment as a telling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at “regaining military superiority.” *The threat here is not immediate, but longer term.* However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. Secondly, in our judgment *the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military.* There is a healthy respect for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime’s ability to manage competing military and civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this

perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future. [*portion marking not declassified*]

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcefully than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past half year. [*portion marking not declassified*]

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

- The Soviets have not initiated the military readiness moves they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.

- In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.

—Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within regime circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.

—In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitriy Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be “over-dramatized” (although Ustinov’s recent Victory Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unleash nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. *Intimidation?* It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences:

—The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of strike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.

—The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgency

but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries
—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

—In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences. [*portion marking not declassified*]

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world *is* a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own. [*portion marking not declassified*]

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort continues. In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam. [*portion marking not declassified*]

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets avoiding threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

—Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to evade a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had come for emergency repairs.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—Took no tangible action in March when one of their merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.

—Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of “good will.” [*portion marking not declassified*]

16. *Reaction to US actions?* The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them—although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a “reactive” element. [*8½ lines not declassified*] A key issue is whether this counterexercising takes on the character of actual preparation for response to a perceived threat of possible US attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to “Able Archer-83.” This was a NATO command post exercise held in

November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises. [2½ lines not declassified] The elaborate Soviet reaction to this recent exercise included [2½ lines not declassified] the placing of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness [2½ lines not declassified]. Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert, [3½ lines not declassified]. Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack. [portion marking not declassified]

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the trends they may display, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what novelty or possible military objectives the Soviets may have read into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not charged a US intent to prepare for imminent war. [portion marking not declassified]

20. *Preparation for surprise military action?* There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and manning practices or the introduction of new

airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator—a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degradation of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms. [*portion marking not declassified*]

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force is clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the force could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without forewarning or precursor political pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely. [*portion marking not declassified*]

22. [*1 paragraph (23 lines) not declassified*]

23. *Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism?*
The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This uncertain political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it could were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in the regime and military priorities remain high

for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here. [*portion marking not declassified*]

24. *A comprehensive pattern?* In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own military rationales and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet force development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiating various activities argue against orchestration for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States. [*portion marking not declassified*]

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and

political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF "counterdeployments," the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia). [*portion marking not declassified*]

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military activities indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigning have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that none of the military activities discussed in this Estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack. [*portion marking not declassified*]

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this Estimate would not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target. [*portion marking not declassified*]

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern

in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undercuts the Soviet power position in the world. [*portion marking not declassified*]

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term Western arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the military challenge posed by the United States. Warning of such actions could be ambiguous. [*portion marking not declassified*]

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

- a. The current mind-set of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.
- b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.
- c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 09T00367R: Intelligence Publication Files, Production Case Files, Box 3, Folder 32: SNIE 11/10/84/JX Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities. Top Secret; [*codeword and handling restrictions not declassified*]. A note on the cover page reads: "This Estimate is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs, except as noted in the text. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State." It also notes as participating: The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

222. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room¹

Washington, May 29, 1984

Soviets Desire Increased Tension with U.S.

[*1½ lines not declassified*] the President and his advisors have skillfully avoided a confrontation with the Soviet Union, be it verbal or otherwise. This has increasingly angered the Soviet Union, since Moscow wants to dramatize the international situation by provoking the U.S. into bellicosity which could then be portrayed to the world, and especially Western Europe, as proof that Washington is to blame for the present confrontational atmosphere.

- Moscow's goal is to create a climate of fear which would prompt at least one NATO country to call for a withdrawal of the Pershing and cruise missiles, and stir public opinion against the U.S.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] the U.S. had avoided Soviet efforts and defused opportunities for heightening international tension in what he characterized as a skillful manner. As two recent examples, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] cited the "clever" way in which the White House responded to Ustinov's recent announcement that Soviet missile submarines had moved closer to the U.S. in response to the deployment of the INF,² and the way the U.S. has handled the Sakharov affair so far.³ However, Moscow may deliberately aggravate the Sakharov affair in a continued effort to provoke the U.S.

- [*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/18/84-05/21/84). Secret. There is no drafting information on the note. The note is based on Intelligence Information Cable TDFIRDB-31512905-84. Reagan initialed in the upper right-hand corner of this note, indicating he saw it.

² The *New York Times* reported that on May 20 Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov said in an interview: "the Soviet Union had increased the number of missile-carrying submarines off United States coasts and that the missiles were within 10 minutes of American targets. Marshal Ustinov also said the number of SS-20 medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union would be increased 'accordingly' in the event that the United States proceeds with its plan to deploy additional Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe." (John F. Burns, "Soviet Said to Add New Subs Off U.S.: Missiles are Within Ten Minutes, *New York Times*, May 21, 1984, p. A1) For the full text of Ustinov's interview, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, no. 20 (June 13, 1984), pp. 8-9. An excerpt of the interview is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 417-419. The White House responded on May 21: "the Soviet Union's buildup of missile-carrying submarines off American coasts did not alter the balance of power. 'There has been no essential change in the strategic situation,' Larry Speakes, White House spokesman, said. 'The numbers don't change much.' He added that Soviet submarines had been operating in coastal waters for years, although he declined to estimate how many might be present. Mr. Speakes said the purported increase was part of a 'familiar litany' by which the Russians have been 'playing the arms control game.' (Wayne Biddle, "White House Plays Down Soviet Sub Threat," *New York Times*, May 22, 1984, p. A13)

³ See [Document 220](#).

223. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, June 6, 1984

In connection with your letter² I would like to express some thoughts in continuation of our exchange of views with you.

I, of course, took note of the pledge of commitment to the lessening of tensions between our countries made by you in the handwritten addition to your letter. In turn, I can affirm once again what I wrote in my first letter to you—namely, that it has been and continues to be our wish that there be a turn toward steady, good relations between the USSR and the USA.³ As a matter of fact, the numerous specific proposals submitted by our side, including those proposals put forward in my letters to you, have been aimed at reaching that very objective.

As regards interpreting a certain period in the history of our relations, about which you had already written once before, here our views differ. We have presented our point of view in this regard, so I will not repeat myself. I will note, however, that one side's having military superiority or seeking such superiority cannot be perceived by the other side as an indication of good intentions. There can be only one indication—a willingness to conduct affairs as equals, a willingness reflected in practical policies. The position of the Soviet Union in this regard is clear and precise: we are not seeking superiority, but we will not allow superiority over us. I do not see anything here that should be unacceptable to the United States, if one wants stability

and a lessening of tensions. It is from a position of equality that it is possible to agree on really mutually-acceptable solutions, when neither side can have reason to believe that it is making unilateral concessions.

I thought it necessary to point this out, having in mind the way in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are interpreted in your letter. I cannot agree with this. This has already been stated on our side in the past. But since you return again to the question of intentions and how they can be perceived, I will express a few opinions, illustrating them with specific examples.

If one is to sum up what on many occasions has been publicly stated by you and other representatives of the Administration, one concludes that the only situation that would be acceptable to the United States would be one in which it was militarily ahead of the USSR. The fact of the matter, however, is that such a situation has not been and is not acceptable to us. In this respect we have experience—bitter experience. The history of our relations, especially in the postwar period, has seen quite a few complications too. Quite a few attempts have been made to exert political, economic, and even military pressure on us.

Let us take the current situation. There is, it seems, an American idiom “to turn the table.” Try to look at the realities of the international situation from our end. And at once one will see distinctly that the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases. These bases are full of nuclear weapons. Their mission is well known—they are targeted on us. Nothing like it can be found around your country.

And what about the fact that entire regions of the globe have been proclaimed spheres of American vital interests?

And not only proclaimed, but made the object of a U.S. military presence. And this is done, among other places, at our very doorstep. And again we, for our part, are not doing anything like it. What conclusions should we draw from this as to the intentions of the U.S.? I believe the conclusions readily present themselves. Such an approach is nothing other than a hypertrophied idea of one's interests in which the legitimate interests of others are completely ignored, an effort to gain, to put it mildly, positions of privilege at the expense of the other side. This approach is not compatible with the objective of ensuring stability. On the contrary, such an approach as a matter of policy objectively helps to create and sustain tensions.

Or let us take strategic arms. Here, too, no claims can be directed toward the Soviet Union. The fact that there is rough parity between the USSR and the USA and, in a wider sense, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can be disputed by no expert familiar with the situation. The SALT-2 Treaty was a reflection of this fact. It was not the end of the road, and we did not consider it as such. But the merit of the treaty was, among other things, that it established, I would say, with mathematical precision the strategic balance that has evolved.

Your military experts can tell you that the Soviet Union has done nothing to upset this balance. At the same time we see what kind of attitude is displayed toward the Treaty by the other side. Is it not the criterion by which to judge its intentions?

The same applies as well to medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. I will recall only that it was we who offered to reduce their number to the minimum on the side of the USSR and NATO. In response, "Pershings" and cruise missiles are appearing near our borders. How would you

regard it, Mr. President, had something similar happened with respect to the U.S.? I believe that your assessment of the intentions of the other side under the circumstances could only be one—as regards both the other side's approach to negotiations and the essence of its intentions.

But even under these circumstances we have displayed and continue to display utmost restraint. The response we were forced to take, in terms of its scope and character, has not gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat posed to us and our allies. Moreover, we propose to return to the initial situation and, instead of further unleashing an arms race, to address ourselves in a decisive fashion to curbing the arms race, and to radically limiting and reducing nuclear arms. This is far from imposing conditions. As a matter of fact, what is unfair about the two sides cancelling those measures whose effect was to heighten the level of nuclear confrontation and, conversely, to lessen global security? There can be nothing unfair or damaging for either side in this. A return to the previous situation in the present circumstances would constitute forward movement by both sides toward stabilizing the situation, toward the practical renewal of the entire process of limiting nuclear weapons that is of decisive importance for the future of international relations and for peace as such.

So far, however, we see no indication that the American side proceeds from such an assumption. Regrettably, nothing new on this major issue of the day can be found in your letter either. I say this not for the sake of polemics, but rather in the hope that you will still find it possible to appreciate the way out of the extremely grave situation that we are suggesting.

From my correspondence with you, Mr. President, as well as from previous correspondence, one can conclude that, in general terms there seems to be an understanding on your part that there are a number of important questions concerning the problem of security which require solutions and where joint efforts by our two countries are necessary.

For my part, in my last message I specifically mentioned several of these questions.⁴ Let me remind you that these included renouncing the construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems, entering into negotiations on preventing the militarization of outer space and on banning anti-satellite weapons, a freeze on nuclear weapons, resuming talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and some other measures. In other words, we are not for dialogue in a general sense between our two countries, but propose to fill it with concrete, weighty substance. We are convinced that practical movement in these and other directions and mutual determination to achieve practical results would fundamentally ease the situation in our relations and throughout the world in general. The degree of trust would increase significantly.

But we have not received a response to these proposals that would enable us to say that the United States is prepared for such concrete actions. I will not make a judgment as to what is the problem here, but I am convinced that, seriously speaking, there is no good reason and, moreover, no justification for avoiding the solution of problems that can play a decisive role in determining the road the world will take in the near future. Awareness of this is growing on the part of the public and the leaders of many states. Graphic evidence of this is the recent appeal by the leaders of six countries from four continents to the governments of the nuclear powers.⁵ Mr. President, this

appeal is a very serious reminder, to our countries as well, of the enormous responsibility they bear for the destinies of the world and mankind. Our common duty is to respond to this appeal honestly, without delay, and through concrete actions. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for it.

In addition to those of our proposals already mentioned, I would also like to draw your attention to additional areas of possible cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace. One of these is the limitation of naval activity and naval armaments. This problem is very urgent; it is no coincidence that the United Nations has attached such importance to it as well. We have specific ideas on what could be done to reduce the growing tensions on the high seas, to ensure freedom of navigation and the safety of international sea communications. We have spoken in favor of discussing this problem within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or in separate multilateral negotiations. Taking into account the role of our countries, we also propose to discuss this set of questions on a bilateral basis. We would like to know your opinion on this score.

Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries recently made a proposal to NATO countries to begin multilateral consultations on the subject of concluding a Treaty on mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The essence and the importance of the idea of such a Treaty are well known. Attention to this proposal has been growing from the moment of its introduction. And here our two countries could also play an important part. We are ready to study any ideas the American side might have on this question.

The Soviet Union will, furthermore, do everything in its power to promote agreements on the problem of banning

chemical weapons and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Our delegations in Geneva and Vienna will be prepared to cooperate with American representatives. It goes without saying that, within the framework of these fora, we shall also express in detail our views on recent positions advanced by the American side. However, I have to note that the overall impression—and not only ours—is that these positions do not constitute a constructive contribution to the work already done in these fora.

Recently the Soviet Union introduced at the Stockholm conference a concrete and carefully balanced document directed at attaining a really significant agreement, which would fundamentally strengthen security on the European continent. In preparing this document, we took into account the opinions expressed at the first round of the conference as well as in the course of bilateral consultations, including those with American representatives. We would like to expect that in Stockholm the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.

As it has already been pointed out on our part in correspondence with you, we favor a bilateral exchange of opinions on regional matters. Our Ambassador is instructed to present to the Secretary of State more specific considerations on these and some other matters. Here I find it necessary to stress the main point: the need for restraint, for refraining from actions—no matter what their motives—which could only intensify dangerous tensions in various regions and make difficult the achievement of a just political settlement. The world has proven more than once that it is a hundred times more difficult to extinguish a fire than to prevent it. To remember this is in everyone's interests.

I do not want to conclude this letter on a negative note, but in view of some of the remarks in your letter, I must point out that introduction into relations between states of questions concerning solely domestic affairs of our country or yours does not serve the task of improving these relations—if this is our goal. I wish questions of such a nature did not burden our correspondence, which both of us, as I understand it, value.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Attachment

Talking Points From Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin⁶

Moscow, undated

First. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the solution of major questions, including new ones, set forth in the message of K.U. Chernenko would be of principal importance from the point of view of improving the Soviet-American relations and the international situation in general. Thus we again confirm in the practical way the line toward conducting a businesslike exchange of views with the Government of the United States with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on a wide range of issues in the Soviet-American relations. It concerns both the questions of strengthening security and ending the arms race as well as the area of bilateral relations.

Up till now, however, the American side acts in such a way that we do not see its readiness to go forward in practice to improving our relations, though quite a few words about such readiness have been said recently. The repeated

promises to do something positive are not followed by anything tangible as yet.

At the same time it is often said that the American side allegedly introduces some concrete proposals, but the Soviet side reacts to them negatively. It is stated even as if we consciously counteract to some constructive efforts by the Administration and do not want progress in our relations. It is obvious for us that the situation is just the opposite. It is not clear, however, why a deliberately false impression is created, if, indeed, there is a desire to find a common language.

It is known, by whose initiative the Soviet-American relations were brought to such a mediocre shape. If an unbiased approach is used, there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, not once we proposed to revive our relations and to fill them with concrete contents. These questions have been discussed with the Secretary of State many times.

If businesslike views in this regard were expressed by the American side, and promises of such nature were given many times, then, by all means, we would consider them with due attention.

We wish only that it could be something specific and not simply symbolics presented as something positive in the way of formal extension of some agreements which are in fact not working. For example, we are told for some time already that a question of allocating fishing quotas for us is being considered. But at the same time, as we find out, measures of the opposite nature are being taken. Is it not the decision on limiting the activity of the joint Soviet-American fishing company on the Pacific coast that speaks about it?

There are attempts to attribute to us the desire to curtail the contacts and ties, including the area of scientific and cultural exchanges. However, the situation here as well rests on the position and acts of the American side. It rests on its unreadiness to solve the question of providing security for Soviet participants in such exchanges and normal conditions for their presence in the US. It is a question of principle and it cannot be avoided. It is again proven by recent hostile acts against Soviet people in the US. The American side also avoids the solution of the question concerning the practical side of such exchanges, connected with the resumption of the flights by the Aeroflot to the United States.

Now the American side keeps some kind of rosters of questions, replies to which should be given by this or that side. But even if to approach the situation with this formal point of view, it still turns out that we constructively develop our position and introduce concrete proposals, while the American side limits itself to promises to think about something and to consider something.

On the Soviet side there is no lack of desire and efforts to really improve the situation in our relations. It is up to the American side.

Second. Questions of security.

The Soviet position on the question of *preventing the militarization of outer space* has been already presented quite clearly to the Secretary of State. We proceed from the idea that formal negotiations on this matter should start between especially appointed delegations. The organizational side of such negotiations should be discussed through the diplomatic channels. In other words now the question is this: is the American side prepared to

solve this urgent problem, which long ago has already gone because of its importance beyond the framework of the Soviet-American relations only?

A proposal has been introduced by the Soviet side that both sides should reject the very idea of developing and deploying *large-scale antiballistic missile defense systems*. We would be ready to discuss the means of realization of this proposal—for example to discuss the substance and the form of appropriate statements, the order of making them public, etc.

Our position with regard to the question of the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions is also clear. The treaties were carefully worked out including the part concerning control. They were signed and should be put in force. There is no necessity in any additional interpretation of any provisions of the treaties. The questions, should the sides have them in the future as the treaties are in force, could be considered and solved in accordance with relevant provisions of those treaties themselves. The issue now is only whether the American side is or is not willing to ratify these treaties. We favor doing this and as far as possible without further delay.

The Soviet side attributes great significance *to the banning of chemical weapons, to the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments in Central Europe*. These questions must be solved. Our specific considerations in connection with the latest proposals of the United States concerning these questions will be stated by the Soviet representatives at the appropriate forums.

However, it may be said even now that the American position, unfortunately, does not give hope. We would like

to think that the American side will properly take into account those observations and remarks which we and not only we shall express in Geneva and Vienna. There the Soviet delegations will be ready to maintain contact with the American side as before.

As for discussing these questions in some other manner, now there is no basis for that in view of the character of the latest American proposals.

Third. Regional problems. We repeatedly expressed our readiness to discuss with the American side regional problems named by it and other ones.

In this connection we are prepared to listen to the possible considerations of the American side in response to what has already been said by us on the South of Africa, and also on the situation in the Middle East and on the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the future, depending on the progress made, we could agree to hold certain special meetings of our representatives as well. We do not exclude this.

As we have already pointed out, it is especially important that restraint be shown, no actions which could exacerbate the situation be taken. This concerns the above mentioned as well as other regions.

Fourth. The Soviet side intends in the nearest future to propose the date of the next round of negotiations *on the convention line in the Bering sea*. We expect that the American side has analyzed the results of the previous round and could take the position which would enable us to come to a just and mutually acceptable solution of this question.

We also intend to convey in the near future our views concerning the negotiations on *cooperation in the search and rescue operations in the Northern part of the Pacific ocean*.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Dobrynin presented Shultz with this letter and the attached talking points during their June 12 meeting (see [Documents 224](#) and [225](#)). A routing slip indicates Reagan was given this package during his June 14 daily briefing.

² See [Document 211](#).

³ See [Document 183](#).

⁴ See [Document 197](#).

⁵ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 420–421.

⁶ No classification marking. A note in the upper right-hand corner written by an unknown hand reads: “talking points”

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.²

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech.³ But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm.⁴ Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propaganda campaign,⁵ while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with

bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an “equal.”

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some “specific considerations” on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs—meaning human rights—into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

—In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the “Chernenko agenda” as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval

armaments (a recent Gromyko “initiative”); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

—On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that “the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.” Dobrynin’s points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

—Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin’s points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue “in view of the character of the latest American proposals.” In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin—in his remarks—insisted so strongly that they “are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration,” and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the

substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30pm (3 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on June 13. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "Attached are a Memorandum for the President analyzing the communications you received from Dobrynin June 12 and talking points based on this analysis for your use with the President today. You may wish to give the President the Memorandum when you see him." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-June 30, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) In a covering note to Shultz attached to another copy of both memoranda, Armacost, who replaced Eagleburger in May as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, commented: "Mr. Secretary, A good set of talkers. I suspect the Soviets are mainly in a quandary due to unresolved issues within their own leadership. Keeping the pressure on makes eminently good sense. I believe a proposal on ASAT along the lines we discussed yesterday would further confound their attempts to regain some initiative." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive

Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1984)

² See [Document 223](#). For the June 12 meeting, see [Document 225](#).

³ Reagan traveled to Ireland from June 1 to 4, addressing the Irish Parliament in Dublin on June 4. After examining the major issues facing the United States and Soviet Union, he stated: "In summary then, we're seeking increased discussion and negotiation to reduce armaments, solve regional problems, and improve bilateral relations. Progress on these fronts would enhance peace and security for people everywhere.

"I'm afraid the Soviet response has been disappointing. Rather than join us in our efforts to calm tensions and achieve agreements, the Soviets appear to have chosen to withdraw and to try to achieve their objectives through propaganda, rather than negotiations.

"The Soviets seek to place the blame on the Americans for this self-imposed isolation. But they have not taken these steps by our choice. We remain ready for them to join with us and the rest of the world community to build a more peaceful world. In solidarity with our allies, confident of our strength, we threaten no nation. Peace and prosperity are in the Soviet interest as well as in ours." For the full text of this speech, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 804-811.

⁴ See [Document 211](#).

⁵ See [Document 217](#).

⁶ In his diary entry on June 14, Reagan wrote: "then a meeting with Geo. S. & Bud. We dug into the subject of a meeting with Chernenko. I have a gut feeling we should do this. His reply to my letter is in hand and it lends support to

my idea that while we go on believing, & with some good reason, that the Soviets are plotting against us & mean us harm, maybe they are scared of us & think we are a threat. I'd like to go face to face & explore this with them."

(Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 357)

225. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin June 12

I had an interesting 40-minute meeting with Dobrynin this afternoon, at which he handed over Soviet Embassy translations of Chernenko's reply to your last letter of April 16 and of some additional "talking points" on issues he and I have been discussing. The Russian original with our more accurate translation of the letter is attached along with their version of the talking points.² I read them over quickly at the meeting, and will be getting you my analysis of them shortly. At first glance they do not appear to move things forward very much, if at all.

After he handed over the Chernenko reply, I raised Sakharov. I said that you had told me about his call with the message from Chernenko,³ and that I thought everyone's interests, including theirs, would be best served if they could figure out a way to reassure people about the health of Sakharov and his wife. I suggested that Mitterrand's upcoming visit to Moscow might offer an opportunity for the Soviets to clarify the Sakharov situation.⁴

Dobrynin replied that they saw things differently, and the fact that Chernenko had replied to you directly and so quickly should be understood as a "gesture of good will," even though the Soviets consider Sakharov purely a domestic matter. Asking for more information casts doubt on Soviet credibility, he added. I said I was not questioning their credibility, but making the observation that the issue

was a real problem of concern to many people, especially scientists worldwide. He replied that the Soviets are prepared to live with the problem.

Turning to the letter and talking points, I said we would study them carefully and respond shortly. The problem, I said, is that we have been trying to do what we can to move the relationship in a positive direction, but cannot seem to get it off dead center. We have talked about revitalizing our bilateral agreements, we have made proposals in the arms control field, and we have suggested discussions on regional issues.

To take an example, on southern Africa we have a report that they had offered to discuss the issue with the British,⁵ yet it seemed unclear whether they were ready to talk with us. Dobrynin replied that if we had something to say on southern Africa, they were prepared to listen. I told him that on some regional issues we should be thinking of going beyond information sharing to damage control and even to trying to find mutual solutions.

Summing up, I reiterated that the general problem is how to get our relations off the ground and moving forward. If we could do that, I suggested, he and I and perhaps others might take a day and review the whole relationship. If no progress seemed possible on some issues, we could move on to others.

Dobrynin replied by saying that movement on bilateral issues should be easy. He said we had been discussing them for almost a year and a half without getting anywhere. I said our preparations to upgrade activities under the four bilateral agreements we had been discussing were ready. He replied there are no obstacles on the Soviet side.

Security and arms control problems were more difficult, he went on, but still he thought it should be possible to begin or renew negotiations on some of them. Our election year did not matter to them, he stressed. He had been hearing “tales” of the Soviets “hibernating” and accusations that they were interfering in our politics. The Soviets are not afraid to move ahead on bilateral issues and to begin negotiations on “big subjects.” It would be good to show the world that the “big boys” are talking, he said. “We are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration,” he concluded. He said he hoped we would study the messages, and that I would sit down with Gromyko in the fall at the United Nations and “get something done.”

I went back to Sakharov in conclusion, urging him to consider what I had said. He ended by saying that requests for more information raise the issue of credibility after Chernenko had given a substantive answer. Chernenko had only done so because the President himself had asked. I said it was not a credibility issue, but an objective and scientific fact about the importance of the problem.

Dobrynin said he would be going on vacation at the beginning or in the middle of July, in order to get to Moscow while Gromyko was still there. I said I would be going to Asia for two weeks in July. We agreed we should get together again before we both left town.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, NSC Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490695) (2 of 2). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See [Document 223](#). The original letter in Russian and talking points are attached.

³ Reference is presumably to the May 19 Reagan and Dobrynin telephone conversation. See [Document 220](#).

⁴ Mitterrand was scheduled to visit Moscow from June 21 to 23, but delayed confirmation of his visit pending Soviet assurances on Sakharov's health. In telegram 23178 from Paris, June 14, the Embassy reported: "Three days before the visit was announced, Mitterrand had lunch with the Soviet Ambassador and, according to press accounts, told him he would go to Moscow as planned, provided he received assurances that the Sakharovs were in good health. The Soviet response was the TASS announcement of the visit on June 4, followed two hours later by the TASS announcement on Sakharov which led shortly, as recounted reftel, to Elysée confirmation. So far as we have been able to ascertain the TASS announcement represented the sum total of Soviet assurances given to Mitterrand so far." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840386-0650) In his diary on June 26, Reagan wrote: "I forgot yesterday to note that I called Pres. Mitterrand about his trip to Moscow. Very interesting. He said Chernenko gives evidence of not being well & doesn't say a word without a script in front of him. He believes the Polit Bureau [Politburo] is kind of a collective in charge." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, pp. 361-362; brackets are in the original)

⁵ In mid-June, the Soviets and British held bilateral discussions on Africa in Moscow. (Telegram 13812 from London, June 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840397-0010)

**226. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, June 15, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet Military Priorities

Jeremy Azrael has called my attention to a most interesting interview which appeared in *Red Star*, May 9, by Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff.² He prepared a memorandum for Secretary Shultz, a copy of which is attached at Tab I,³ and I believe you will find his observations of interest.

First, Ogarkov's comments on nuclear war are entirely consistent with our conviction that the Soviet General Staff is *not* fearful of an imminent U.S. first strike.⁴ Although the interview is directed at a military audience, and therefore would be expected to convey an air of confidence, his categorical statements that nuclear war makes no sense comes very close to an explicit endorsement of MAD. It is particularly interesting in this regard that he does not dwell on the alleged threat of the Pershing II's and GLCM's in Europe.

A second striking feature is his treatment of ET.⁵ The emphasis he gives it implies that he sees developments along these lines as his greatest future worry.

It would be foolhardy to attach too much significance to a single statement. But this one is indeed food for thought.

As Jeremy points out, one of the questions it raises is whether we may not have more leverage in vigorous pursuit of ET in the conventional area than in the strategic nuclear area. Going somewhat further afield with speculation, one can also read in Ogarkov's treatment a recognition that the Soviet economy cannot support competition across the board and may have to make some agonizing decisions on priorities. This *could* mean that the Soviet military may not be as rigid in opposing strategic arms reduction as many assume. Even if this should be the case, however, we should understand that the most likely reason will be a desire to have more resources available for ET.

I have asked the Agency to be alert for any further commentary in Soviet military literature which reiterates or supports Orgakov's themes.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron June 1984 (06/15/1984-06/20/1984). Confidential. Sent for information.

² For an extract of the interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 391-394.

³ Tab I is attached but not printed. In a covering note to Shultz on a Department of State copy of the memorandum, Rodman wrote: "I believe you will find the attached memorandum from Jeremy [Azrael] well worth reading. Among other things, it highlights a number of questions that you might want to take up at a 'Saturday seminar' on Soviet affairs." Per Shultz's request on June 26, a slightly revised version of this memorandum was sent to Weinberger, Casey, and McFarlane on July 2. (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/ Correspondence from the

Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P
Chron's PW 6/16-30/84)

⁴ See [Document 221](#).

⁵ ET: emerging technologies.

**227. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to President Reagan¹**

Washington, June 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Secretary Weinberger's Views on an ASAT Initiative

Following your meeting last week with Secretary Shultz in which he proposed that he be authorized to agree to the Soviet proposal to open "discussions" which would lead to "negotiations" on limiting weapons in space, George and I met with Cap on Friday to discuss how to proceed.² It became clear that Secretary Weinberger was worried that such discussions could be unwise not only in light of severe verification problems but as well because we might want to pursue certain highly sensitive programs which would give us the ability to neutralize certain Soviet satellites in time of crisis. Cap will discuss these with you this afternoon.³

I am aware of these programs and they do offer promise. But we must keep one fundamental truth in mind. You are under tremendous pressure from the allies and the Congress to open some kind of talks on ASAT. In addition to the French initiative in Geneva opposing your strategic defense initiative, every other leading ally (UK, Germany, Italy, the Dutch, Belgians and Danes) have lined up against us. Many of our warmest supporters on the Hill are also calling for talks and even a complete ban. Thus, we are simply faced with a legislated diktat if we don't regain the initiative.

In my view, having looked at the possibilities for negotiation (which protect our interest and are verifiable), we can discuss certain restrictions (particularly on high altitude systems) and should do so. The key is to shape the agenda (in the Shultz-Dobrynin channel) so as to limit the scope of the talks to things which are truly in our interest. Cap and the JCS ought to be heard on this issue.⁴ At today's meeting, I recommend that you: 1) Hear Cap out; 2) Note the mounting pressure which will lead to our being told to do things much worse than those we might choose on our own; and 3) Suggest that we agree to open discussions to shape an agenda in preparation for which he and the Chiefs would be given a full opportunity to limit the scope of any negotiations.

Such a plan would lead to:

—A joint announcement by us and the Russians this week that we have agreed to open discussions in August for the purpose of defining the scope, timing and venue of negotiations on limiting weapons in space.

—The interdepartmental studies would then be completed by August 1st so that you could take decisions on our position in the negotiations.

—In August, the “discussions” would begin probably leading to the actual “negotiations” opening after the elections, perhaps even next year.

Such a scenario would have the great advantage of preempting pending legislation which will be acted upon this week and next.

(Note: Please return this memo to me personally).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (03/09/1984–06/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-3-1. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Friday, June 15. No record of this meeting was found.

³ Reagan and Weinberger met on June 18 from 3:02 to 3:30 pm. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry for June 18, Reagan wrote: "Cap Weinberger came by—he's concerned it would not be to our advantage to discuss an antiweapon in space treaty with the Soviets. We are making progress on a defense against nuclear missiles." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 359)

⁴ See [Document 232](#).

**228. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, June 19, 1984

SUBJECT

Next Steps on US-Soviet Relations

In the wake of your meeting with the President last week,² that of Secretary Weinberger,³ a meeting of the Arms Control Policy Group and the forthcoming meeting this Friday between the President and the JCS,⁴ the following scenario seems to me manageable for reaching decisions on the arms control aspects of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin. While the specific content of any ultimate negotiations with the Soviet Union will have to await completion of ongoing work now scheduled to be completed by August 1st, there appears to be a high probability that the US will be prepared to enter a negotiation. The question is whether we should go ahead within the next week or so to agree to open "discussions" with the Soviets (perhaps in August) for the purpose of setting an agenda and agreeing on the timing and venue for the negotiations. I believe the President can make that decision following his meeting with the JCS, perhaps in an Oval Office meeting next Monday.⁵

At my morning session with the President today, he expressed interest in seeking to gain Soviet agreement to also open talks on improvements to verification in the TTBT/PNE context. He would like for you to explore this issue with Ambassador Dobrynin in your meeting tomorrow.⁶ The President's point is that notwithstanding

the Soviet walkout and their separate refusal to discuss verification issues in the TTBT/PNE context, we are willing to accept their proposal for discussions of ASAT arms control. The emphasis should be put on the Soviet attitude toward verification generally. In ASAT, we would be entering an area in which both sides acknowledge serious verification difficulties. There is a reasonable point to be made that the Soviets have an opportunity to demonstrate their appreciation of this issue and willingness to treat verification seriously by agreeing to open talks toward improved verification on TTBT/PNE. (Perhaps unsaid is the obvious point that absent agreement, we would be constrained to point to the Soviet refusal and call into question their seriousness in dealing with verification in the ASAT context. We would also continue to criticize their absence from the START and INF talks.)

The outcome of your dialogue with Ambassador Dobrynin and the President's meeting with the JCS will facilitate a decision making session with the President next Monday.

If you see problems with this scenario I would be pleased to discuss it at any time.

Robert C. McFarlane²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (3/09/1984–6/20/1984); NLR-362-3-20-6-8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Outside the System.

² See [footnote 6, Document 224](#).

³ See [footnote 3, Document 227](#).

⁴ On June 22, Reagan went to the Pentagon for a briefing by the JCS. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his

diary entry for June 22, Reagan wrote: "It was a briefing on where we are going weapon wise, communications & intelligence gathering. I can only say I left for the Oval Office filled with optimism, pride & a sense of safety." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 360–361)

⁵ June 25.

⁶ Shultz and Dobrynin met on June 20. See [Document 230](#).

⁷ McFarlane signed "Bud" above his typed signature.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)¹

Washington, June 19, 1984

SUBJECT
US/Soviet Tension

1. I attach here a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defense sector, security operations, political harassment, logistical steps, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.
2. The depth and breadth of these activities demand increased and continual review to assess whether they are in preparation for a crisis or merely to embarrass or politically influence events in the United States.
3. In the light of the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type, we will shortly begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report which will monitor and assess the implications of these incidents which we report on as they occur, but have not, thus far, pulled together in any systematic way.

William J. Casey²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, undated

U.S./SOVIET TENSION

The recent SNIE-11-10-84 JX examined a range of Soviet political and military activities that are influenced by Soviet perceptions or a mounting challenge from U.S. foreign and defense policy.⁴ Each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or political purpose consistent with developing military readiness or a "get-tough" policy to counter the current U.S. stance.

This summary will consider some longer term events that may cause some reflections about the kinds of actions the Soviets could orchestrate that would create a political embarrassment for the U.S. in the wake of deployment of INF in Europe. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater than it was before the INF decision, that Soviet vulnerability is greater and will grow with additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building U.S. defense budget, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in force readiness, and a potentially massive space defense program may be propelling the USSR to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace. There is a certain consistency and coherence in the symptoms of measures being taken that suggest central decisionmaking. Some of "civilian to wartime-type" of activity suggest a broad-based plan. These activities may all be prudent

precautions in a period of anxiety and uncertainty on the part of the Soviets. Some of the measures we perceive follow.

A. Media

Soviet media have portrayed the environment as dangerous to the domestic populace. The risks involved have been recognized in that in December 1983, the Soviets carefully modulated the tone to allay what appeared to be brewing hysteria. A message has been that the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations is comparable to those between Nazi Germany and the USSR prior to WWII and that the Soviets will not be surprised again.

B. Civil Defense

It is difficult to document an increase in attention to this area, but the civil defense exercise at Omsk in March in which 800 persons walked 50 km was without precedent in our knowledge. Civil defense remains an area of perennially high interest in the Soviet domestic media.

C. Security Procedures

—Leningrad has become a closed city to Western attaches. U.S., UK, French and Canadian attaches in Moscow have been denied travel to Leningrad on numerous occasions in 1984. The Soviets prevented attache travel by international visas from Helsinki to Leningrad to Helsinki in May 1984. Their willingness to ignore the international portion of that trip to prevent attache travel indicates high-interest activity in the Leningrad area and/or a critical time-frame.

—In May 1984, valid visas for 58 Americans planning tour travel of USSR were cancelled. Apparently, the decision was made by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The trip included a flight from Naples to Leningrad and it appears that those with defense security clearances were denied visas.

—According to the DAO Moscow, there has been an important change in the “political atmospherics” surrounding attache operations. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in particular, has become intense. The publication of an article in *Red Star*, 25 May 1984, against U.S. Naval Attaches suggests the Soviet campaign will be generalized and expanded.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] a Hungarian Ambassador at a non-European Embassy has forbidden all of his staff to have contact with Western officials.

—The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly issued a directive in late 1983 that officials abroad should terminate contact with U.S., British and West German officials.

—The changes in Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) in East Germany impose significant restraints on operations of the Allied MLM.⁵ Most of the training areas, major unit facilities (air and ground) and their observation vantage points are now in the PRA. The new boundaries effectively restrict the missions to autobahns when traveling any distance in East Germany. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] restrictions severely hamper the right to free and unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin agreements and similar agreements.⁶

—In June 1984, for the first time since 1972 a portion of the City of Potsdam was included in a TRA.⁷

—The Soviets continue to declare multiple TRA's in addition to the PRAs.

—There have also been other travel restrictions. In Poland, there has been a perceptible increase in surveillance of attaches in the southwest corner of the country (Wroclaw, Zegnia, Swietoszow, Zagan), but not elsewhere. There has also been an increase in instances of surveillance since late 1983.

—Three recent incidents occurred in Poland where army and security personnel detained NATO attaches and then forced them to drive through a military restricted area for posed photography. In each case, the attaches were detained on public roads in an apparently well-planned effort at intimidation.

—In the Soviet Union, *Pravda* articles in June called for greater vigilance of Westerners and Soviet dissenters. Other reporting indicates that harassment of Western reporters has increased. Soviet border guards are conducting more intensive searches of Western visitors.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] there has been a steady increase in civilian companies apparently enforcing discipline and improving "piece rates." The greater presence of guards and security people at defense-related production plants is also reported.

D. *Political Harassment*

—On 20 February 1984, the Soviets imposed new restrictions on Allied flights in the three corridors linking

Berlin to West Germany. Basically, altitude restrictions apply to the entire length of the corridors, rather than the central portions as had been the practice. New traffic-identification demands have also been made and met by the Allies.

—On 22 March 1984, an East German military vehicle rammed a French MLM vehicle killing the driver and injuring two others.

—On 18 April 1984, the Soviets briefly detained an eight-vehicle French Army convoy at an Autobahn Checkpoint.

—On 2 May 1984, a U.S. military train bound for Berlin was delayed by East German railroad officials.

—On 16 May, East Germans refused to pull a French military train to Berlin until the French protested to the Soviet Embassy.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] East Germany party official, the Soviet leadership wants to remind the West of the fragility of free air access to Berlin. East Germans look to take advantage of the Soviet behavior.

—On 8 June, the U.S. Consul General in Leningrad was called to a Soviet review of the assault on Ronald Harms on 17 April accusing the press coverage of being an exaggerated claim in a U.S. Government anti-Soviet campaign.

E. *Logistics*

The 1983 study of Soviet railroads concluded that the industry must improve its performance.⁸ The need for attention to the railroads is beyond question, but the new

campaign which features early completion of the BALCOM line adds a sense of urgency to transportation improvements.

F. *The Economy*

—There has been a significant reduction in production of commercial aircraft in favor of military transport production since about June 1982. DIA studies show commercial aircraft production down 14 percent in 1983.⁹ Not only are traditional Soviet aircraft customers not adding new aircraft of Soviet make to their fleets, but the Soviets are buying back civil aircraft from Eastern European airlines. The increased allocation of resources for military aircraft production is supported by DIA production data.

—Other changes under way in selected segments of the economy point toward shifts to military needs. The termination of military support to the harvest, by directive of March 1984, may say that the success of the harvest is less important than the maintenance of military capabilities at high readiness. Such a decision is consistent with a leadership perception that danger is present, but inconsistent with the alleged priority of the food program and stated Soviet concerns about internal security problems owing to shortages and consumer dissatisfaction.

—In December 1983, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] production of tank chassis at the Chelyabinsk tractor plant for the first time since World War II. A second plant has also converted from tractors to tanks. Since July 1983, the first new nuclear weapons storage facility in a decade is under construction at Komsomolsk. Throughout the USSR, floorspace for ammunition and explosives plants has been

expanding since about 1980 after a decline of several years' duration. In April, the East German ammunition plant at Luebben increased to full three-shift 24-hour production and has more than doubled its output. These developments cross several sectors of national economic life and indicate that decisions are being made consistently across economic sectors.

—The increases in production are complemented by developments in the factors of production, especially labor and management. These have been subjected to one of the most strenuous and long-lasting campaigns to improve performance and expand output ever undertaken by Soviet authorities.

—At the same time, there has been a cutback in Soviet support for the East European economies, Soviet demands for better quality products from them, and higher prices for Soviet exports. These trends became evident in the fall of 1980 during the Polish crisis and have persisted. Although there are many sound reasons for the trends, they complement those already mentioned.

—Rationing of key products may be affecting commercial interests. State-owned trucking companies in Czechoslovakia are reported operating far below capacity due to insufficient fuel rations allotted as of 1 January 1984.

—In Poland, Jaruzelski apparently has formally agreed with the USSR to give up civilian production capacity to supply the Soviets with more military hardware.

—In a Magdeburg, East Germany metal processing cooperative, there are resource allocation shortages and increased target plans for 1984. While the imbalance could

be blamed on poor management, the situation was exacerbated by a new bank law that prevents using state financial reserves since 1 January 1984.

G. Military Activity

—In June, DAO Moscow reported that rail movement in support of Soviet troop rotation, although with a slightly reduced volume, was continuing. (This extension also occurred during the last two rotation periods.) Extending the rotation seems to conflict with other Soviet efforts to minimize the impact of rotation, and the flow of personnel over three months would seem to disrupt programmed training.

—Other irregularities have occurred in the troop rotation. Past railroad rotation activity was marked by a regularity of arrival and departure times. This rotation has been scheduled inconsistently. Additionally, there have been a number of anomalies. Railroad cars have arrived at Weimar, East Germany with approximately 75 troops but departed with only 35. [*3½ lines not declassified*]

—The Soviets may, for the first time during peacetime, be keeping a portion of their nuclear forces in Eastern Europe on quick-alert status, using sites for their SS-22 brigades in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

—On 23, 24, 25 and 26 March 1984, approximately 3,650 Soviet troops arrived in Hungary.

—In June 1984, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that during the past 6-12 months additional SPETNAZ troops have arrived in Hungary. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] an increase of SPETNAZ forces in Hungary and

Czechoslovakia as well as an ongoing "aggressive indoctrination" of Warsaw Pact forces.

—[*1½ lines not declassified*] he is concerned about stockpiling of material and an increase in Soviet troop strength in Hungary.

—In Hungary, a recall of an undetermined number of reservists was under way in May 1984.

—In the fall of 1983, the length of service for Czechoslovakian Army draftees with missile/rocket specialities was reportedly extended from two to three years. The length of service for air defense draftees with missile training was similarly extended.

—In Poland, the length of required military service for new reserve officers was to be increased from 12 to 18 months effective in 1984.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] a mobilization exercise involving armed forces and territorial forces as well as civil defense elements is to occur in June in Czechoslovakia.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] since 1983, men up to 35 years old have been drafted without consideration of family difficulties or their profession.

—The Soviets have pressed for stationing additional troops in Poland. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] additional Soviet air elements are already sanctioned by the Poles.

H. *Intelligence Activity*

A spate of clandestine source reports have related the extraordinary intelligence directives that have been issued.

The thrust of these directives is to increase the authority of the intelligence agencies at the expense of career diplomats and to focus intelligence collection on survivability of networks and on warning. [2 lines not declassified]

I. Political Activity

—In external relations, Soviet activity has been intense. A series of relatively low-level harassments concerning Berlin air corridors and ground access to Berlin fall into this category and have the potential to become more escalatory. The Soviets have recently cancelled a long-standing commercial accord with the U.S. The level of official harassment of Western attaches is high throughout the Warsaw Pact, even including a shooting incident in Bulgaria. New travel restrictions have been placed on Western diplomats in the USSR.

—A message of dissatisfaction in U.S.-Soviet relations is clear, but more than the message the Soviets may actually be paying costs—surrendering commercial contacts and their own freedom of access. Activity resembles a calculated and careful withdrawal on multiple fronts; a limitation of exposure and vulnerability.

J. Military Behavior

The behavior of the armed forces is perhaps the most disturbing. From the operational deployment of submarines to the termination of harvest support to the delayed troop rotation there is a central theme of not being strategically vulnerable, even if it means taking some risks. It is important to distinguish in this category those acts which are political blustering and those which may be, but also

carry large costs. The point of blustering is to do something that makes the opponent pay high costs while the blusterer pays none or little. The military behaviors we have observed involve high military costs in terms of vulnerability of resources for the sake of improved national military power, or enhanced readiness at the price of consumer discontent, or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. None of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern that is often not reflected in intelligence issuances.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret.

² Casey signed "W.J. Casey" above his typed signature.

³ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

⁴ See [Document 221](#).

⁵ According to telegram 15109 from Bonn, June 7, a Soviet representative delivered a new permanently restricted area (PRA) map to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) at the Potsdam House on May 16. The "new PRA will severely hamper right to free unimpeded transit guaranteed under the Huebner-Malinin" agreement. (See [footnote 6, below](#).) (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840368-0687)

⁶ The Huebner-Malinin agreement, which officially established the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, was signed by the United States and Soviet Union in April 1947. It ensured the rights of each side to protect the interest of their nationals in the German zones of occupation and "complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both

zones except in places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.” (Ibid.)

⁷ TRA: temporary restricted area.

⁸ The study on Soviet railroads was not found.

⁹ The DIA studies were not further identified.

230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 21, 1984

SUBJECT

My meeting with Dobrynin June 20

We met for a little under three hours, and went through some 25 issues on the US-Soviet agenda. The meeting demonstrated that our dialogue is well enough established now for us to be able to move through successive topics in very businesslike fashion with an occasional sense of motion on details suggesting that some desire for progress is appearing on their side. I was accompanied by Rick Burt, Dobrynin by his Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov.

In the preliminaries at the outset of the meeting, Dobrynin expressed uncertainty about the meaning of your press conference statements.² I told him that you are prepared as always to meet with Chernenko. I said you believe there should be content in such a meeting, and while we are not saying major agreements have to be reached, a significant, concrete agenda should be addressed. I added that perhaps some items on our agenda today could contribute to a summit agenda.

Dobrynin went on to say that they were interested in our response to Chernenko's last letter and talking points,³ but it developed that his main point, which he made early in the meeting and returned to at the end, was that it would be "good for you and good for us" if we concentrated on getting some negotiations going on one or two of the "big" security issues.

In our review of the US-Soviet agenda, I began with *arms control* issues, and it emerged from this discussion that Dobrynin's prime candidates for "big" issues to work on were nuclear testing and outer space.

—On outer space, I explained your concerns about verification and your skepticism about negotiations, but told him that as a result of Chernenko's letters and our discussions you are taking a fresh look at the problem and would be making a decision soon. Dobrynin asked whether we were considering just anti-satellite weapons or all of outer space. I replied that we were looking at a range of things, and that verification was a real problem, but you were focussing on the most promising areas, and would be making a decision soon. At that point Dobrynin said he had just received a telegram calling him back to Moscow, and he would be leaving July 3. I noted I would be leaving for Asia shortly thereafter,⁴ and said I would try to get back to him before he left.

—On the Stockholm talks he was evasive. I told him that the offer in your last letter of Chernenko and the Dublin speech to discuss non-use of force commitments *together* with our confidence-building measure proposals was a direct response to Chernenko,⁵ and that we are disappointed by the lack of an answer. His reply was that although they were "interested," they needed additional clarification and elaboration of what the offer means before they can respond.

—On START and INF he was absolutely rigid. I reiterated that we considered their walkouts from the two negotiations unjustified, and that we remained prepared for private discussions on nuclear arms reductions. He replied that they are not prepared for such discussions while INF deployments continue, since they believe deployments have

changed the strategic situation, and merely reiterated their position that they would reverse their “counter-measures” if we were prepared to withdraw our new missiles.

—On chemical weapons and the MBFR talks in Vienna, he was not forthcoming either. I said that although verification is a major problem in both areas, our new proposals were meant to be constructive, and I urged them to negotiate. Dobrynin grumbled about our MBFR proposal, and his statement that they are prepared to make progress in both areas was pretty weak.

—On nuclear testing, he pressed for resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, and I worked hard to explain how important it is to concentrate first on reducing the margin of error in verification of the threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties (TTBT/PNET). That was why we had proposed very confidential discussions involving such measures as calibration tests, I said, and I stressed that progress on verification could help us move in another area where verification was difficult, namely anti-satellite weapons. But Dobrynin was very dug in on ratification of the two treaties first, calling it a “matter of principle” for the Soviets. Although he suggested that new verification proposals could be discussed in resumed CTB negotiations, simply getting us back into CTB talks was clearly his main purpose.

—On strategic defense, I reiterated that this was a research program, that we have no intention at this time of departing from the ABM Treaty and that we remain prepared to have a confidential discussion about ballistic missile defense in START, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) or some other forum. Dobrynin said he took note of my statement on abrogating the ABM Treaty

and would get back on the question of discussions. I briefly touched on Soviet proposals concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a code of conduct for nuclear powers and naval arms limitations, and rejected them all. He was not anxious to pursue them either.

—On hotline upgrade, I pointed out they had our proposal for another round; Dobrynin said they would be getting back to us soon. I said we hoped this could be settled this round; he responded that it would be. Since both he and I would be out of town in July, I suggested that Gromyko and Art Hartman in Moscow might exchange the notes settling the issue. He said he would have to ask Gromyko about a Moscow venue but didn't think it would be a problem.

We discussed only two *regional issues*, southern Africa and the Middle East. On southern Africa I reminded Dobrynin of our offer to have Chet Crocker meet with his counterpart for an update, but he said that they think we owe them a reply to Gromyko's presentation to Art Hartman April 3 before they consider other meetings,⁶ and I promised to send Art in with our views. On the Middle East I sketched out our position on the Iran-Iraq war, and made the point that we have a common concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons. I reminded him of my suggestion that experts join us for a special session. He replied that they also think the war "completely useless," and are also against any military movements in the area that could make the situation worse. On talks, they think any bilateral discussions should address the problems of an overall settlement; I replied that if they wanted a small-group discussion, it could discuss this problem too, and he appeared to agree.

Turning to *human rights*, I repeated that the Sakharovs were an issue of world concern and would remain one until

the Soviets clarified their situation.⁷ I also mentioned a number of other human rights issues—Soviet Jewry, harassment of Americans, problems in Leningrad and binational marriage cases—and gave him your view that the way such issues are handled will have a big impact on our overall relationship. He groused about the contacts our diplomats there have with dissidents—“they are looking for trouble”—but made no other reply.

We concluded with a checklist discussion of *bilateral issues*:

—I described the steps we propose to take to revitalize activities under our agreements on agriculture, housing and the environment. On health, I told him we are considering a number of steps, but the Soviet approach to Mrs. Bonner’s request for foreign medical treatment is holding up initiatives to expand activities.

—I told Dobrynin Art Hartman would be tabling our draft of a new exchanges agreement in Moscow soon.

—On the Kiev/New York consulates, I repeated our request to send a study team to Kiev to look at our facilities there. Dobrynin replied by raising the resumption of Aeroflot flights. I said we are prepared to talk about it, but we are waiting for a Soviet reply to our February proposals in Montreal to improve air safety in the northern Pacific.⁸ In addition, I said, there may be a problem for Soviet planes under our noise abatement regulations, and American carriers flying to the Soviet Union would have to have a better deal than before. All in all, I suggested, we should move ahead on the consulates, while also talking about Aeroflot. Dobrynin said he would pass the suggestion back.

—In this same connection, I noted that the Incidents-at-Sea talks between our two navies had gone well, and described the Soviet Navy's proposals we are looking at (Dobrynin appeared not to have heard of them). I suggested we might look at similar opportunities for other contacts between our two militaries, in keeping with the interest in such contacts you expressed in your March 6 letter.⁹

—On the Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation Long-Term Agreement, Dobrynin said they would have a reply soon to our proposal for a ten-year extension, and I said we were thinking of an eventual Joint Commission meeting in terms of cabinet-level participation.

—On the Pacific maritime boundary talks, I proposed resumption July 23 (instead of in June, as they have proposed). He said they would be back to us, but there appeared to be no problem.

—On fisheries, I said we would be getting to them soon and were working on an allocation for them, but it would be less than before. When Dobrynin grumbled, I said this was true for most countries.

In conclusion, I told him once again you wanted to see motion in the relationship, and noted that even if there is little on the "big" security issues, we do seem to be making progress on the bilateral side. Dobrynin reiterated that movement on one or two of the big issues we can talk about bilaterally would be good for both countries and once again identified outer space and nuclear testing as the prime candidates, and ones on which they would like an answer from us.

Looking at the meeting in the big picture, I think it was probably an important discussion, with some interesting

implications for US-Soviet relations overall.

The most interesting is the way Dobrynin chose to play the two issues now at the top of the Soviet agenda, outer space and CTB. On substance, he had no new ideas to offer. But he defined these topics in the context of the desirable negotiations between the superpowers, negotiations that “would do you good, and would do us good.” Getting talks going on such issues would show the world that the two superpowers are talking to each other, that both sides can address important problems, he observed. And, while he reiterated that the Soviets are not concerned with US domestic politics, he pointed out that if we cannot move on issues like these, by the end of the year there will be nothing to indicate that the two sides are working on major topics.

We should ask ourselves what this means.

Clearly, the Soviets would like to draw us into negotiations on topics they have long promoted. In CTB, they would like to blunt our technological potential in the field of nuclear testing, especially as it relates to our Strategic Defense Initiative. On outer space, they know we are catching up to their early lead, and here too they are worried about our superior technological capacity.

At the same time, this focus on getting arms negotiations underway this year may also reflect a change in Moscow’s political approach to us. It could well mean that there are at least serious doubts in Moscow that “hibernation,” the deep chill the Soviets suddenly reintroduced in our relations last month, is working, or will work for them over the rest of 1984. Your policy of firm but reasonable openness to dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets has given us the initiative in the eyes of world opinion. What

the Soviets may now be saying, it seems to me, is that in face of your program for US-Soviet dialogue, small bilateral business will not be enough to preserve their credibility, and they have invested so much in being rigid on START and INF that their credibility would be further weakened by returning to these negotiations in the immediate future. Hence, they may now believe that, aside from START and INF, it is in their interest as well as ours to see movement on arms control between the superpowers, and they have chosen nuclear testing and outer space as the prime candidates.

As you know, I believe that the area where we ourselves can safely move is ASAT. By defining our objectives for talks clearly, we can protect our technological interests in any ensuing negotiations. I do not believe we should pick up on the Soviet interest in resumed CTB negotiations; instead, we should continue to seek improvements of existing verification methods for the TTB/PNE treaties that would enable us to ratify them. That said, we should also be wary of creating any direct linkage between space arms control and improvements in verification of nuclear testing.

In general, however, it is worth pointing out that even though the meeting may have pointed to some evolution in the Soviet approach, it also demonstrated that our current posture is the correct one. We should keep plugging away on each item of our broad agenda with the Soviets. Progress on a number of these items could provide the basis for a constructive meeting between you and Chernenko. But, while we should be ready to engage them constructively on the range of issues between us, we must avoid appearing anxious to go to the summit. If we seem overeager to get there, we will be taking pressure off them to meet us half-way on the substance, and that should remain our primary objective.^{[10](#)}

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations May-June 1984. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: "RR—(On mtg w/ Doby) I want to lay out our concerns about their military buildup and relieve theirs over us being a threat." A handwritten note on another copy of this memorandum reads: "President ret'd original to RCM on 8-27-84. RCM gave original to Jack Matlock." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File —1984 (06/21/1984-07/26/1984))

² During his June 14 press conference, the President was asked repeatedly about the possibility of a summit meeting with Chernenko. Reagan was clear when asked: "Would you be willing to meet with Mr. Chernenko even if he won't send his delegation back to the nuclear arms talks?" He responded: "Yes, yes, I'm willing to meet with him." For the full text of the press conference, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 851-859.

³ See [Document 223](#).

⁴ Shultz traveled to Asia and the Pacific region from July 7 to July 17.

⁵ See [Document 211](#). Regarding the Dublin speech, see [footnote 3](#), [Document 224](#).

⁶ Hartman and Gromyko met in Moscow on April 3. See [footnote 5](#), [Document 209](#).

⁷ See [Documents 219](#) and [220](#).

⁸ The ICAO continued to meet in Montreal to discuss Pacific air routes in the aftermath of the KAL shootdown and safety precautions for civil aviation. See [footnote 8](#), [Document 185](#).

⁹ See [Document 190](#).

¹⁰ In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled: "On June 20 Shultz invited me for another conversation. This time it lasted

more than three hours.” He continued: “We took stock of all controversial and unsettled questions, but made no attempt even to outline solutions. The discussion undoubtedly proved useful for putting all our affairs in systematic order.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 553-554)

**231. Information Memorandum From the
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) and the
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Washington, June 27, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Study of Indicators of Increased Soviet Aggressiveness

Bill Casey has sent to the President, yourself and other senior members of the National Security Council a study (attached) entitled "US/Soviet Tension," which he characterizes in his cover note as "a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities." We have serious reservations about the tone and methodology of this CIA paper.² The study itself is essentially a shotgun listing of reports on various Soviet activities in the political, propaganda, commercial, internal security and military fields which taken together, are read as perhaps suggestive of a coherent Soviet decision to move from "civilian to wartime-type" activity. Citing "the increasing number and accelerating tempo of developments of this type," Casey says the CIA will begin to produce a biweekly strategic warning report of a similar nature.

In past weeks a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE-11-10-84 JX) examined recent Soviet political and military activities in light of their possible perceptions of an increased U.S. threat.³ It concluded that each Soviet action could be sufficiently explained by its own military or

political rationale and was consistent with larger policies of developing military readiness over the longer term or conveying a “tougher” public posture vis-a-vis the U.S. in the post-INF deployment environment. This new CIA paper readily admits those points, but raises the question whether they may also represent coordinated preparation on the part of the Soviets for a major East-West crisis—presumably at their instigation.

The CIA paper flags a useful cautionary note and one which we have tried to be sensitive to in our own ongoing assessments of Soviet activity. It is important in the current state of relations that we remain especially alert and continue to pay careful attention not just to immediate and specific events, but to the underlying patterns of Soviet behaviour as well.

We too noted earlier this year that the Soviets have apparently chosen to project a somewhat more assertive “Don’t Tread on Me” posture in response to their INF embarrassment. Some of their more consciously visible naval deployments and pressures in the Berlin area, for instance, seem at a minimum designed to remind the West of Soviet power and its potential. Along with recent examples of ongoing modernization of the Soviet military in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, they are also consistent with increased Soviet concern over growth in our own military capabilities.

However, that being said, we believe there are serious problems with this CIA paper. The analysis is neither systematic nor sophisticated. In some instances, there are obvious misstatements of fact (the study incorrectly claims, for instance, that the Soviets have recently cancelled long-standing commercial accords with us when almost the opposite is the case).

In other areas, individual reports are misinterpreted or out of context (the non-use of military trucks in the grain harvest in a single Soviet republic cited by the study, for instance, seems more related to institutional economic shifts than to preparations for significant military purposes; similarly, it is hard to stretch local Soviet complaints about publicity concerning the April attack on our consul in Leningrad as a serious indicator). There seems to be relatively little discrimination in assessing the relative import of particular Soviet actions and no attention given to evidence contrary to the study's general thesis.

In sum, we do not believe that careful examination of the evidence available supports the sort of breathless warning that the paper's apparent conclusions or Casey's cover note convey.

We are especially concerned that this report will create a greater sense of impending danger among its high-level readers around town than the facts warrant. By mixing a variety of tenuous pieces of evidence and questionable assertions with significant indicators of Soviet strategic intentions, the study risks devaluing the concept of warning indicators. It makes it that less likely we can correctly assess such indicators if we begin to pick up signs of something truly ominous.

It may be useful for you to mention our concerns in your next meeting with Bill Casey. You might want to note in particular that:

—We welcome the idea of approaching the study of Soviet strategic warning indicators on a more systematic and rigorous basis and believe such a regular exercise can play a useful role.

—However, we have carefully reviewed the June 19th study of “US/Soviet Tension” and have serious problems with some of its analysis and conclusions. We believe it is slanted too much towards reaching a conclusion of increased Soviet aggressiveness than the evidence warrants.

—The Soviets have been trying to encourage divisions in the West, in part by seeking to scare people about the state of East-West relations, and we do not want to play their game. Should this piece reach the press, it would do more harm to our policies in Western Europe than several months worth of Soviet propaganda.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1-30, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; Wnintel. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Martens, Simons, Palmer, J. Mayhew (INR/SEE), M. Mautner (INR/SEE), J. Danlyk (INR/CE), D. Howells (INR/PMA), and N. Bellochi (INR). An unknown hand initialed for all clearing officials. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on June 28. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Shultz circled Montgomery’s name in the “FROM” line and drew a line to his handwritten note in the margin: “INR: Pls prepare a careful ltr from me to Casey stating our concerns. Clear EUR. GPS.”

² See [Document 229](#). In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “Toward the end of June, the CIA produced a shotgun listing of reports citing increased Soviet aggressiveness in the political, propaganda, commercial, internal security, and military arenas. The CIA suggested a Soviet decision to

move from civilian-to wartime-type activity, which could easily be read as a prediction of war. I told CIA director Bill Casey that I had problems with the report. It was a sloppy piece of work and more alarmist than the facts warranted. It appeared to be straining toward a conclusion of heightened Soviet aggressiveness. I pointed out to Casey that the Soviets had been trying to encourage divisions in the West, in part by seeking to scare people about the state of East-West relations. 'We do not want to play *their* game,' I told Casey. 'Should this piece reach the press, it would do more harm to our policies in Western Europe than several months of Soviet propaganda.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 476)

³ See [Document 221](#).

232. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Dear Bud:

Washington, June 28, 1984

(C) I am very concerned with the accelerating search for ASAT arms control options that might serve as a basis for near-term discussions with the Soviets.² While we all have attempted to separate ASAT and SDI in public and Congressional fora, it is clear that they are linked, both technically and from the perspective of arms control options. The worst possible scenario I can imagine would be one that places the President in a position of destroying his own defensive initiative via arms control proposals. I understand that the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SAC PG) is meeting on June 28th to review the progress of your directed study effort. As you deliberate, I urge that you carefully consider the following preliminary assessment of the impacts on SDI of the several principal options being considered. Other options also have important implications for our security and we will continue to work closely with your study efforts.

(S) The thrust of the approaches to an ASAT Treaty ranges from an Incidents in Space initiative, to a ban on high altitude ASAT interceptors, to a ban on all ASAT interceptors. Our basic concern is that distinctions between ASAT and SDI will not be capable of being maintained.

(S) While I assume efforts will continue to draft language that would not legally constrain SDI, I believe that

constraints would result. For example, the negotiating process will likely lead to political pressures to make a U.S. proposal more comprehensive, and consequently, further restrict SDI. In addition, the greater danger is that it would likely create expectations in Congress that would result in significant reductions in the SDI program.

(S) The proposal currently being studied to ban testing of high-altitude ASAT interceptors provides an example of the problem. The distinction between an ASAT interceptor and kinetic energy weapons that are being examined in SDI would be difficult to make and sustain in a negotiation. Several of the kinetic energy weapons that we will be demonstrating will have the inherent capability to attack high-altitude satellites.

(C) If we were unable to demonstrate these kinetic energy weapons, the net effect would be to eliminate our ability to develop the technology for near-term boost phase and post-boost phase intercept systems and cripple our ability to develop midcourse defense systems. In addition, we would be unable to demonstrate the kinetic energy weapons that would be used to protect our space-based sensors systems from attack by enemy ASATs.

(C) I offer our services to assist you in evaluating the impact on SDI of the various ASAT arms control proposals. Initially, I believe our mutual interests would be served by having the SDI staff brief those involved in this process at State and on the NSC staff on exactly what we are attempting to accomplish with SDI. While we recognize the international political pressure which we all are under and will fully support the finally agreed to position, my larger concern is that we are about to get involved in a process that could turn on us. Even if we are successful in structuring an option that meets our requirements, we

must anticipate counterproposals from the Soviets and urging from our own Congress that will expand the scope of negotiations to impact the President's strategic initiative.³

Sincerely,

Cap

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jun-1984). Secret.

² See [Documents 227](#), [228](#), and [230](#).

³ Below his signature, Weinberger wrote: "Bud—This is simply to sum-up my oft repeated points!"

June 1984-October 1984 “Sitting on Mountains of Nuclear Weapons”: The Reagan-Gromyko Meeting

233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, June 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84-06/01/84); NLR-748-25A-3-5-1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shultz. A typed note on another copy of the document filed without the attachments reads: “Original carried by GPS to the President on June 29.” (George Shultz Papers, Box 5, Secretary’s Meetings with the President, 06/29/1984-07/23/1984) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office from 1:55 to 2:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for June 29: “Met with George Shultz & Bud & came to an agreement on our statement to the Soviets.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 363)

234. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, July 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In their meeting on July 3, Shultz gave the letter to Dobrynin for transmission to Chernenko. (see Document 236). In a July 2 briefing memorandum to Shultz for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kelly noted that the Senior Arms Control Planning Group meeting “was almost entirely devoted to working out the text of the letter and your talking points. The spirit was unusually cooperative. There is no controversy about our basic line, i.e., lack of preconditions. There was the usual concern that we not go too far on ASAT, but a consensus that we will be able to do something substantive on ASAT.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July–December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin) In a covering memorandum to Reagan forwarding the letter, Poindexter indicated Matlock drafted the final version of the letter, and that the letter was cleared by Shultz, Ikle, and Moreau in the JCS. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793))

235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Washington, July 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, July 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum on July 4, indicating he saw it. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hartman in Moscow in telegram 196102, July 3. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July-December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin)

237. National Security Decision Directive 142

Washington, July 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 142 [Arms Limitation Talks, September 1984]. Confidential. In a July 2 memorandum to McFarlane forwarding the NSDD, Linhard and Rye wrote: "At this juncture, we are in a very strong position. We should take every step to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. To do this, we should: —We should not characterize the U.S. intent to discuss our full agenda as a precondition to meeting in September. But, we should also not agree that we will only discuss the Soviet agenda. Rather, we should continue to make it clear that we agree to meet in September in Vienna, and at that meeting, we intend to discuss all items in these areas. —We should not accept a Soviet no. No matter what the initial Soviet response, we should visibly press on with our internal preparations for the September talks and press the Soviets for a positive response without preconditions on the

agenda. The attached NSDD should help us in this regard.” Matlock initialed his concurrence. They attached a memorandum for McFarlane to forward the NSDD to Reagan for signature, which McFarlane sent and Reagan signed on July 5.

238. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984–07/14/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only McFarlane and Poindexter. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “I agree with your points, especially in re Gromyko & the need to find another way. What measures could we try? Bud.”

239. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 6, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 6.

240. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a July 7 memorandum to Reagan, Acting Secretary Dam noted that Soviet Chargé Isakov delivered the letter during a July 7 meeting with Burt. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

241. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan

Washington, July 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

242. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 9, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. No classification marking, Dictated by Dam on July 9.

243. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 10, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 10.

244. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 (07/01/1984–07/14/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, I opt for Jack trying to meet with Zagladin." McFarlane replied in the margin: "I think we should seek to arrive at option 1 outcome (ie Matlock Zagladin) by pursuing option 2. Ty [Cobb] could see Zagladin & make clear our interest."

245. Memorandum From Walter Raymond of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400684. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

246. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Washington, July 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

247. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, July 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In his personal notes for July 16, Dam described the drafting process: "We also met today to decide what we would recommend to the President should be his response to the letter from Chernenko on the proposed Vienna talks. This is something we have met a great deal on, and we have a draft response which we sent out to the Secretary

on his trip. There are many bureaucratic ins and outs to the drafting of Presidential correspondence, and in fact we sent a copy of the draft response to the National Security Council staff, where Bud McFarlane drafted several of the paragraphs of what we now plan to send back to the National Security Council as our proposed response. The real problem here is getting Defense and specifically Cap Weinberger to sign off on our response without setting the precedent that Presidential correspondence is drafted by an interagency committee. The big problem in the proposed Vienna talks is that it is unacceptable to Cap Weinberger, and probably to the President too, to say that we are prepared to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Yet without a fairly forthcoming position on that, it is unlikely that the Soviets would be prepared to negotiate on what we want to negotiate, namely, on offensive strategic weapons.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and the Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84–07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-9-2. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Casey also sent a copy of this memorandum to Shultz; the copy is stamped with Shultz’s initials, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/25/1984–07/26/1984); NLR-775-12-15-11-0)

249. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, Jack Matlock, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84-07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-7-4. Secret. Sent for action.

250. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, July 23, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 23.

251. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July–December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Secret; Sensitive. According to the covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, this memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. It is unsigned, but a note in the

margin on the covering memorandum reads: "original of Sec Pres delivered by J. Crawley/S to McFarlane." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

252. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829). Secret; Sensitive. The original Russian language text is attached. Sokolov provided Dam with the text translated from Russian. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "Soviet Charge Sokolov, under the impression I was out of town, came in today to hand over to Ken Dam a new letter from Chernenko on Vienna. The letter takes a tough line. It claims our response to their proposed announcement 'does not tally' with the statement in your letter that you accept their proposal and leaves 'no doubt whatsoever' that we are 'not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.' Chernenko says that they 'regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations,' that they would be ready to 'return to consideration of the issue' should we change our position, and that the Soviet position of June 29 remains in force." See also footnote 3, Document 253.

253. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 26, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July 1-July 31, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Dam, Armacost, and Chain. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on July 26.

254. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 26, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/16-31/84. Secret; Sensitive.

255. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, July 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/15-31/84. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on July 27

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 28, 1984, 0510Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490829). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

257. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan

Moscow, July 31, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490847, 8491054). Secret; Sensitive. Sokolov delivered the letter to Dam on July 31. See Document 258. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. The oral statement is not attached to this copy of the letter in the Head of State File; however, it is attached to a copy in the Matlock Files. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2))

258. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 31, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1984. Secret. Drafted

on August 1. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Dam's office. Dam's handwritten initials are to the right of the list of participants, indicating he saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on August 1,

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 31, 1984, 0936Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0359. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. A copy was sent for information to Shultz, who was on vacation in California. (Telegram 224320/Tosec 80009, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0362)

260. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

Washington, August 2, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Simons; cleared by Palmer and Burt. In a covering note to Shultz on a July 25 draft of this paper, Burt wrote: "Attached is our long-awaited paper that attempts to analyze the context of East-West relations over the next four years, and sets forth a strategy for dealing with the Soviets." (Department of State, EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., (Chron),

Lot 03D256, July–August, 1984) In an August 1 memorandum to Shultz, Rodman provided a “status report on the Looking Ahead exercise and the preparation for the August 7 meeting,” noting that “EUR is doing a redraft of its paper on ‘East-West Relations: The Next Four Years.’ The July 25 draft, which you already have, was subjected to the constructive critique of the Seventh Floor ‘Looking Ahead’ Wise Men on Tuesday. EUR will now refine the paper, which we will get to you later this week.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/01/1984–08/05/1984) In an August 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Sestanovich provided a summary of the paper, commenting: “This analysis may be correct, but with so few specifics it’s hard to judge. If our entire policy depends on arms control (to win domestic support) and could crumble on its own, what terms will Moscow accept? And can we really combine arms control so easily with tough policies elsewhere? Maybe, but it’s a much bigger challenge than EUR admits. Finally, regular summits may be possible if we make progress; they don’t produce progress.” (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984–08/27/1984) In an August 7 PROFs note to Matlock, Poindexter wrote: “This morning you received a Sestanovich paper that forwarded to Bud an EUR long range planning paper. Please consider that a privileged paper for your eyes only. Don’t acknowledge that you have seen it. Don will be meeting with you soon on the long range planning process.” (Ibid.) The paper was used for the August 7 meeting held at Shultz’s residence in Palo Alto, California, to discuss “Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy.” See Document 262.

261. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, August 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (7/27/1984–9/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-2-0. No classification marking; Eyes Only.

262. Memorandum of Conversation

Palo Alto, California, August 7, 1984, 9 a.m.–5 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Aug. 13, Mtg. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 10. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. This meeting took place at Shultz's residence.

263. Editorial Note

264. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, August 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/08/84–08/16/84). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A fuller copy of SNIE 11-9-84 is available on the CIA Electronic Reading Room website. A note on the cover page

reads: "Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred with by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The CIA, DIA, NSA, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps participated in the preparation of the Estimate." In a June 26 memorandum to Casey, McFarlane requested further analysis of Soviet activities related to Casey's June 19 memorandum to Reagan (see Document 229) and building on the May 1984 SNIE (see Document 221), resulting in this SNIE. McFarlane wrote: "It would be helpful if you would integrate pieces of evidence to develop further these and any other relevant hypotheses which may help us anticipate potential Soviet political or military challenges during the coming six months. Specifically, detailed discussion of the utility to the Soviets of interfering in various geographic trouble spots, and of indicators that they might plan or have the opportunity to do so, would be helpful, with prioritization of potential problems in order of likelihood. Competitive analysis would be appreciated." (Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400571)

265. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 14, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-

December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost.

266. Note From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, August 17, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, August 1984. No classification marking. In a covering note forwarding the note and attached memorandum to Shultz, Dam commented: "I highly commend this memo for your careful review. Despite its length, it is by far the most refreshing and cogent piece that I have read on the process of arms control negotiations." Shultz replied in the margin: "KD for discussion next week."

267. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 20, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/S, Lot Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, August 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dobbins and Vershbow on August 17; cleared by J. Gordon (PM/SNP), R. Davis

(PM/SNP), R. Dean (PM), and Palmer. An unknown hand wrote in J. Campbell (P) as an additional clearing official. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins. Forwarded though Dam. The memorandum was also slated to be sent through Armacost, but his name is struck through.

268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 23, 1984, 1402Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010-0077. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

269. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 4, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-23-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Reagan also wrote in the margin: "This sounds practical. RR."

270. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/27/84-08/31/84); NLR-748-25A-25-1-1. Secret. Sent for information. A stamp on the first page reads: "Noted."

271. Editorial Note

272. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2. Secret; Sensitive. Weinberger wrote "Bud" above McFarlane's title. In a September 13 covering memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé wrote: "I had a good discussion with Tony Dolan who is quite enthusiastic about using these themes for the President's UN speech. But he says it would be easier for him to work on it if Bud McFarlane requested him to do so. Hence, the last paragraph in the attached memo." He continued: "I also discussed these ideas with Jeane Kirkpatrick. While she agrees with the general thrust I proposed, she feels more strongly about the economic aspects of the UN speech. I have talked to Ken Adelman also, and he is more or less moving in the same direction. At the NSPG, now scheduled for Tuesday [September 18] to discuss arms control, he

intends to argue against making a specific proposal now and that we should instead urge general talk on an overall framework for arms control." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jul-) 1984)

273. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, September 14, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (2/5).
Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum.

274. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, September 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984-09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the margin: "Let's talk about this. RR."

275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, September 17, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/01/84); NLR-748-25A-26-3-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer according to the forwarding memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents). Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on September 18, indicating he saw it.

276. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/22/84); NLR-748-25A-26-4-7. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Many thanks. M."

277. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, September 18, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-109, NSPG 96. Secret. There is no drafting information on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although titled a "National Security Council Meeting," this meeting is listed in numerical order as NSPG Meeting 96 in the NSC and Reagan Library files. In a September 15 memorandum to

McFarlane, Kraemer and Linhard forwarded a package of preparatory materials for this NSPG meeting, including the interagency paper detailing Options 1,2,3 and the NSC-formulated Option 1½. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

278. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, September 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 18.

279. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, September 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 19 and September 22.

280. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, September 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980–1986, Matlock Chron, September 1984 (2/5). Secret.

281. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, September 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush.

282. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, September 22, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, USSR: September Meeting
President/Gromyko Meeting September 1984 (3). Secret. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock wrote: "Secretary Weinberger has sent a memorandum to the President recommending certain talking points for his meeting with Gromyko. I believe the points he proposes are sound and deserve a place in the President's presentation to Gromyko." There is no evidence Matlock's memorandum went forward to the President.

283. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union (Ermarth) to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)

Washington, September 25, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00886R: Subject Files (1984), Box 6, Folder 7: B-257, Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee. Secret. In a covering note forwarding this memorandum and its attachment to Casey, Jay Rixse wrote: "Bob Gates sent the attached memo up to John [McMahon] as a matter of interest. As it represents a different interpretation of the Gromyko visit, John thought you should see it also." Gates wrote in the margin: "ADCI—FYI. RG."

284. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 26, 1984, 9:45 a.m.–12:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Bush/Shultz/Gromyko/Dobrynin in New York and Washington September 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Palmer, Butler, and McKinley. An unknown hand initialed for the clearing officials. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. Brackets are in the original. In preparation for this meeting with Gromyko, Burt provided Shultz with a 36-page briefing packet on September 22, prepared by Simons and cleared by Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super

Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super
Sensitive Documents Super Sensitive July 1-Dec 31, 1984)

285. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House

New York, September 27, 1984, 0105Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0169. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. Repeated as telegram 293390 to Moscow, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0327)

286. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1984, 10 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (5). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Matlock. This meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, from 3:03 to 3:54 p.m. on September 27, the President participated in a briefing for Gromyko's visit. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) McFarlane also briefed Reagan for the meeting with Gromyko at 9 a.m. on September 28. (Ibid.) No record of these meetings has been found.

287. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1984, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials President-Gromyko—Working Papers (7). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Zarechnak. This lunch took place in the State Dining Room at the White House. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled of the reception and lunch: “Nancy Reagan appeared during the cocktail party before lunch. Gromyko, after the introductions, proposed a toast to her. He had cranberry juice, her glass was filled with soda water. ‘We both are certainly fond of drinking,’ he remarked with characteristic dry humor. Gromyko had a short chat with the president’s wife. ‘Is your husband for peace or for war?’ he asked. She said that he of course was all for peace. ‘Are you sure?’ Gromyko wondered. She was one hundred percent sure. ‘Why, then, does not he agree to our proposals?’ Gromyko insisted. What proposals? she asked. Someone interrupted the conversation, but right before lunch Gromyko reminded Mrs. Reagan, ‘So, don’t forget to whisper the word “peace” in the president’s ear every night.’ She said, ‘Of course I will, and I’ll also whisper it in yours, too.’ I must report that Gromyko got a kick out of this exchange and recounted it to the Politburo with great animation.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 555)

288. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 29, 1984, 10 a.m.-12:20 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Simons. The meeting took place at the Department of State. In a September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz wrote: “I sensed somewhat

more flexibility on his part concerning how to get going, and I think that hearing your candid and intense views probably helped.” He continued: “Looking over our meetings with Gromyko this week, I think they are the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years. We are addressing real issues, and even—in Gromyko’s case—revealing sensitivities that the Soviets usually conceal, on Germany and Japan and the fear of losing what they achieved in the War. This kind of frank discussion on substance cannot help but be useful, in contrast to talking past each other. Moreover, in today’s meeting, Gromyko began to display a measure of genuine interest in the expanded dialogue you have proposed. On the other hand, because he was so defensive, he revealed no new substance at this time.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko—Working Papers (2))

289. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 2, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Hartman. Forwarded through Armacost. Printed from an uninitialed copy. McKinley’s handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 2.

290. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House

New York, October 5, 1984, 1754Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0446. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State. An October 3 State Department draft of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Vershbow on October 3; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Dobbins, and Kanter. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary: My only reservation is to the formation of an interim restraint agreement. The linkage proposed is ambiguous. We could agree that 'being the process of reducing . . . ' means some actual reductions. But another interpretation is possible. In the initial bargaining stage I would think a more straight-forward linkage is desirable bureaucratically, politically, and for negotiating purposes. I recognize the President's words impose some constraint, but if we want to establish a tougher linkage—as I think we should—this letter offers an opportunity." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) A typed note in the margin of the draft reads: "memo revised by S and dispatched from NY 10/5. bdf."

291. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 9, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/05/1984-10/15/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

292. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 15, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/15/84-10/23/84). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. McFarlane wrote at the top of the page: "Mr. President, I thought you would find this interesting. It reinforces the value of bringing Paul Nitze into the White House. Bud." In an attached handwritten note on Air Force One stationery, Reagan wrote: "Very interesting and if I've read it correctly affirms something I've felt for some time; namely that part of their problem is their inferiority complex. They want to feel we see them as a superpower. I'm willing to look at a pvt channel but believe this would have to have Georges approval. If he, you & I were the only team in on it at this end with someone like Nitze the channel—talking only to us—why not? To bypass George would be a personal humiliation I wouldn't want to inflict. RR."

293. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, October 1984. Secret. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Dobbins and Niles. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are also on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 16. In a covering note forwarding the memorandum to the White House, McKinley wrote: "Paul, The Secretary wanted Bud to have this internal memo. Brunson."

294. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock concurred. On a routing slip attached to this memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "I think the NSDD is good. You may feel you are a little beyond the point of the cover memo, although everything that has been done is consistent with it. JP." McFarlane then wrote: "Pls run my proposed chgs by Ron Lehman." On the draft of the NSDD, McFarlane made substantial changes to the last paragraph, which were reflected in the final version signed by Reagan. See Document 298.

295. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

(Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, October 25, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A more complete account of this meeting is in telegram 325166 to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840700-0675)

296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/25/84-10/30/84); NLR-748-25A-36-3-7. Secret; Sensitive. An October 26 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. A handwritten note on this covering memorandum reads: "Orig. Sent by Courier 10/26." Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on October 30, indicating he saw it.

297. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC
National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records,
1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal];
NLR-751-7-33-2-2. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by
Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer (see footnote 5, Document
291). A stamp on the memorandum reads "signed."

298. National Security Decision Directive 148

Washington, October 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC
National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records,
1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal].
Secret. In a memorandum on October 27, McFarlane
forwarded the signed NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger,
Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman.

233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 29, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, June 29, 1984

Ambassador Dobrynin called on me this morning at his request. We talked for about three-quarters of an hour covering three subjects.

1. Dobrynin delivered an additional proposal from the Soviet Union on negotiations about the "militarization of space" in which they add some specificity to the modalities of their proposal, particularly a date and place for negotiations. I said that we are not yet prepared to respond to their proposal but that there are no doubt a number of issues involved that need some discussion. For example, does "militarization" in space apply only to defensive systems or do they want to talk about offensive systems that go through space as well? Dobrynin did not respond to that suggestion, but I don't think it went by him either. The text of the Soviet proposal and the oral statement accompanying it are attached.

2. Dobrynin asked for anything I might tell him of a philosophical nature on our approach to the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, raising as an example his problem in interpreting your recent speech in which there was a part that was "good" from their standpoint and another part that was "bad."² I said that the message from that speech and from the fact that you sent our negotiators back to Geneva at the height of the tension over the Korean

airliner suggested an effort on a philosophic plane along the following lines:

We know that our systems are very different and the likelihood is that they will remain so. We know that our interests are often at variance and the likelihood is that they will remain so. It is, nevertheless, the case that our two countries have the preponderance of military power in the world and are at the moment the two largest economies, so the existence of a working relationship between us is of great importance to each of us and to the world more generally. Therefore, we have to seek a way of managing the relationship that will have important elements of continuity through the ups and downs of events that will trouble us greatly and that we will feel call for statements and actions on our part. That philosophy, I said, is what motivated the President to send our negotiators back to Geneva some months ago and, more recently, to identify a large number of significant—if not quite “the big”—problem areas where positive work can and is taking place. If such a philosophy can be implemented in practical terms, then we would consider that a positive achievement.

3. Dobrynin also raised questions about the personal and technical management of our relationship and used the Scowcroft mission as an example of how a good thing misfired because it wasn't handled right. The elements of incorrect handling from his point of view were: (a) it came about too suddenly, (b) there was no back-and-forth discussion of something so important as sending a Presidential Emissary to their head of state, and (c) it seemed to be an effort to go to Chernenko through some part of their government other than the Foreign Ministry. Dobrynin said that if the Scowcroft mission and Presidential letter had been worked out through him and then on to Moscow with careful preparation, he could have

“guaranteed 100 percent” that Scowcroft would have seen Chernenko.

I told him that we were prepared to work out with him the technical aspects of our relationship in a way that did everything possible to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. We recognize the importance of giving interpretations of statements and activities we undertake and wish that they would also take note of this point in terms of their own behavior and work with Art Hartman. We also agree that private and small and perhaps one-on-one discussions could make an important contribution to the development of the relationship.

He stated that he felt the START and INF talks might have gone in a more constructive way if, in the discussions I had with him about them some time ago, it had been possible to discuss them in broad terms in a one-on-one meeting as distinct from meetings “where Rowny or Nitze or someone else was always present.”

Dobrynin said that he is looking forward to the opportunity for conversation with you at the Diplomatic Reception on Sunday.³

Attachment

Proposal by the Soviet Government⁴

Moscow, undated

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Soviet Government most insistently draws attention to the necessity of urgent measures aimed at the prevention of the militarization of outer space.⁵

The spreading of the arms race to outer space would sharply increase the risk of the military disaster, undermine the prospects of the limitation and the reduction of armaments in general. Everywhere the understanding of this is widening, the demands are growing to stop such development of events until it is too late. And it is necessary to do everything in order not to waste this opportunity, to close reliably all the channels without exception of the militarization of outer space.

In practical terms this means that weapons of any type—conventional, nuclear, laser, beam or any other should not be launched in space and deployed there, whether on piloted or pilotless systems. Space weapons of any basing mode should not be developed, tested or deployed either for antiballistic missile defense, or as antisatellite means, or for the use against targets on the ground or in the air. Means of such nature already created must be destroyed.

The use of force in space or from space against the earth, as well as from the earth against the objects in outer space should be banned forever.

Such approach, which would ban and eliminate the whole class of armaments—the attack space means including antisatellite and antiballistic missile space-based systems, as well as any other ground, air or sea-based means designed to destroy objects in space, allows to ensure a reliable control over the compliance by the sides with their obligations.

The Government of the Soviet Union proposes to the Government of the United States of America to begin Soviet-American negotiations on the prevention of the militarization of outer space at the level of specially appointed delegations. Within the framework of these

negotiations the question of mutual comprehensive repudiation of antisatellite systems should be resolved too.

Such negotiations could be started this September in Vienna (Austria), if the Government of Austria agrees to this. The specific date of the beginning of the negotiations would be agreed upon through the diplomatic channels.

For the purposes of creating the favorable conditions for achieving an agreement and of undertaking practical measures on the prevention of the arms race in outer space already now the Soviet Union proposes also to establish on mutual basis beginning from the date of opening the negotiations a moratorium on testing and deploying such weapons. It goes without saying that the joining of other states to such moratorium will be welcomed.

As the leading powers in the area of exploration of outer space, the USSR and the USA are called upon to do everything in their power to provide peace in space for the mankind and to show an example to other states in resolving this task common to all the humanity, creating the basis for multilateral agreement on this matter.

In view of the urgency and importance of this question the Soviet Government expects a prompt and positive reply of the US Government to this appeal.

Attachment

Soviet Oral Statement⁶

Moscow, undated

I am instructed to deliver to you a text of the statement of the Soviet Government on the question of preventing the

militarization of outer space.

We would like to draw your attention to the fact, that the Soviet Union suggests a radical solution—to ban and to eliminate the whole class of attack space weapons and to close once and for ever all channels of possible militarization of outer space. It is exactly the attack space means that would be banned. While the means used for the purposes of control, navigation, communication, etc. would not be covered.

We deem it necessary to emphasize the importance and the urgency of the solution of the question of preventing the militarization of outer space, the special responsibility which rests upon the USSR and the USA as the leading space powers, and the necessity in this regard to show an example to all other states engaged in research and exploration of outer space.

The beginning of the negotiations on outer space between the USSR and the USA would be a practical proof of the readiness of the sides to wage a businesslike and concrete dialogue on one of the major questions of ensuring security and peace.

The Soviet side is ready to begin such negotiations in Vienna on September 18, 1984, for example, if there is a consent of the Austrian Government, and to send a special delegation for this purposes.⁷

We would like to express hope that the American side will consider the Soviet proposal with all due attention and give a positive reply to it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/24/84–06/01/84); NLR-748-25A-3-5-1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shultz. A typed note on another copy of the document filed without the attachments reads: “Original carried by GPS to the President on June 29.” (George Shultz Papers, Box 5, Secretary’s Meetings with the President, 06/29/1984–07/23/1984) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office from 1:55 to 2:25 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for June 29: “Met with George Shultz & Bud & came to an agreement on our statement to the Soviets.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 363)

² Dobrynin was referring to Reagan’s speech in Dublin. See [footnote 3, Document 224](#).

³ On Sunday, July 1, the Reagans hosted a BBQ at the White House for Chiefs of Mission and their spouses. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary: “Anatoly Dobrynin (Soviet Amb.) was at my table along with Geo. Shultz. Anatoly wanted to talk about our situation—the Russians wanting us to meet in Sept. to talk about weapons in space & our reply that we’d like to discuss this and nuclear weapons etc. which they have refused to do. We didn’t settle anything but I got a few things off my chest.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 364) On Monday, July 2, Reagan wrote: “We had the usual staff times but this one attended by Geo. Shultz—our 1st chance to compare notes about Anatoly. We’re telling the Soviets we’ll be in Vienna in Sept. waiting for them—our terms.” (Ibid.)

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ TASS released the Soviet statement on June 29. The next day the White House issued the U.S. response, approved by McFarlane. Excerpts of both were printed in the *New York*

Times. ("Soviet and U.S. Statements on Space-Weapons Negotiations," *New York Times*, June 30, 1984, p. 4)

Matlock later recalled the reaction to the Soviet proposal and the development of the U.S. response: "The proposal was obviously directed at Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, even though it defined the subject of negotiation in terms so broad that it was hard to determine just what specifically it was intended to cover. There had been no previous discussion of the proposal in diplomatic channels, so the announcement seemed designed for the public rather than policy makers." Matlock continued: "By late afternoon [on June 29], the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, with representatives from all relevant U.S. agencies, gathered in the Situation Room. At first, the sentiment was almost universal: 'It's directed straight at SDI. We can't do it. Besides, it's nothing but propaganda.' But as we went around the table, opinion began to shift, aided by McFarlane's deft mention, from time to time, of arguments in favor of acceptance. In less than an hour, it was unanimous: the United States would accept, but say that it would also discuss ways to resume negotiations on INF and START. The Soviet Union would not have to agree to reopen those negotiations, but would be placed on notice that the U.S. considered ballistic missiles that travel through space a part of the 'militarization of outer space.' The statement I had prepared in advance was revised to stress this before McFarlane took it to the president for his approval. Reagan approved it without change and it was issued in time for the evening news on television, and for the following day's papers, which carried both U.S. and Soviet statements. It was probably the most rapid decision ever made by a committee in the U.S. government dealing with arms control." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 99-100)

⁶ No classification marking.

⁷ An unknown hand inserted "in Vienna" following the word "negotiations."

234. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, July 2, 1984

Your letter of June 6 deals with a number of issues which I would like to pursue after careful deliberation,² but I wish to take the opportunity provided by Ambassador Dobrynin's return to Moscow to give you my thoughts on the proposal your government made June 29 for a conference in Vienna in September regarding the "militarization of outer space."³

First, let me say that I believe your proposal for a conference is an excellent idea. I am prepared to have a delegation in Vienna September 18. I would observe that the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin serious discussions of ways arms competition can be slowed and the risk of nuclear war reduced.

Let me describe my concept of the way a useful conference might be organized. I believe that each of our delegations should be free to raise questions of concern to its side which are relevant to the overall topic. However, these should not be raised merely for the sake of exposition and debate, but with a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

I have studied the position you have taken regarding the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms. Even though I

cannot agree with your reasons, I am not asking you to change that position in order to start discussions. But inasmuch as strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons systems are the most lethal systems and are intimately associated with those other space weapons on which you propose to negotiate, it is clear that it will be difficult to move very far in solving some of the problems without addressing the others. It would, therefore, be difficult to understand a refusal even to discuss ways that negotiations on nuclear systems might be resumed. As I have pointed out to you several times, I have a number of ideas as to how these problems might be resolved to the advantage of both our countries. I believe that it is in our mutual interest to resolve our current impasse on offensive nuclear weapons.

Regarding the other space weapons referred to in your proposal, I am optimistic that we can find significant aspects of anti-satellite weaponry which could be a fruitful object for negotiations. In sum, I am agreeable to a conference without preconditions of any sort, but one based on a commitment by both of us to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before us.

You spoke in your last letter about the necessity of dealing with each other as equals. Naturally, I agree, and I believe the approach I have outlined for a conference embodies this principle in both form and spirit. As we have both often observed, it is time for deeds. Finding ways to make progress on the central issues I have outlined would be a deed for which the whole world would thank us.

Of course, we need not wait until a conference is organized to discuss the issues before us. I will be pleased to continue our discussion of these and related topics, on a confidential

basis, both in our correspondence and through our respective representatives.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving your thoughts on these matters. It is my earnest hope that you will join me in seizing the opportunity we have to make a major step toward improving relations between our countries and creating a safer world for all.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In their meeting on July 3, Shultz gave the letter to Dobrynin for transmission to Chernenko. (see [Document 236](#)). In a July 2 briefing memorandum to Shultz for his meeting with Dobrynin, Kelly noted that the Senior Arms Control Planning Group meeting “was almost entirely devoted to working out the text of the letter and your talking points. The spirit was unusually cooperative. There is no controversy about our basic line, i.e., lack of preconditions. There was the usual concern that we not go too far on ASAT, but a consensus that we will be able to do something substantive on ASAT.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July-December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin) In a covering memorandum to Reagan forwarding the letter, Poindexter indicated Matlock drafted the final version of the letter, and that the letter was cleared by Shultz, Ikle, and Moreau in the JCS. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793))

² See [Document 223](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

235. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Iklé) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, July 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Arms Control Diplomacy

Monday we had two White House meetings (chaired by Poindexter) on what to say to Moscow about the September arms control meeting.² George Shultz joined us during the first meeting. He explained the President sought to engage the Soviets by having Dobrynin take a letter back to Chernenko.³ According to Shultz, we would say to the Soviets:

- (1) We are prepared to meet in Vienna, 18 September (the Soviets proposed date).
- (2) We are prepared to discuss any aspect of limitations on space systems (including those that start from a land-base and land on a land-target, i.e. ICBMs).
- (3) We expect them to put issues on the table and we will do likewise.
- (4) We can start with negotiations on ASAT, particularly low altitude.

Shultz continued, we could discuss arrangements for negotiations, and stressed the importance of discussing ideas from both sides. We might possibly develop a new venue in Vienna, a general setting for guiding arms control

talks that would make efforts to find areas that can be spun off for specific negotiations. ASAT might be the first area to be spun off, also confidence building measures in space. This would be a bit like the General Motors-United Auto Workers negotiations, with specific issues being dealt with at side tables. (FYI: I found it noteworthy that this “analogy” was being proposed.)

I pointed out (1) that we should not have ASAT negotiations move ahead of ICBM/INF, and (2) that we were still working (deadline of August 1) on the whether and how of a verifiable and acceptable ASAT limitation.

FYI: State tends to take position that it was decided in Oval Office meeting you attended that we could and would agree to negotiate *some* ASAT limits.⁴ However, the more I am looking into the questions of (1) verifiability, and (2) ASAT-SDI entanglement, the less likely it seems to me that there is such an option that meets our US interests. Almost any ASAT limitation would be pounded by Soviet and Congressional pressures, into an ever more comprehensive inhibition on our SDI (though not equally effective in limiting Soviet missile defenses).⁵ The Soviet negotiating strategy is a replay of what they did in 1969-1972, when they pressed for an ABM Treaty first, only begrudgingly and belatedly acceding to a very lopsided and incomplete limitation on offensive missiles.

Our SACPG Group then drafted talking points for today's Shultz-Dobrynin meeting and the attached letter from the President to Chernenko.⁶ Shultz's talking points track with the letter, adding the points that (1) ballistic missiles were the first weapons using space, (2) the US was agreeable to have the arms control/space meeting take place in September or, if the Soviets preferred, after our elections.

In our meetings yesterday, there was reference to a President-Chernenko letter being in draft stage as a reply to a recent letter from Chernenko. I assume you are being shown these letters; I have not seen them (but Rick Burt and his deputy are fully involved).

I am afraid, we in OSD, and you personally, will have to weigh in frequently and heavily to slow down the train that's speeding up toward extensive SDI limitations, largely unverifiable and hence unilateral, with but token limits/reductions on offensive arms. The question who will be the negotiator is also an important one. Rumor has it Brent Scowcroft or Walt Stoessel are possibilities.

Fred C. Ikle²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

² Monday, July 2.

³ See [Document 234](#).

⁴ Iklé was likely referring to a June 26 meeting. In his diary for June 26, Reagan wrote: "Then an N.S.C. meeting on how to respond to the Soviet challenge to negotiate on limiting militarizing Space. The problem is they are ahead of us in that dept. and want to freeze us into inferiority. I think we've worked out a plan that will 'head them off at Eagle gap.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 362) Weinberger's handwritten notes of the June 26 meeting are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Part I: Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information, Department of Defense, 1981–1987, Appointment and Diary File, 1980–1987, White House, cabinet, and other

important meeting notes, Box I: TS SCI 9, Set B, 1984, 2, #23-49.

⁵ Weinberger expressed similar concern in a letter to McFarlane on June 28. See [Document 232](#).

⁶ An unknown hand inserted "(copy attached)" after "meeting." See [Documents 234](#) and [236](#) for the letter and the meeting with Dobrynin.

⁷ Iklé signed "Fred" above his typed signature.

236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 3, 1984

SUBJECT

Breakfast Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Following a relaxed breakfast, I gave Dobrynin your letter,² and elaborated on its contents by running through the agreed talking points (attached). Dobrynin read your letter carefully and promised to deliver it to Chairman Chernenko tomorrow.

Dobrynin professed not to grasp how we intended to proceed with the September meetings in practical terms. The Soviets, he said, had raised one issue (the demilitarization of space), and we had raised another (resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems) which they regarded as unacceptable. Did we, he asked, plan to simply register our views on such matters as START and INF, and then proceed to address arms control in outer space? Or did we intend to continue to refer back to the issues on our agenda? In his quest for clarification, he claimed the negotiators needed a precise understanding of the agenda; that the delegations could not be left simply to talk about "the cosmos;" and that without clarity regarding the scope of the talks further misunderstandings could burden our relationship.

In response I emphasized that we were prepared to meet in September without preconditions. I said that we are ready to discuss the issues the Soviets have raised, but that we have issues of our own to discuss as well. I noted that they say they wish to talk about "the demilitarization of space."

We have our own definition of what that means, and intend to relate our presentation to that definition. They did not have to agree to discuss the issues we were raising in order for us to show up.

I noted that, in every negotiation there is a preliminary sorting out of issues. As the conference proceeds, and as a variety of subjects are discussed, some ideas may appear susceptible to negotiations. Others will not be. On the subject of verification, for example, we have doubts that some arms control proposals in outer space are verifiable. The Soviets may have a different view. We are ready to listen and perhaps we can learn something. We have an open mind. We think there are some possibilities for negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations. Perhaps others can be identified.

While Dobrynin did not indicate acceptance of this concept, I believe he understands our intentions more clearly. Obviously the Soviets would prefer to restrict the talks to their agenda, but he could not deny the logic of our position that since weapons in space affect nuclear deterrence, limitations of arms in outer space and limits on offensive and defensive nuclear systems are conceptually connected.

I urged Dobrynin to push the discussion of this subject back into diplomatic channels. I noted that the USSR had made a proposal and publicized it. We consequently publicized our response after notifying the Embassy. Now, I said, you are writing confidentially to Chernenko to confirm that we accept the Soviet proposal without preconditions. But we want them to know that there are some additional things which we expect to discuss. This is not in the nature of a precondition, but rather a statement of our intent.

I emphasized that since our systems are different, and that won't change, we think it is important to take steps to stabilize our relationship. We consequently have laid out a broad agenda of "smaller" and large issues,—arms control proposals, regional issues, bilateral matters, concerns about human rights. Now, I said, the Soviet government has made a proposal. We believe we need to look at that proposal in a broader context to get something moving. We are prepared to discuss that either in September or following our elections, if the Soviets prefer. The timing is a matter of indifference to us, since we surely need no help from them in the elections. I underscored the fact that our purpose was merely to push our relationship in a constructive direction.

Dobrynin asked whether we conceived of the September conference as directed toward merely sorting out issues or conducting negotiations. I said we could envisage a variety of possibilities. When our delegations showed up in Vienna in September, led by broad gauged negotiators, they could take one of several approaches. They would, I presumed, examine the broad subjects that each government had raised with an eye to identifying those subjects susceptible to early negotiation. As subjects were identified, they could either negotiate them seriatim, divert those issues to special negotiators while continuing themselves to address the broad issues at the main table, or confine themselves to the task of isolating negotiable issues, while leaving actual negotiations until later. I told Dobrynin that we envisaged further private discussions—at the Assistant Secretary level—to work out the modalities for the September conference.

Dobrynin was noncommittal, but he indicated that we could expect an official response from the Soviet government. He indicated that at this stage he could not say that the Soviets accept our acceptance, reiterated some distaste for

a loose agenda, and implied that further clarification will be sought.

While Dobrynin did not tip his hand, I feel we have framed a response that his government will find difficult to handle. Eventually I suspect they may be forced to take yes for an answer.

Attachment

Talking Points for Secretary of State Shultz³

Washington, undated

—I think that you gathered last night a first-hand sense of the President's seriousness about getting substantive arms control talks moving forward.⁴

—He carefully studied Mr. Chernenko's last letter and has prepared this letter today in reply. It does not try to address all of the issues between us, but concentrates on a problem Mr. Chernenko focused on—what he called the "militarization of outer space."

—The President confirms what we indicated to your Embassy last Friday night. We accept your proposal of earlier that day to meet September 18 in Vienna.

—As we have indicated in our statement on Friday, the militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed.

—We have noted what you wish to discuss in Vienna. We will be prepared to address those issues. We have identified issues we plan to raise as well.

—As the President notes in his letter, we anticipate that we will come to Vienna with constructive suggestions both on the question of resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems and on negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations.

—I wish to make one point very clear: contrary to initial press commentary, we have set no preconditions for these talks in September.

—The U.S. and the Soviet Union need not agree to any common agenda on those talks. The U.S. is prepared to meet at the time and place the Soviet Union has proposed, and to address all the issues the Soviet Union has raised, in addition to which, the U.S. side will raise other issues.

—The U.S. believes that it is important to consult privately on more detailed preparations and groundwork for this meeting in order to ensure that it is fruitful.

—As the President has indicated, we see this meeting as a valuable opportunity for businesslike and constructive exchanges through which we might work out mutually acceptable approaches to arms control negotiations. We are serious about taking advantage of this opportunity to make progress.

—Thus, we are prepared to refrain from any further public comment on these discussions if you will do the same. Our preference is to pursue this question quietly through private diplomatic channels.

—I would further note that on several recent occasions, the Soviet government has stated that the upcoming U.S. Presidential election has no bearing on its policies in this regard. I can confirm to you the same holds true for us. As the President's letter indicates, if the Soviet side wishes to hold these talks after the election in late November or

December as opposed to September, that is acceptable to us as well.

—I hope that in your consultations in Moscow, you will personally underscore the seriousness and positive manner in which we are seeking to handle your proposal.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84–06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum on July 4, indicating he saw it. A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hartman in Moscow in telegram 196102, July 3. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1984 July–December, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ No classification marking. See [footnote 1](#), [Document 234](#).

⁴ Presumably a reference to the discussion at the July 1 BBQ. See [footnote 3](#), [Document 233](#).

237. National Security Decision Directive 142¹

Washington, July 5, 1984

ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, SEPTEMBER 1984 (U)

*The Official Response to the Soviet Proposal of May 29.*² I have authorized the following response to the Soviet proposal made on May 29, 1984. (U)

"The United States Government has taken note of the statement by the Soviet government proposing a meeting of delegations in September to begin negotiations on preventing the "militarization of outer space." The militarization of space began when the ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed. The United States Government, therefore, draws attention to the pressing need for the resumption of negotiations aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals on a balanced and verified basis." (U)

"Therefore, the United States Government has informed the government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet the Soviet Union in September at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union and to the government of the country where the meeting is held for the following purposes:

- (1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed; and

(2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches, which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on anti-satellite weapons.

We will also be prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or other matters of interest to both sides.” (U)

“We will continue contacts with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on arrangements for these September talks.” (U)

Implementation. The U.S. will be prepared to begin discussions in Vienna on September 18, 1984. However, the date and location is of less importance than our agreement to begin well prepared and serious discussions. The U.S. agrees to the discussions proposed without preconditions, but based on a commitment by both sides to find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches to the important questions before both the United States and the Soviet Union. (C)

We should attempt to shift the continuing discussion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concerning these talks out of the public arena and into private diplomatic channels. To do this, we should seek Soviet agreement to join us in refraining from further public comment. (C)

Preparations for Discussions. No matter what the initial Soviet response, the United States will be prepared to begin the discussions as outlined above on the dates initially proposed by the Soviet Union.

—Initial priority must be given to completing those papers which have been already tasked as a part of the ongoing program of work in the ASAT, START and INF areas. The prompt completion of this work is essential to providing the

detailed, substantive foundation needed to support the final development of a U.S. approach to the discussions in September. This work program should be completed and its results delivered for my consideration no later than August 1. (C)

—Based upon this work, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop and coordinate the necessary strategy and position papers needed to support the generation of instructions for the team representing the United States at the discussions beginning in mid-September. These papers will be provided for my review and approval no later than August 31. At that time, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group will also recommend a plan for timely consultations with the Congress and our Allies as appropriate. (C)

—Within the next few weeks, the National Security Advisor will provide the Senior Arms Control Policy Group with additional guidance as needed to sequence, develop, and coordinate other aspects of U.S. preparations. (C)

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 142 [Arms Limitation Talks, September 1984]. Confidential. In a July 2 memorandum to McFarlane forwarding the NSDD, Linhard and Rye wrote: “At this juncture, we are in a very strong position. We should take every step to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union. To do this, we should: —We should not characterize the U.S. intent to discuss our full agenda as a precondition to meeting in September. But, we should also not agree that we will only discuss the Soviet agenda. Rather, we should continue to make it clear that *we agree to meet in September in Vienna*, and at that

meeting, we intend to discuss all items in these areas. —We should not accept a Soviet no. No matter what the initial Soviet response, we should *visibly press on* with our internal preparations for the September talks and press the Soviets for a positive response without preconditions on the agenda. The attached NSDD should help us in this regard.” Matlock initialed his concurrence. They attached a memorandum for McFarlane to forward the NSDD to Reagan for signature, which McFarlane sent and Reagan signed on July 5.

² This NSDD incorrectly dates the Soviet proposal to meet in Vienna for negotiations on preventing the “militarization of outer space.” The Soviet proposal was made on June 29. See [Document 233](#).

**238. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, July 6, 1984

SUBJECT

The Soviets: Where We Stand

I have the following miscellaneous (but interconnected) thoughts on the current state of play in our Soviet relations and how we might handle some of the issues tactically.

The September Meeting

The June 29 Soviet proposal and our quick response has put us in a very strong tactical position, both publicly and privately.² We must move carefully to exploit our current advantages.

The Soviet response shows clearly that Gromyko has no intention of allowing a meeting to materialize in September unless we buy the Soviet position in full. However, he is coming on increasingly defensive, and may not be able to hew to this rigid position as the time approaches. Evidence is accumulating that his critics in Moscow may be becoming more assertive. If we play our cards right we may be able to achieve a breakthrough, and if not, undermine the Soviet position even further, with useful implications for 1985.

Publically, we should stick right where we are: we are placing no preconditions on the meeting, therefore assume

it will take place, and are pursuing arrangements in diplomatic channels. This forces the Soviets to growl and concentrate on *their* preconditions, which are looking less and less tenable. Meanwhile, this relieves us of the immediate pressure to define our ASAT position, which is desirable tactically, since we need to squeeze the Soviets as much as we can in advance. Since they have proposed a conference, there is no rational argument in favor of our communicating in advance what our position is. To do so would only give Gromyko the ammunition to say it is inadequate and to shift attention from their intransigence to the alleged shortcomings of our substantive position.

This thought should also lie at the basis of our private communications with the Soviets. We should make our proposals general enough and ambiguous enough to provide no logical grounds for complaint (the diplomatic equivalent of a stealth design).³ One way to do this would be to propose an agenda whereby the first item would be the Soviet exposition of their proposals, and the second item the U.S. commentary and proposals, followed by a Soviet commentary, etc. If we do not define the subjects precisely, it will be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to argue that there are any preconditions, or that we are refusing to discuss their agenda.

As for the timing, if the conference begins September 18, we need to handle it so as to minimize the opportunity for the Soviets to break it off before November claiming U.S. intransigence. Therefore, there is an advantage in letting them go first, and instructing our delegation to ask frequent questions in order to maximize the amount of time necessary to get their position on the table. We could then take our time in commenting in detail and putting forth our thoughts. This process, if handled adroitly, could easily carry us into November without giving the Soviets

ammunition to cry foul and break off. Such tactics would also drive home the point implicitly that they should expect little in the ASAT area until they start talking turkey on nuclear arms.

Gromyko's Role

The above is predicated on the assumption that Gromyko will retain his stranglehold on Soviet policy throughout this period, and that therefore our object should be to demonstrate the weakness of that policy while not damaging our own public image.

With every move on the U.S.-Soviet chessboard, my conviction deepens that Gromyko is in fact our principal problem, and that we are likely to make no significant progress until sufficient pressure is brought to bear on him from within the system to modify his approach.

Two recent straws in the wind support this interpretation. First, Strobe Talbott informed me that during his recent visit to Moscow, his interlocutors (mainly from the Institutes) put the finger on Gromyko quite explicitly.⁴ This came up in a discussion of the treatment given Scowcroft; all the Soviets said privately that the problem was the effort to secure a private audience with Chernenko, which caused Gromyko to "hit the ceiling." So far, nothing new, but what was surprising was that the Institute types added (when they were out of the office and walking in the park), that our analysis was quite correct; it *is* necessary to bypass Gromyko, and the only thing wrong with our effort was the way it was done, since it gave Gromyko the opportunity to block it. A quieter effort at a lower level might have worked, they observed.

Second, Robert Anderson informed me today that Velikhov had telephoned his assistant Hirsch twice since their visit to inquire about the fate of "point three" of Anderson's "Bering Straits" proposal. You will recall that Anderson had given them an off-the-cuff idea for a declaration regarding the Bering Straits, which included a proposal for a high-level binational commission to discuss this and other matters (TAB).⁵ The idea has many potential problems and probably is not worth pursuing on its merits, but I am struck by Velikhov's obvious and uncharacteristic interest. Could it be that a "commission" of some sort would provide a structure for those outside the MFA to interact with us on behalf of the Party and/or KGB? No other explanation comes readily to mind.

In sum, while it will be necessary for us to continue to play out the game with Gromyko, I am convinced that we are unlikely to find any real opening for a breakthrough, this year or next, unless we can get something going, very quietly, with other elements in the Soviet hierarchy. It should be obvious by now that we cannot do this with officials in the State Department, because Gromyko will always have the perfectly sound bureaucratic argument that it is his responsibility to deal with them. He is on much weaker ground in fending off counterpart-to-counterpart meetings, even if he should know about them in advance (which he will), and gets reports on what transpires.

The fact is that every senior official puts more credence in what his own staff produces than in what comes from others. Therefore, it makes a real difference bureaucratically whose staff does the initial work. So long as the Central Committee *apparat*, for example, has no direct contact with us, they have little means of reaching conclusions other than those Gromyko is pushing. With direct contacts, they are better able to activate their boss

to their own ultimate advantage, provided political conditions permit.

The argument that we should continue to try to communicate with various elements in the Soviet hierarchy is not based on a “good guy, bad guy” presumption. There are no “good guys,” and we should never act as if there were. But we should not pass up any feasible opportunity to utilize normal and natural bureaucratic rivalries in the Soviet system to our own advantage.

The Danger of Leaks

Few things can be more damaging to our ability to maximize our current tactical advantage than a further succession of leaked stories about the progress of our interagency consideration, possible positions on specific issues and the like. We need either to achieve much greater discipline than we have managed in the past, or else simply keep the bureaucracy (including the SACPG) ignorant of the President’s decisions until we have had time to act upon them and can time our public disclosures.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 [07/01/1984–07/14/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only McFarlane and Poindexter. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: “I agree with your points, especially in re Gromyko & the need to find another way. What measures could we try? Bud.”

² See [Documents 233](#) and [236](#).

³ McFarlane wrote in the margin: “Right on.”

⁴ Strobe Talbott, *Time* Magazine correspondent on U.S.-Soviet relations. Likely a reference to the Institute of US

and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN).

⁵ The tab is not attached. For more on Robert Anderson and this proposal, see [footnote 3, Document 244](#).

239. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 6, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

We had a very good internal meeting this afternoon in my office in which we discussed our approach to the talks that appear to be shaping up for September in Vienna with the Soviets on ASAT.² Our approach is to include the subject matter of START and INF in those talks, whereas the Soviets are claiming that our desire to talk about ballistic missiles means that we are imposing preconditions to any negotiation on what they call the “militarization of outer space.” This is a rather delicate war of words, because we are saying that we have accepted the Soviet proposal to talk about the militarization of outer space and that all we want to do is to talk about the whole picture, which includes ballistic missiles passing through space, and in any event the overall subject matter cannot be limited simply to weapons originating in space or used against space objects. The full richness of the possibilities from a definitional and rhetorical point of view became obvious, and a good number of papers are going to be written as a result of this meeting. Our first step will be to get a sound approach. The second will be to get it through the interagency process, and the third will be to sell it to the Soviets, assuming that the Soviets do not try to back out of what they have already offered.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 6.

² In telegram 199520/Tosec 70065 to Shultz in Asia, July 7, the Department forwarded the text of “a memorandum in progress on ASAT and the other arms control issues relative to the Vienna talks, which was used today as the basis for an in-house discussion in Ken Dam’s office. It will be the basis for further meetings on the issue and will evolve further, but we did want you to have our tentative thinking.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

240. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 7, 1984

I have carefully read your letter of July 2, 1984.² Let me say frankly that I was looking in it for a positive response to our proposal to hold Soviet-American negotiations this September on preventing the militarization of outer space.³ Regrettably, there is no such response in the letter.

One has to reach such a conclusion despite the fact that you express readiness to start negotiations in Vienna. For from your letter it clearly follows that the U.S. is not agreeing to participate in the kind of negotiations which the Soviet side proposes and in which it is prepared to participate.

Let me recall that the Soviet Union favors the adoption of urgent measures which would enable us effectively to block all channels for extending the arms race into space. This can be done by banning all space attack systems, which is precisely what we propose to have negotiations about, and by establishing a moratorium, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, on testing and deployment of such systems.

The American side essentially is talking about conducting not negotiations on space, but some sort of "conference" without a definite agenda, i.e. there would be a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.

We are far from underestimating the importance of questions of nuclear armaments, which in your letter are linked with the problem of space. You know our position with regard to how to solve these questions. But as before, nothing points to the readiness of the American side to take into account this position and open the way out of the present impasse. Banning space weapons is a problem of great importance in its own right. To tie it to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, which are in fact currently blocked, would be to put negotiations on space attack weapons into a stalemated position as well. At the same time, the deployment of space attack weapons would inevitably lead to a sharp escalation of the arms race on earth too, and would complicate all the more the possibility of undertaking effective measures for limiting and reducing armaments in general. We are convinced that such a development of events would serve nobody's interests.

As for space weapons themselves, the emphasis here should, of course, not be on studying something. It is necessary to reach agreement on practical measures in order to prevent the appearance of space attack weapons of any kind. This is also what determines the concrete questions put forward by the USSR for negotiations, in order to resolve the problem in all its aspects and in a radical way.

We approach these negotiations seriously and responsibly, and we expect the same attitude from the American side. If, however, for some reason it is difficult for you to give consent to such negotiations at the time we suggested, we would have to take that into account. It is important that we be in agreement that such negotiations are necessary, and that we will conduct them without unjustifiable delays.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the main point once again. There cannot be any doubt that it is more sensible to exclude space from military competition in advance, rather than trying later on to eliminate the otherwise inevitable, serious and perhaps even irreparable damage to stability and security. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to look at this whole problem once again from this perspective. I would like to hope that you could give a positive reply to our proposal, which remains in force.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In a July 7 memorandum to Reagan, Acting Secretary Dam noted that Soviet Chargé Isakov delivered the letter during a July 7 meeting with Burt. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July–December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

241. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dam to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 7, 1984

SUBJECT

Chernenko's Response to Your July 2 Letter on the Vienna Talks

Soviet Chargé Isakov came in to see Rick Burt Saturday afternoon under urgent instructions from Moscow to hand over a reply from Chernenko to your July 2 letter on the Vienna talks.² An unofficial translation, as well as the Russian original, are attached.³

Chernenko's letter stresses the following points:

—It insists that you have not yet given a positive response to the Soviet proposal to negotiate on preventing “the militarization of space” in September,⁴ and that “the American side” is still talking about some “conference” without a definite agenda.

—It very forcefully makes the point that nuclear negotiations are frozen, and that linking them to negotiations on outer space is therefore a recipe for deadlock on outer space too. The resulting arms race in space would accelerate the arms race on earth as well, Chernenko says, and would make it harder to limit and reduce armaments in general.

—As a result of these two factors, the letter goes on, “it is necessary to come to a clear understanding as to the subject of these negotiations” before our delegations meet at the negotiating table. If it is hard for us to agree to such

negotiations in September, they will "take that into account."

In response, Burt first recalled that it was we who had suggested beginning talks later if the Soviets preferred. He said we would study the letter and reply soon, but stressed that both you and the Secretary have told the Soviets we are prepared to come to Vienna with clear substantive ideas on outer space arms control. At the same time, we believe that if we are going to address this topic we must also discuss related issues like offensive nuclear weapons. In any event, however, we are prepared to enter into diplomatic discussions of the agenda for talks, and Burt invited the Soviets to begin such preparatory discussions without delay.

Isakov replied by asking again whether we are ready to negotiate on "preventing the militarization" of outer space. If we were making an announcement, would we be willing to say that, he asked. Burt said that in discussing the agenda for a Vienna meeting, we could address the issue of what any announcement might say. Isakov concluded that he would report the exchange, and the specific question of initiating a discussion of the Vienna agenda, to Moscow.

On the way out, Isakov commented to the State Department official accompanying him that the Soviets are offering the Administration a political "bumper harvest" if negotiations on outer space begin in September; all that was being asked was that the agenda be fixed before the two delegations sat down. The official replied that you do not need Soviet help to get reelected, and that the Administration is approaching the talks on the assumption that they must be to mutual benefit, without regard to such considerations.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

² Saturday, July 7. See [footnote 1](#), [Document 240](#). The President's July 2 letter is [Document 234](#).

³ Both are attached. The Russian original is not printed. The translation is printed as [Document 240](#).

⁴ See [Document 233](#).

242. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 9, 1984

I attended a meeting this afternoon in the White House with Bud McFarlane and John Poindexter to discuss next steps on the meeting that the Soviets have proposed for September in Vienna on "the militarization of space." The meeting went on for an hour and a half, and so we covered many topics, but we came down to the conclusion that the President should, in a week or so, respond to a letter received on Saturday from Chernenko attacking the U.S. position that we must discuss not only space but also associated offensive systems.² The general situation is that the Soviets are most interested in talking about our strategic defense initiative, whereas we, partly for internal reasons within the Administration, have no interest in negotiating away the SDI in any way at this time, but we do want to talk about offensive systems.

Actually there are several aspects of the current situation. First, we would obviously like to have a series of meetings in Vienna in September, both because it would provide a substantive opportunity and because the President and his closest campaign aides would like to see some arms control negotiations restarted before the election. On the other hand, the Soviets understand this and are using that fact to put the negotiations on the basis which is best for them substantively. Second, we have the problem of knowing what it is that we are prepared to negotiate about. On the one hand, we have been going through an exercise in the interagency process which no doubt dictates being cautious about being able to negotiate about very much at all at this

point. On the other hand, the President is very interested in having a heart-to-heart broad discussion with the Soviets about how to get into a posture where we can negotiate very broadly about all kinds of offensive and defensive weapons.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984. No classification marking, Dictated by Dam on July 9.

² See [Document 240](#).

243. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 10, 1984

I attended a Senior Arms Control Policy Group meeting this afternoon in the Situation Room. Bud McFarlane chaired the meeting, which was on space arms control, and kept it well off the procedural question of how we tie the Soviets down to a broad-based discussion in Vienna and well onto the substance, with heavy emphasis on the procedures for getting the substantive work done. It became clear that the major problem is going to be how to protect the strategic defense initiative. This is important primarily from the standpoint of preventing DOD from vetoing participation in the Vienna talks in September, because Cap Weinberger is prepared to go to any lengths to protect that initiative from being limited in arms control negotiations at this time and will probably be able to count on the President to back him up in view of the fact that the President views the strategic defense initiative as a path to a future free from the threat of nuclear weapons (an expectation that I find groundless). The upshot was that the SACPG meeting was usefully boring. We will be able to handle in a smaller group the preparation for agreement with the Soviet Union on an agenda.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984, Personal Notes of Deputy

Secretary Kenneth W. Dam. No classification marking.
Dictated by Dam on July 10.

² The Department reported the results of this meeting in telegram 202711/Tosec 70220 to Shultz in Asia, July 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

**244. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the
National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, July 13, 1984

SUBJECT

Establishing Contact outside Gromyko's Staff

You asked for my thoughts on how we might go about establishing a contact outside Gromyko's staff. Several possibilities come to mind, which are not mutually exclusive. Tactically, I believe we should not show too much eagerness, but simply let it be known that we would have something to say if they wish to listen.

Our principal target, in my opinion, should be the CC CPSU Secretariat staff. These are the people who work directly for Chernenko and presumably Gorbachev, since the latter seems to be acting as Chernenko's number two in running the Secretariat. He may actually be the more active of the two; if he aims for the top spot—as he doubtless does—he is probably eager to get his finger in the foreign affairs field, where he has little prior experience. The most valuable interlocutor here is probably Zagladin. He runs the International Department (although Ponomarev is the titular head), is a Central Committee member in his own right, and clearly has a vested interest in building up his organization's influence, as compared with Gromyko's MFA.

In the past, however, this channel has not been used (except for my two meetings this year, the second with Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's "desk officer" for the

U.S.).² In the past, private channels have either been through Dobrynin (who seems to have had a direct line to Brezhnev's office, but this may not exist any more), or through KGB contacts who acted merely as message bearers. There are dangers in using Dobrynin, since we don't know how direct his own lines of communication are, and since we should not subject our messages to whatever spin he chooses to put on them. The use of KGB contacts would be feasible—and should be done if that is the Soviet preference—but has the disadvantage of dealing with a person who is only a message bearer and who plays no personal role in the policy making process. For some types of subjects, this is preferable—for example in arranging a prisoner exchange, or some other limited, concrete deal which the Soviets want off the record. It has its limitations, however, if our objective is a broader discussion of how disparate issues might be put together to form a package.

The following specific possibilities come to mind:

1. We could have Hartman pass a message to Zagladin that another meeting might be useful to review informally what might be possible for the balance of this year and next year. If he agrees, we could offer to meet quietly in Washington, Moscow or a third country, as he suggests. If we decide to follow this course, the best way to get the message to Hartman would be to call him on the secure line. Nothing should be done in telegraphic traffic, because it is too difficult to control distribution.

2. Ty Cobb has an outstanding invitation from the USA Institute to visit Moscow in connection with a research project initiated before he came on the NSC staff. It has been renewed verbally since he became a staff member, but he of course has done nothing about it. We could have him pick up the invitation (if the Soviets are still willing). When

he was there in 1981 he was given excellent access to a variety of senior officials, including Zagladin. Ty would not have to go with any particular message (and probably should not), but his Soviet interlocutors would know that they could get messages back to us by him if they desired.

3. Robert O. Anderson's suggestion (TAB I)³ could provide an avenue to Academician Velikhov (who has gone out of his way to express an interest in it). I am not sure just how influential Velikhov is (aside from his prominent role in Soviet space, SDI, and ASAT programs), or on whose behalf he may be speaking. He is not himself a member of the Central Committee, which would indicate that his personal status in the Party is not very high. On the other hand, he may be a channel to someone else, and the matter might be worth exploring.

There are several ways this might be done:

(1) Hartman or his Deputy might ask for an appointment with Velikhov, in the course of which inquiries could be made about the Soviet view of Anderson's proposal.

(2) A USG official from Washington could do the same, and perhaps with greater success than the Embassy can. For example, Alvin Trivelpiece of DOE⁴ has an invitation from Velikhov which he is willing to accept if we want him to. He could be briefed to raise the Anderson proposal and attempt to smoke out just what the Soviets find appealing about it.

(3) Finally, we could ask a reliable private citizen with ties to Velikhov to raise the matter. Anderson and his assistant Hirsch,⁵ for example, could be encouraged to follow up on our behalf. There are dangers here, however, because, as I mentioned before, I don't find the idea attractive as it

stands, and its main utility would be as a vehicle for smoking out possible Soviet interest in establishing a special channel. Therefore, I believe it would be better to use a USG official to inquire, if we decide to do so.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1984 (07/01/1984–07/14/1984). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: “Bud, I opt for Jack trying to meet with Zagladin.” McFarlane replied in the margin: “I think we should seek to arrive at option 1 outcome (ie Matlock Zagladin) by pursuing option 2. Ty [Cobb] could see Zagladin & make clear our interest.”

² See [Documents 180](#) and [195](#).

³ Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Company (ARCO), visited the Soviet Union and apparently met with Velikhov, discussing issues regarding access to the Bering Straits. Attached at Tab I, but not printed, is a memorandum that Anderson gave to Velikhov on the Bering Straits, dated May 24. Matlock explained in a handwritten note: “This is the proposal Anderson gave Velikhov during his trip in late May/early June. It was the third point that Velikhov asked about specifically in two subsequent telephone calls to Hirsch, Anderson’s assistant.” Point three of the memorandum proposed forming a joint commission to “pursue any and all other matters of any nature whatsoever that may be of importance to the long term interest of both countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” Matlock’s note continued: “As I mentioned in my earlier oral briefing, I don’t think we need a private commission meeting with Soviet officials. But we might think about a “commission”

from within the USG (and perhaps with a few reliable 'outsiders') as a vehicle to maintain contact with Soviet officials outside MFA. It is the latter aspect which *may* explain Velikhov's interest." McFarlane clearly preferred Matlock's options 1 and 2 over using Anderson as a contact (see [footnote 1, above](#)).

⁴ Alvin Trivelpiece, Director of the Office of Energy Research, Department of Energy.

⁵ Robert L. Hirsch, ARCO Vice President.

⁶ In a follow-up memorandum to McFarlane on July 24, Matlock wrote: "All of Anderson's proposals have serious defects in my view. Nevertheless, we must decide what we will tell Anderson. In doing so, it would be well to look at his ideas to see if they might be adapted to serve any of our purposes." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/09/84-07/11/84))

**245. Memorandum From Walter Raymond of
the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, July 17, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet Covert Action Program

My understanding from former colleagues is that the Soviet/East European Covert Action Program was budgeted at \$8.3 million for FY 84. The program managers projected funding needs at \$9.1 million for FY 85, however the "bureaucracy" (probably including John McMahon) has cut the figure to \$7.6. Some of my figures may not be totally accurate but the *bottom line* is that there is a projected cut in this program. I do not believe that this issue has been brought to Bill Casey's attention. I have a personal interest in this program, not only because I was responsible for it before, but also because I worked very closely with the Agency on this activity. I have been trying to generate a parallel non-covert dimension in the field of political action toward the target. I think it is vital that funding be continued. Indeed, more could and should be more meaningfully spent on this program.

I would urge you to raise this with Bill Casey privately and insure that he sees the program is continued without reductions.

Attached at Tab I is a bootleg copy of a recent letter from Secretary Shultz to Bill Casey underscoring the importance

of the program and the need for it to be expanded.² Ken and I and others share this view.

FYI: [2 lines not declassified] This is a second item I believe you should raise with Bill Casey in order to develop a Congressional strategy designed to reverse this HPSCI position.

Recommendation

That you underscore to Bill Casey your commitment that the Soviet/East Europe Covert Action Program continue at equal or greater funding levels in FY 85.³

That you raise [less than 1 line not declassified] funding with Bill Casey to develop strategy for use with HPSCI.⁴

Ken deGraffenreid concurs.⁵

Tab I

Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to Director of Central Intelligence Casey⁶

Dear Bill:

Washington, undated

I know that you see the US-Soviet relationship as a long-term struggle. Some of our most important allies in that struggle ultimately may prove to be the various peoples of the Soviet Union. For that reason, this Administration's basic policy document on the Soviet Union (NSDD-75)⁷ set out as a major objective encouraging the internal liberation

of that society and penetrating the controls set up by the system.

We have limited means to pursue this process. The CIA's programs designed to get materials to the Soviet and East European peoples and to support groups there and in exile are among the most important. I have in mind such programs as the dissemination of books and other publications within the Soviet empire, letters by Soviet emigres to their contacts in the Soviet Union, [*1 line not declassified*].

It is sometimes difficult to measure results in our penetration efforts, to know precisely what materials get through. But at a time when the KGB has managed temporarily to stifle most organized dissent inside the USSR, keeping the struggle going outside is even more significant as it preserves hope.

Similar programs directed at Eastern Europe are also important. Poland is only the latest demonstration of the fundamental instability of these systems, of the strong desire of Eastern Europeans for the lifestyles and basic freedoms of the West. Also, dissent in Eastern Europe has some spill-over influence inside the Soviet Union.

Recognizing the difficulty of measuring results but also emphasizing the long term benefits, I urge that you sustain the existing programs designed to increase Soviet and East European preoccupation with the aspiration of their own peoples. For a variety of reasons I do not advocate an immediate expansion of these programs, and I understand and agree with your desire to avoid additional controversy now with such pressing priorities as Nicaragua facing us. But looking towards the future, I believe that we should be thinking about a new and more ambitious finding in this

field. I suggest that our staffs get together as soon as possible to develop plans for additional and increased activities over the next four to five years that might usefully be undertaken vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to Secretary of State Shultz⁸

Washington, May 4, 1984

SUBJECT

Suggested Response to Letter dated 19 April 1984 Regarding US-Soviet Relationship

I very much appreciate the interest and support you express for our covert action programs directed at the Soviet Union and its East European allies. You can be sure that I take a personal interest in preserving the momentum they have developed over the past many years and will continue to give high priority to finding ways in which these programs can be sharpened and eventually expanded, within our current overall budgetary constraints.

I find your idea of beginning staff planning in this field now for the next four to five years an excellent one and have initiated action through our International Activities Division to pursue this proposal from our side. [*name not declassified*] who heads the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] within IAD, will start the process with your European Bureau. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer

knows both [*name not declassified*] and our existing programs well and will be our initial point of contact.

William J. Casey⁹

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400684. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action.


² Raymond called this a “bootleg copy” because the letter from Shultz to Casey is undated and unsigned. The single attachment is referred to as “Casey-Shultz correspondence” but is printed below as two enclosures.

³ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁴ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

⁵ DeGraffenreid initialed his concurrence and wrote in the margin: “Strongly agree with Walt that we must *not* let these programs be reduced.”

⁶ Secret; Sensitive. See [footnote 2](#), above.

⁷ See [Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 260](#) .

⁸ Secret; Sensitive.

⁹ Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature.

**246. Memorandum From the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane) to Secretary of Defense
Weinberger¹**

Washington, July 18, 1984

SUBJECT
Responding to Chernenko

Further to our conversation at breakfast this morning concerning how we respond to Chernenko's latest letter (Tab B),² I enclose at Tab A a draft which has been prepared based upon specific guidance from the President.³

I draw your attention to two points—one involving tactics for the talks and the other more fundamental long-term arms control strategy. The first arises in paragraph four on page one in which the President offers to let the Soviets go first. This is designed to make clear to the Soviets that we are willing to hear them out. The risk we face, of course, is that having made their case on ASAT and SDI, they would walk out if we began to talk about offensive systems. Our strategy would be that after their presentation, we would open by asking questions about their ideas over a prolonged period. During this period, however, we would weave in the obvious relationship between weapons in space and offensive systems leading to a full-blown presentation of why negotiations on offensive systems must be resumed.

The second issue in my mind is more fundamental. It concerns the President's wish to state to the Soviets that

our experience during the past 15 years reflects that we have focussed on the short to mid-term programs which have an inexorability which has led us to making gestures at the margins while future systems are ignored. In a rational world in which the Soviets approached arms control as we have, such a proposal is eminently sensible. But it has two risks. First, the Russians do not approach arms control as we do. They negotiate to weaken us. In this Administration we have reflected this reality by acting in our self-interest to deal with anticipated Soviet programs. Our focus on exploring SDI reflects this realism. The second risk is one of public diplomacy and opportunities we may give the Soviets to charge us with raising new issues and either introducing "preconditions" or at least proposing such fundamental new directions as to make clear that we are not serious. As defensible as our position would be on the merits, we could receive substantial criticism from the cult of arms control writers who believe we should not alter the existing framework for discussion.

I have discussed these reservations with the President and I must say that he was very emphatic in his view that we can deal with such criticisms as we may face and that at bottom the importance of getting to these longer term issues requires that we proceed as he proposes. With some impatience he accepted that we might introduce the last paragraph on page two with the phrase "Looking beyond the matter of talks in September. . ." so as to relieve suspicions that we are introducing either a precondition or insisting on a short-term focus on this broader concept. He was supported by the Vice President and Ed.⁴ Jim shared my reservations.⁵

The President wants strongly to send a reply today. Could I ask you to review the draft letter and let me know your views. I intend to try to get time on his calendar this

afternoon to discuss this further and will invite you to attend.⁶ Many thanks.

Robert C. McFarlane⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, 1984—Arms Control. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

² Tab B is not attached. The letter is printed as [Document 240](#).

³ The draft letter from Reagan to Chernenko with revisions suggested in the text and margins is attached but not printed. The final version of the letter, sent on July 18, is [Document 247](#).

⁴ Reference is to Edwin Meese.

⁵ Reference is to James Baker.

⁶ According to the President's Daily Diary, Weinberger, McFarlane, and Baker met with Reagan from 3 p.m. until about 4:12 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting was found.

⁷ McFarlane signed "Bud" above his typed signature.

247. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko¹

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Washington, July 18, 1984

Thank you for your prompt reply to my letter of July 2.² I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my reaction to your proposal for a meeting of delegations in Vienna in September,³ as my earlier statements seem to have been misunderstood.

It is certainly not my intention to propose a "conference without a definite agenda," involving "a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically." Of course, agreement on the content and objective of these talks is desirable, and both sides should have a clear idea of the issues the other considers relevant and important, so that the interchange can be concrete and productive.

It is also not my desire to have a conference merely to "study something," as you put it in your letter. As I stated in my previous letter, there should be a clear mandate to seek out and find mutually acceptable negotiating approaches which hold promise for concrete results.

Defining the agenda should be the immediate task of our diplomatic representatives. As you know, yours have been invited to present Soviet views on this question. I have no objection to making presentation of the Soviet proposals the first item, and my delegation will be instructed to respond to them promptly and constructively.

As we consider the agenda, I think you will agree that neither of us can assert the right to define for the other those issues which are relevant to the questions being discussed. To attempt to do so would not reflect a serious and responsible approach to solving problems and would hardly be consistent with the indispensable principle of dealing on the basis of equality.

The fact is that, if we are to negotiate effectively regarding weapons in space—or as you would put it, “the militarization of outer space”—we must take into account the overall strategic environment of which these weapons are but one element. Many military activities in space, after all, involve efforts to monitor, to communicate with, to warn against, or to counter offensive nuclear systems, while many of those offensive weapons pass through outer space to reach their targets. Problems involving strategic systems, including anti-satellite weapons, therefore, must encompass existing offensive systems. This is not a matter of policy preference, but a practical fact of life. I am sure you recognize this since, in your last letter,⁴ you noted the close relationship between the question of weapons in space and the arms competition on earth.

Is it reasonable to assume that we can make significant progress in solving part of the problem, while ignoring other parts? I think not, and this is the reason I have suggested that we try to find ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms. These are in fact the most destructive weapons in our hands, and if we cannot find ways to reduce the dangers they present, whatever efforts we make in other areas will be severely hampered. This is the reason I feel strongly that we must also discuss ways to resume negotiations on offensive nuclear arms while at the same time we turn our attention to arms control of weapons in space.

Mr. Chairman, I can reiterate to you that I accept your Government's proposal to begin talks in Vienna on September 18. My acceptance is without any precondition—as I assume your proposal was. I am confident that our representatives can rapidly work out an agreed statement of the meeting's content and objectives, so long as my interest in making concrete progress is matched on your part.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490757, 8490769, 8490793). No classification marking. In his personal notes for July 16, Dam described the drafting process: "We also met today to decide what we would recommend to the President should be his response to the letter from Chernenko on the proposed Vienna talks. This is something we have met a great deal on, and we have a draft response which we sent out to the Secretary on his trip. There are many bureaucratic ins and outs to the drafting of Presidential correspondence, and in fact we sent a copy of the draft response to the National Security Council staff, where Bud McFarlane drafted several of the paragraphs of what we now plan to send back to the National Security Council as our proposed response. The real problem here is getting Defense and specifically Cap Weinberger to sign off on our response without setting the precedent that Presidential correspondence is drafted by an interagency committee. The big problem in the proposed Vienna talks is that it is unacceptable to Cap Weinberger, and probably to the President too, to say that we are prepared to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Yet without a fairly forthcoming position on that, it is unlikely that the Soviets would be prepared to negotiate on what we want to negotiate, namely, on offensive strategic weapons.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

² See [Document 234](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

⁴ See [Document 240](#).

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 23, 1984

I thought you would be interested in this roundup of recent information and current judgments on Chernenko's ability to function, his standing in Moscow, and its impact on decisionmaking there.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey²

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, July 23, 1984

SUBJECT
Chernenko

[10 paragraphs (33 lines) not declassified]

Politics

[less than 1 line not declassified] a perception among his colleagues that he will be only an interim leader, thereby weakening him politically. This is underscored by the bureaucracy's persisting denigration of him. Since he became General Secretary, there have been several indications that much more than Brezhnev, or Andropov,

Chernenko must share power with his senior Politburo colleagues:

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] after Chernenko's election that Ustinov and Gromyko had backed him with expectation they would share power with him while maintaining control of their defense and foreign policy bailiwicks.

—Two weeks after Chernenko's election, Gromyko [*1 line not declassified*] cited his own statements, not Chernenko's as expositions of Soviet line.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] that our only hope of softening Moscow's foreign policy would be somehow—perhaps via unofficial, high-level academics—to bypass Gromyko.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Gromyko has played larger role in their talks with Chernenko than he did under Brezhnev or Andropov.

—When reporting the Politburo's approval of Chernenko's talks with foreign leaders, Soviet media have included names of other Politburo members who participated in the talks—a departure from practice under Andropov.

Decisionmaking

We do not believe that this wider distribution of power has paralyzed the Politburo, but it may have reduced the flexibility and speed of decisionmaking:

—Shifting tone of Soviet reactions to our response on the space weapons talks offer may indicate increased

difficulty in reacting to unexpected events. Moscow's handling of issue may have reflected leadership disagreement over how much flexibility to display. Under a strong leader, such differences could be more quickly resolved.

—Differences in statements by Soviet leaders on nature of US "threat" and resources necessary to meet it suggest allocations decisions for the next five-year plan, which should already have been made, might have been delayed because of uncertain leadership situation over past year.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and the Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84-07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-9-2. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Casey also sent a copy of this memorandum to Shultz; the copy is stamped with Shultz's initials, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/25/1984-07/26/1984); NLR-775-12-15-11-0)

² Casey initialed "WJC" above his typed signature.

³ Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon.

**249. Memorandum From Robert Linhard,
Ronald Lehman, Jack Matlock, and Sven
Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff
to the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, July 23, 1984

SUBJECT

Responding to Soviet Proposed "Agreed Statement"

Alternative Responses. Attached at *Tab A* is a draft response that NSC staff would recommend be used in responding to the Soviets.² It does not use any of the alternative formulations suggested in the package that Secretary Shultz provided to the President this morning (provided at *Tab B*).³

NSC staff have problems with the State alternatives. None of the alternatives mention limits on offensive nuclear arms. All put us in the position of depending upon our ability to bring up reductions in offensive nuclear arms only as this is "related" to the subjects of the "militarization of space" or weapons in space. Given the Soviet actions, we don't feel that we should try to finesse this issue any further. We are in the process of negotiating an agreed statement. We had best make our interests clear.

The NSC staff alternative simply states what we have asserted before—that we are ready to meet to discuss negotiating approaches to areas of concern without preconditions. The specific references make it clear that we are ready to deal with Soviet concerns. They also restate

US intentions to pursue both ASAT negotiations and a resumption of negotiations on offensive nuclear arsenals.

The State package (*Tab B*) also suggests that we consider announcing our own version of an ASAT moratorium. NSC staff would *strongly recommend against such a step* without additional staffing and discussion. The NSC alternative (*Tab A*) handles the Soviet call for a moratorium by explicitly stating that we would be prepared to discuss this in Vienna.

Timing of the Response. State has proposed that we make a response to the Soviets this afternoon, and then consider making that response a matter of public record. NSC staff feel that it remains in our interest to keep the exchanges on preparations for Vienna private if possible. It shows to the Soviets and to the knowledgeable publics a seriousness of purpose on our part.

Once a decision is taken on *how* to respond to the Soviets, the NSC staff would recommend that we *not rush to deliver it today*. Tomorrow would certainly be early enough to meet our commitment to a prompt response.

Staff would also recommend that we *not release the US response to the press* in order to avoid giving the impression that we are simply reacting to Soviet public diplomacy tactics. It would also underscore our seriousness of purpose with the Soviets.

Talking Points. Attached at *Tab I* are a set of talking points which you might find useful in this afternoon's meeting on this subject.⁴

Recommendations

That you recommend the response at *Tab A* as the preferred initial U.S. counter to the Soviet "agreed statement" proposal.⁵

That you recommend against too prompt (i.e., this afternoon) a formal response to the Soviets lest we look like we are reacting to their public diplomacy tactics.⁶

That we not make the U.S. response a matter of public record but maintain our efforts to keep the diplomatic exchanges private.⁷

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/03/84-07/07/84); NLR-748-25A-8-7-4. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed. The Soviet proposal for a joint communiqué was given to Burt on July 20. See [Document 250](#).

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ McFarlane approved the recommendation and wrote "as mod."

⁶ McFarlane noted: "RR approved reply today."

⁷ McFarlane approved the recommendation.

250. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)¹

Washington, July 23, 1984

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Finally I had several meetings with the Secretary and Rick Burt to discuss our response to the note that Soviet Charge Isakov gave Rick Burt Friday night,² giving the Soviet response to the President's recent letter to Chernenko.³ The Soviet response was simply a proposed public statement which was extremely tendentious. In fact, the Soviets published it today. Our own response we intend to make in the form of a draft joint statement announcing the talks, but unlike the Soviets, we do not plan to publicize it, because it is simply impossible to negotiate in public, as the Soviets are doing. Indeed, their own behavior indicates that they probably do not intend to go forward with talks, but one can never be sure what is motivating them to release publicly immediately their own diplomatic communications.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983-Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on July 23.

² July 20.

³ A Department of State chronology, which accounted for U.S. and Soviet statements on the Vienna talks, is attached to an information memorandum from Kelly to Shultz, July

30. According to the chronology: "Soviet Chargé Isakov gave Assistant Secretary Burt text of a Soviet proposal for US-Soviet joint announcement of agreement 'to open talks in order to draw up and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including the complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems.' The proposed statement would also announce agreement on a 'mutual moratorium on the testing and deployment of outer space weapons commencing on the day of the start of the talks.' Isakov suggested U.S. should be able to accept Soviet draft, since the President accepted Soviet proposal 'without preconditions.'" (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, July 1984)

251. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

July 24 Meeting With the Soviets on Vienna

Rick Burt called in Soviet Charge Isakov early this morning on the Vienna meeting. He led off by emphasizing the disappointment felt by you, me, and other senior US officials that the Soviets had chosen not to respond to your letter directly, but instead handed over a formulation for an announcement and then went public.² Burt said we had examined their formulation and produced one of our own, which he then provided Isakov.³

Isakov did not respond to Burt's point about not replying to your letter, although he seemed embarrassed. He did respond to our draft announcement, saying it did not move the process forward. He said it was like our other responses to the Soviet June 29 proposal in that we apparently refuse to respond to their central proposal—negotiations on the “prevention of militarization of outer space.”⁴ Our current formulation, he continued, like those immediately following the June 29 proposal and your letters, also refuses to agree to “negotiations,” talking merely about “approaches”. Finally, Isakov noted that our response was silent on a moratorium for space weapons testing and deployment.

Burt replied that our position has been clear all along. We are prepared to discuss outer space issues in Vienna. We also believe it necessary to address offensive strategic arms, such as ballistic missiles, that fly through space and

are related to the outer space issue. He told Isakov that we are serious about the subject and thus were interested in continuing our dialogue in diplomatic channels, adding that Soviet public relations ploys made us question if they were equally serious.

Isakov said he would report to Moscow. He is returning to Moscow tomorrow on vacation and told Burt he would brief Oleg Sokolov who will take over as Charge so we can continue our discussions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Secret; Sensitive. According to the covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, this memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. It is unsigned, but a note in the margin on the covering memorandum reads: "original of Sec Pres delivered by J. Crawley/S to McFarlane." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² In telegram 9294 from Moscow, July 24, the Embassy reported that TASS released a public statement on the possible Vienna negotiations on July 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840472-0067) In remarks to the press the same day, Speakes said that the administration was "pleased that the Soviets have now responded to our suggestion that we work out the joint statement" and that the United States would "respond promptly in diplomatic channels." (Dusko Doder, "Soviets Seek Talks Pledge From U.S.," *Washington Post*, July 24, 1984, p. A1) In his diary entry for July 23, Reagan wrote: "Bud brought Cap, George S. & Gen. Vessey in re the answer to the Soviets demand for a meeting on

ASAT. We're holding out for talks also on reducing nuclear weapons." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 370) According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was from 4:35 to 5:10 p.m. in the West Sitting Hall. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

³ The draft text of this July 24 joint announcement given to Isakov by Burt was not found.

⁴ See [Document 233](#).

252. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 26, 1984

In your letter of July 18,² it was stated that you accept without any preconditions our proposal of June 29,³ and the wish was expressed that our representatives work out an agreed statement regarding the beginning of the negotiations we proposed.

Taking this into account, on July 21 we handed over to the American side a draft of such an agreed statement prepared in strict conformity with what we proposed on June 29, namely: to begin negotiations with the aim of working out and concluding an agreement on preventing the militarization of outer space, including complete mutual renunciation of anti-satellite systems, and to establish from the day of the beginning of the negotiations a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons.

Since, as I have already noted, you wrote that you accepted our proposal of June 29, it was natural to expect that such a text of a joint statement would not meet with any objections on the American side.

However, the response which we received through the Department of State does not tally in any way with what was said in your letter. The draft statement proposed by the American side has nothing at all to do with the negotiations which we proposed. Instead of negotiations on outer space, it speaks of some "meeting to discuss and to define

approaches for negotiating” and it is absolutely unclear what the negotiations will be about.

To put it briefly, Mr. President, no doubt whatsoever now remains that the American side is not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.

To be candid, we deeply regret the unwillingness of the American side to reach agreement on this vitally important problem. We believed and continue to believe that now, while things have not yet gone too far, it would be easier to reach agreement on the complete prohibition of the entire class of space attack systems. Such is the objective of our proposal for the negotiations.

And the establishment of a mutual moratorium on testing and deployment of space attack weapons, as we proposed to do in conjunction with the beginning of the negotiations, would of itself be a major step showing, among other things, the commitment of the sides to the goals of strengthening strategic stability and reducing the military threat.

I repeat, we regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations. Should this position subsequently change—and we would like to hope this will happen—and should the wish be expressed on the part of the U.S. to start negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on the complete and unconditional prohibition of space weapons, we would be ready to return to consideration of this issue. In other words, our position, as it was presented in the statement by the Soviet Government of June 29, remains in force.⁴

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829). Secret; Sensitive. The original Russian language text is attached. Sokolov provided Dam with the text translated from Russian. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "Soviet Charge Sokolov, under the impression I was out of town, came in today to hand over to Ken Dam a new letter from Chernenko on Vienna. The letter takes a tough line. It claims our response to their proposed announcement 'does not tally' with the statement in your letter that you accept their proposal and leaves 'no doubt whatsoever' that we are 'not prepared to conduct negotiations with the aim of preventing the militarization of outer space.' Chernenko says that they 'regret that the current American position makes it impossible to conduct the negotiations,' that they would be ready to 'return to consideration of the issue' should we change our position, and that the Soviet position of June 29 remains in force." See also [footnote 3, Document 253](#).

² See [Document 247](#).

³ See [Document 233](#).

⁴ On a routing slip attached to the letter, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, Jack [Matlock] and Ron [Lehman] are working on a memo for the President. My initial reaction is we should stick to our position and respond to Chernenko accordingly. We should still keep the position that *they are* setting pre-conditions. I also think we need a good public affairs assessment of where we stand with the media and the public. JP." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (84900829))

**253. Information Memorandum From the
Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State
Shultz¹**

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, July 26, 1984

The Soviet reaction to our draft announcement for Vienna was fairly predictable.² Their own draft statement was obviously unacceptable, particularly its pre-condition of a moratorium, but our response went so far to the other extreme of emptiness that it did not begin a process.

I know you think that the process of discussing a joint statement has made it more difficult for the Soviets to extricate themselves from talks in Vienna, but I do not share this view. I do not think the Soviets have decided whether to come to Vienna. They have been quite candid in noting that their coming would help the President politically, which they have no interest in doing. If they come, their part of the bargain would be a negotiation on an area where the US has considerable technological potential.

So far we say that we accept their proposal, but for their suspicious mind (and they are more suspicious of us than we are of them) we have not really done so. We have not said we are prepared for negotiations (this despite the fact that even the most minimal position, on "incidents in space", is a negotiating position). Nor have we clearly said that one of the subjects of Vienna talks would be outer space.

I recognize that the Soviets are engaging in a bit of brinksmanship, and we should not be overly alarmed. Nevertheless, we must be aware that unless there is something in it for them, they won't go. I do not believe that agreeing to negotiate on outer space would be a major concession. We should not accept the Soviet demand for a moratorium, nor should we prejudge the outcome of talks by agreeing to negotiate on the "demilitarization of outer space" on Soviet terms. But, as we have discussed many times, I believe it is possible to devise a negotiating approach covering ASAT that is in our interest and is politically defensible.

The three formulations we looked at the other day would all provide an acceptable basis for negotiations: they provided for "talks" (I prefer "negotiations") "on: (a) the militarization of outer space; *or* (b) antisatellite weapons and related subjects of mutual interest; *or* (c) weapons related to space, including antisatellite weapons."

What is necessary now is to tell the Soviets that we are prepared to "negotiate"; that we are prepared to address "outer space" arms control; and that their requirement for a moratorium is prejudging the outcome of the negotiations.

We could make this point to Chernenko in a succinct letter from the President. Alternatively, you or someone else in the Department could make the point to Sokolov. I do not believe that Art Hartman should make this point to Dobrynin, since neither of them have been close enough to this process to date. On balance, I do not think a Presidential letter is the best vehicle to convey our response; perhaps not even you. Because of the empty nature of our first draft, we are now in the situation of having to "clarify" our position. The President should not

be directly engaged. But whoever conveys our new formulation, it should be clear that he is not free-wheeling and that he is providing officially-authorized language.

It may well be that because the Soviets are trying to prejudge the outcome and are trying to stop ASAT and SDI altogether, they may still be unwilling to come to Vienna. So be it. At least in the public debate over who was responsible for the lack of talks, we and not the Soviets would be seen to be the reasonable party; the ones who agreed both to a meaningful public statement/agenda and to show up in Vienna without preconditions.

I hope to discuss this with you at the 7:00 meeting.³

Richard Burt⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July 1-July 31, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Dam, Armacost, and Chain. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on July 26.

² By this time, several rounds of U.S. and Soviet proposals had been rejected. According to a chronology of Vienna related statements and events, on July 26: "Sokolov gives Deputy Secretary Dam Soviet message responding to U.S. message delivered in Moscow on July 19." This message was a letter from Chernenko to Reagan. See [Document 252](#). "Message states that U.S. response to their proposed joint announcement does not square with U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposal for talks, and leaves no doubt that the U.S. is not prepared to conduct negotiations aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. Message expresses regret that the U.S. position makes it impossible

to conduct negotiations, but says USSR is prepared to reconsider if the U.S. alters its position.” (Attachment to Information Memorandum from Kelly to Shultz, July 30; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, July 1984)

³ In his personal notes for July 26, Dam wrote: “The Soviet Charge Sokolov came in today to deliver a letter from Chernenko to President Reagan [see [Document 252](#)]. The subject was the proposed Vienna space negotiations. The Soviets took a pretty hard line. It is clear that they are trying to back away from negotiations. Tonight at 7:00 we met in the Secretary’s office to consider our reply. We came to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to prepare a letter or other document in response that could be released to the public if the Soviets chose to release their letter. The Soviets in the letter seem to be making a record for justifying their refusal to go to the Vienna talks. We settled on an approach which would allow us to go back and show that we really were accepting their proposal without preconditions, although we would not accept all of their exact language and we would make clear that from our standpoint, their phrase ‘militarization of outer space’ included the use of offensive nuclear arms that passed through space, such as ICBMs.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983–Sept. 1984)

⁴ Burt signed “Rick” above his typed signature.

254. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 26, 1984

Here is a redraft of the “Dealing With the Soviets” memorandum that we discussed with you yesterday afternoon.² Since Rick had to be out of the building for most of the day he has not seen it, but Mark Palmer has and his suggestions have been fully incorporated.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council³

Washington, July 26, 1984

DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS

I. Where We Stand

—In the past four years, we have managed to halt what had become a worrisome pro-Soviet shift in the global “correlation of forces.” On our watch, “containment” has become an operational reality instead of a pious slogan.

—Likewise, the strictly damage-limiting objective of detente—to “manage” the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global superpower—has been supplemented by a new determination to resist Moscow’s demands for unilateral advantage.

—These changes have been accompanied by what our critics call a “deterioration” in U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, our ability to meet the Soviet challenge is greater than at any time in recent memory. There is clear evidence that Moscow knows this and has become more sensitive to the costs and risks of continuing a cutthroat competition.

—More concretely, we can—and should—take credit for the following successes:

- We have made real (though still insufficient) headway in redressing the military balance, restoring our economic vigor and our national self-confidence.
- We have demonstrated a renewed willingness to use [*less than 1 line not declassified*] force in the “grey area” competition (Grenada, Lebanon, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.).
- We have reconfirmed the cohesion of the anti-Soviet coalition of the democratic nations and China.
- We have stimulated and been able to capitalize on rising doubts about Moscow’s reliability as a friend and ally (Grenada, Iraq, Angola, Mozambique).
- We have put and kept Moscow on the diplomatic defensive (INF, START, CW, Vienna).
- We have cast doubt on Moscow’s claim that “there is no international question that can be settled without Soviet participation” (Southern Africa).
- We have reinforced Moscow’s “isolation” within the Communist world (improving U.S. relations with China, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, etc.).

II. *Opportunities*

—Our primary objective in a second term will be to consolidate and build on these achievements, thereby further narrowing Moscow's opportunities for self-aggrandizement.

—At the same time, we will want to be alert and to probe for signs that Moscow is willing to deescalate the competition and take meaningful steps to stabilize East-West relations.

—Contrary to conventional wisdom, the continuing leadership transition in the Kremlin may be conducive to a modification of established Soviet policies and priorities and create further incentives for international self-restraint:

- This is what happened in the post-Stalin succession struggle, and it could happen again.
- While there is no way we can determine (or even accurately monitor) the jockeyings for power within the Kremlin, we can help to ensure that would-be militants face an uphill struggle and more moderate elements can make a plausible case.

—What is required, above all, is continued firmness and resolve. It is illusory to think that the Soviets will moderate their behavior in the absence of countervailing power. We must further increase our military capabilities and convince Moscow that it will lose a continuing arms race.

—Our demonstrations of military prowess must be coupled with political overtures and negotiating initiatives that convey a sincere willingness to take account of legitimate Soviet security concerns and to reach equitable

agreements. Otherwise, the competition will escalate to increasingly dangerous and, for us, unsustainable levels.

III. *Negotiations*

—One of the strengths of Soviet foreign policy has always been its steady, patient determination. The Soviets have a long-term strategy. We must have as well.

—Moscow's outrageous behavior makes it tempting to treat the Soviet Union as an international pariah and limit diplomatic contacts and communications to an irreducible minimum. This is the more tempting because more intensive dialogue can create dangerous illusions among susceptible Western publics. Nonetheless, this is a temptation we must resist. Negotiations—and negotiating flexibility—are crucial ingredients of our overall strategy:

- Some agreements with the Soviet Union would be in our interest. (Similarly, with other adversaries Vietnam on MIA, Cuba on Marielitos, Nicaraguans on ways of halting subversion, etc.)
- In such cases, we must put forward negotiable proposals and be prepared to make reasonable compromises and trade-offs.
- Serious diplomatic exchanges and credible offers to negotiate are essential for putting relations with Moscow on a more stable basis and reducing the risk of unnecessary confrontation.
- They are also essential in order to retain domestic and allied support for our overall strategy. Over the long run, Western publics will not tolerate the absence of good-faith efforts to reach agreements.

—Even in the near term, standing pat helps the Soviets put us on the defensive:

- Pressures build up and *force* us to move. The move we make loses some of its political impact because people believe we were forced into it.
- To some extent we lose control of the process and leave the initiative in the hands of our opponents.

—The need for negotiating flexibility is particularly acute in a period which could see some erosion of Congressional support for the defense programs, security and economic assistance [*less than 1 line not declassified*] efforts required to counter the Soviets and give them real incentives to moderate their behavior.

—Accordingly, we must continue to use negotiation as a weapon of political strategy. We have done this:

- Putting forward a positive arms control program was good strategy.
- In Central America, our positive political program (support for Duarte, Contadora, Marielito talks) is keeping our opponents off balance and our public support more solid. Similarly in Southern Africa.

IV. *Problems and Pitfalls*

To sustain our strategy we must anticipate and overcome a variety of difficulties:

—We must clearly identify our negotiating goals and priorities and ensure their effective and timely implementation. Decisive presidential leadership is needed

to overcome bureaucratic infighting and obstructionism here in Washington. Otherwise, as experience clearly indicates, the interagency process will lock us into a position of sterile immobilism.

—We must not oversell the agreements we reach or exaggerate the prospects of a fundamental and enduring change in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviets will not change their spots and we must protect our strategy against the public's tendency to fluctuate between outrage and euphoria.

—We must be prepared to respond to recurrent incidents of outrageous Soviet behavior without allowing them to deflect us from our strategic course. Your decision to couple strong condemnation of KAL with new arms-control initiatives provides a model for the future. We start with no illusions about the Soviet Union and we are thus in a position to maintain a steady course (unlike Carter, who was shocked by Afghanistan).

—We must not permit the prospect of reaching agreement in some areas (if it in fact materializes) to inhibit our reaction to Soviet encroachments on our interests in other areas. We must compete while negotiating and be ready to confront not only periodic episodes of Soviet misconduct but an uninterrupted Soviet effort to prevail in a long-term global contest.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/16-31/84. Secret; Sensitive.

² In a July 24 memorandum to Burt with a draft of the memorandum attached, Rodman wrote: "This is what the Secretary referred to this morning. He asked me Friday to do some talking points for his use with the President articulating the approach to US-Soviet relations that we have been pursuing. The purpose was (a) to stress the value of a consistent, steady course that is more immune to shocks, and (b) to help us fight off the constant attempts (at home) to derail our negotiating efforts. This is what Jeremy [Azrael] and I came up with. The Secretary is impatient to see it, so Charlie [Hill] suggested I send this to you simultaneously with sending it forward." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

In a July 24 memorandum to Hill, Rodman wrote: "Here is a first cut at talking points on US-Soviet relations. As you suggested, I have sent a copy also to Rick Burt." Hill then wrote in the margin: "for the Secretary's use with the President." (Ibid.)

³ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Azrael; cleared by Palmer in draft.

255. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 27, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet "Hard Ball"

I believe you will be interested in and disturbed by the possibilities that Jeremy conjures in the attached memorandum.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council²

Washington, undated

ARE THE SOVIETS ABOUT TO ESCALATE?

I am extremely concerned that the Soviet "cancellation" of the Vienna talks marks the beginning of a more active effort to embarrass the President and discredit the Administration's policies.³ More particularly, I am apprehensive that Moscow's predictable denunciations of our continuing "intransigence" will be followed by "retaliatory" actions—actions that will demonstrate that there are limits to Soviet "patience." I do *not* anticipate the sorts of "adventures" that would mobilize support for the President and invite a confrontational U.S. response. What I fear are less provocative, "grey area" challenges that put our credibility on the line but are difficult for us to counter without seeming to overreact.

My most immediate concerns center on what I see as the increasing likelihood of escalating cross-border operations against Pakistan⁴ and the transfer of military jets to Nicaragua.⁵ Failure to react strongly to either of these contingencies could jeopardize important U.S. regional interests and cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of our overall foreign policy.

Provided the cross-border operations were “limited” to air strikes against Afghan encampments and the planes transferred to Nicaragua were “only” trainers, the adoption of strong countermeasures would stimulate sharp domestic controversy and could contribute to the President’s electoral defeat. In either case, the Soviets could hope to reap significant benefits while running only minor risks.

The intelligence assessments I have seen tend to downplay the likelihood that either of these contingencies—let alone others of equal or greater moment—are likely to materialize. However, my reading of the underlying evidence makes me *far* less sanguine. At a minimum, I think there is enough evidence to be urgently making serious contingency plans and, above all, for us to be considering possible measures of deterrence.

Unfortunately, some of the options that come to mind in this regard would be extremely controversial in their own right—e.g., the deployment of AWACs to Pakistan, the reenforcement of our air and naval forces around Cuba and Nicaragua. But this is not the case with other options such as demarches to the Nicaraguans, Cubans, or Indians or other, more ambitious, political and diplomatic undertakings. Even in the case of our more muscular options, moreover, managing the attendant controversy may be preferable to dealing with Soviet *faits accomplis*.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/15-31/84. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on July 27

² Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Azrael.

³ TASS released a statement on July 27 alleging that the United States was "engaged in deceitful play over the question of the Soviet-proposed talks on the prevention of militarisation of outer space and was not going in fact to enter into such talks." (*Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 549-550)

⁴ According to a weekly situation report on Afghanistan, the Soviets had increased efforts to seal border crossings in the Paktia region: "The extensive military convoys observed in Kabul on the Jalalabad road have evidently been on their way to Paktia province, where fighting reportedly continues to be heavy. There have been reports that Soviet and DRA troops are massing in the Ghazni area for an early move to Paktia and Paktika. According to our sources, the aim of their operations will be to try and seal off border crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This jibes with other reports we have had that the regime is actively trying to buy off local tribesmen in an effort to seal the border. Regime media, which claimed on July 22 that Pashtun tribesmen are refusing to permit 'counter-revolutionaries' to cross their areas tend to support the proposition that the Soviets/DRA may be putting new emphasis on trying to prevent border crossings." (Telegram 1074 from Kabul, July 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840469-0336)

⁵ In telegram 3740 from Managua, July 10, the Embassy reported: "The Soviet Political Counselor [Vladimir

Burovlev] told PolCouns July 9 that a Soviet commitment in principle to supply fighter aircraft to the GRN has existed for some time. However, its implementation remains a matter 'to be discussed at an appropriate time.' PolCouns warned that such a step would be regarded with gravity by the U.S. Burovlev said the Soviet side understood that. He later said the Soviet Union did not want Nicaragua to become a sore point in U.S./Soviet relations, and would welcome a negotiated solution to Nicaragua's problems." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840440-0375)

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 28, 1984, 0510Z

222775. Subject: President's 7/27 Letter to Chernenko.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. Ambassador should deliver the letter beginning para 3 from the President to Chernenko along with the draft statement at highest available level of the MFA on Saturday.³ In delivering the letter and draft statement, the Ambassador should stress the seriousness of the President in approaching the meeting in Vienna. He should also make the following two points.

A) On the Soviet moratorium proposal: We would consider language in the statement which states that both sides will consider what mutual restraints on activities would be appropriate during the course of the negotiations.

B) We offer the proposed joint statement on the understanding that, if questioned about the meaning of the phrase "militarization of outer space," the United States will make clear that it refers to proposals which either side may make relevant to this matter.

3. Begin text of letter: Dear Mr. Chairman:

—Candor should be an essential feature of our dialogue given the responsibilities of our two offices. Thus, I must be frank in informing you that I am surprised by your letter of July 26, 1984,⁴ since it draws conclusions which are not warranted by the explanations I have given you.

—Mr. Chairman, since receiving your proposal to begin negotiations on the “militarization of outer space” on June 29,⁵ I have believed that our two countries have an important opportunity to make progress in arms control in an area of fundamental importance. This is why I immediately accepted your proposal and in subsequent letters and diplomatic exchanges suggested that our representatives get down to work on developing an agreed formulation for the Vienna meeting, so that negotiations there could lead to meaningful results.

—Thus, I am disturbed that in your most recent letter, you misrepresent our position. Let me once again make the US position absolutely clear. As I stated in my letter to you of July 2,⁶ your proposal for a conference on the “militarization of outer space” remains “an excellent idea.” The concept of the “militarization of outer space” is a broad one, and as I have indicated previously, in my view accommodates offensive as well as defensive systems. Your side may have a different concept, but the important thing at this stage is for our negotiators to meet in Vienna and work out whatever differences may exist.

—So, Mr. Chairman, contrary to your assertion in your latest letter, the United States is prepared for talks on the “militarization of outer space” without preconditions. I must remind you that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that seems unwilling to reach negotiated solutions to important military problems. It was, after all, the Soviet Union and not the United States that left the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces in Geneva, and it is the Soviet Union and not the United States that continues to refuse to cooperate on the important task of reducing strategic arms. Thus, Mr. Chairman, your latest letter raises a question in my mind about whether, having made a

proposal to go to Vienna, you are now backing away from it. I hope this is not the case.

—If, as you say in your latest letter, your proposal still stands, I think it is time now for our representatives to work out the preparations for the meeting in Vienna, including, if possible, a joint statement. I have instructed Secretary of State Shultz to continue this effort. If your side approaches this task with the good will and serious intent which is the basis of my approach, I am confident that we can serve the interests of both our countries. Ronald Reagan. End text of letter.

4. Begin text of draft statement: Joint Soviet-American Statement. As a result of exchanges through diplomatic channels between the USA and the USSR, agreement has been reached to open talks with the aim of working out and concluding agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including anti-satellite systems and other aspects of this issue. The talks will begin in Vienna on September 18, 1984, at the level of specially appointed delegations.

End text.

Shultz

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490829). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² In a July 27 note to Bush, McFarlane noted that the letter was staffed “with Cap, Jack Vessey and George and hope to take it to the President later today.” Two drafts were found with Matlock’s handwritten suggestions and edits. (Ibid.) According to an attached NSC routing slip: “Pres approved

msg" on July 27. No formal, signed copy of the letter was found.

³ July 28.

⁴ See [Document 252](#).

⁵ See [Document 233](#).

⁶ See [Document 234](#).

257. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan¹

Dear Mr. President:

Moscow, July 31, 1984

I agree completely that the subject of our correspondence requires complete candor.

In the spirit of such frankness, I cannot but object categorically to the fact that the American side continues with its persistent attempts to distort the very essence of our proposal of June 29.² This is evident from your letter, too.³

You write, for example, that we supposedly proposed that negotiations begin on questions of the "militarization of outer space." We have, however, proposed and continue to propose that negotiations be conducted on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. These things are different in principle.

Further. An integral part of our proposal of June 29 is the establishment on a mutual basis, beginning from the date of the opening of the negotiations, of a moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons. It was also stated quite clearly in my letter to you of July 7.⁴

Since in your reply of July 18 you wrote that you accepted our proposal without preconditions,⁵ we naturally were entitled to believe that you agreed to introduce a moratorium as well. Now, however, the American side refuses to include in the joint statement a provision

regarding a moratorium. The question of a moratorium is also passed over in complete silence in your last letter. The conclusion from this is inescapable.

The case is exactly the same as regards the attitude of the American side toward another integral part of the proposal—to the effect that, within the framework of the negotiations, the issue of complete, mutual renunciation of antisatellite systems also be resolved.

Such is the actual state of affairs, Mr. President. The facts show that, stating its acceptance of our proposal without preconditions, the American side actually speaks about negotiations with the aim not of prohibiting but, in fact, of legalizing space weapons. And, in addition, it also drags into them weapons which have nothing at all to do with the subject of the negotiations we have proposed.

You are certainly free, Mr. President, to put forward any proposals of yours. But why should the public be misled by purporting that the U.S. accepts our proposal? Why should the impression be created that the Soviet Union were backing away from its own proposal?

As far as we are concerned, our proposal continues to remain in force, but it is precisely the proposal which was made public in the Statement of the Soviet government of June 29 and which was outlined in my letters to you. We did not put forward any other proposal which could be construed simply as an invitation “to go to Vienna.” Anyone who familiarizes himself with our correspondence can easily see that.

K. Chernenko

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8490847, 8491054). Secret; Sensitive. Sokolov delivered the letter to Dam on July 31. See [Document 258](#). Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. The oral statement is not attached to this copy of the letter in the Head of State File; however, it is attached to a copy in the Matlock Files. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2))

² See [Document 233](#).

³ See [Document 256](#).

⁴ See [Document 240](#).

⁵ See [Document 247](#).

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 31, 1984

SUBJECT

Vienna Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

Oleg Sokolov, Charge, Soviet Embassy

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary

Mark Palmer, EUR

James P. Timbie, D

Sokolov said he was authorized to present a letter from Chernenko to President Reagan, and handed over the text.² He also handed over the text of an oral statement,³ which he said was analogous to the oral statement presented by the U.S. on Saturday.⁴ After reading the text, Mr. Dam said we would, of course, study this communication, but on first reading two questions came to mind.

Mr. Dam noted it is not entirely clear what is meant by the phrase "prevention of the militarization of outer space." The Soviet Union already has military systems in space. Sokolov replied that they had used this term from the very beginning. They were prepared to foresake anti-satellite systems altogether. In the Russian language and in Soviet eyes "militarization" without the word "prevention" implies something different than what the Soviets had in mind for these talks. Sokolov claimed it changes the entire emphasis.

Mr. Dam said his second question concerned the proposed moratorium. How does this fit into the process, the proposals the Soviets might make and the proposals the U.S. might make at the actual negotiations? He noted there

was a problem with the formality of exchanges of letters like this. It is difficult to understand exactly what meaning is intended without some discussion. Sokolov replied that they would like to strictly abide by the terms of their proposals. In the past, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were able to come to agreement not just on words but even their meaning. This letter speaks for itself in response to the President's last letter. Mr. Dam said the moratorium sounded like a precondition to him. Sokolov replied the Soviet side included it from the beginning. If the two sides enter negotiations with one side being able to do all it wants during the course of the negotiations, then what is the purpose of the negotiations? Mr. Dam responded that it is to discuss what can be accomplished that would be in our mutual interest. Sokolov said we shouldn't waste time. We should do it right away. Mr. Dam said there should not be preconditions on negotiations.

At this point, Sokolov said he did not have any instructions to interpret the letter. Mr. Dam replied that he was pointing out two difficulties in trying to understand the Soviet position so that we could decide how to react. Sokolov pointed out that the key words are even underlined in the text. Mr. Dam told Sokolov we would study carefully what he had given us.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1984. Secret. Drafted on August 1. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in Dam's office. Dam's handwritten initials are to the right of the list of participants, indicating he saw it. McKinley's

handwritten initials are in the upper right-hand corner, indicating he saw it on August 1,² See [Document 257](#).

³ The statement reads: "The version of the joint statement proposed by the American side is completely unacceptable for the reasons outlined in the letter of K.U. Chernenko to President R. Reagan." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (1/2))⁴ July 28. See [Document 256](#).

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 31, 1984, 0936Z

9589. Subject: Ambassador's Meeting With Dobrynin, July 30.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. On Monday Dobrynin came to lunch and we had a general review of our relations. I took the occasion to question him closely on the current campaign against the outside world that seems to characterize the press and television of his country. He was in a relaxed, pre-holiday mood and, therefore, unwilling to admit that his propagandists might be filling the air waves with stories of war dangers. I said that apparently his colleagues in the Foreign Office took the same relaxed approach since we had been unable to find any senior officer on Saturday morning to deliver a Presidential letter to.² He laughed and said, "the weather was too nice. They were all at their dachas."

3. There was nothing particularly new in our review of bilateral issues. He did confirm that they were giving serious attention to the Montreal proposals on air navigation in the North Pacific.³ Otherwise, he seemed pleased with the general progress on bilateral matters.

4. Our main conversation centered on space. I said that Senator McGovern had come away with the impression from his talk with Gromyko that September talks were not in the cards.⁴ Dobrynin confirmed that that was the current

assessment. He summed up the positions by saying that they were trying to make progress on the issue of space and that we were trying to use it to re-launch strategic and INF talks or just make propaganda points. I corrected him by saying that we had accepted unconditionally but had thought it only proper to point out to them that these issues were interconnected. We would be in Vienna and have serious things to say about space and proposals to make, for example, on ASAT. But when the discussion reaches the question of what either side puts in space to defend against missiles, we would naturally want to talk about the missile threat and the necessity to deal with that.

5. I also said that their general language was confused and misleading. Did they, for example, want to talk about eliminating all military activities in space, e.g., command and control, observation, etc.? He said of course not, but we were trying to confuse the issue. Were they, I said, just trying to put pressure on the administration to postpone our ASAT test? He said, "what is wrong with a moratorium? Your President, when he is re-elected, can say the negotiations have not made progress and go ahead with test." I said that if all the President got was the doubtful benefit of negotiating in September, that seemed to ignore some political realities. He tried to make it sound as though they had done us a favor suggesting a major negotiation at this time. I said the President needs no favors. But if they want to be serious, they will find us prepared to treat the problems with all due seriousness.

6. One theme running through Dobrynin's comments was that space was a separate issue. We shouldn't worry about getting back to talks on offensive arms. That would come in its own time, after the elections.

7. In sum, I got the impression that the Soviets are playing this out in public for the moment, but haven't made a firm decision on what they will do come September.

8. In a more general vein, Dobrynin countered my comments about how they had not taken us up on changing the tone of our exchanges by repeating arguments he has used with the Secretary that we don't prepare our approaches with enough care, i.e., we don't consult him in private so that he can pave the way in Moscow. He was unabashed in yearning for the old days when Kissinger could call him and tell him not to pay too much attention to our Middle East alert, we would cancel it tomorrow. His conclusion, however, was interesting and perhaps more believable, that the present leaders don't know each other and have no confidence in each other. Can the leadership here be sure what is said one day will hold the next? I said that the President's record on doing and saying what he intends are pretty good and that should be noted here.

9. On the UN meetings, he seemed pretty firm on their taking place and made a plea that enough time be set aside that both sides could go beyond an exchange of known positions.

10. Dept pass as desired.

Hartman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0359. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. A copy was sent for information to Shultz, who was on vacation in California. (Telegram 224320/Tosec 80009, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840009-0362)

² See [Document 256](#).

³ Discussion in the ICAO in Montreal of the Pacific Air routes was directly related to the downing of the KAL 007 in August 1983. See [footnote 8, Document 185](#).

⁴ McGovern and Gromyko met on July 27. On July 29 McGovern had lunch with Hartman and reported on his meeting with Gromyko: "Gromyko outlined the dangers of putting weapons in space or pursuing ASAT and characterized the US administration as not serious about space arms control. He blamed the INF collapse almost entirely on the unfairness of our continuing to refuse responsibility for British and French forces." (Telegram 9619 from Moscow, July 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840486-0442)

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